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INTRODUCTION 
The Purpose of the Dissertation. This dissertation 
is the product of an investigation into the character of 
Soviet Russian exploitation of nationalism in foreign pol-
icy during the period or Lenin and Stalin. It is intended 
to demonstrate: (1) that Soviet exploitation of nationalism 
in foreign policy was derived from a revolutionary plan 
conceived by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the last 
half of the nineteenth century; (2) that the exploitation 
of nationalism by Lenin and Stalin has contributed signif-
icant benefits to the Soviet interest 1n world politics; 
and (3) that it has also contributed in an important way to 
the recurrent Communist problem of national deviationism. 
My interest in this topic stemmed from the observa-
tion that the Russian Communist position with respect to 
the national issue displayed a dual character. Whereas in 
theory the Communist leaders viewed nationalism as incom-
patible with socialism, they f~equently promoted nationalism 
as a matter of practical policy. Upon closer examination 
of this seeming incongruity, !~discovered a number of inter-
esting facts about it. For one thing, it did not represent 
a hidden conflict between the opposing tendencies of inter-
nationalism and nationalism, but rather a deliberate scheme 
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to utilize nationalism in the interest of Communist revolu-
tionism. Secondly, Communist promotion of nationalism as a 
matter of practical policy was consistent with Marxism, 
since its roots were contained in a revolutionary plan con-
ceived by Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century. Third-
ly, Lenin's adoption of a modified version of the original 
plan, and his and Stalin's application of it, constituted 
one of the important reasons for Soviet Russia's successes 
in world politics since 1918. And finally, the promotion 
of nationalism by the Soviet leaders contributed signifi-
cantly to one of Communism's recurrent internal problems, 
national deviationism. 
In the course of my preliminary investigation, one . 
thing that struck me as being curious was the absence of a 
complete study of this aspect of Soviet Russian foreign pol-
icy. To be sure, it had not escaped attention entirely, 
In several excellent volumes on Soviet politics, I found 
references to the fact of expedient Communist nationalism. 
In a few instances, there were detailed descriptions of its 
nature in connection with particular episodes. But in no 
case could I find a study of the subject in its entirety, 
or one that satisfied all requirements for an understanding 
of its essential nature and significance. In view of Sov-
iet Russia's prodigious success in world politics from 
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1918 to 1953, and the need to understand the methods by 
which it was achieved, I undertook the task of filling this 
g~. 
The Scope and Method of the Dissertation. While the 
focus of attention here will be on Lenin's and Stalin's ex-
ploitation of nationalism in foreign policy since 1918, 
this is not meant to imply that it was their sole, or even 
their main, tactic, or that they used it in foreign policy 
exclusively. On the contrary, the fact is that the Russian 
leaders made use of the Red Army, the Comintern and other 
international Communist organizations, and a variety of 
propaganda themes in their revolutionary strategy, the ab-
sence of which could not have been compensated tor by any 
additional expedient promotion of nationalism. Further-
more, they also promoted nationalism at home in order to 
perpetuate their dominion over Russians and non-Russians 
~ike. However, it is my opinion that the purpose here 
can be served best by avoiding the method of a general sur-
vey, and the difficulties of repetition and confusion that 
it would entail. Consequently, I have elected'to consider 
other aspects of Soviet policy, whether domestic or foreign, 
only when, and to the extent that, they are considered 
necessary to illuminate more fully the.nature of the ex-
ploitation of nationalism and the significance of ita re-
iv 
sults. 
The method of the dissertation is historical and 
analytical. In an introductory chapter, the concept of 
nationalism as an instrument of Communist revolutionary 
policy is traced from its origin in the writings of Marx 
and Engels to its revival and enlargement by Lenin. There-
after, beginning with the year 1918, attention is centered 
mainly on the exploitation of nationalism in Soviet for-
eign policy, first by Lenin, and then by Stalin. Five 
chapters are composed for this purpose, each defining a 
major phase of Soviet policy. Within each chapter, pars 
ticular ~ttention is devoted to a definition of the motives 
behind the expedient promotion of nationalism, an analysis 
of its form, and an evaluation of its contribution to the 
Soviet purpose. Success in each case is measured on the 
basis of the ability of the Communist leaders to persuade 
non-Communists of the sincerity with which they espouse 
the cause of nationalism and the extent to which it con-
tributes to the achievement of the objective sought. 
The Method of Research. For the purpose of this 
study, I began by reviewing available works on Marxism, Com-
munism, Soviet Russian foreign policy, and the Communist 
International. In this respect, scholarly studies by Max 
Beloff, Solomon F. Bloom, Franz Borkenau, Edward H. Carr, 
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David Dallin, Isaac Deutscher, Louis Fischer, Andrew Gyorgy, 
Barrington Moore Jr., Richard Pipes, Rudolph Schlesinger, 
Hugh Seton-Watson, and Bertram Wolfe, and the publications 
of the Institute ~dr the Study of the U.S.S.R. were par-
ticularly stimulating, and served to clarify my own thoughts 
on the subject. Their bibliographies were helpful, and, in 
a few instances, they afforded access to pertinent infor-
mation not otherwise available to me. 
My next step was a thorough examination of all rele-
vant.original documentation available to me. Chiefly, this 
included the writings of Otto Bauer, Eduard Bernstein, 
Nikolai Bukharin, Friedrich Engels, Karl Kautsky, V.I. 
Lenin, Karl Marx, George Plekhanov, Karl Renner, I.V. Stalin, 
Lev Trotski, and Gregori Zinoviev, the Soviet newspapers 
Pravda and Izvestiia, the Soviet periodicals Bolshevik (now 
Kommunist), Istorik Marksist, Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, 
Novi Vostok, New Times, The Communist International, For a 
Lastins Peace, For a People's Democracy, and the published 
proceedings of the congresses of the Russian Communist Party, 
the Comintern, and the Cominform. 
~en found, reliable translations from the original 
Russian, German, and French into English were employed. In 
this respect, translated editions of many important works 
made available by Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., International 
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Publishers, and Foreign Languages Publishing House were es-
pecially helpful, as were translations in documentary 
volumes compiled by O.K. Cumming and Walter Petit, Jane 
Degras, Frank Golder, and Xenia Rudin and Robert c. North. 
Otherwise, I am personally responsible for all translations 
from Russian into English, and for such translations from 
German and French into English that were graciously, and 
gratuitously, provided by close friends and colleagues bet-
ter qualified than I. 
The results of my search were rewarding. I discover-
ed that my needs could be satisfied almost entirely on the 
basis of original documentation for the period up to 1928. 
In the early years, the Soviet leaders made no secret of 
their aims and methods. The major difficulty occurred after 
1928, when Stalin consolidated his power in Russia. From 
that point, Communist documents became very carefully cen-
sored, making the definition of Soviet methods somewhat more 
difficult. 
But the problem ~f~de~ining Stalin's method of ex-
ploiting nationalism in foreign policy was not an insur-
mountable one, nor was it as serious as that which confronted 
the student of domestic Soviet politics. Even Stalin could 
not avoid the consequ~nce of an active foreign policy, which 
is revealing to a considerable degree for the rea~on.that 
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it involves r~lations with governments and people beyond 
the jurisdiction of the Communist censor. Thus, invaluable 
clues ~o the character of Soviet foreign policy generally, 
and the exploitation of nationalism particularly, were 
found in the published proceedings of the international 
conferences attended by the Communist leaders and in the 
official accounts of relations with Soviet Russia published 
by many governments. Their complement was found in the 
statements of the Communists, personal accounts of non-
Soviet statesmen and diplomats who dealt directly with them, 
and accounts of those who lived under Communist rule before 
fleeing to the West. Finally, not overlooked were the pen-
etrating analyses of Soviet foreign policy presented by a 
host of Western scholars and outstanding newspaper report-
era. 
In conclusion, I wouid add that I have been aware at 
all times of the problem posed by the willful deceit of 
some Communist writers and the zealous anti-Sovietism of 
the refugees whose native countries have fallen under Com-
munist domination. In this connection, I can only say that 
I have tried. earnestly to distinguish fact from fiction and 
to present my subject as objectively and dispassionately as 
possible. MY purpose has not been to attack or defend Com-
munism, but simply to define, as accurately as possible, 
viii 
the character of Soviet Russian exploitation of nationalism 
in foreign policy during the period of Lenin and Stalin. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE GENESIS OF POLICY 
As one examines the historical record o~ Marxism on the 
national question, it becomes evident that Soviet Russian use 
o~ the national idea in ~oreign policy since 1918 has been a 
logical extension o~ ideas first advanced by Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels in the nineteenth century. For one thing, 
it has been based on the classical Marxian assumption that 
the nation and nationalism possess no lasting value, that, 
as the products o~ capitalist economics, they will disappear 
with the advent o~ socialism on a world scale. For another 
thing, it has also been based on Marx's acceptance o~ the 
.nation and nationalism as ~acts to be reckoned with as long 
as they do exist, and even to be promoted at such times when 
the paramount revolutionary interest will be served best. 
In this ~irst chapter, attention will be centered on the 
character o~ the classical Marxian regard for the national 
question, its eclipse in socialist thinking a~ter Marx's 
death, and its revival and remolding by Lenin to ~it the cir-
cumstances o~ the Russian revolution. 
The Marxian Heritage. While evidently aware o~ the 
nation and nationalism as inexorable ~acts, neither Marx nor 
Engels attempted a systematic treatment o~ the national ques-
1 
tion as such. Their ideas on the subject were random and 
informal. For the most part they reflected the influence 
of preconceived theoretical notions and were largely neg-
ative. 
For example, the "world" of the founders of Marxism 
was Western Europe, whence they drew the bulk of the source 
material for their economic and social studies; and where, 
as far as they were concerned, nationality no longer con-
stituted a serious problem. This appeared to them a normal 
condition, fully supported by the progress of historical 
forces: 
National differences and antagonisms between 
peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to 
the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of 
commerce, to the world market, to the uniformity in 
the mode of production1and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. . 
History, according to Marx and Engels, was governed 
by an underlying "economic law of motion". It unfolded in 
successive economic stages, each with its peculiar institu-
tional and ideological "superstructure 11 • The nation and 
nationalism they defined as part of the nsuperstructure" of 
the capitalist stage, and they predmcted that both would 
disappear once capitalism had been supplanted by socialism. 2 
1Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,·Manifesto of the 
Communist Party (Chicago: C.H. Kerr and Co., 1906), p. 26. 
2cr. Ibid. 
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Consequently, continuing appeals to patriotism were viewed 
as anachronistic vestiges of declining capitalism, executed 
1n the interest, and under the direction, of the bourgeoisie. 
The glorification of tradition, history, the state, and the 
nation was dismissed as a futile instrument of oppression 
and exploitation. 
In contrast, the proletariat was regarded as naturally 
free of national prejudice and hostile to all nationalistic 
appeals. Once the working classes had succeeded in over-
throwing capitalism, it was expected that national distinc-
tions would decline more rapidly and would ultimately disap-
pear altogether.3 
From their Western-oriented basis, Marx and Engels also 
deduced ttsolutions" to nationality problems in other regions 
of the world. For example, they viewed Eastern Europe as 
being still a half-stage behind Western Europe in social 
develo~ment, hampered by the remnants of feudalism and the 
continued existence of innumerable small etbnic groups. 
Hence, they predtcted that feudalism would be replaced by 
capitalism there and that the small nationalities would be 
compelled by it into the orbits of such nenergetic" nations 
as the German, Hungarian, Russian, and Serbian, and would be 
· 3Cf. ~·, p. 28; Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property and the State (Chicago: C.H. Kerr 
and Co., 1902), p. 211. 
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assimilated by them.4 They also predicted that, ~ollowing 
the example to be provided by the West, socialist revolutions 
within each o~ the nenergetio" nations would in turn dispense 
with the nationality issue entirely. 
The originators o~ Marxism arbmtrarily excluded Asia 
and ~rica ~rom the stage o~ social development that gives 
rise to the nationality question. Both continents were 
considered as sociologically "statio and stagnanttt, rooted 
in primitive communal agrarian systems, and hampered by 
limited domestic industry and backward methods o~ produotion.5 
Still in a pre-~eudal oondi.tion, and held there by Western 
imperialism, re~o~m ~rom within was held to be an impossib-
ility. The only hope ~or progress in Asia and Afric~~ they 
concluded, was to be ~ound in an enlightened ~orm o~ prolet-
arian imperialism. It would ~ollow the success o~ socialism 
in the West and would bring socialism to both continents 
without the prerequisite evils o~ ~eudalism and oapitalism. 6 
Marx and Engels never abandoned their ~aith in the 
proletarian revolution in Western Europe as the key to the 
4cr. Karl Marx, Revolution and Counterrevolution, or 
Germany in 1848 (Chicago: C.H. Kerr and Co., 1912), pp. 62-
64; Solomon F. Bloom, Tae World o~ Nations (New York: Col-
umbia University Press, 1941), pp. 33-36, 40-41. 
5c~. The New York Tribune, June 25, 1853; August 8, 1853. 
6a~. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Correspondence, 
1846~1895 (New York: International Publishers, 1934), p. 399. 
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solution of the nationality problem everywhere. However~ 
their original view of the relationship of nationalism to 
socialism did undergo a significant modification. This 
occurred in the wake of the revolutions of 1848~ which, 
according to their estima~e~ were supposed to have resulted 
in the overthrow of European capita~iam. It grew out of their 
quest for a method to stimulate new and successful revolutions. 
Searching about~ the self-styled engineers of social up-
heaval perceived the possibility of deriving important bene-
fits from an accommodation between socialism and nationalism. 
According to the founders of Marxism, the revolutions 
of 1848 had failed for two reasons principally: because of 
Tsariat Russia1 a counterrevolutionary intervention and 
because of a low level of revolutionary enthusiasm among the 
working classes in Western Europe. In order to eliminate 
these two impediments from future revolutionary efforts, they 
adopted the single expedient of promoting the cause of nat-
ionalism. 
The new revolutionary strategy was a simple one; baaed 
on the support of Polish and Irish claims to national self~ 
determination. Polish independence was advocated for the 
reason that ita achievement would mean the establishment of 
a bulwark against a new counterrevolutionary incursion by 
Taariat Russia. Marx wrote: 
5 
There is but one alternative for Europe. Either 
Asiatic barbarism under Moscovite direction will burst 
around its head like an avalanche, or else it must 
reestablish Poland, thus putting twenty million heroes 
between itself and Asia and gaining a breathing spell 
for.the accomplishment of its social regeneration.7 
Irish freedom was favored as the means of stimulating 
the requisite degree of revolutionary consciousness among 
the working classes of Western Europe, starting with the 
English. As Marx explained it in a letter to Engels: 
The way I shall put forward this matter is this: 
that quite apart from all phrases about "international" 
and "humane" justice for Ireland,- which are to be 
taken for granted in the International Council -- it is 
the direct and absolute interest of the English working 
classes to get rid of their present connection with 
Ireland. And this is my most complete conviction, for 
reasons which in part I cannot tell the English workers 
themselves. For a long time I believed that it would 
be possible to overthrow tlie Irish regime by English 
working class ascendancy. I always expressed this point 
of view in the New York Tribune. Deeper study has 
convinced me of the opposite. The English working class 
will nev~r accomplish anything before it has got rid of 
Ireland.ts 
The conclusion drawn was that the loss of Irish land-
holdings, which were regarded as the principal pillar sup-
porting British capitalism, would lead to increased exploit-
ation of the working class within Engl'and. In turn, it would 
intensify unrest there to a revolutionary pitch and ultimately 
7Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz (eds.), The 
Russian Menace to Europe: A Collection of Articles 1 Speeches, 
Letters and News Dis atches b Karl Marx and Friedrich En els 
Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952 , p. 108. 
8Marx and Engels, Correspondence ••• , pp. 280-281. 
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spark an upheaval that would "••• react on the Continent". 9 
The revolutionary strategy propounded by Marx and Engels 
at this time represented a change from their original position, 
which had rejected unequivocably the possibility of a correl-
ation between socialism and nationalism. To keep the record 
straight, however, it did not alter their conception of the 
two forces as fundamentally incompatible. They encouraged 
Irish and Polish nationalism in order to exploit it in the 
interest of the socialist revolution and in no' sense conceived 
of national self-determination as an end in itself. On the 
contrary, they emphatically denied any future role to the 
Irish and Poles other than that of assimilation within larger 
political entities.10 
Even so, the seeds of revolutionary strategy sown by 
Marx and Engels bore no fruit in the nineteenth century. 
This was due chiefly to a general decline of the revolution-
ary will among the European working classes. In such "key 11 
countries as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, broad-
9Karl Marx, Letters to Dr. Kugelmann (London: Martin 
Lawrence, 1934), pp. 67=68, 79, 95-96; Karl Marx and Fried-
rich Engels, Letters to Americans: A Selection (New York: 
International Publishers, 1953), p. 77. 
10They did allow, however, that the assimilation of the 
Irish by the English might take a longer time, and that their 
reunion might first be founded on a federal basis. Cf. Marx 
and Engels) Correspondence ••• , p. 278. 
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ened electoral bases and accompanying social welfare prog-
rams amelio~ated the plight of the workers. Instead of the 
predicted pauperization and revolution, living standards rose 
and the appeal of socialist internationalism diminished. 
Furthermore, now possessing a greater stake politically, the 
proletariat increasingly identified its interest with that 
of the state, thus denying in fact the theoretical maxim 
that it possessed no fatherland. Finally, as if to repudiate 
the idea of alleged immunity from nationalism as well, the 
the workers of Franee and Germany, and their socialist leaders, 
displayed intense hostility during the war of 1870-1871. 
The impact of this on the soci-alist movement generally 
was d~vastating. Despite Marx's efforts as conciliator, 
nationalistic squabbles and a general lowering of morale was 
manifested among or.thodox socialists. It opened the way to 
a sharp and bitter division over fundamental doctrine and 
then to the dissolution of the nFirst Internationaln in 1876. 
Embittered by disappointment and despair, Marx died in 
1882. He left little more than a variety of suggestions for 
a revolutionary program that seemed to ~ave been rendered 
obsolete by social progress. That they could serve as a 
guide for future action was a hope cherished only by the moat 
stubborn of the remaining disciples of Marx. 
Eclipse in ttRevisionism". Though Friedrich Engels l.ived 
until 1895, he was unabl.e to stem the further impact of the 
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changing European socio-political order on socialist think-
ing generally and with respect to the socialist regard for 
the nationality question in particular. For example, a 
n Second International n was created in 1889, on a basis of 
separate and unequal status for the national delegations. 
Its proceedings were so marked by conflicts over nnational 
interestsn that one delegate was prompted to suggest that the 
organization had the appearance of little more than a vehicle 
for the expression of national interests and grievances.1 1 
Furthermore, in 1891, the 11Erf'urt Program" of the German 
Social Democratic Party, which embodied vigorous demands for 
additional political and social reform in Germany, indicaued 
the full extent to which parliamentary electioneering had 
come to be aecepted by a major Marxist party as the principal 
means of gaining power. 
Such developments as these evoked Engels~ bitter oppos-
ition, and he decried them as "opportunismtt and 11 self-
deeeptionn.12 But, if anything, his words served as only a 
temporary brake~ Within a year after his death, the new dev-
11cf. Daniel DeLeon, Flashlights of the Amsterdam Cong-
~ (New York: New York Labor News Co., 1929), p. 7. An 
excellent account of socialist activity during this period is 
provided by J. Lenz, The Rise and Fall of the Second Inter-
national (New York: International Publishers, 1932), 
12cf. Marx and Engels, Correspondence • • •.. z.. p. 486. 
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elopments in socialist thinking burst forth into formal state-
ments attacking practically every aspect of Marxism. In the 
process, Marx's revolutionary strategy was overlooked comp-
letely. 
Not the least of the criticism was directed against 
Marx•s views on the national question. For example, Eduard 
Bernstein, the "revisionistn German socialist, repudiated 
outright the idea that the proletariat has no fatherland: 
This might, in a degree perhaps, apply to the 
worker of the 'forties without political rights, shut 
out of public life. Today, in spite of the enormous 
increase in intercourse between nations, it has 
already forfeited a.great pa~t of its truth and will 
always forfeit more •••• 1~ 
Bernstein also argued that the workers~ concern for 
national interests had to be accepted as legitimate because 
of the political privileges already obtained and because the 
democratic national state had become not only an invaluable 
vehicle for the attainment of socialism, but one worthy of 
the full support of all socialists as well. Finally, he 
even allowed for socialist support of European colonial pol-
' icies, though with the qualification that it be o:f'fered only 
in such cases where it might serve to strengthen pacific and 
democratic states against reactionary imperialists and aute-
13Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism: A Critic-
ism and Affirmation (London: Independent Labour Party, 1909), 
p. 169. 
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crats.14 
This open disavowal of Marxian internationalism was 
favorably received by many leaders of the "Second Internat-
ional". They had observed the spread of nationalism among 
the workers and had heard growing demands for stronger nat-
ional parties and more active participation in national pol-
itics. Having achieved a gegree of political respectability 
for themselves, they were little inclined to risk their gains 
for the sake of a dubious internationalist solidarity. Conse-
quently, at their congress in London in 1896, they quietly 
laid the issue to rest with a resolution declaring in favor 
of the full autonomy of all nationalities.15 
Austrian "Revisionism". While satisfactory to many of 
the West European socialists, the trend to national compart-
mentalization was viewed as no panacea by the socialists in 
Austria. Their area of interest embraced the whole of the 
multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire, and, as a matter of 
fact, they were already faced with a serious nationality prob-
lem. Ever since 1878, the Czech Socialist Party had been 
asserting a claim to national self-determination on behalf of 
all Czechs. Furthermore, similar sentiments were beginning to 
14cf. Ibid.; pp. 17d, 173-174. 
.. 15cf. A. Hamon, Le Socialisme et le Congres de Londres 
(Paris: V. Stock, 1897), p. 151. 
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be voiced by Poles, Italians, Serbs, and Ruthenians as well. 
To check the impending disintegration of the party, the 
Austrians proposed reorganizing it on a federal basis. It 
was to be composed of six autonomous national divisions: 
Austrian, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Italian, and Serbian. 
Furthermore, looking ~o the future, Austrian Marxism's chief 
theoreticians, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, combined their tal-
ents for a definition of a socialist multi-national state in 
which nationalism could be reconciled with the political and 
economic centralism that fundamental theory prescribed. 
In their attempt to satisfy both needs, Renner and Bauer 
drew a distinction between the nation, which they defined as 
a ncommunity of spirit", and the state, which they called the 
vehicle for the nation's political and economic expression. 
While the nation was. fixed in character, the state might assume 
any one of a variety of forms, depending on the immediate cir-
cumstances and needs. 16 .And for Austria under socialism, they 
proposed to combine the different nationalities into a single 
political entity, according the members of each nationality 
cultural autonomy on a personal basis. "National councils" 
were to be elected by the various nationalities as agencies to 
12 
oversee their educational and other cultural af'fairs. Res-
erved to the political agencies of the state were political 
and economic matters.17 
It is a matter of' history now that the Austrian plan 
failed to satisfy the deep-seated aspiration~ of the non-· 
Austrian minorities of the Hapsburg empire, or to prevent the 
latter's complete disintegration in the wake of' World War I. 
Nevertheless, it was not without a certain degree of histor-
ical significance. For one thing, the Austrian "soluj.ionn 
to the nationality problem rep~esented the result of the first 
study by Marxists that squarely faced up to the fact of increas-
ing nationalism and its conflict with socialist aims, and 
tried to reconcile the tW,o. For another thing, and more pert-
inent to the purpose here, it provided a bridge over which 
the debate on the national issuer;moved eastward into the cir-
cle of Russia's·Marxists. 
Lenin and Marxism. In 1895, when Vladimir Ilich Lenin 
joined Russia's first Marxist organization, Osvobozhdenie · 
Truda (Liberation of Labor), he found the nationality problem 
already nsolvedn. Led by its founder and chief theoretician, 
G.V. Plekhanov, the group had accepted as satisfactory for 
the Russian situation the basic Marxist premise that capital-
ism would compel the assimilation of' the non-Russian nation-
17c:r. Bauer, op. cit., pp. 122-124. 
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alities with the Russian and that socialism would ultimately 
dispense with the issue en~irely.18 Also following the orig-
inal scheme, persistent manifestations of nationalism had 
been dismissed as merely the result of the still incomplete 
development of capitalism and the class struggle. As yet, 
no one had suggested the possibility of utilizing national-
ism in conjunction with a revolutionary effort in Russia. 
Lenin's appearance on the scene had no immediate effect 
on this situation. Apparently without knowledge of either 
the general or socialist literature on the subject of nation-
alism, he accepted Plekhanov's authority without question. 
His initial action with respect to the national issue consis-
ted of a simple affirmation of the ideas already advanced. 
Shortly thereafter he was arrested for distributing revolut-
ionary pamphlets among the factory workers in St. Petereburg. 
After being held in a house of detention for over a year, he 
was sent into exile in the Siberian village of Shushenskoe. 
Lenin was cut off from the mainstream of Russian revol-
utionary activity for about five years. And probably because 
of it, the period proved to be a critical one for him. OWing 
~;~ 
to the laxity of police regulations, he was able to expand 
his still meager knowledge of Marxism and revolutionism indep-
18cr. G.V. Plekhanov, Sochineniia (Works) (Moskva-Pet-
rograd: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1923-1927), I, pp. 
264ff, 320. 
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endently of Plekhanov's influence. He read extensively and 
discussed Marxism with other socialists who shared his place 
of exile.19 Though the national question, as a specific 
topic, did not enter into the scope of this inquiry, the 
basis upon which it, as well as all other matters, would be 
evaluated thereafter did materialize as the prtncipal product. 
The focal point of Lenin's developed views consisted 
of an obsessive regard for the cause of proletarian revolut-
ion and an intense desire to see it come to pass as quickly 
as possible. Toward Marxism, his attitude· was one of ambiv-
alence. On the one hand, ita bookish and abstract acceptance 
I 
was rejected as inimical to the revolutionary purpose. 20 On 
the other, as would be demonstrated time and time again, its 
ntruthn was permissible whenever it served to justify a 
course of action deemed consistent with the paramount goal. 
Thus, when the budding youns revolutionary returned to St. 
Petersburg early in 1900, he brought with him the basis for 
a revolutionary doctrine that would be developed completely 
19cf. Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, Memories of Lenin (New 
York: International-Publishers, 1930), I, p. 27. 
20For example, against the nlegal Marxists" and other 
revolutionary factions which believed that Russia's develop-
ment must follow the Western example strictly, Lenin argued 
as follows: 11We do not by any means regard the theory of 
Marx as something fixed and inviolable. On the contrary, we 
are convinced that it laid only the cornerstone of the scie~ 
nee that socialists must carry forward in all directions if 
they want to keep pace with life. We think that the Russian 
socialists particularly should develop the theory of Marxism 
independently.n V.I. Lenin, Soch1neniia (Works) (2d ed.; 
Moskva-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1926-1932), 
II, p. 514. 
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in the light of existing needs and potentialities and to 
which new conceptions could be added while old ones were 
being modified or discarded. It was indeed an extreme tact-
ical and ideological flexibility that constituted the phys-
iognomy of Lenin's intense inner singleness of purpose. 
It was not long after his return from exile that Lenin 
first came to grips with the nationality issue. This occur-
red late~ 1901, after the Russian All-Jewish Workers' Union, 
or Bund, prompted by news of the Austrian Marxists' plan, 
adopted a resolution calling for the acceptance of national-
cultural autonomy as one of the bases of the multi-national 
Russian state under socialism. Furthermore, claiming to be 
the legitimate spokesman for all Jews in Russia, the Bund 
also proposed that it be given imm~diate autonomy within the 
framework of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, then 
being organized as the successor to Liberation of Labor.21 
On this occasion, Lenin joined the party leaders in an 
unequivocal rejection of the Bund's proposals, labelling them 
Un-Marxian, chauvinistic, and impractical. However, he was 
already fully immersed in his own conception of revolution-
ary tactics, the militancy of which promised to conflict with 
Plekhanov's less aggressive posture, and he opposed a sugges-
21Cf. M. Rafes, Ocherki po istorii "Bundan (Essays on 
·the History of the nBund 11 ) ( Q/Ioskva): nMoskovski pabochi", 
1 923) ' p. 70. 
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tion that the Bund be expelled.22 Cognizant of the need for 
allies from any quarter, he also followed this up with a 
secret effort to unite with the Jewish nationalists against 
Plekhanov. 23 
This marked Lenin's first attempt to secure· political 
advantage through the exploitation of nationalistic discont-
ent, and apparently without knowledge of Marx's regard for 
such a matter. As yet, he w~s not prepared to meet all 
demands for the sake of expediency. Over a year later, 1n 
February, 1903, in Iskra, he resumed the attack against the 
Bund for its nserious mistakes" and then struck out against 
the Armenian social democrats, who had since taken up the 
national cause as wel1.24 
The episode proved particularly significant for two 
reasons. For one thing, it prompted Lenin to recognize that 
nationalism among Marxists was a more potent force than he 
had imagined. It could not be quelled merely by repeating 
22 Cf. Lenin, op. cit., IV, pp. 19-31. 
23Lenints attempt to exploit Jewish nationalism is 
revealed in a letter to one F.V. Lengnik, on May 23, 1902: 
nAnd so your task now is to~:create out of yourself' a commit-
tee for the preparation of the ~econd) Congress, to admit 
the Bund member (R. Portnoi) into this committee •••• 
All this is extremely important! Remember this! Be bolder 
in this, more ingenious and in other ways quieter and more 
cautious. Be wise as serpents and as gentle as doves (with 
the committees, the Bund and Petersburg.),.. Cited in Eliza-
beth Hill and Doris Mudie, (eds.), Letters of Lenin (London: 
Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1937), p. 156. 
24cr. Lenin, -O~P~·~c-i~t., V, pp. 236-243. 
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the argument that national-cultural autonomy was un-Marxian, 
for that served only to generate fresh animosity. Conse-
quently, he altered his tactic a bit. While continuing to 
oppose the specific demands of the nationalistie socialists, 
he offered a seeming concession on the general issue of 
national self-determination: 
It is not the work of the proletariat to preach 
federalism and national autonomy • • • which would lead 
to demands to ereate a class state. The task of the 
proletariat is to join together the broad masses of all 
workers of all nationalities, to join together for the 
struggle on the widest seale possible for a democratic 
republic and socialism • • • • Our concern is not for 
the self-determination of peoples and nations, but the 
proletariat of each nationality.25 
Lenin did not bother to explain precisely the differ-
ence between the self-determination of the proletariat and 
that of peoples and nations. undoubtedly, the former was 
intended to mean nothing more than the freedom to unite in 
rejection of all things nationalistic. His silence on this 
point reasonably can be taken as motivated by a desire to 
avoid provoking the Bund and the Armenians to a further 
extent. But it did lead to the second important consequence 
of this episode. Less than a month later, the Polish Marx-
ists, staunch advocates of union with Russia under socialism, 
delivered an unexpected and strong attack against what they 
18 
termed Lenin's "vague" and ttmysterious'1 treatment of the 
national issue and his "bourgeois" advocacy of national self-
determination.26 
While there is no record of his immediate reaction, 
Lenin's astonishment at being charged with bourgeois nation-
alism was no doubt considerable. He was certainly as anti-
nationalistic as his accusers, and, in his article, the 
right of national self-determination advocated had been del-
iberately vague and mysterious in order to render it mean-
ingless. But expediency still militated against complete 
candidness. Fearing the alienation of still other socialists 
with a nationalistic bent, he tried to win over his orthodox 
accusers. After admonishing ~em for failing to consider 
nationality rights as consistent with democratic principles, 
he assured them that his own·acknowledgement of the fact of 
the demand for national self-determination was not intended 
to mean the same as bourgeois unconditional support of it. 
Finally, by way of conclusion, Lenin did drop a hint as to 
the real meaning of his regard in the matter. This was 
contained in a remark that Marx and Engels, while confirmed 
anti-nationalists, had been advocates of Polish independ-
ence.27 
26The Polish charges are summarized by Lenin in his art-
icle of reply. cr. ~., pp. 337-338. 
27cr. ~., PP• 338-339. 
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This represented Lenin's first public acknowledgement 
of Marx's expedient encouragement of nationalism. But, care-
ru11y refraining from spelling out completely an identific-
ation of his own position with it, the effort satisfied no 
one. The Poles continued to hurl invectives against his 
alleged "deviation" from basic doctrine, while the Bund and 
the Armenians persisted stubbornly in their demands for 
national-cultural autonomy and federalism. The issue was 
rar from being a dead one. 
The Struggle Against National-Cultural-Autonomy Broad-
~· At least in part, the failure to effect a compromise 
between the nationalists and anti-nationalists among Russia's 
Marxists cost Lenin the opportunity to displace Plekhanov. 
Instead, at the second congress or the Russian Social Demo-
cratic Labor Party, he split with Plekhanov, causing the 
creation of the so-called "bolshevik" and "menshevik" fact-
ions. For nearly a decade thereafter, repeated attempts to 
heal the breach met with failure. Then, at a "sixth" party 
congress, convened by Lenin in Prague in January, 1912, and 
attended only by his followers, the mensheviks were "expel-
ied" and an independent Bolshevik Party was proclaimed. 28 
During that whole period, Lenin had paid no attention 
to the national issue. However, seven months after the fate-
the Communist Part of the Soviet 
Moscow: Foreign Languages 
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ful "sixth'r congress, his interest was revived by news that 
the mensheviks had weakened under the pressure of the demands 
by the Bund and the Armenian social-democrats to the extent 
of adopting national-cultural autonomy in principle. Then 
in Cracow, he undertook an intensive examination of the nat-
ional problem in general and the theory of national-cultural 
autonomy in particular, reading all that Marx had written on 
the subject, several volumes on the minorities of Russia, 
Bauerts work, and Karl Kautsky's criticism of it. 29 His main 
purpose was to collect sufficient aata for an effective ref-
utation of the idea of applying the Austrian scheme to Russia. 
But, after compiling voluminous notes, he didn't assume the 
task Qf transforming them into a finished literary product. 
Apparently conscious of his own notoriety among Russian Marx-
ists, and acting on the assumption that his signature would 
detract from its impact, he turned over the job to an aspir-
ing aide from Georgia, one Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.3° 
Except for being a member of one of Russia's minor-
ities, Stalin was not particularly qualified for the assign-
29cf. Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution 
(New York: The Dial Press, 1948), pp. 580-581. 
3°According to Bertram Wolfe, Lenin's "• •• main rea-
son for wanting a Transcaucasian to write such an article, 
••• was the fact that the Georgian Social Democracy, the 
stronghold of menshevism, had just begun a slight ·but per-
ceptible shift on the national question, and Lenin needed a 
Georgian to carry his nnational" war into Menshevik-domin-
ated T:hanseaueasia. u Ibid., p. 581. 
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ment. He had not written anything of significance on the 
national question, or, for that matter, on any other sub-
ject.31 And his lack of ~xperience showed up in the finish-
ed work, entitled Marxism and the National Question, which 
presented a thoroughly confused and unconvincing pattern of 
argumentatiGn • 
. For_example, Stalin opened his attack on the theory of 
national-cultural autonomy with an arbitrary definition of a 
nation: 
k:nation is a historically evolved, stable com-
munity of language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested in a community of 
culture. 
To it he added the Marxian qualification that a nation is 
subject to the law of change, has its history, its beginning 
and end. And then he added a qualification o~ his own: 
••• it is sufficient for a single one of these 
characteristics to be absent and the nation ceases 
to be a nation.32 
From this, Stalin derived two pertinent, and obviously 
preconceived, conclusions. One, that the Austrians had 
founded their theory of national-cultural autonomy on the 
false premise of defining the nation solely as a community 
of character. As far as he was concerned, it was enough to 
31up to this point, Stalin's literary products consist-
ed only of short.articles expounding ideas originated by 
Lenin. 
32r.v. Stalin, Sochineniia (Works) (Moskva: Gosudar-
stvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1946-), II, 
p. 296. 
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invalidate everything they had said about the nation and 
the nationality question. And two, that the Bund was at 
fault for the same reason and for the extra reason that the 
Jews no longer constituted a nation; n ••• the Jewish nat-
ion is coming to an end, and, therefore, there is nobody to 
demand national autonomy for."33 
Stalin's "proofn that national-cultural autonomy was 
inapplicable to the Russian situation 1n any case rested on 
an even more dubious foundation. He began this part of his 
argument with the reasonable assertion that it was not to be 
expected that a single solution to the nationality problem 
would be applicable in all multi-national states. Historical 
conditions, he contended, would dictate the choice in each 
case. However, he fell into serious difficulty when he added 
that the distinctions between the Austrian and Russian sit-
uations boiled down to two "facts n essentially: 1 v· the Rus-
sian Marxists were·proponents of national self-determination, 
while the Austrians were not; and 2) the "hub" of political 
life in Austria was the nationality problem, while in Russia 
it was the agrarian problem.34 
The weakness, if not absurdity, of poth nfactsn was 
33rbid., pp. 330, 333. 
34cf. ~., PP· 316, 318-319. 
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patent. For one thing, on the issue of national self-deter--
mination, Stalin, either deliberately or unknowingly, over-
, 
looked the fact that his own leader was fundamentally op-
posed to the principle and only supported it for reasons of 
expediency. For another thing, concerning the nhubs" of 
political life in Austria and Russia, he also overlooked 
the very real struggle over the national issue that was 
taking place in Russia. His own immersion into it bore dram-
atic testimony of its existence. Finally, his attempt to 
divert attention to the agrarian problem in Russia was equal-
ly lacking as an arguing point, particularly as it was not 
accompanied by an explanation.35 No Bolshevik writer had 
subscribed to the view that the nationality problem,oor ln.-
deed the political problem, was subordinate to the emancip-
ation of the land in Russia. Whether or not he was aware of 
it, Stalin was actually espousing the philosophy of the Nar-
odniks, who hela the peasants to be the driving force of the 
revolution and who Lenin had bitterly denounced earlier.36 
Stalin concluded Marxism and the National Question with 
his own solution to the nationality problem in Russia, which 
contained a few surprises. For one thing, he included an 
unqualified acceptance of the principle of national self-det-
35cf. Ibid., pp. 318-319. 
36af. Lenin, op. cit., I, pp. 193-194. 
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ermination: 
It is quite possible that a combination or internal 
and external factors may arise in which one or an-
other nationality in Russia will find it necessary 
to raise and settle the question of ita independ-
ence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to 
create obstacles in such cases. 
And he added that his plan was not for the,. Russian state· 
as it was then composed, but for those 
" • • 
• nations 
which for one reason or another will prefer to remain with-
in the general fram.ework.n37 
The plan itself centered on the elimination of minor-
ity discontent, which Stalin contended was the crux of the 
problem. Thus: 
A minority is discontented not because there is 
no national union, but because it does not enjoy the 
right to use its native language. Permit it to use 
its native language and the discontent will pass by 
itself. 
A minority is discontented no't because there is 
no artificial union, but because it does not enjoy 
the right to possess its own schools. ·Give it its 
·own schools and all grounds for discontent will 
disappear. 
A minority is discontented not because there is 
no national union, but because it .does not· enjoy lib-
erty of conscience, liberty of movement, etc. Give 
it these liberties and it will cease to be discont-
ented. 
Thus, national equality in all forms (language, 
schools, etc.) is the essential element in the solu-
37sta~in, op. cit., II, p. 360. 
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tion o~ the national problem.38 
Stalin proposed no creation of nationally delimited 
territories, no shifting of people in order that larger, 
more compact minorities be established. Quite the contrary, 
all were to remain exactly where they were, and to become 
members of such already "crystallized units'' as Great Russia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus; the only 
difference being that each minority would·then enjoy full 
rights of conscience, movement, language, and national 
schools. Just how this differed essentially from the ~us­
trian scheme was not explained. 
Among authorities on Russian Communism, there is consid-
erable disagreement over the importance of Marxism and the 
National Question to the development of the Communist re-
gard for the national issue. Professor Edward Carr, for 
one, on the basis of undefined "external and internal 11 evid-
ence, offers the view that the work n ••• remained the stan-
dard work in party literature on its subject.rr39 In a sim-
ilar fashion, Isaac Deutscher, a biographer of Stalints, 
arrives at the conclusion that it was consistently Leninist.4° 
.38Ibid., p. 362. 
39Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951-1953 , I, p. 
40I. Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New Yo-
~k: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 119. 
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However, Richard Pipes, in perhaps the most penetrating anal-
ysis, arrives at an entirely dirferent interpretation. By 
his reasoning, Stalin's errors in fact and in argument, and 
the absence of any published references to the work by Lenin, 
points to the conclusion that it "· •• would long ago have 
been relegated to total oblivion were it not for the auth-
or's subsequent career.n41 
Of these, the evidence appears to favor the conclusion 
drawn by Pipes. Textually, of course, Marxism and the Nat-
ional Question was replete with. errors in fact and methodol-
ogy. Moreover, as an examination of Communist literature 
for more than a decade thereafter reveals, it certainly was 
not accorded the attention customarily given to a standard . 
work. Finally, within five months of its publication, Sta-
lin's effort was disqualified as both a scholarly contribut-
ion to knowledge and a political argument by no less a judge 
than Lenin. Apparently cognizant of· the error made in sel-
ecting St~lin for the job, the Bolshevik leader undertook 
remedial action in the form of an article of his own. 
Lenin's article, "Critical Remarks on the National 
Question," in October, 1913, was devoted t9 a refutation of 
the Austrian theory. Though neither Stalin' s name, nor his 
essay, was mentioned once, it was evident from the begin-
41Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: 
Communism and Nationalism, 1 17-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 195 1. 
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ning that its criticism was intended for his benefit as well 
as for those who were named. 
The tone of the article reflected an intention to avoid 
stimulating an even wider circle of hostility than existed 
already. For example~ Lenin's argument bore none of the 
clumsy vindictiveness of Stalin's; no definition of a nat-
ion with which to quarrel over fundamentals, or to deny open-
ly the integrity of the Austrians and the Bund, was presented. 
Instead, always the subtle tactician, cognizant of the need 
to win friends, he charged the nerror" of national-cultural 
autonomy to "bourgeois pressuresn among.the minorities in 
Austria and to "the rabbis. and bourgeoisie 11 in the Bund. Had 
it not been for such elements, he asserted, 11 ••• neither 
the Austrian, nor Russian, social-democrats would have ac-
cepted 'cultural-national' autonomy in their programs.n42 
Unlike Stalin, Lenin referred to the Jews without dis-
tinction from other nationalities. He even made a special 
point of reminding the nassimilationists" that h1$tory attest-
ed to the fact that the Jews had given to the world some of 
the leaders in the forefront of the struggle for democracy 
and socialism.43 
The leader of Russia's Bolsheviks also presented aver-
sion of his attitude toward minority rightsL'that was decid-
42Lenin, op. cit., XVII, p. 149. 
43Ibid., p. 141. 
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edly less generous than Stalin's. Though allowing the right 
of language to stand, he excluded the right of conscience 
and implied a denial of the right to national schools. The 
latter was contained in a lengthy discourse on the problems 
involved in the creation of separate schools in every commun-
ity and 4n the conclusion that the matter should be left open 
to such time when a law on nationality rights could be worked 
out on a "realistic basis".44 
Thus having dealt with the "nationalists" of the Marx-
ian movement, Lenin turned his attention next to the extreme 
internationalists, who rejected absolutely any recognition of 
nationality rights. In an article entitled "On the Right of 
Nations to Self-Determination", published in February, 1914, 
. . . ' 
he began by defining their difficulty with the issue of self-
determination in terms of a miscpnception of the role of the 
national movement in history. By this he meant that their 
failure to employ the "historical-economic theory" of Marx-
ism had left them without any appreciation of the fact that 
the national movement had constituted an indispensable cat-
alytic agent in the transformation from feudalism to a sys-
tem of bourgeois national states _in Western Europe. Fur-
thermore,-they were now ~aware that the national movement 
was playing a similar role in the transformation of Eastern 
44of. Ibid., p. 153. 
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Europe and Asia: 
In Eastern Europe and Asia, the period of the 
bourgeois-democratic revolutions only started in 
1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey, 
and China, the wars in the Balkans, such is the 
chain of world events in our period, in our "Orientn. 
And only the blind can fail to see the awakening of 
a whole series of bourgeois-democratic national 
movements, striving to create nationally independent 4 
·and nationally united states in this chain of events. 5 
On this basis, Lenin proceeded to develop his principal 
argument, which centered on the issue of revolutionary tac-
tics in Russia and particularly on the relevance of the nat-
ional question to it. It turned on three main points. In 
the first place, ~asmuch as Russia was then passing through 
the stage of feudalism to capitalism, support of national 
movements within the empire was a matter of his:Corical neces-
·sity. It would ensure peace with the bourgeoisie, provide 
equal rights for the workers, and thus create better cond-
itions f'or the development of the cl'ass struggle. Secondly, 
to deny the right of nations to self-determination would not 
only be flouting the democratic principle of equality among 
nations and the spirit of socialist internationalism, but 
. 
would also be playing into the hands of' the feudal landlords 
and the Great-Russian Black H~dreds, whose very existence 
was founded on such a denial. In short, the proletariat of 
a ruling nation could not properly be an accomplice to the 
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defense o:f' the privileges of' the ruling class of' one nation 
over another.46 Finally, drawing on Marxism's authority·once 
again for support, Lenin concluded by reminding his readers 
that Marx and Engels had been the first to advocate the 
principle of' national self-determination as a means of' prom-
oting the world socialist revolUtion: 
The policy of' Marx and Engels on the Irish ques-
tion serves as the greatest example (an example which 
retains its tremendous practical importance down to 
the present time) of' the attitude which the proletar-
iat of' the dominating nations should adopt toward nat-
ional movements. It serves as a warning against that 
"servile haste" with which the philistines of' all 
countries, colors, and languages hurry to declare 
nutopiann all changes in the frontiers of' sjiates estab-
lished by the violence and privileges of' the landlords 
and bourgeoisie of' one nation.47 
In one respect, c,!!'f' course, Lenin's expressed views on 
the national issue represented an extension of' the original 
Marxian position. That was contained in the allowance that 
Asians were capable of' initiating their own social progress, 
which Mrax had denied. But the point was not intended as a 
refutation. Without exploring the matter deeply, a simple 
accommodation between the theory of the nineteenth century 
and the reality of the twentieth was worked out. The Asian 
nations were not regarded as having suddenly come abreast of' 
those in Eastern Europe, but were left in a modified third 
46cf. ill9:.·, p. 441. 
47 ill9:.· ' p. 464. 
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category following the pattern of Marx's threefold classific-
ation of nations. If not incapable of progress from within, 
they were still regarded as too backward to catch up with 
the rest before socialism had been established in Europe.48 
Though such views suggested not only full acceptance 
of the original Marxian revolutionary scheme but an exten-
sion of it to include all colonial peoples in Asia as well, 
they· .were in reality only incidental to the main purpose at 
hand. The reference to Marx and Eng~ls had been made only 
to support the contention concerning the significance of the 
national movemen~s. in general and the nationalities in Russia 
in particUlar. Consequently, Lenin wrote nothing else on the 
subject at this time. 
As yet, Lenin's principal concern was the revolutionary 
issue in Russia. His purpose was to introduce formally the 
expedient aide of Marx's dualism toward the national ques-
tion as the b~sis for his own revolutionary program. That 
the two were related was contained in the fact that national-
ism among the minorities in Russia was already a force threat-
ening the foundations of the empire. But whereas Marx had 
supported Polish national self-determination in order to 
thwart Tsarist counterrevolutionism, Leriin now proposed to 
48n ••• we do not know whether Asia will have time be-.. 
fore the downfall of capitalism to become crystallized into 
a system of independent national st.ates like Europe t s." Ibid., · 
pp. 430-~31. 
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guarantee it by extending the same consideration to all min-
orities in Russia and thus destroy Tsarism altog~ther. 
The Leninist Strategy Assumes World-Wide Proportions. 
Within six months, and even be~ore he had an oppovtunity to 
assess the impact o~ his argument on Russia's Marxists, Len-
in was on the way to the ultimate de~inition o~ how the nat-
ional idea could be exploited ~or revolutionary purposes. 
It was prompted by the outbreak o~ the First World War, which 
he assumed heralded the socialist revolution in Europe. Con-
sequently, the hitherto exclusive concern ~or the revolution 
in Russia was expanded into a world-wide strategy, parallel-
ing and expanding upon that which had been expounded by Marx 
a hal~-century earlier. 
To begin with, the Bolshevik leader drew the conclusion 
that a socialist revolution would develop out of the war 
because o~ the latter's unique character~ It was not a nat-
ional war, he averred, ~ought strictly ~or military conquest. 
Rather, it was an imperialist war, or a struggle ~or. ~the wor-
ld's resources and markets between alliances of capitalist 
states. It represented capitalism's highest stage of devel-
opment and could lead to no other end but complete destruction. 
Thus the task for socialists everywhere was to rally the work-
ers for thefinal onslaught against capitalism: 
The Third International fiirote Lenin on November 1, 
1914) is con~ronted with the task o~ organizing the 
forces of the proletariat for a revolutionary _onslaught 
on the·capitalist governments, ~or civil war against 
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the bourgeoisie of all countries, fo~ political 
power, for the victory of socialism.49 
But, albeit the most fundamental, this was o~y one 
aspect of the new revolutionary prospectus. Cognizant of 
Marx's experience, Lenin was cautious in his acceptance of 
the proposition that a successful revolution depended merely 
on the ability of socialists to organize and lead the prolet-
ariat in Western Europe against their governments. Accord-
ingly, he proposed to guarantee it on the basis of Marx's 
revolutionary plan, though modified by his own improvements. 
On the one hand, to eliminate the counterrevolutionary chal-
lenge of Tsarism, Lenin proposed that socialists everywhere 
lend their support to the quest of Russia's minorities for 
national self-determination.50 On the other hand, to gen-
erate the requisite degree of revolutionary class conscious-
ness among the workers of Western Earope, he advocated the 
support not only of Irish independence but that 0f all col-
onial and ,semi-colonial countries of Asia as well. Their 
political and economic independence would strike a lethal 
blow at capitalism in all West European countries simultan-
eously.51 
49Ibid., XVIII, p. 71. The "Third International" men-
tioned here refers to a proposal of Lenin's to replace the 
defunct Second International and has no connection with the 
Communist International created in March, 1919. 
socf. Ibid., p. 323. 
51cf. ~., XIX, p. 169. 
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As far as Lenin was concerned, Asia had beoome social-
ism's vast reservoir of allies against capitalism. The pot-
ential r~mifioationa of widespread Asian national insurrec-
tions -- the curtailment of the supply of raw materials and 
manpower and the psychological impaot on Europe's working 
classes -- were inescapable. Thus, in addition to taking 
up the slogans of "peaoe without annexationan and "national 
self-determination", the duty of Western socialists was to 
arouse "· •• to insurrection all the peoples now oppressed 
by the Great-Russians, all the colonies and dependent coun-
( ) 52 tries in Asia India, China, Persia, eta. • ••• 
With this, the process of bringing forward into the 
context of the twentieth century the original Marxian rev-
olutionary plan was completed. To be sure, the new version 
represented an elaboration of the old one. Whereas Marx had 
championed the cause of independence for Ireland and Poland 
in order to promote and protect the revolution, Lenin now 
sought the same ends by encourag:ing the national aspirations 
of the peoples in the c·olonies and semi-colonies of Asia and 
all.the minorities of Russia. But it did not alter the fund-
amental parallel between their aims and methods. 
Unfortunately for Lenin, the parallel between his exp-
erience with the national idea and Marx's was de~tined to 
52Ibid., XVIII, p. 323. 
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develop to an even further extent. He also failed to e~oke 
an affirmative response among Europe's socialists. In West-
ern Europe, where the war had served to stimulate the nat-
ionalistic trend in socialist thinking to an extent greater 
than before, the call to revolutionary action fell on entirely 
deaf ears. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, its effect was none 
other than to provide the Polish Marxists and other propon-
ents of ideological purity with still another excuse for not 
accepting even that part of the Leninist scheme which applied 
to Russia. By their standards, acceptance of an alliance 
with the bourgeois-national revolutionaries of the East was 
tantamount to heresy of the first magnitude.53 
So vigorously was the anti-Leninist argument pressed, 
that even Lenin's own followers were prompted to question the 
validity of his ideas.54 Consequently, only he remained with 
the conviction of the importance of the national movements 
as a revolutionary force. Writing with undisguised bitter-
ness, he warned all disbelievers in the following terms: 
National wars waged by the colonial and semi-
colonial countries are not only possible but inev-
itable in the epoch of imperialism. The colonies 
and semi-colonies (China, Turkey, Persia, etc.) have 
a population of nearly one billion, i.e., more than 
half the population of the world. In those countries, 
53cf. Olga H. Gankin and H.H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks 
and tlie World War: The Ori in of the Third International . : 
Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 
1940), pp. 394-398. 
54c~. ~., PP· 219-221. 
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the movements for national liberation are either 
very strong already, or are growing and maturing •••• 
The national liberation policies of the colonies will 
inevitably be continued b~ national wars of the colon-
ies against imperia1ism.55 
Because he stood alone .in his advocacy of the importance 
of the national question in the East, Lenin had no confidence 
that he would live to see its corre~ation with the revolut-
ionary movement in the West. In January, 1917, he told an 
audience of Swiss socialists in Berne of his doubt that 
n 
• • • we, the old, would live to see the decisive battles 
of the revoiutionn.56 He could not have known, of course, of 
the momentous changes about to take place: that, in less ~an 
six weeks, a revolution would break out in Russia; that, more 
than a month after that, the Germans would permit him and a 
party of twenty to travel across Germany in a guarded rail-
way car to Sweden; and that, on April 16, the party would 
arrive in the Russian capital of Petrograd. 
From Theory to Practice. ·The revolution in Russia in 
March, 1917 had a profound effect on Lenin's plans. When the 
Bolshevik leader arrived in Petrograd, his bearing was that 
of a man reborn, rej~venated by the promise of new revolut-
ionary prospects. His first action was negative, consisting 
of a strong denunciation of practically all Russian Marxists, 
55Lenin, op. cit., XIX, p. 204. 
56ill£., p. 357. 
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including his 
ialism. This 
followers, as enemies and traitors of soc-
as due to their expressed confidence in the 
liberal Provis onal Government, which had replaced the Tsar-
1st regime, 
port of the 
particularly because of their continued sup-
effort. 
Lenin's econd action was more positive, consisting of 
the issuance o the famous "April Theaesn. In it he proposed 
that his follo era change their stand from ttrevolutionary 
defenciamtt to revolutionary action". His new thesis was 
that world itions both permitted and necessitated the 
transformation Russian revolution into a socialist 
revolution. rope, he concluded, was on the brink of revol-
ution and need d. only the Russian nsparku to set it off.57 
T~~ new evolutionary prospectus wrote off the Asian 
aspect of the arlier plan. But its elimination did not 
rule out the e ploitation of nationalism altogether. The 
immediate task , according to Lenin, were to undermine the 
Provisional Go ernment to the point of collapse and to win a 
majority of th workers away from the Bolsheviks' chief 
rivals, the Me In this connection, the minorities' 
quest for self determination, the peasants' quest for land, 
the workers' q control of production and distribution, 
and the genera desire for peace were to be exploited. 
The tact cs on the national issue, our concern here, 
XX, pp. 95-103. 
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were announced at a party congress, on May 12, 1917. Once 
more, Lenin ch a non-Russian as the ostensible spokes-
man on the question, and, apparently as a reward 
for having one of the first to accept the nApril The-
sea", Stalin w favored. On this occasion, however, 
care was to avoid a repetition of 1913. Lenin spoke 
first on the a bject, touching briefly on the principal 
points of the olicy to be pursued. Then-Stalin, as rap-
porteur, 
visional 
that Marxists 
determination 
As it t 
f'ectively for 
minorities, a 
ment, proved 
ed with a bitter denunciation of the Pro-
ent for its refusal to grant full autonomy 
the Ukraine. He also informed his listeners 
deny the p_eoples of the Caucasus the 
tion and that the advocacy of national self-
as in the best Marxian tradition.58 
however, the opportunity to bid ef'-
of anti-Russian sentiment among the 
t 
it against the Provisional Govern-
than anticipated. For example, 
Poland, Eaton a, Latvia, and Lithuania were either under, or 
about to fall under, German occupation and thus afforded no 
opportunity w: 
· a potentially 
In addition, Finland was eliminated as 
ground soon after by the Provisional 
Government's romise to grant it autonomy. In other regions, 
the principal obstacle faced was the absence of extreme anti-
58cf. s alin, op. cit., III, pp. 49-57. 
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Russianism. 
example, the 
ong Belorussians and Transcaucasians, for 
pular view opposed a complete destruction 
of the politic l unity forged by several centuries of Rue-
sian conquest d domination. Most favored some form of 
federal arrang ment, on either a regional or national-cult-
ural basis.59 
The only important exception in this respect was pro-
vided by the 
Accordingly, 
proponent of 
testation 
fered, he 
rainians, whose struggle with the Provisional 
the issue of autonomy remained unresolved. 
nin lost no time in becoming the most vocal 
rainian national rights in Russia, even ex-
ainians themselves,60 And as a further at-
sincerity with which the suppprt·,-.was of-
ebuked publicly the Ukrainian Bolsheviks for 
rt ntheirn national cause enthusiastically.61 
enough to convince the Ukrainian nation-
alist leaders, ome of whom were socialists, of the feasibil-
59of. S.M Dimanshtein (ed.), Revoliutsiia i Natsion-
alni Vo ros: Do iumenti i Materiali (The Revolution and the 
National uesti n: Documents and Materials) (Moskva: Gosud-
arstvennoe Izda elstvo, 1930 , III, pp. 2 7, 271-272. 
ple, in June, 1917, Lenin denounced the Pro-
ent for failing in its duty to recognize the 
to both autonomy and complete freedom of 
Lenin, op. cit., XX, pp. 539-541. For their 
onents of federalism, the Ukrainians did not 
on until after the revolution in November. 
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ity of· an alliance with their self-styled champion •. 
When they accepted Lenin's offer of assistance, the 
Ukrainians did not seek to overthrow the Provisional Gove~-
ment. Nor, for that matter, did they anticipate that the 
Bolsheviks would grow into a formidable revolutionary force. 
Their sole purpose was to convince Petrograd of the need to 
meet their demands far autonomy, and, toward this end, they 
were willing to aecept Lenin's nuisance value as an addition 
to their arsenal in the war of nerves already underway. 
Thus, without visible signs of reservation, they refused to 
join the general condemnation of the Bolshevik attacks aga-
inst the Provisional Government. One of their number, Vol-
odimir Vinniehenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Social Demo-
cratic Labor Party, even went so far as to encourage Lenin 
openly by cre.di ting him with being the prime mover behind 
revolutionary progress in Russia.62 
In a situation that dictated a high degree of caution, 
the nationalist leaders of the Ukrainian Rada displayed an 
attitude that, in retrospect, was foolhardy. Their estimate 
of the issue of autonomy as vital was no less presumptuous 
than the expectation that procrastination would bring victory. 
Though not without knowledge of Lenin's past, they failed to 
62trQne must admit,n stated Vinniehenko, ttthat the rev-
olution would not pro~ress were it not for the Bolsheviks.rr 
Quoted in :V.'~::Manilov (ed.), 1917 god na Kievshchine (Kiev in 
1211) (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo Ukraini, 1928), 
p. 166. . 
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appreciate the extent to which they were playing into his 
hands. Thus, by mid-July, 1917, with no success against 
the Provisional Government as yet scored, they found them-
selves being pushed into a more extreme position than they 
were willing to go. Bolshevik conspiratorial and demogogic 
work among the workers, peasants, and soldiers in the Ukraine 
was stimulating national emotions to a 4igher pitch, causing 
pressure for unilateral action on the autonomy issue to mount 
rapidly. Furthermore, at the first All-Ukrainian Workers' 
Congress, convened by the Rada in Kiev, there was heard not 
only open criticism of the failure to act decisively, but 
demands for economic reforms that reflected the Bolshevik 
bias against private enterprise.63 
While this did not result in a complete break between 
the Ukrainian Rada and the Provisional Government, its effect 
was registered in another significant way. It divided the 
Ukrainian nationalists into two factions, one favoring and 
the other opposing acceptance of a compromise on the autonomy 
issue. Ironically enough, it was Vinnichenko who, now cog-
nizant of the danger in the alliance with Lenin, alone champ-
ioned the cause of moderation. In the face of a growing pop-
ular demand for action, however, his effort to dissuade his 
63cf. Ibid., pp. 166-168. In the following September, 
the Third Congress of Peasants of the Kiev Region displayed 
the very same spirit. cr. Michael Hrushevsky, A Histery 0f 
Ukraine (New Raven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 526-
530. 
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co11eagues in the Rada was to no avai1. The anti-Petrograd 
front of Ukrainian nationalism had become fixed rigid1y, and 
it remained unimpaired unti1 the overthrow of the Provisiona1 
Government.64 
Realistical1y, it would be no better than speculative 
to assert a primary causa1 relationship between Lenin's con-
tribution to the fai1ure of the Rada and the Provisional Gov-
nment to reso1ve their differences and the success of the 
Bolshevik coup on November 7, 1917. Neverthe1ess, the extent 
to which he was able to weaken the Provisiona1 Government by 
the encouragement of Ukrainian nationalism cannot be rated 
inconsequent1~1. For one thing, the tug-of-war between Kiev 
and Petrograd, to which he contributed significantly, made 
the task of restoring order in Russia much more difficult 
than otherwise would have been the case, particu1arly as the 
Ukraine was the second most important region of Russia. Fur-
thermore, the fruitless bickering not only cost the Provis-
ional Government valuable time and effo.rt, but also provided 
the pretext on which the 1ibera1 Constitutional Democrats 
64Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the degree of 
Lenin's success in this connection was provided by an incid-
ent in Kiev, on November 9, 1917. Then, with the fina1 st-
ruggle between the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government 
approaching its climax, the Rada effeotive1y thwarted the ef-
forts of the latter's troops to capture the Bo1sheviks there. 
Need1ess to say, the Ukrainians were unaware that the Bol-
sheviks were already plotting to wrest power from the~. Of. 
Manilov, op. cit., pp. 324-325. 
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withdrew their support of the Kerenski cabinet in July.65 
Finally, though statistical evidence is unavailable, it 
would be ·reasonable to conclude that the weakening of the 
Provisional Government, together with the patronage of the 
Ukrainian nationalists, enhanced the appeal of Bolshevism 
not only among the workers and peasants in the Ukraine, but 
in Russia proper as well. 
In Quest of a European-Wide Revolution. On November 8, 
1917, when he assumed the duties of Chairman of the Couneil 
of People's Commissars, Lenin viewed the nationality problem 
in Russia as all but solved. His optimism stemmed in part 
from the theoretical premise that granting the full right of 
self-determination ·to the non-Russian nationalities would 
lead not to their separation, but to their union with Russia 
under socialism. Given the right to separate, all national-
istically inspired suspicions and hostilities would disap-
pear as a matter of course.66 However, his confidence was 
also based upon a very important fact; namely, that only a 
few of the non-Russian minorities had actually stated a pref-
erence for separation, while most had favored unity on a fed-
65ct. Frank A. Golder,(ed.); Documents of Russian Hist-
ory, 1914-1917 (New York: The Century Co., 1927), p. 440. 
66cr. Lenin, op. cit., XX, pp. 123, 535; XXI, p. 316. 
In July, 1917, reflecting this same confidence, Stalin had 
predicted: rr ••• after the complete overthrow or Tsarism, 
nine-tenths of the nationalities will not wish to secede.n 
Stalin, op. cit., III, p. 53. 
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eral basis. The importance or this consideration was under-
scored dramatically in December, in the nDeclaration of the 
Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Peoples," when he jettis-
oned his earlier opposition to federalism and became one of 
its leading proponents.67 In other words, having made use 
of the destructive potential of the national issue against 
the Provisional Government, Lenin now sought to exploit its 
constructive side for the purpose of effecting a peaceful 
reunification of a major portion of the defunct Russian Emp-
ire. 
But this did not mean that Lenin was completely fin-
ished with nationalism as a weapon or destruction. On the 
contrary, it remained in the forefront of strategic consid-
erations for the purpose of stimulating proletarian revol-
utions throughout Europe.68 For example, in the famous nDec-
ree on Peace, n issu~d on November 8'~ 1917, the right of all 
nations to self-determination was made a coro~lary of the 
demand for a just and democratic peace, without annexations 
and indemnities.69 And this was followed by the publication 
of the secret treaties between Tsarist Russia and the Allies, 
67cr. Lenin, op. cit., XXII, pp. 18-19; Stalin, 2£• 
cit., III, pp. 28-31. 
68According to Leon Trotski, only a "few revolutionary 
proclamations" were deemed necessary for this purpose. cr. 
Leon Trotski, Moia Zhizn· o it avtobio rafii (My Life; an 
attempted autobiography Berlin: 11 Granit,n 1930), II, p. 64. 
69cr. Lenin, op. cit., XXII, pp. 13-16. 
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an action designed to prove the latter to be among the chief 
despoilers of the world's wealth and the violators of the 
rights of small nations. Needless to say, the inaccessibil-
ity of the agreements between the Central Powers did not 
prevent the Soviet leaders from attributing a comparable 
character to them as we11.70 
This first Soviet effort in psychological warfare in 
international politics was skillfully contrived. The call 
for peace was likely to evoke a ready response at the pop-
ular level in Europe, where the emotional and physical toll 
of the war was already being translated into restiveness.71 
Moreover, the inclusion of the right of national self-deter-
mination was designed to add to its general democratic flavor 
and to stimulate the Poles and Baltic peoples, who were under 
German occupation, and the minorities of Austria-Hungary, who 
were threatening the complete destruction of the Hapsburg 
empire with their demands for independence. 
Lenin acted on the premise that no Communist peace pro-
posals, no matter how reasonable their terms, would be aecep-
70cf. Pravda, November 17, 1917, p. 1. 
71The United States Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, 
for example, reacted with the following observation: n ••• 
the presentation of (the Communist) peace terms may well ap-
peal to the average man, who will not perceive the fundamen-
tal errors on which they are based." Cited in Ray S. Baker, 
Woodrow Wilson; Life and Letters (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1927-1939), VII, p. 444. Of. also, 
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Llo d Geor e (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown, and Co., 1933-1937 , V, p. 110. 
46 
table to the Allies and the Central Powers, and that their 
rejection would provoke a violent outburst on the part of the 
.war-weary European masses.72 But on this vital point he mis-
calculated. For example, his copyright on the championship 
of peace was challenged first on November 26, 1917, when the 
Germans agreed to discuss the peace terms offered, the meet-
ing to take place at Brest-Litovsk. 
Though surprised by the German willingness to bargain, 
Lenin remained unshaken in his conviction that the European 
revolution was impending. Thus, with characteristic facility, 
he altered his tactics to meet the requirements of the new 
situation. 
When the Soviet delegation, headed by Adolph Joffe, ar-
rived in Brest-Litovsk on November 29, 1917, its strategy was 
already established. On the one hand, it was to delay a set-
tlement long enough to allow Western restiveness to mature to 
an explosive po1nt.73 On the other hand, it was to stimulate 
72Speaking before the Petrograd Soviet, in the evening 
of November 8, 1917, Lenin stated: nThis proposal will meet 
with resistance on the part of the imperialist governments --
we don't fool ourselves on this score. But we hope that rev-
olutions will soon break out in all the belligerent count-
ries; •••• u Cited in John Reed, Ten Days that Shook the 
World (New York: The Modern Library, Inc., 1935), p. 130. 
73As Trotski described it, the purpose was "• •• to 
delay the negotiations as long as possible to give the Europ-
ean masses time to understand the main fact of the Soviet 
revolution.n Leon Trotski, Lenin (New York: Minton, Balch, 
and Co., 1925), p. 128. 
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national uprisings in Eastern Europe by making strong appeals 
to sentiment there. Both purposes were to be served by stub-
born insistence on the absolute right of nations to self-
determination, which, it was assumed, would be unacceptable 
to the Central Powers in any case. 
At a meeting preliminary to the opening of formal neg-
otiations, Joffe requested that the sessions be conducted 
with full publicity. After obtaining the Germans' agreement 
on this point, he then proceeded to speak at length on Sov-
iet peace principles, concluding wmth the demand that all 
belligerents agree to an armistice to work out a general 
peace settlement. And he was followed by Lev Kamenev, who 
berated the Central Powers for lacking a genuine desire for 
peace and for violating the rights of small nations.74 But 
this was only a harbinger of things to come. 
The first plenary session of the armistice negotiations 
opened on December 22, 1917, and Joffe continued the propag-
anda offensive. For one thing, in response to a suggestion 
by the chief spokesman of the Central Powers, Baron Richard 
von Kuhlmann, that the proceedings be. conducted in an amiable 
spirit, he delivered an inflammatory appeal to the multi-far-
ious nationalities in Eastern Europe. Then, after a recitat-
ion of most of the "Decree on Peace," he demanded a settle-
74cf. John w. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace: 
Brest-Litovsk (New York: W. Morrow and Co., 1939), p. BO. 
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. 
ment without indemnities or annexations, political independ-
ence for those nationalities which had been deprived of it 
since the beginning of the war, independence for those not 
hitherto enjoying i~, and national plebiscites and full 
guarantees for the rights of minorities in multi-national 
states.75 
Apparently caught off guard by the precocity of the 
neophyte Soviet diplomat, who was supposed to be playing the 
role of the vanquished, von Kuhlmann•s retort was as antic-
ipated. P+aying into the gambit unwittingly, he offered the 
quite transparent explanation that the nations under German 
occupation had already expressed themselves on the subject 
and had decided in favor of German protection.76 Then, in 
the face of his demand that the Russians accept this as 
fact, Joffe took advantage of the situation to suspend neg-
otiations and to return home for new instructions. 
The first meeting at Brest-Litovsk provided immense 
satisfaction for the Soviet leaders, who, bolstered by an in-
finite capacity for belief in the correctness of their cause, 
looked forward to the full maturation of the revolution in 
75Cf. A. Ioffe i L. Trotski (eds.), Mirnie peregovori 
v Brest-Litovske (The Brest-Litovsk Peace Negotiations) 
(Moskva: (n.n.), 1920), I, pp. 6-8. 
76cf. Ibid., PP· 10-11. 
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Europe at almost any moment.77 At the same time, in the op-
posing camp, second thoughts reflected serious concern over 
the obvious propaganda defeat that had been suffered. Wrote 
Prince Maximilian of Baden: 
On December 28, 1917, we made our irreparable 
mistake. We gave the impression to the whole world 
and the German masses that, in contrast to the Rus-
sian attitude, our agreement to the national right 
of self-determination was insincere and that annex-
ational designs lurked behind it. We rejected the 
Russian demand for a free.and untrammeled popular 
vote in the occupied territories on the ground that 
the Courlanders, Lithuanians, and Poles had already 
decided their own fate. We ought never to have 
claimed the arbitrarily instituted or enlarged land-
councils as the authoritative representative assem-
blies. The Russian request for a referendum should 
either have been accepted without reserve, or rep-
laced by a demand for a National Constituent Assem-
bly elected by universal suffrage.78 
The joy in Moscow was only short-lived, however. On 
January 8,1918, there fell a second, even more devastating, 
blow to revolutionary hopes. On that day, the historic 
nFourteen Pointstt of President Woodrow Wilson's were pro-
claimed, representing the Western democratic answer to the 
nDecree on Peace." Not entirely by coincidence, it duplic-
770n December 30, 1917, Trotski hopefully wrote: nwe 
conceal from no one that we do not consider the present cap-
italist governments capable of a democratic peace. Only the 
revolutionary struggle of the working masses against their 
governments can bring Europe near to such a peace.n L. Trot-
ski, Sochineniia (Works) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelst-
vo, 1925-1927), III, ii, p. 206. 
78Maximilian, Prince of Baden, Memoirs (New York: C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1928), I, p. 208, Of. also, Erich von Lud-
endorff, Ludendorff 1 s OWn Stor A ust 1 14- November 1 18 
{New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919 , I, p. 169. 
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ated most of the communist peace terms, including the right 
of small nations to self-determination.79 
Gross indignation was the character of the response to 
the "Fourteen Points" by the Soviet leaders. They sought to 
disparage the sincerity with which the American President 
had acted.BO But the damage was obvious. The American offer 
was made without revolutionary strings attached, suffered no 
taint from the secret treaties, and was backed by a respec-
ted democratic tradition and promising military might. By 
comparison, the communist promise of a njuat and democraticn 
peace now sounded a bit hollow. Moreover, it required no 
great insight to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the pro-
bable outcome of the competition for the sympathy of the 
small nations in Eastern Europe. 
Even eo, Lenin did not abandon the hope that his over-
all strategy might yet succeed. To meet the new challenge, 
he altered his tactics somewhat. For example, just after the 
79ane authoritative source offers evidence that Presid-
ent Wilson was pressured from all sides to restate the war 
aims of the Allies in order to meet the Soviet challenge ef-
fectively. Even the Provisional Governmentts Ambassador to 
the United States, George· Bakmetiev, advised the President 
that rr ••• any evasion on the part of the Allies in the 
matter of peace will simply strengthen .the Bolsheviks and 
help them to create an atmosphere unfri~dly to the Allies." 
Cited in Charles Seymour (ed •. ), The Intimate Papers of Col-
onel House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), III, 
p. 330. 
BOer. Pravda, January 12, 1918, p. 1. 
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nFourteen Pointstt were made public, Trotski was sent to 
Brest-Litovsk as the new head of the Soviet delegation. By 
putting in the master of polemics, the hope was obviously 
to bring the revolutionary situation to a head as quickly 
as possible, before the full impact of the American action 
could be registered. 
Needless to say, Trotski did not overlook a single op-
portunity to exploit the nat~onal idea. For example, he 
added Karl Radek to the diplomatic party. As a Polish Jew, 
a subject of the Hapsburg Empire, and a well known radical 
in German socialist circles, his presence symbolized the 
communist indifference to national distinctions, even when 
an nenemy alienn was involved. .And to dramatize the point, 
Radek discussed the mat~er openly with the German soldiers 
.assembled on the station platform in Brest-Litovsk, and even 
distributed revolutionary pampb1ets among them.81 
The Germans, still smarting from their propaganda de-
feat at the previous ses~ion and indignant at Radek's ef-
frontery, delivered a verbal lashing when the meetings were 
formally reopened. But Trotski remained unperturbed. He 
81cf. Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed; Trotsky: 
1879-1921 {New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 
360-361. At the conference table, Radek added insult to in-
jury by identifying himself as a representative of Polish 
and Lithuanian interests, and by a loud condemnation of the 
German occupation of those two oountri:es as a nveiled annex-
ationrr •. cr. Ioffe i Trot.ski, op. cit~, pp. 173-175. 
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countered with a harangue of his own, which he concluded by 
challenging von Kuhlmann's claim that the peoples under Ger-
man occupation had already expressed their will freely on 
the national issue. As proof, he demanded that all foreign 
troops be withdrawn and that national plebescites be con-
ducted. 
For nearly four weeks, Trotski and von Kuhlmann domin-
ated the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk with a full blown 
debate on the ethics, forms, and principles of national 
self-determination. This, of course, was exactly what Lenin 
wanted. And for a while it appeared as though the tactic 
might indeed satisfy communism's broader objectives. Dur-
ing January, 1918, general strikes broke out in Austria and 
Germany, while general unrest among the nationalities in 
Eastern Europe continued to mount.82 
Probably as a result of the improved revo+utionary 
prospects, and a desire to set in motion the chain reaction 
of social upheaval throughout Europe before the full effect 
of the American entrance into the war could be registered, 
Lenin undertook to complement the delaying tactic at Brest-
Litovsk with a revolutionary offensive. The pretext was con-
tained in the fact that relations with the Ukraine had deter-
82count Czernin, the Austrian diplomat at Brest-Litovsk, 
also interpreted the events in Eastern Europe at this time as 
a portent of revolutionary upheaval. Cf~ Count Ottokar Czer-
nin, In the World War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920), 
pp. 237-241. 
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iorated to the point of open hostility.83 However, the Sov-
iet declaration of war, issued on January 17, 1918, was ad-
dressed not only to the Ukrainians, but to European capital-
ism as well: 
, Citizens! The Civil War has started. The Civil 
War goes on. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, 
across the Danube toward Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and 
London we shall march with fire and sword, establish-
ing Soviet power everywhere. With fire and sword we 
shall destroy everything that dares to stand in our 84 way. There will be no mercy for any of our enemies. 
Simultaneously, communists in Minsk proclaimed the establish-
ment of a Belorussian Soviet Republic, while those in Hel-
sinki attempted to overthrow the Finnish government.85 
But January, 1918, did not prove to be the month of 
communist fulfillment; the expected revolutionary flood in 
Europe turned out to be only a small tide. The fact of the 
matter was that the revolutionary offensive caught the imag-
ination of very few. The general strikes in Austria and 
Germany, in which had been plaeed great hope, attained no 
real revolutionary level and the national restiveness in 
v 
84cited in S. Mazlakh, noktiabrskaia revol1utsi1 na 
Poltavshchine," ("The October Revolution in Poltavatt) ~­
opis Revoliutsii (Annals of the Revolution), I, p. 139. 
85cf. Alfred L.P. Dennis, The Foreign Policies of Sov-
iet Russia (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1924), pp. 105-
106; Nicholas Vakar, The Makin~ of a Nation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959 , p. 100. 
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Eastern Europe was replaced by a rising hope for peace and 
self-determination based on the promise of American assis-
tance. 
At Brest-Litovsk$ also, the tide turned rapidly against 
the Soviets. Trotski's rhetoric at the conference table, for 
all its skill and forcefulness, could no longer becloud the 
fact of its inherent hypocrisy. And the Germans were able 
to range a most potent weapon against it. The representa-
tives of the Ukrainian Rada, who had arrived on January 7 to 
negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers, were per-
mitted every opportunity to denounce the Soviet attack on the 
Ukraine. For example: 
The noisy declarations of the Bolsheviks regarding 
the complete freedom of the people of Russia is but 
vulgar demagogy. The Bolshevik government, which has 
dispersed the Constituent Assembly, and which rests 
on the bayonets of the Red Guards, will never choose 
to apply in Russia the very just principle of self-
determination, because they know only too well that 
not only the Republic of the Ukraine, but also the 
Don., the Caucasus, Siberia and other regions do not 
regard them as their government, and that even the 
Russian people themselves will ultimately deny their 
right. Only because they are afraid of the develop-
ment of a national revolution do they declare here at 
the peace conference and within Russia, with the spirit 
of demagogy peculiar to themselves, the right of self-
determination of the peoples. They themselves are 
struggling against the realization of this principle 
and are resorting not only to the bands of Red Guards, 
but also to meaner and less legal methods.86 
Though the complete picture of the communist regard for 
86cited in Ioffe i Trotski, op. cit., p. 152. 
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the principle of national self-determination, particularly 
the use of it deliberately as a weapon of revolutionary 
strategy, was not presented, there was enough truth in the 
Ukrainian charges to cause Trotski extreme discomfort.87 
After the Central Powers had expediently proclaimed their 
recognition of the Ukrainian Rada as the legitimate govern-
ment, his words on behalf of the East European nationalities 
lost completely the sense of devotion to principle. Finally, 
adding insult to injury, von Kuhlmann brushed aside Trotski's 
further efforts to promote a discursive bout on the national 
issue with the blunt rejoinder that he had not come to Brest-
Litovsk to·indulge in mere intellectual combat.88 
Lenin, also, was forced to recognize that he had over-
estimated the revolutionary P9tential of Europe and the nat-
ional idea as an instrument of destruction, and had underes-
timated the ability of his capitalist opponents to make use 
of the very same weapon against him. Furthermore, the self-
effacement of the carefully constructed facade of respect 
for national rights by the desparate revolutionary offensive 
made it a foregone conclusion that all minority national-
87oount Ozernin has described Trotski's appearance un-
der attack as chalky, nervously drawing on his blotter, star-
ing fixedly ahead, and with great drops of perspiration tric-
kling down his forehead. Of. Ozernin, op. cit., P• 246. 
88of. Ioffe i Trotski, op. cit., p. 160. 
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ities of the former Russian Empire would henceforth view all 
communist offers of assistance with extreme caution, if not 
outright hostility. In short, all signs pointed not only 
to the first decisive setback in the use of the national idea 
as an instrument of revolutionary policy, but also to the 
unlikelihood that it could ever be used again. 
Conclusion. More so than any other claimant to its 
heritage, Vladimir Ilich Lenin was responsible for the re-
vival and perpetuation of the original Marxian regard for the 
national issue and therefore of the original revolutionary 
program as well •. Following Marx and Engels, he recognized 
early the destructive potential of the aspirations to self-
determination of the nations dominated by the European pow-
ers and the method by which it could be utilized in the in-
terest of the socialist revolution. 
When translated into the terms of a specific program, 
Leninrs revolutionary scheme became an enlarged version of 
the original, which had been based exclusively on the prom-
otion of Irish and Polish national independence. According 
to Marx and Engels, the realization of the independence of 
both nationalities would have denied British capitalism its 
principal prop and Tsarist counterrevolutionism its main 
channel into Western Europe. In contrast, Lenin•s plan cal-
led for the promotion of the aspirations of all national-
ities under imperialist rule, which he held would not only 
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generate the proletarian revolution in Europe more rapidly, 
but would also guarantee its success through the complete 
destruction of Tsarism. 
One curious fact about the original Marxian revolu-
tionary scheme and its Leninist enlargement was that both 
failed to win the approval of socialists generally. Marx 
failed because improved economic conditions in Europe in the 
last half of the nineteenth century caused socialists to 
attach greater importance to the national, as opposed to the 
international, interest. Lenin suffered the same fate in 
Europe generally for the same reason and in Russia because 
his advocacy of national self-determination went too far to 
suit dogmatic internationalists and not far enough for nat-
ionally-minded socialists. Thus, while Marx never did have 
a chance to test the vali~ity of his revolutionary plan, 
Lenin probably would not have either, except for the unex-
pected turn of events in Russia early in 1917. 
In the process by which the exploitation of the nation-
al idea has been developed into an important instrument of 
Soviet foreign policy, the Russian revolution of March, 1917 
must be considered an important factor. For one thing, it 
made possible Lenin's return from exile in Western Europe, 
at a time when he had all but given up the revolutionary · ... 
quest as hopeless. For another thing, it afforded the Bola-
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hevik 1eader his opportunity to discover that the nationa1 
idea could be exploited successful1y for a revo1utionary 
purpose. This was il1ustrated in the Ukraine, where cal-
culated promotion of nationalism at the popular 1evel·made 
it impossible for the moderate Ukrainian nationalist leaders 
to agree to a compromise sett1ement of their differences 
with the Provisiona1 Government. It undoubtedly contrib-
uted significantly to the fai1ure of the Provisional Govern-
ment to cope with the manifold problems it faced and thus to 
the success of the Bo1shevik uprising in November, 1917. 
Once in power in Russia, Lenin attempted to utilize the 
national idea to set off a revolutionary chain· reaction 
throughout Europe. He included the right of national se1f-
determination in the famous "Decree on Peacen in order to 
appeal to the European proletarian sense of justice and to 
incite the subjugated nations of Eastern Europe ·to revolut-
ionary action. His purpose was the same in publishing the 
secret treaties between the Allies and Tsarist Russia and in 
appealing to national sentiment during the armistice negot-
iations at Brest-Litovsk. 
In this case, however, the intended results were not 
forthcoming. Paradoxically, the main reason for the failure 
can be attributed to the strength, rather than the inherent 
weakness, of the tactic. Its implications were both too ob-
vious and menacing to be ignored by either the Central Powers 
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or the Allies. More than that, it evoked the only effect-
ive antidote, one created in the very same image. That was 
provided by President Wilson 1 s nFourteen Points,n which, 
among other things, successfully outbid the Soviet leaders 
for the sympathy of the peoples of Eastern Europe. Against 
the very same promise of national self-determination, but 
backed by the moral and material strength of the United 
States, the revolutionary appeal lost most of its magnetism. 
Even 1n defeat, however, there was one note or consol-
ation for Lenin: once again the usefulness or the national 
idea as an instrument of policy had been demonstrated. Now 
faced with the task or defending the first Marxist state 
against a host or hostile, and much stronger, capitalist 
states, this was one lesson that could not be overlooked. 
In view or the record; it was almost a foregone conclusion 
that it would not be forgotten. 
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CHAPTER II 
IN DEFENSE OF SOVIET POWER 
As far as most of Russia's leading communists were 
concerned, the exploitation· of nationalism as a tactical 
device had been compaetely discredited with the failure to 
generate a European-wide revolution. On the one hand, a 
left wing faction, headed by Nikolai Bukharin, proposed aban-
doning the psychological offensive in favor of an all out 
revolutionary war. Standing rigidly on ideological ground, 
Bukharin argued against what he termed a continuation.of the 
betrayal of socialist internationalism and for a military 
offensive against capitalism, even if it meant ultimate de-
feat and destruction.1 On the other hand, a more moderate 
group, for which Stalin spoke, accepted the need for peace, 
but strongly recommended a basic modification in the official 
attitude toward the national issue. Unconditional support 
of the right of all nations to self-determination, Stalin 
contended, had prompted neither a revolution in Europe nor a 
voluntary reunion of the non-Russian border regions with Rus-
in the 
revolu-
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sia proper. Henceforth, he concluded, the right of national 
self-determination should be subordinated to socialist prin-
ciples and interpreted as a right not of the bourgeoisie 
but of the proletariat of each nation.2 
From the standpoint of fundamental doctrine, the dif-
ference between Lenin and his impatient colleagues was more 
apparent than real. He shared their desire to see a prolet-
arian revolution materialize in Europe and, if conditions 
had permitted, would have been more than agreeable to the 
idea of a military-revolutionary offensive. However, his own 
estimate of the capabilities of the Soviet regime left him 
with no alternative to the conclusion that the continuation 
of a war with an infinitely superior foe would be senseless, 
if not suicidal. Realistically, he preferred to see his 
first revolutionary effort on a world scale suffer a humil-
iating setback rather than to have it destroyed altogether 
for the sake or myopic idealism.3 
Furthermore, Lenin's regard for the national issue was 
2cf. Stalin, op. cit., IV, pp. 8, 31-32. 
3Lenin's reply to Bukharin was as follows: nwe are 
'defencists'; we have won the right to defend the father-
land since 1917. We are not defending the secret treaties, 
for we have torn them up • • • • We do not stand for the 
state, we do not defend the status of a great power: of Rus-
sia nothing is left but Great-Russia. These are not national 
interests; we affirm that the interests of world socialism 
are higher than national interes~s • • • • We are 'defen-
cists' of the socialist fatherl.and.u Lenin, op. cit., XXII, 
P.P• 13-14. 
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in fact neither less negative than Bukharin's, nor less ex-
pedient than Stalin's. But, on the basis of existing needs, 
he refused to accept any proposals to disavow or modify the 
use of the national idea as an instrument or policy. His 
s~and on this point was conditioned by three considerations. 
First and foremost was the fact that the power position or 
the Soviet regime, which as yet excluded an armed force or 
any consequence, left no alternative to the use or whatever 
weapons were available.4 Secondly, it could be anticipated 
that the continued occupation or Eastern Europe by the Cen-
tral Powers -- about to be extended farther into what had 
been the borderlands or the Russian Empire -- would afford 
some new opportunities to exploit nationalism there. Fin-
ally, there was the matter or personal pride. Inasmuch as 
he had suffered chagrin in seeing his first major defeat 
result from the use of the very.,·device he had counted on, 
Lenin evidently was anxious to even the score: "If we fight 
against Wilson, and Wilson turns the small nations into wea-
pons, we must contend with those weapons.n5 
Even so, it required more than reasoned argumentation 
before the Leninist conception or immediate needs was accep-
4Lenin underscored this point with the following: nour 
military preparedness is still incomplete, and therefore our 
general maxim remains as before -- to tack, to retreat, to 
wait while continuing this preparation • • • an Ibid., XXX, 
p. 384. 
5Ibid., XXIV, p. 155. 
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ted. .Its validity was not confirmed until after the Central 
Powers, in response to Trotski's tragicomical 11no war, no 
peacen ultimatum of February 10, 1918, had announced the 
resunption of hostilities and had begun to advance ~n all 
sectors with impunity. Thereupon it became necessary to ac-
cept new, harsher terms as the basis for peace, which was 
done on Manch 3. Exactly three weeks later, the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk was ratified by the Congress of Soviets. This 
formally terminated Soviet Russia's very first revolutionary 
offensive. However, it also opened the first of the defen-
sive wars against hostile capitalism, in which the· exploit-
ation of tha national idea emerged as a permanent weapon of 
Soviet fDveign policy. 
Defense Against the Central Powers. Sqviet use of the 
national idea as an instrument of defensive strategy occurred 
first in connection with the threat posed by the Central Pow-
ers from March to November, 1918. While the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk limited the area of the latters' occupation to the 
non-Russian borderlands west and south of Russia proper, their 
obvious distaste for Communism made it likely that sooner or 
later they would look upon the demarcation line as violable. 
Lenin recognized that communist appeals to national 
sentiment in those regions occupied by the Central Powers 
would be hampered by fresh memories of the attempts to estab-
lish soviet regimes in the Ukraine and Belorussia by force. 
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Nevertheless, there did exist some basis for hope. For 
one thing, there were many prisoners of war in the Russian 
camps, which meant the possibility of recruitigg propagan-
dists and agitators who might disrupt the efforts of~:,the 
Central Powers in the occupied areas after being repatriated. 
For another thing, based upon the expectation that the Cen-
tral Powers' occupation policy would sooner or later reveal 
an anti-socialist bias and imperialistic tendencies, it was 
possible that a new basis for attractive offers of assistance 
to socialists and nationalists in the border regions would 
materialize. In such case, Lenin could exploit the role of 
the lesser of two evils and forge alliances against the com-
mon enemy. 
Of the two possibilities, the one involving the pris-
onere of war was of least immediate consequence; though not 
for the reason that it wasn't tried. In April, 1918, for 
example, there were formed in Moscow German, Hungarian, Aus-
trian, and Yugoslav sections of the Russian Communist Party, 
each with an appropriate nnationaln head and an assignment 
to proselytize among fellow countrymen in the prisoner camps.6 
The program did not get very far, however, for it was conduc-
ted openly and quickly evoked a formal protest by the Ger-
6cf. Iv. Ulianov, "Oktiabrskaia revollutsiia i Voennop-
lennien (nThe October Revolution and the Prisoners of War"), 
Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, No. 7, 1929, p. 97. 
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mans.7 Thereafter, not wishing to provide the latter with 
a pretext for repudiating the peace treaty, the search for 
converts among the war prisoners was carried out on a sec-
ret, and necessarily limited, basis. 
There is no evidence that any of the converted prison-
ers were actually sent out on the type of assignment origin-
ally envisaged for them. Thus the effort can be said to 
have been successful only to the extent that it provided 
communism with a few hundred new German, and nearly ninety 
Hungarian, adherents.B Their full usefulness remained to 
be demonstrated at a future time, as revolutionary mission-
aries in their own countries. 
The immediate benefits flowed from the second aspect 
of the strategy contemplated by Lenin; for the Central Powers 
did play the role of anti-socialist and imperialist expected 
of them. In Belorussia, for example, the Germans refused to 
recognize the authority of a provisional government formed 
in Minsk, which was composed largely of moderate socialists. 
Instead, they created a puppet regime in Vilna, composed of 
liberals, conservatives, and clerics, and compelled the Minsk 
7of. ~., p. 107. 
23, 
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group to join it. Soon a~ter, however, the socialists and 
liberal nationalists resigned in protest o~ a German dec-
ision to support a Lithuanian claim to territory heavily 
populated by Beloraaaians.9 
The o~~icial Soviet policy toward Belorussia at this 
time was strictly proper. It satis~ied the German concep-
tion o~ sel~-determination by making no protests against the 
~lagrant disregard of ·Belorussian national rights. Moreover, 
it met the terms o~ the Treaty o~ Brest-Litovsk by recogniz-
ing the German-sponsored regime and by permitting it to est-
ablish a consulate in Moscow. Uno~~icially, however, an un-
derground organization was maintained there ~or the purpose 
o~ encouraging the spirit o~ resistance and promoting alli-
ances with the partisan groups that developed spontaneously 
in reaction to the overbearing German policy.10 
As a consequence o~ this latter e~~ort, many Belorus-
sian socialists, liberals, and peasants joined the Communist 
underground. Others, pre~erring exile, fled to Moscow, where 
they were warmly received. Subsequently, congresses of Bela-
russian re~ugees were convened in the Soviet capital, which 
denounced the occupation and encouraged the union of the nat-
ionalist resistance movements with the communists against the 
9of. Vakar, op. cit., pp. 101-105. 
10o~. Pipes, op. cit., p. 152. 
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common enemy. At least on one occasion, the intention to 
establish an independent Belorussian Soviet Republic was an-
nounced. It was not only to be patterned after the Russian 
model, but ultimately united with it on a federal basis as 
we11.11 Clearly, then, Lenin!s exploitation of Belorussian 
nationalism against the Germans was beginning to return very 
definite benefits. 
In the Ukraine, similar efforts produced similar re-
sults, though not with comparable speed. The delay was due 
chiefly to the fact that the Germans did not at first pursue 
an anti-socialist and imperialist policy there; but accepted 
the Rada, composed largely of socialists and liberals, as 
the legitimate political authority. Under the circumstances, 
Lenin was compelled to rely exclusively on his own devices 
for a rapprochement with the Rada's leaders. For example, 
during the last weeks of March, 1918, and for most of April, 
overtures to the Rada for a settlement of their differences 
were emitted regularly. In addition, all communists who had 
been sent into the Ukraine to direct the local soviets under 
the protection of the Red Army were withdrawn.1 2 Then, as 
11Cf. C. Iakubovskaia, "K Voprosu ob Obrazovanii CCCP,n ("On the Question of the Formation of the U.S.S.R.n) Voprosi 
Istorii, No. 1 (1947), p. 11. 
12The true character of the Soviet action is revealed 
in a confidential note from Lenin to Antonov-ovseenko, the 
commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine, dated May 2, 1918: 
"The Ukrainian affair must be liquidated at least temporar-
ily, and our cause must wait for more favorable times.rr 
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something of a final testimonial to the sincerity of the 
quest for friendship, the Russian leader announced the in-
tention to draft a constitution for the first Soviet state, 
one that would include as a basic principle the right of 
each nationality to decide independently "• • • whether it 
desires, and if so, on what basis, to participate in the 
federal government and in other Soviet institutions.n13 
Even so, after nearly six weeks of persistent wooing, 
the best that the Leninist effort could achieve was to get 
the Ukrainian leaders to agree to discuss a peace settlement. 
Negotiations commenced on April 27, 1918, in the border town 
of Kursk. 
In the meantime, Lenin's Ukrainian strategy had become 
beset by another unexpected problem, posed by doctrinaire 
Ukrainian communists who refused the new i~structions to 
seek allies among local nationalists by posing as national-
ists themselves. The nKievans,n as they were known, led by 
Gregori Piatakov, were die-hard internationalists who, like 
the left wing faction in Russia, had little sympathy for any 
suggestion that the revolutionary banner be lowered, even 
temporarily. But, by a curious metamorphosis that the cir-
cumstances effected, the extreme internationalist argument 
V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine (Notes 
on the Civil War) (Moskva: Vishii voenni redaktsionni sovet, 
1924), II, p. 293. 
13pravda, April 2, 1918, p. 1. 
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of the "Kievanan also generated particularistic, if not nat-
ionalistic, ramifications. It reau1ted in an assignment of 
priority to revolutionary objectives in the Ukraine over 
everything else; for Piatakov informed the Russian leaders 
of his intention to announce immediately the establishment 
of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic led by an ind-
ependent Ukrainian Communist Party.14 
Piatakov'a action in this case marked the first exam-
ple of what was later to be called "leftn communist national 
deviationiam, or sectarianism. What it represented was an 
extreme reaction of the stubbornly doctrinaire non-Russian 
communist upon learning that submission to the Russian lead-
ership on the issue of utilizing the national idea as an 
instrument of foreign policy carried with it the extra ob-
ligation to abandon his revolutionary efforts in his own 
national homeland whenever the security of the Russian reg-
ime was threatened. Whereas the acceptance of the use of the 
national idea in itself had been distasteful enough, the dis-
covery of ita hidden corollary made it absolutely insupport-
able. And rather than submit to this double infringement up-
on his personal dedication to fundamental internationalist 
14cf. M. Ravich-Cherkaaaki, Iatoriia Kommunisticheakoi 
Partii Ukra1ni (History of the Ukrainian Communist Party) 
(Gosudaratvennoe izdatelatvo ukraini, 1923), pp. 56-57. 
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principles, he was prepared to pursue a revolutionary policy 
on his own. 
Fortunately ror Lenin, Piatakov conrined his statement 
of intentions to party circles, which meant that there existed 
a chance to prevent the dogmatic Ukrainian from upsetting the 
plan to promote Ukrainian nationalism against the Germans. 
And this was achieved by the Russian leader by means or a few 
expedient concessions. For one thing, he agreed to permit 
underground revolutionary activity in the Ukraine on the eon-
dition that it be carried out in s~ch a way as not to arouse 
the suspicion of the nationalists. For another, he accepted 
the idea of Ukrainian independenee and even instructed Piat-
akov's rivals, the pro-Moscow nKhar~ov group,n to unite under 
his leadership in the formation or a single Central Executive 
Committee. Finally, though he didn't accept the idea so 
readily, Lenin promised to give serious consideration to the 
matter or a completely independent Ukrainian Communist Party. 15 
The wisdom of Lenin•s conciliatory effort in this case 
was demonstrated soon after. Only a rew days beyond the open-
ing of peaee negotiations with the representatives of the 
Rada at Kursk, the Germans executed a radical shift in policy. 
Without warning, they forcibly dissolved the Rada and replaced 
it with a puppet regime under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadski, an 
15cr. Ibid., PP· 91-97. 
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ex-officer of the Tsarist army and an avowed· anti-socialist. 
As for the dispossessed Ukrainian socialists and liberal nat-
ionalis~s, they became determined opponents of the new reg-
ime and its German benefactors. 
Needless to say, the reaction in Moscow· to this dev-
elopment was automatic. Officially, a facade of diplomatic 
propriety was maintained; the interrupted peace negotiations 
at Kursk were resumed with Skoropadski's representatives as 
though nothing had happened. Secretly, however, the Soviet 
diplomats, Khristian Rakovski and Dmitri Manuilski, met with 
the ousted nationalists to discuss the creation of an alli-
ance against the occupation. On the basis of a Soviet prom-
ise to recognize them as the legitimate authority in the 
Ukraine, they agreed to cooperate. 16 
Lenin made no serious attempt to forge similar alliances 
with nationalists in the Transcaucasian States, the Baltic 
States, or Poland, all of which were also under occupation 
at this time. Distance, the absence of strong local c.om-
munist organizations, and general suspicion of Soviet motives 
denied in advance any chance for immediate success. It made 
little difference, however, for the objective of defending 
Soviet power in Russia against the Central Powers was real-
16cf. Volodimir Vinnichenko, Vidrozheniia Natsii (Death 
of a Nation), (Kiev-Vienna: Vidavnitstvo Devin, 1920), III, 
p. 158. 
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ized anyway in a matter of months. 
Lenin could not claim the credit for having elimin-
ated the threat posed by the Central Powers; he had the vic-
tory of the Allies in November, 1918 to thank for it. How-
ever, his own efforts in this case had provided invaluable 
experience in the use of the national idea as an instrument 
of policy. For one thing, he had found out that even nation-
alists with fresh memories of communist duplicity could be 
persuaded to accept Soviet offers of assistance, based on 
new promises of respect for their national rights, against a 
common enemy. For another thing, he had learned that new 
appeals to national sentiment in occupied territories could 
facilitate the development of a resistance movement capable 
of widespread destruction, sabotage, and aasasaination.17 
17According to the noted Ukrainian historian Hrushevsky, 
the German policy in the Ukraine opened the way n ••• for the 
dissemination of propaganda among the Ukrainian peasants and 
factory and mine workers against the new regime and its Ger-
man sponsors. Passive resistance became widespread, breaking 
out in riots against foreign landlords and German soldiers, 
and in the northern province of Cher.nikiv, near the Bolshevik 
border, into organized rebellions." Michael Hrushevsky, ! 
History of Ukraine (New Haven: Yale University Preas, 1941), 
p. 552. Cf. also, Vakar, op. cit. , p. 105. The Germans also 
testify to the effectiveness of Lenin's tactics. According 
to Ludendorff: "I anticipated to be able to increase our ar-
mies and our food supply; and the raising of new Ukrainian 
formations was actually commenced. This, of course, required 
time and brought us no immediate relief. The German troops 
that were in the Ukraine were urgently needed for the pro-
tection against the Bolsheviks and securing the economic ex-
ploitation of the country. Whenever we wanted to reduce the 
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Needless to say, such lessons as these were not lost upon 
the calculating Russian revolutionary leader. 
The Second Military-Revolutionary Offensive. It goes 
without saying that November 12, 191~ was a day welcomed en-
thusiastically in Moscow. But relief was only a part of Len-
in's reaction. Always adapting to the opportunities of the 
moment, he also viewed the defeat of the Central Powers as 
conducive to a new effort to extend the revolution into the 
separated border regions of the defunct Russian Empire. Buk-
harin and other staunch internationalists no doubt agreed 
with him. Hence, only two days later, he declared the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk null and void and issued marching orders to 
the commanders of the Red Army units. 
By this time, the Soviet Red Army, under the tutelage 
of Trotski, had made significant progress in terms of quan-
titative and qualitative development. Though not yet a first 
rate fighting force, its abilit'y to fill the vacuum left in 
the border regions by the withdrawal of the Central Pewers 
was beyond doubt. Even so, to expedite the new revolutionary 
offensive by lending it a more.legitimate character than the 
first one, Lenin utilized the national idea as a screen. The 
invasion of each region was proclaimed an effort of national 
troops, the Ukraine complained that they were not strong 
enough to stand the reduction in numbers.n Ludendorff, .Q.E..:.. 
cit., p. 261. 
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liberation and was spearheaded appropriately by a nnationaln 
army.18 And in the latter's wake followed a "national" reg-
ime, which, once settled on native soil, received Moscow's 
recognition, military assistance, and full blessing with res-
pect to ita right to self-deter.mination.19 The meaning of 
self-determination in this instance, of course, had already 
been worked out by the Soviet leaders. 
These tactics were immediately successful in Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, where military resistance was at a 
minimum and where the expedient display of re~pect for nat-
ional institutions and rights benefited by contrast with the 
policy pursued earlier by the Germans. The same was true in 
Belorussia, where the Soviet leaders enjoyed the extra advan-
tage of having available a nnationaln regime whose claim to 
legitimacy was a very strong one. It was composed of native 
communists and social-democrats who had fled to Moscow during 
the occupation and who, by their close identification with 
the Belorussian resistance movement, had helped to make them-
18cf. Izvestiia, December 13, 1918, p. 1. 
19stalin wrote: "Soviet Russia has never regarded the 
western regions as its own possessions. It has always con-
sidered them as the inalienable possessions of the working 
masses that inhabit them and possess the full right to det-
ermine freely their political destinies.u Op. cit., IV, 
p. 178. What he neglected to say, of course, was that their 
determination of their political destiny would in fact re-
quire Moscow's approval. 
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selves acceptable as the logical successors to the departed 
German puppet regime. 
But the experience in Belorussia was not without sig-
nificant incident; for:; it was discovered once again that the 
utilization of the national idea involved a risk, even when 
only communists were concerned. This developed when Lenin 
decided to take advantage of the favorable situation in Belo-
russia for the sake of the campaign in Lithuania, where there 
existed strong sentiment for a territorial restoration of the 
fourteenth century Grand Duchy of Lithuania. To appease that 
sentiment, and thus reduce Lithuanian resistance to soviet-
ization to even more manageable proportions, the proclama-
tion of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, on Jan-
uary 14, 1919,'was followed shortly after by Moscow•s inst-
ruction that it unite with Lithuania to form a single state.20 
The Russian order, however, was not greeted with any 
noticeable enthusiasm among Belorussians. On the contrary, 
the leader of the Belorussian Communist Party, z. Zhilono-
vich, who apparently took the idea of proletarian national 
self-determination literally, objected strenuously to it. In 
one ou~burst of anger, in which he charged the Russians with 
gross violations of both Belorussian and Lithuanian national 
rights, Zhilonovich refused to have anything to do with the 
20cf. Ibid., pp. 228~229. 
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new government. His rejection o~ an o~~er to head the com-
bined Belorussian and Lithuanian Communist Parties under-
scored the point.21 
Inasmuch as he was resisting an application o~ the 
principle of internationalism, Zhilonovich provided a nright" 
counterpart to Piata.kov' s earlier t'le~tn communist national 
deviationism, and, incidentally, the very ~irst example of 
what was to be called titoism three decades later. His ada-
ment de~ense of Belorussia's sovereignty no doubt was rooted 
in a mistaken interpretation of Lenin's expedient concessions 
to nationalism as evidence o~ a permanent departure ~rom 
strict .internationalism and centralism. But it is equally 
probable that the intensity o~ his ~eelings was heightened by 
the summary character o~ the Russian order to unite with Lit-
huania, which bore a striking resemblance to the Tsarist 
policies toward the non-Russian border regions, and by the 
easily obtained impression that the proletarian revolution 
in Belorussia was being made subordinate to the satisfaction 
o~ Lithuanian national sentiment. Needless to say, there 
were ~ew Belorussians ready to look with ~avor on even the 
slightest suggestion o~ a restoration o~ the Grand Duchy o~ 
21cf. V.G. Knorin, Zametki k istori diktaturi proletar-
iata v Belorussia (Notes for the Histor of the Diotatorshi 
of the Proletariat in Belorussia Minsk: Gosudarstvennoe iz-
datelstvo Belorussii, 1934), pp. 29-34. 
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Lithuania. 
Nevertheless, Zhilonovich's 11rightn national deviation-
ism proved no serious problem to the Russians. Inasmuch as 
his regime depended on the support of the Red Army, his vol-
untary abdication simply saved the trouble of removing him 
by force. Thus, on March 12, 1919, the union of Belorussia 
and Lithuania was formally proclaimed. The new state was 
named the Lithuanian-Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic 
and the membership of its first Council of People's Commis-
sars·was divided evenly between the two nationalities. Also 
indicative of Lenin's care in balancing national sensitiv-
ities was the choice of the Council's chairman. That post 
went to one Mitskevich-Kapsukas, a half-Belorussian, half-
Lithua.nia.n.22 
A revolutionary offensive against the Ukraine did not 
begin at the same time as those against Belorussia and the 
Baltic States, though not for the reason of Lenin's promise 
to the Ukrainian nationalists to respect their authority 
once the Germans had left. It was due to the opposition of 
the Soviet military leaders, who feared the risk involved in 
22cf. V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, uBorba za sovetskuiu 
vlast v Litve i Zap Belorussii" (nThe Struggle for Soviet 
Power in Lithuania and West Belorussia"), Proletarskaia Rev-
oliutsiia, No. 1-10, 1931, pp. 65-107. 
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trying to maintain so broad a rront.23 However, this did not 
prevent the calculating Lenin rrom making the necessary pre-
parations ror the moment when the largest non-Russian pro-
vince of the former Russian Empire, with its rich soil, mod-
ern industries, and plentiful coal and iron ore deposits, 
could be."liberated". His first step in this connection took 
place on November 28, 1918, when a Ukrainian Workerst-
Peasants~ Provisional Government suddenly appeared in the 
border town of Kursk and publicly proclaimed itselr the legi-
timate government of the Ukraine. Attesting to ita ninde-
pendent and national" character was the presence of Gregori 
Piatakov as its chairman. 24 
Lenin undoubtedly planned to initiate the invasion or 
the Ukraine by formally recognizing the "Provisional Govern-
ment n, by entering into an alliance with it, and by lending 
it sufficient military aid. In other words, the attack was 
to occur without a declaration of war and on the pretext of 
23of. V. Zatonski, "K voproau ob organizatsi Vremen-
nogo Raboche-Krestianskogo Pravitelstva Ukraini" ("On the 
Question of the Organization or the Ukrainian Workers'- Pea-
sants' Provisional Governmentn), Letopis Revoliutsi, No. 
1-10, 1925, p. 141. . 
24The appointment of Piatakov to head the Kursk regime 
did not signify that his breach of discipline in the previous 
summer had been excused. As a matter of fact, in October, 
1918, Moscow had reorganized the Central Committee of the 
Ukrainian Communist Party to the extent of demoting Piatakov 
to the status of an ordinary member, giving a majority of the 
seats to the "Kharkov group", and introducing Stalin as one 
of its permanent members. Of. Ravich-Oherkasski, op. cit., 
pp. 217-219. 
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meeting the obligations of an alliance. But an unforeseen 
development necessitated a slight modification. The Ukrain-
ians reacted to the appearance of a competing regime in 
Kursk with unexpected vigor. With enough experience to rec-
ognize a communist ruse when they saw one, they delivered a 
stinging protest and followed it up with a declaration of 
war. 25 
Needless to say, Lenin responded in kind. Piatakov, 
who had been earmarked for removal from all prominent pos-
itions ever since his display of deviationism, was replaced 
by Khristian Rakovski, a Russified Bulgarian. And in much 
less time than the diplomatic process customarily takes, 
the Kursk regime was recognized as legitimate, an alliance 
was made, and the Red Army was sent into the Ukraine to as-
sist the new ally. On February 6, 1919, Kiev was captured 
by the Soviet armed forces for a second time in a year. 
This second military-revolutionary offensive mounted by 
Moscow did not extend into Transcaucasia, Central Asia, or 
Siberia. In addition to the limited power of the Red Ar.my, 
obstacles were present in the form of organized hostile 
forces. In Transcaucasia, for example, there were British 
units f'rom Iran. The way to Central Asia was blocked in the 
northern Caucasus by a "whiten Russian army commanded by 
25of. Vinnichenko, op. cit., III, p. 230. 
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General Anton Denikin. And, in Siberia, such obstacles were 
even more plentiful. Present there were some fifty thousand 
troops of the "Czech Legion", who, provoked by the communists 
on their way to Europe by way of the Pacific, had delayed 
their departure to help overthrow the revolutionary regime. 
Furthermore, there was another "whiten Russian army, under 
the command of Admiral Alexander Kolchak, and British, 
French, American, and Japanese military units. 26 
Aotually it made little difference; for the Soviet 
victories achieved elsewhere were only short-lived. Within 
four months of the advance into the western border regions, 
the Red Army and the "national" soviet regimes were compel-
led to beat a hasty retreat. In Estonia and Latvia appeared 
a third nwhite" Russian army, under General Yudenich, sup-
ported by Allied naval squadrons in the Baltic and by Ger-
man "volunteersn, while the retreat from Belorussia and Lith-
uania was compelled by an Allied-supported Polish Army. And 
~imultaneously, from the east and southeast, the armies of 
Kolchak and Denikin began their advance against the revolut-
ionary regime. Thus, after a second unsuccessful attempt to 
26The Allies, of course, had landed in Siberia in the 
summer of 1918 for the purpose .~·of striking against the Ger-
mans from the east, guarding supplies given the Tsarist reg-
ime, and expediting the evacuation of the nczech Legion 11 • 
After November, 1918, they had remained to assist Kolchak's 
effort against the Soviet regime. 
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extend the revolution by force, the Soviet leadership found 
itself on something of a political island against which the 
waves of anti-Communism mounted menacingly. 
The Defense of Soviet Power Against the nWhite Russian 
Counterrevolution. Perhaps the outstanding single fact about 
the Soviet success against the nwhite" Russian counterrevolu-
tion was the surprisingly short period of time that it re-
quired. Though the combined strength of the Allied-suppor-
ted rrwhiten forces was much greater than the Red Army's, 
only several months were needed to defeat them completely. 
In this connection, one important factor was the Allied 
decision to play only a supporting, as opposed to a fully 
active, role on behalf ot the counterrevolution, which ren-
dered the balance of contending forces more nearly equal 
than would have been the case otherwise. Another important 
factor was Trotski's masterful job in rapidly building up 
the strength of the Red Army. But most of the credit be-
longed to a new use of the national idea as a tactical weap-
on by Lenin, without which the Soviet success could hardly 
have been achieved in so short a time, if at all. 
Lenin's opportunity to utilize the national idea ef-
fectively against the counterrevolution was provided by the 
unmistakable imperialistic quality of the Allied and nwhite" 
Russian policies. The Allies, for example, offered ample 
evidence that they were as much interested in the economic 
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opportunities that Russia presented as in overturning the 
Soviet regime. In Eastern Siberia, the Japanese hastily 
established an elaborate banking system, while the French, 
British, and Americans cast openly covetous eyes on the reg-
ion's mineral resources and railway system.27 In Trans-
caucasia, one of the first acts of the British upon arrival 
was to declare the Baku oilfields an exclusive preserve.28 
In addition to these violations of what ordinarily 
27Even more clearly indicative of Japanese intentions 
in Siberia was the activity on the Tokyo stock exchange late 
in 1918. In the closing months of that year, more than a 
third of all foreign bonds sold were for investment in Rus-
sia. Cf. Kakujiro Yamasaki and Gotaro Ogawa, The Effect of 
the World War U on the Commerce and Industr of Ja an (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1929 , p. 38. Cf. also, 
Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of 
Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World 
(1st ed., London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), I, p. 101; S.V. Vos-
trotin, nA Russian View of Manchuria," The Slavonic and East 
European Review, July 1932, p. 25. 
28Cf. A.L. Popov, 11 Iz epokhi,angliiskoi interventsii v 
Za.kavkazien (nFrom the Epoch of the English Intervention in 
Transcaucasian), Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, No. 8, 1923, pp. 
97-98. The sound of imperialistic drum-beating was even more 
pronounced in London. For example, the chairman of the Brit-
ish Bibi Eibat Oil Company, Herbert Allen, issued a call to 
action on December 24, 1918 in the following terms: nNever 
in the history of these islands was there such an opportunity 
for the peaceful penetration of British influence and Brit-
ish trade, for the creation of a second India, or a second 
Egypt • • • • The oil industry of Russia, liberally finan-
ced and properly organized under British auspices, would in 
itself be a valuable asset to the Empire • • • • A golden 
opportunity offers itself to the British government to exer-
cise a powerful influence upon the Grosni, Baku, and Trans-
caspia fieldsn. Cited in Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism 
(New York: International Publishers, 1926), p. 31. 
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would be regarded as legitimate national economic rights, 
the Allies also infringed Russia's territorial rights by 
giving the Poles a guarantee of impunity in the satisfaction 
of their ambitions at the expense of the Ukraine and Belo-
russia.29 But perhaps the most blatant abuse of power was 
that contained in the indignities heaped upon the local pop-
ulation. The Ja:Panese in particular were notorious for their 
cruelty, perpetrated against Russian civilians and the men 
and officers of Kolchak's army.30 The British did not go to 
such extremes in Transcaucasia, but their rigid control over 
local affairs was undoubtedly enough to stimulate popular 
hostility. And apparently not to be outdone in this respect, 
the French, who landed also at the Ukrainian port city of 
Odessa, not only dictatea the composition of the Ukrainian 
nationalist regime but ordered it to turn over its military 
units to nwhitert''Russian officers.31 
Finally, besides generating enmity at the popular 
level, the Allied policies frequently evoked bitterness on 
29cf. United States Department of State, Papers Relat-
ing to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris· 
Peace Conference 1 19 (Washington: United States Government 
Printing Office, 193 , II, pp. 411ff; III, pp • .581ff. 
30cf. John Ward, With the "Die-Hardsn in Siberia 
(New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920), p. 54. 
31cf. Q. G. Shlikter, (ed.), Chernaia Kniga (The Black 
Book) (Ekaterinoslav: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo Ukraini, 
1925), pp. 111-112; John Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 
1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 
p. 241. 
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the part o:r the "white" Russian leaders. For example, the 
latter took exception to an Allied proposal in January, 1919 
that all contending ~actions in Russia, including the Com-
munists, be brought together at Prinkipo for a peace:rul set-
tlement o:r their di:r:rerences.32 And it goes without saying 
that Kolchak did not conceal his contempt :ror the Japanese, 
who not only mistreated his o:r:ricers and men, but also sup-
ported his chie:r rivals, Gregori Semenov and Ivan Kalmikov.33 
Equally disheartening to the nwhiten Russians was the action 
o:r the French in Odessa, in March, 1919, who summarily dis-
missed Denikin's choice o:r local military commander andre-
placed him with one who was personally disliked by the 
"Whiten Russian general.34 
While the leaders o:r the Russian counterrevolutionary 
movement had su:r:ricient grounds to question the propriety 
o:r Allied policies in Russia, they themselves were guilty o:r 
serious tactical errors. Most important in this connection 
33The ex-Tsarist admiral also took exception to an Al-
lied proposal that a French general be placed in command o:r 
the Siberian military theater. C:r. A.W. Knox, nGeneral Jan-
in's Siberian Diary,n The Slavonic and East European Review, 
March 1925, p. 724. 
34c:r. General A. Denikine, The White Army (London: 
Jonathan Cape, (1930])), p. 246. 
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was their unconcealed a~ to restore Russian domination over 
the non-Russian borderlands once the Soviet regime had been 
defeated. In the Ukraine, for example, Denikints revival 
of the name "Little Russian and his designation of Russian 
as the official language there served notice to the Ukrain-
ians, as well as to other national minorities of the former 
Russian Empire, that enforced ttrussificationn was far from 
a dead issue.35 
Lenin, of course, wasted no time in presenting the 
national idea as the key to his psychological campaign · 
against the Allies and the nwhite" Russians. Essentially, 
his tactics followed the pattern established earlier against 
the Central Powers. However, inasmuch as this new threat 
was real rather than potential, the intensity and scope of 
their application were increased considerably. Thus, there 
was no hesitation on this occasion to depict the struggle 
as one in which a small, helpless nation was pitted against 
a combination of powerful imperialists. The ndark subter-
ranean conspiracies 11 of the imperialists, according to the 
new propaganda line, were aimed not only at Soviet Russia, 
but against all small nations. And coupled with this accus-
ation was an impassioned protest a.gainst nthis wanton ag-
35cr. Hrushevsky, op. cit., p. 556. 
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At the moment when the Entente armies are cros-
sing the borders and the Entente fleets are nearing 
the shores of what was previously the Russian Empire, 
the Government of the Soviet Republic protests once 
more solemnly before the deluded soldiers and sail-
ors or their fleets, before the toiling brothers all 
over the world against this wanton aggression, against 
this act or sheer violence and brutal force, against 
this attempt to crush the liberty, the political and 
social life of the people of another country.36 
The right of national self-determination was espoused 
with greater vigor than ever before, and the,masses of West-
ern Europe were exhorted to force their governments to dis-
continue their "devilish playn.37 On occasion, appeals 
beamed to the West also included the demand that the work-
ing classes overthrow the "bandits of international imper-
ialismn. But revolutionary expectations occupied no import-
ant part of the Leninist perspective at the moment. What 
the Soviet leader sought as the immediate objective in this 
connection was the stimulation of anti-imperialist sentiment 
in the West, which might cause sufficient anxiety among the 
Allies to compel them tolimit their assistance to the "whiten 
Russians. Though he never publicized his fear, Lenin no doubt 
was mindful of the possibility that the Red Army might have 
to fight Allied armies in addition to the nwhite" Russians. 
36~uoted in Cumming and Petit, op. cit., pp. 269-270. 
37or. Iu.V. Kliuchnikov i Andrei Sabanin (eds.~, Mezh-
dunarodnaia politika noveishnogo vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh 
i deklaratsiiakh (Recent International Politics in Treaties, 
Notes, and Declarations) (Moskva: Izdanie Litizdata N.K.I.D., 
1925-1929), II, pp. 158-161. 
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In the non-Russian b.orderlands, Leninr s exploitation 
of the national idea was carefully trimmed to take advantage 
of every opportunity presented. One of its aspects consisted 
of appeals to the Allied troops landed and to the sailors 
of the Allied fleets supporting them, which emphasized the 
point that they were being used as pawns in an nimperialist 
war" that was so far undeclared and held little interest for 
them.38 In addition, the theme of national self-determination 
was played up constantly for the benefit of the non-Russian 
nationalities, as a counterpoise to the imperialistic char-
acter o:f the policies of the Allies and the nwhite" Russians. 
In this connection,, a special effort was directeq to the nat-
ionalities of Transcaucasia, who so far had escaped the pain 
of Soviet aggression and who might at least be willing to 
test the sincerity of this latest championship of their nat-
ional rights. To them, Moscow of:fered understanding and sup-
port of their national aspirations, even to the extent of 
promising material assistance for a joint effort to throw out 
the Allies and the nwhitett Russians. Characteristic was one 
message over the signatures of Chicherin and Narimanov, the 
Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs and the Director o:f the 
Moslem Section of the Commissariat of Foreign Arfairs: 
38cf. The New York Times, April 6, 1919, p. 2. 
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Comrades, workers, and peasants of Azerbaijan, 
Daghestan, and Georgia! 
Soviet Russia has no intention of marching against 
your republics. • • • ~e stands firmly on the prin• 
ciple of national self-determination. She has shown 
this in fact by granting autonomy even to the backward 
Bashkirs, Kirghizes, and other peoples~ And if you, 
the Moslems and Georgians of the Caucasus, are satis-
fied with the form of government qf your republics, 
live in peace, exercise your right of self-determin-
ation, and restore good-neighborly relations with us. 
Soviet Russia expresses the firm hope that the 
workers and peasants of Daghestan, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia will not allow their freedom to be trampled 
under the feet of the Tsarist General, and English 
Executioner, Denikin.39 · 
Similarly worded pronouncements could not be addressed 
to the nationalists in the Ukraine or Belorussia for the 
reason that few, if any, could be expected to be taken in 
by mere avowals of respect for nationality rights. The Sov-
iet record of aggression against those regions militated 
against it. However, it did not preclude an attempt to win 
the cooperation of the nationalists by playing upon their 
fears. Accordingly, the Ukrainians were reminded constantly 
of the dire consequences portended by the French landing in 
Odessa and Denikin's attempt to revive the Tsarist policy of 
ttrussification 11 • Poland's seizure of Western Ukraine was 
another point emphasized in this connection.40 The Belorus~ 
39cited in G.V. Khachapuridze, Bolshevik! Gruzii v 
boiakh za pobedu sovetskoi vlasti (The Georgian Bolsheviks in 
the Struggle for thec:Victory of Soviet Power) (Moskva: Gos-
udarst~ennoe izdatelstvo, 1951), pp. 161-162. 
40cf. Stalin, op. cit., IV, pp. 324-325. 
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sians, also, were warned about the consequences of a vic-
tory for the Allied-supported "white" Russians and Poles: 
• • • the French need the re-establishment of a 
Poland of generals and ar~ ready to make any sac-
rifice to accomplish this, while England, because 
of her economic situation, needs precisely the dis-
memberment of Russia and a weak Poland for her 
trade interests and colonial policy.41 
In reality, this Soviet propaganda campaign could be 
likened to the case of nthe pot calling the kettle black". 
But it enjoyed one distinct advantage. Whereas .the combined 
Allied, "white" Russian, and Polish threats to the indepen-
dent existence of these borderland regions were both clear 
and present, the Soviet threat to them by contrast was re-
mote. Under such circumstances, Lenin sought the role of 
the lesser of two evils whose willingness to assist might 
represent a straw that even the most skeptical Ukrainian 
and Belorussian nationalist might be tempted to grasp. 
Another of the areas in which the Soviet leader sought 
to stimulate the national emotion and direc~ its force 
against the counterrevolution was Russia proper, or, more 
accurately, that part of it under his control. Temporarily 
set aside were the familiar anti-national and anti-state 
sentiments fundamental to the Communist philosophy. In their 
place -- in the press, in resolutions, and in speeches --
41Pravda, May 6, 1919, p. 1. 
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patriotism emerged as the dominant theme. The Soviet regime 
was depicted as the defender of the Russian "fatherland", 
indeed, as the very embodiment of patriotism itself, and 
against the nimperialist intervention" and the "traitorous 
Russians" were all efforts said to be directed. Not un-
usual for the setting was Lenin's own impassioned plea for 
a "resolute national charactertt in the defense of Russia.42 
And there was still another aspect to the Leninist 
exploitation of the national idea against the Allies and 
the "white" Russians, one that developed quite unexpectedly 
in April, 1919. In that month, there arrived in Moscow an 
unheralded emissary from the ruler of Afghanistan, who bore 
a proposal for a united effort against British imperialism.43. 
Needless to say, Lenin, whose recognition of the importance 
of national sentiment in the colonies and dependent countries 
of the East was one of long standing, responded affirmatively. 
But he did not limit himself to Afghanistan. In June and 
July, 1919, he sent formal diplomatic notes to Iran and 
China as well, each containing avowals of respect for their 
right to national self-determination, offers to repudiate any 
concessions enjoyed formerly by the Tsarist regime in ex-
change for diplomatic recognition, and offers to assist mat-
42Lenin, op. cit., XVI, p. 155. 
43cf. Fischer, op. cit., I, pp. 285-286. 
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erially in their struggles against existing and threatening 
imperialist domination.44 
There was, to be sure, little in the way of material 
assistance that Moscow could spare at this time, even if 
the offers were accepted. Thus, no great hope was placed 
in being able to stimulate nationalist, anti-imperialist 
uprisings in Afghanistan, Iran, or China. However, the psy-
chological implications of the move were promising; for real 
or apparent ties between Soviet Russia and those three coun-
tries was bound to cause concern in the West. And Lenin 
undoubtedly expected that it would benefit his own cause 
most. 
One thing to be said about Lenin's exploitation of the 
national idea at this time was that it could scarcely have 
been more ambitious; for no opportunity passed unnoticed. 
More important, however, was that it invariably worked in 
the Soviet favor. For one thing, the general anti-imperial-
ist theme of the propaganda be~ed to the West coincided 
with demands by British labor and French radicals that the 
intervention in Russia be stopped. The possibility of their 
direct connection was not discounted by the Western leaders.45 
44cf. Kliuchnikov 1 Sabanin, op. cit., II, p. 341; I. 
Maiski, Vneshnaia Politika RSFSR (The Foreisn Policy of the 
R.S.F.S.R.) (Moskva: "Krasnaia Nov 11 , 1923), p. 147. 
45cf. David Lloyd-George, Memoirs of the Peace Con-
ference (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), I, pp. 
243-244; The New York Times, April 4,6, May 30, 1919. 
.. · 
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But ita impaot was manifested moat dramatically in April, 
1919, when, due in large part to Communist propaganda and 
agitation, a rebellion broke out in the Frenoh fleet stat-
ioned in the Blaok Sea.46 As a oonaequenoe of that event, 
the Frenoh foroea in the Ukraine were withdrawn immediately. 
A few months later, influenced by the Frenoh action, by the 
continuing demands of anti-interventionists in London, and 
by conoern over the possible effeota of Communist prop-
aganda in Afghanistan and Iran, the British announced their 
intention to do the same in Transcaucasia. 
That marked the first major Soviet success against the 
"white" counterrevolution, and, in a sort of chain reaotion, 
others followed in rapid succession. Besides bolstering 
morale in Moscow, the withdrawal of the Allies from the 
Ukraine and Transcaucasia had the opposite effeot on the 
nwhiten Russians. According to no leas an authority than 
Denikin, the Allied retreat 
• • • produoed a moat painful impression in the 
city (Odessa) and upon our troops ••• and shat-
tered our last vestige of faith in the possibility 
of the Allied Command fighting the Bolsheviks, or 
their desire to do so.47 
Denikin also recounts ruefully that the Allied action 
46cf. H. Sloves, La France et L'Union Sovietigue 
(Paris: Editions Rieder, 1935), pp. 95-96; The New York Times, 
April 6, June 1~, 1919. 
47nenikine, op. cit., p. 245. 
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provided the Oo:mmunis:ts with the most telling propaganda, 
since they were then able to taunt the "whiten troops wit.h 
the :fact that they had been abandoned by their trimperialist 
partners" from the West. Thereafter, he testifies, deser-
tions to the Red Army, or to anti-nwhiteu partisans, mounted 
at a phenomenal rate.48 
Another important consequence of' the Allied with-
drawal from the'Ukraine and Transcaucasia was its impact on 
local nationalists, of' both conservative and radical-persuas-
ion. For as long as the British and Fr.ench had remained, 
they had served as something of' a protective shield against 
the 11whi tea n and had helped to sustain the hope that separ-
atist aspirations would be recognized. Now, however, their 
departure made it seem as though the nationalist causes were 
being abandoned altogether. Hence, le:f't with no alternative, 
. . 
many local nationalists became receptive to M6scow 1 s o:f'f'ers 
of' assistance. For example, soon after the French departed, 
-the forces of' the Ukrainian Directory under General Grigoriev 
went over to the Communist side.49 They were followed soon 
after by the left wing factions of' the Ukrainian Social Dem-
ocratic and Social Revolutionary parties, both of' which had 
come to accept the idea of' an independent Soviet Ukraine as 
48or. Ibid., pp. 237-239. 
49Qf. George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia 
~ (New York: The Macmillan Oompany, 1 933) , p. 172. 
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preterab~e to the reimposition of reactionary Great Russian 
doinination.50 
But perhaps the most significant benefit realized by 
the Soviet leaders in the wake of the Allied withdrawal, 
and on the basis of new generous offers of national self-
determination, was the acquisition of the leadership of vir-
tually the whole of the anti-"white" partisan movement, the 
Green Guards.51 Hitherto, the partisans had carried out 
their activities in the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Siberia 
without co-ordination. Now, under Moscow's direction, they 
were employed as an important auxiliary of the Red Army. 
While the latter mounted frontal attacks against the "whites", 
the Green '!Guards carried out forays b·ehind the lines .52 
A final note here concerns the positive effect of 
the Soviet nationalistic appeals within Russia. itself. The 
depiction of the struggle as one between Russia and foreign 
aggressors stirred patriotic emotions and thus facilitated 
the task of military mobilization. Illustrative of the stub-
born will to resist the enemy generated by the Communist 
propaganda was the battle in defense of Petrograd, in Oct-
50cr. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 146-147. 
51cf. John A. ·White, The S1b.er1an Intervention 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 275-276. 
52cr. William H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 
1917-1921 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), II, pp. 278-
279. 
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ober, 1919, when, standing on the very last line o~ the 
cityts hastily contrived de~ense network, soldiers and wor-
kers together stemmed the advance o~ General Yudenich's 
"whiten army and then ~orced it to retreat.53 Similar e~­
forts and successes were repeated all along the line that 
separated Reds ~rom nwhites". 
By the ~all o~ 1919, the ~ull importance o~ the ex-
ploitation o~ the national idea to the Soviet de~ense e~fort 
was mani~ested. Against the weakened enemy on the southern 
and eastern ~rents, the vastly improved Red Army swung over 
to the o~~ensive ~or the ~irst time. Its blows not only 
turned the tide, but rapidly turned the orderly retreats o~ 
Denikin's and Kolchak's armies into complete routs. There 
seemed little doubt that Soviet power in Russia was about 
to pass its greatest test o~ strength to date. 
Conclusion. In the record o~ Soviet Russian use o~ 
the national idea as an instrument 0~ foreign policy, the 
period ~rom the spring o~ 1918 to the fall o~ 1919 was an 
extremely critical one. When it opened, there was little 
reason to expect that the promotion of nationalism would 
ever again occupy an important place in Soviet strategy. 
Prompted by the setback suf~ered at Brest-Litovsk, doctrin-
aire Communists inveighed strenuously against it as both 
53of. Ibid., PP• 274-275. 
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theoretically incorrect and tactically useless. Though less 
concerned about the ideological problem involved, moderate 
Communists also voiced doubts about its tactical value. But 
Lenin refused to concede defeat on this point, and, abetted 
by the fact that the desperate plight of the Communist 
regime in 1918 afforded no·>.practical alternative, he was able 
to overcome the opposition. 
Another failure· undoubtedly would have eliminated the 
exploitation of nationalism from Soviet strategy altogether. 
As it turned out, however, Lenin's confidence was completely 
vindicated •. For one thing, in the summer of 1918, he was 
able to demonstrate to his doubting colleagues that, despite 
past evide~ce of Communist perfidy on the national issue, the 
principle of national self-determination still could be used 
against Western capitalism. At the time when.the Ukraine 
and Belorussia were occupied by the Central Powers, his cal-
culated promises to respect the sovereignty of bath regions 
provided the basis for new alliances with Ukrainian and Bela-
russian nationalists and-widespread campaigns against the 
occupation. Consequently, the Central Powers were denied 
every benefit they had sought by eliminating the Eastern 
front as an active military theater. And inasmuch as this 
contr.ibuted to the ultimate defeat of the Central Powers by 
the Allies, it also helped to remove the first real threat to 
Soviet power in Russia. 
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For another thing, after the withdrawal of the Cen-
tral Powers, Lenin also had a chance to illustrate how the 
national idea could be used as an offensive weapon, as a 
screen for forceful extensions of the revolution beyond the 
established Soviet borders. For example, when the Red Army 
swept into Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, and the 
Ukraine in the winter of 1918-1919, an air of legitimacy 
was created by proclaiming the action to be based on concern 
for the right of those nations to self-determination. To 
add to the illusion, fictitious national regimes and nation-
al armies were employed. 
Lenin's policy toward the Ukraine was of special in-
terest since it exhibited an important variation on the 
basic tactical scheme. Because the invasion of the Ukraine 
was not scheduled to take place until after Belorussia and 
the Baltic States had been secured, and because this afforded 
the Ukrainian na~onalists an opportunity to establish a 
working regime, the use of national liberation and protection 
of national rights as pretexts was ru~ed out. In its place, 
the Russian leader created his o'fil Ukrainian national-revol-
utionary government on Russian soil, the ttnationaln army of 
which consisted of a few detachments from the Red Army. 
Then, at the propitious moment, diplomatic recognition was 
extended to it, a militaPy alliance was signed, and all aid 
necessary to ensure its success against the nationalists was 
98 
made available without delay. 
Though doctrinaire Communists may have continued to 
view the use of nationalistic symbols as incongruous from an 
ideological standpoint, there existed no longer any reason 
to question its merit on a purely tactical basis. But if 
any doubts remained, Lenin surely dispelled them with his 
demonstration of the usefulness of the national idea in con-
nection with the stunning victory over the Allied-supported 
"whiten Russian counterrevolution in 1919. Again aided by 
unconcealed imperialistic ambitions on the part of the enemy, 
new Soviet offers to recognize ~he sovereignty of the border 
regions resulted in new alliances with local nationalists. 
This was in spite of the fact that similar offers made in the 
past had turned out to be purely expedient. Furthermore, 
the defensive effort of the Red Army gained important assis-
tance from Moscow's appeals to anti-imperialist sentiment 1n 
the West, from calculated expressions of sympathy for the 
national aspirations of dependent peoples in Asia, and from 
the promotion of national feeling within Russia itself. In 
short, together with the rapid development of the Red Army 
under Trotski's direction and the skill of the Soviet mil-
itary commanders in the field, Lenin's skillfully contrived 
and executed campaign of psychological warfare contributed 
in large measure to the outcome of the conflict. 
One final point to be made about Lenin's use of the 
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national idea in 1918-1919 was that new evidence of its lim-
itations was also revealed. Hitherto, the only known obs-
tacle to the successful exploitation of the principle of 
national self-determination had consisted of similar efforts 
undertaken by the capitalist enemy. The experience with the 
Germans at Brest-Litovsk and.with Wilson's Fourteen Points 
had revealed that Communism's claim to champion the cause 
of national rights was not regarded by oppressed national 
minorities as the exclusive hope for salvation. Now, how-
ever, there was evidence of potential difficulty originating 
within the Communist framework itself. On the one hand, 
as Piatakov had shown, there was danger that the promotion 
of nationalism for defensive purposes in the future could 
stir doctrinaire non-Russian Communists into a stubborn 
resistance to Russian leadership and to damaging revolution-
ary adventures. On the other hand, as demonstrated by Zhil-
onovich, the swing back from expedient nationalism to inter~ 
nationalism could produce a similar effect among moderate 
non-Russian Communists, who,, by virtue of their temporary 
association with it, took the idea of national self-deter-
mination lite~ally. 
In reality, the actions of Piatakov and Zhilonovich 
represented early manifestations of what was later to be 
called nleftn and nrighttt Communist nationalist deviationism. 
In 1918-1919, however, the implications were easily over-
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looked ~or the reason that no serious damage had resulted 
and because it was possible to dismiss them as nrelicsrr o~ 
the bourgeois era. At any rate, Lenin was not prepared to 
regard them as su~~icient reason ~or curbing any ~urther 
attempts to make use o~ the national idea in ~oreign policy. 
As a matter o~ ~act, he already had in mind plans ~or a new 
Communist military-revolutionary o~~ensive, and in which 
the exploitation o~ nationalism ~igured prominently. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SECOND MILITARY-REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSIVE 
Late 1m the fall ef 1919, as the Red Army swept 
seuth and east after the retreating "white" armies sf 
Den1k1:ra and Kolchak, Lenin shifted Seviet foreign pelicy 
from the defensive. Prempted by the sudden chamge in 
fertume, and exhibiting the same eld propensity te make 
the mast ef any situatien, he went ever to the offensive 
in a grand way. The immediate objective marked eut by 
Lenin was twofold: (1) to extend Soviet power ever as 
much ef the fermer Russian Empire as pessible; and (2) 
to force the withdrawal of the Allied Powers from their 
pesitions along Asia's periphery, particularly from 
Afghanistan, Iran, and China. 
In conneetien with both aims, the exploitation of 
the national idea again figured prominently as a tactical 
device. On the ene hand, following the pattern develeped 
during the winter of 1918-1919, it was used as a complement 
to military force, to give a semblance of moral justifica-
tion and legitimacy to.aggressio:ra against the independent 
border regions. On the other hand, in a move that harked 
back to the pre-revelutionary period, te the importance 
attached to national rebellions in the East, it was used 
as the basis for an extensive diplomatic offensive against 
imperialism. 
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Generally, that dual erfart marked still another 
astonishing triumph in the record of Seviet exploitation 
or the national idea in foreign policy. Skillful use of 
the device provided an effective screen for the conquest 
of most of the separated border regions. Of equal importance 
was its employment in connection with the diplomatic offen-
sive in the East, for it compelled a decisive diminution 
of the influence of the capitalist Powers in certain of 
their traditional ttspheres o:f influencen. However, the 
whole episode, which extended down to 1927, was not without 
its negative :features. Once again the use of the national 
idea evoked the phenomenon of Communist nationalist devia-
tionism. More than that, :from the standpoint of its extent 
and impact, it represented by far the most serious outburst 
t0 date. 
The "Liberationrr of the Border Regions. As the Red 
Army advanced south and east in the fall of 1919, overrunning 
non-Soviet territory in the process, it bore the banner of 
nationai liberation conspicuously. To liberate the peoples 
of the border regions :from nwhite" Russian imperialism was 
proclaimed as one of its paramount aims.l But, by Moscow's 
definition, full national liberation could mean nothing less 
than the establishment of Soviet power in those regions and 
:Lor. Lenin, op. cit., XXIV, pp. 498-499, 516, 552; 
Stalin, op. cit., IV, pp. 283-284. 
their union with the Russian republic. As Stalin 
exp~~ined to an audience or North Caucasians early in 
1920: 
Autonomy means not separation, but union or 
the self-ruling mo~tain peoples with the 
peoples of RU.$Sia. 
Hence, it was a deliberate part or Soviet military 
strategy to overleok the distinction between the "white" 
Russian enemy and local nationalists or conservative 
persuasion. Many or the latter, including some who had 
allied themselves with the Communists expecting eventual 
self-determination, were either killed or forced to flee. 
Only those localnationa1ists who could be of 
further use to the Soviet purpose were spared by the Red 
Army. They were part or Lenin's scheme to qualify the use 
or armed force for conquest and to minimize local resistance 
and the loss of friends in non-Soviet Europe and Asia won 
during the desperate days of the Civil War. Also at stake 
was the success of a contemplated attempt to relieve the 
chaotic economy in Soviet Russia through the establishment 
of trade relations with Western countries.3 In short, 
2sta1in, op. cit., IV, p. 402. 
3Evidence of the Soviet interest in trade with the 
West materialized as early as November ~0, 1919, when the 
fallowing announcement was made: ~The British customer and 
purveyor are as necessary to us as we are to them. Not only 
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what Lenin had in mind was to slow down the sovietization 
of the conquered border regions sufficiently to permit the 
use of the national idea as its smokescreen. His aim was 
to shroud the fact of military aggression in the cloth of 
respect for national rights and to make it appear as no 
aggression at all. 
In the Ukraine, for example, a Soviet regime was 
established in December, 1919, in Kharkov. Following 
Lenin's prescription, which sought to lend a national 
character to the new regime, the leading posts were f~ed 
by Ukrainians almost exclusively and Ukrainian was declared 
the official 1anguage.4 Furthermore, to detract from its 
Communist character, a representative of the Borotbisti, 
a Ukrainian peasant party of Social Revolutionary complexion, 
was included as a member of the government and the policies 
pursued in economic matters were definitely moderate. 
Finally, the Ukraine was proclaimed an independent Soviet 
Republic, with its relationship to the Russian republic 
defined ostensibly on a formal diplomatic basis~5 
do we desire peace and the possibility of internal develop-
ment, but we also feel strongly the need of economic help 
from the more fully developed countries such as Great Britain.· 
We are ready even to make sacrifices for the sake of a close 
economic connection with Britain •••• " Quoted from Moscow 
Radio in Alfred L. P. Dennis, The FG>reign Policies of Soviet 
Russia (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1924), p. 380. 
4The only exception was Khristian Rakovski, a 
Bulgarian by birth. 
Bar. Lenin, op. cit., XXIV, pp. 552-554. 
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The fact that all but one member of the Ukrainian 
ruling body were unqualified Communists assured Moscow's 
effective control over its affairs. But illustrative of 
the inordinate character of Lenin's scheme from an ideol-
ogical standpoint was the fact that it failed to please 
the Ukrainian Communists concerned.6 For one thing, they 
objected to the use of the Ukrainian language and to the 
inclusion of the representative of the Borotbisti in the 
government. More than that, they were reluctant to pursue 
a gradualist course in such matters as domestic economic 
reorganization and.union with the Russian Republic. 
This represented only a very mild nleft '1 deviation-
1st-type outburst, and Lenin was able to overcome it easily. 
However, it did suggest once again the difficulty inherent 
in the tactic that gave temporary priority to the national 
idea. 
In the principal Moslem border regions, located in 
the Volga-Ural Region and in Central Asia, Lenin employed 
still other means to conceal the aggre·ssive and fundamentally 
anti-national content of his policy. For one thing, the 
Tatar, Bashkir, and Khirgiz regions were assigned the status 
of republics. ThEfwere autonomous in form, but possessed 
nothing but negligible administrative powercin fact.7 
6ar ~ ~·, pp. 557-558, 815-816, 818-·819. 
7ar. Pipes, op. cit., pp. 166, 171, 173. 
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Even more extreme in character was the technique employed 
in Turkestan. Lenin was particularly care:ful in dealing 
with that region, since it touched the borders of Iran, 
Afghanistan, India, and China, and, according to the official 
view, constituted "the outpost of Communism in Asiarr.8 
Consequently, greatest stress was placed initially on the 
need to eliminate all traces of Great Russian imperialism. 
All Communists in Turkestan were given the strictest orders 
to establish ttcomradely relations" with the peoples there.9 
Their languages and local customs were to be honored, 
while the process of sovietization was to be reduced to the 
slowest pace possible. It couldn't have been much slower, 
since Turkestan was left without the title of Soviet Repub-
lic until the spring of 1921. 
There was one other aspect of Lenin's policy in 
Central Asia that illustrated the great importance attached 
to the exploitation of the national idea. This concerned 
the two ancient khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. Because 
the ruler of Afghanistan, whom Lenin was courting seriously 
as an ally against the British, show.ed particular interest 
in the fate of those tiny regions, all aspects of sovietism 
were exc1uded.10 In each case, local liberal .organizations, 
Bar. S.M. Dimanshtein, nNashi protivorechiia i Vostokn 
(nOur Contradictions and the East"), Zhizn Natsionalnostei 
(Life of the Nationalities), No. 36, September 21, 1919, p. 1. 
9cf. Lenin, op. cit., XXIV, p. 531. 
lOcr. Ibid., pp. 531, 810-811. 
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the "Young Khivans" and the "Young Bukharans'', were 
encouraged to eliminate the emirs. In addition, each was 
given the status ef npeople's Republic". Their relation-
ship with Mescow was left undefined for several months, 
but the proximity of the Red Army and its·support of local 
Oommunists in fact determined the lacation of the political 
center of gravity.ll 
It was impossible in the winter of 1919-1920 to 
apply similar tactics in all the separated parts of the 
former Russian Empire for the reason that the range of the 
Red Army was limited. In Eastern Siberia, its way was 
blocked by the continued presence of a Japanese army, which, 
according to Tokyo, could not be evacuated because the 
"chaotic conditionstt in Russia posed a serious threat 
to its interests in Manchuria and Korea.l2 In Transcaucasia, 
the ·obstacle was not a more powerful army, but rather the 
fact that the Western Powers showed a marked interest in 
the well-being of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In 
January, 1920, for example, the Allied Supreme Oouncil, 
acting on the recommendation of Lord Ourzon, extended 
llo:r. G. Skalov, "Khivinskaia revoJ.iutsiia 1920 g'' 
(nThe Khivan Revolution of J.920"), Novi Vostok (The New 
East) , No. 3, pp. 241-257; "M.V. Frunze na Turkestankom 
frontett ("M.V. Frunze on the Turkestan Front"), Krasni 
Arkhiv (The Red Archives), No. 3, 1940, pp. 37-78. 
l2o:r. United States Depar:tment of State, Papers 
Relating to. the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
l919j Russia (Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 
1932 ' p. 6Q2. 
de facto recognition to the three Transcaucasian states.13 
In addition, the Crimea was exc1uded for the reason that 
it had become the base of a new "white" Russian army, 
composed largely of remnants of Denikin's forces and headed 
by Baron Wrange1. Fina1ly, in the west, Belorussia and the 
Baltic region were cut off by a Polish army and Yudenich's 
"white" army. 
This, however, did not stop Lenin completely. The 
situation was not enc0uraging, but it did not lack entirely 
the opportunity of putting the national idea to work. Two 
points of immediate interest to the calculating revolution-
ist were Eastern Siberia and Transcaucasia. 
With respect to Eastern Siberia, Lenin's strategy 
did not aim at the early incorporation of that region into 
the Russian state. His immediate purpose was to prevent 
the Japanese occupation from becoming a permanent condition, 
or, what was more likely, the creation of an independent 
Siberia under Japanese sponsorship. Thus, early in 1920, 
he sent out one Alexander Knasnoschekov, a native Siberian 
and one-time resident of the United States, to promote the 
cause of an independent republic among Siberian Social 
Revo1utionar1es and Mensheviks. Krasnoschekov's initial. 
success was recorded in March, when a "Temporary Loca1 
13cf. The New York Times, January 15, 1920, p. 2. 
For a short while about that time, it appeared possib1e that 
Armenia would become a mandate of the United States. Of. 
Ibid., January 4, 1920, IX, p. 14. 
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Sel.f-Government of Pri-Baikal.ia" was proc1aimed.14 It 
incl.uded some Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, but 
the majority was composed of 1oca1 Communists. 
Krasnoschekov stayed on in the capacity of Soviet 
Russia's ambassador to the provisional Siberian regime. 
However, his activities ranged far beyond the customary 
diplomatic 1imits.l5 For example, he drafted the formal 
declaration of independence, which called for the creation 
of an "independent democratic Far Eastern Republiott. It 
was approved unanimously by the provisional assembly on 
April 6, 1920. Then, immediately thereafter, the pseudo 
diplomat resigned his post, renounced his ·Soviet citizen-
ship, and became a citizen of the new republic. Not sur-
prisingly, he was also elected the Far Eastern Republic's 
first president. 
The Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic, 
written by Krasnoschekov, defined a system of government 
decidedl.y non-Soviet in character.l6 Generally, it 
14cf. Henry Norton, The Far Eastern Republic of 
Siberia (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1923), pp. 131-132. 
It is unlikely, contrary to Norton's view, that Krasnosche-
kov was actually opposed to the immediate establishment of 
Soviet power in Siberia. Apparently, his admiration for the 
revolutionary colored his view to the exclusion of certain 
obvious facts concerning the latter's relationship with 
. Moscow .. 
15For a description of Krasnoschekiv's activities, 
CT. Ibid., pp. 135ff. 
16An English translation of the full text of the 
constitution is contained in Ibid., pp. 282-307. 
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followed the sxample of the United States, with govern-
mental powers divided between three branches. But perhaps 
its most interesting feature was contained in that section 
pertaining to the nationality issue. Thus: 
All the national minorities of the territory 
of the Republic shall be granted autonomy in 
matters pertaining to their national culture. 
Autonomy in matters pertaining to the national 
culture of minorities shall be made effective by 
their respective self-governing bodies, elected by 
universal, equal, direct and secret ballot, on the 
basis of proportional representation. 
The national self-administrative bodies shall 
be public bodies legally authorized, and their 
competence shall be limited to matters pertaining 
to the national culture of the respective minor-
ities • 
.Anyone at all familiar with the Marxian record on 
the national question could have easily identified the 
above provisions as embodying the essential features of 
the old Austrian national-cultural autonomy scheme. 
Apparently, that was exactly what Lenin intended. Inasmuch 
as he had denounced the Austrian plan repeatedly as un-
Marxist, its incorporation into the constitution of the 
Far Eastern Republic dramatically attested to the non-Soviet 
character of that' state and, tog~ther with its other non-
Soviet features, provided a convenient smokescreen for the 
actual Communist control that was exercised. 
Needless to s~y, there was more than a bit of irony 
in the fact that Lenin would make better.use of the national-
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cultural autonomy idea than either its originators, the 
Austrian Socialists, or its principal proponents in Russia, 
the Bundists. For whether Tokyo was actually beguiled by 
the facade of independence, or was merely compelled to act 
for the reason that rrchaotic conditionsn no longer existed 
on the Russian side of the Manchurian and Korean borders, 
the ruse worked.17 ·On May ll, 1920, the Japanese announced 
that their trob.ps would be withdrawn from Siberia in the 
near future. Then, a little more than two months later, 
on July 17, the Soviet-Japanese "Gongotta Agreement'' for-
malized the acceptance of the Far Eastern Republic as an 
independent ''buffer" state.18 
At the very time that the Far Eastern Republic was 
being erected as a barrier against the Japanese, Lenin 
made his final preparations for the campaign against Trans-
caucasia. Despite the fact of Allied patronage in that 
region, he was intent on bringing it into the Soviet orbit 
immediately. Azerbaijan was his first target. Since it 
was geographically more accessible than Armenia, militarily 
weaker than Georgia, and possessed a larger native Communist 
17rn that connection, the Communist effort was abetted 
by the Western Powers, principally the United States, who 
wanted the Japanese to withdraw from Russian territory and 
who apparently accepted the independence of the Far Eastern 
Republic at face value. Of. The New York Times, January 16, 
1920, P• 15; July 29, 1920, P• l .• 
18 Of. ~., July 19, 1920, p. 12. 
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movement than either of those two, the choice was a logical 
one. 
The method of operation against. Azerbaijan was 
neither unique nor complicated. It followed the pattern 
established a year earlier in connection with the invasion 
of the Ukraine. For example, on April 27, 1920, the 
Azerbaijani Communist Party, hitherto an underground organ-
ization, created a "military-revolutionary committeen, 
proclaimed it to be the legitimate government of Azerbai-
jan, and issued an ultimatum to the existing regime to 
leave Baku in twelve h0t+rS. At the same time, according 
to the official Soviet account, the "military-revolution-
ary committee" requested a military alliance with Moscow.1 9 
Needless to say, the speed with which the request was ful-
filled would have astonished even the most optimistic view 
of the process of diplomatic correspondence. On the very 
next day, an armored train brought Sergei Kirov and Sergei 
Ordzhonikidze into Baku; and they were followed almost 
•.. ~ . .:.~· 
immediately by the main force of the Eleventh Red Ar.my.20 
That Lenin did not intend to delay the forcible 
extension of Soviet power t~oughout Transcaucasia was 
1 9of. A.·Raevski, Angliiskaia interventsiia i musa-
vatskoe pravitelstvo ( The lish Intervention and the 
Mussavat Government) (Baku: Armenian Kommunist Parti , 1927), 
pp. 188-190. 
. ~ . : 
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20of. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 
1917-1921 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), pp. 283-285. 
evident in the fact that the Eleventh Red Army did not 
confine its area of operation to Azerbaijan. It began 
to move across the Kura River into Georgia and Armenia 
21 
early in May, 1920. However, this action was halted 
by the ~utbreak of war with Poland, occasioned by the 
latter's decision to invade the Ukraine. For the four 
months that followed, principal attention was directed 
to meeting 'the latest threat to Soviet power. 
Thoug~ the Polish attack diverted Lenin's 
attention away from the task of extending Soviet power 
into the non-Russian border regions of the former Tsarist 
Empire, it was a.foregone conclusion that he would return 
to it as soon as conditions permitted. In addition, it 
was assured that the national idea would continue to 
figure prominently as a.tactical device. The record to 
date was an encouraging one. The Ukraine, the Moslem 
borderlands, Eastern Siberia, and Azerbaijan were already 
• 
a part of the Soviet polity in fact, if not in form. 
Furthermore, the use of the national idea in connection 
with their acquisition had been suffie&ently skillful to 
forestall a serious Western reaction. As much was evi-
dent in the absence·of any notable protest against the 
~ Cf. Pipes, op. cit., P~ 227. 
~14 
Soviet aggressions and 1n a growth of Western interest 
in Moscowts trade offers.22 
Of equal, if not greater, importance was that 
the use of the national idea had helped to conceal the 
fact of aggression from the sensitive gaze of nationalists 
in Afghanistan and Iran, who, while amenable to Moscow's 
offers of assistance in their own quests for full indepen-
dence, were certainly not disposed to accept the threat of 
Soviet imperialism as an alternative to British imperialism. 
This provided Lenin with the basis for a full scale diplo-
matic offensive along the periphery of Asia against the 
Western Powers. It is to this subject that attention w111 
be directed next. 
Anti-Colonialism Revived. Back in the summer of 
1919, Lenin's diplomatic notes to Afghanistan, Iran, and 
China hardly fitted into the category of tactical devices 
of major importance. Considering the character of the 
struggle with the nwhitett Russians at that time, which 
more than not generated doubts about the staying power of 
the Soviet regime, they were more in the nature of final 
22Encouraged by the decision of the Allies to lift 
the blocka~e of Russia in January, 1920, a trade delegation 
headed by Leonid Krasin was sent out to Copenhagen and 
Stockholm a month later. Of. Liubov Krasin, Leonid Krasin: 
His Life and Work (London: Skeffington and Son, Ltd., 1929), 
P• 122. 
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straws grasped in desperation. In the winter of 1919-
1920, however, after the combined military-psychological 
effort had turned the tide decisively in the Communist 
favor, the importance of Asian nationalism in the Leninist 
strategy rose rapidly. Indic.ati ve of the change were the 
,words of the Russian leader before an All-Russian Congress 
of Moslem Communist Organizations, in December, 1919: 
'Xge .. ~ocialist revolution will not be solely, 
or pp+n.cipally, the revolutionary proletariat 
in each country against the .bourgeoisie. No, 
it will be a struggle of all ~olonies and 
countries oppressed by imperialism, of all 
dependent countries,.against international 
1mpef1i~lism.23 
Those words marked the end of one phase of Commun-
ism's world~wige' strategy and the beginning of another. 
Gone was the idea that the revolution in Russia alone 
could set>of:f',a general proletarian onslaught against 
;, .. ; .I 
capitalism in Europe. In its place appeared Lenints pre-
revolutionary scheme, borrowed from Marx, in which the 
aspiration to independence in the colonies and semi-colonies 
of the East had been conceived as the principal lever 
against capitalism in th~ West. As before, it was centered 
on the assumption that the existence of European capitalism 
depended almost entirely on. the resources made available 
23Lenin, op. cit.; XXIV, p. 548. 
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through imperialistic exploitation of the East. 
There was one difference, however, The revival 
of the Eastern strategy was marked by none of the original 
exuberant optimism, or the expectation that the revolu-
tionary issue could be settled on a ttpush-button" basis. 
Experience tempered the view that a successful revolution-
ary ef~ort could depend on the issuance of a few inflamma-
tory proclamations. Accordingly, in the new setting, 
Lenin proceeded on a cautious and workmanlike basis. His 
attention was directed first to the semi-colonial countries 
like Iran, Afghanistan, and China, where the Western foot-
. 
hold was weakest and where national ~eeling was strongest. 
Furthermore, it was eoncentrated on the promotion of local 
bourgeois-nationalist interests exclusively. 
For example, with respect to Afghanistan, the Leninist 
policy could not have been less obDrusive. Soviet pro-
nouncements concerning that country, and its nationalistic 
leader, Amanullah Khan, were completely devoid of revolu-
tionary content. To assugge Amanullah's expressed concern 
over the fate of Russia's Moslems, the Russian leader 
promised that it would be determined by national plebescites 
and that the khanates of Kb.i va and Bukhara would be granted 
independence. Furthermore, in a showy affirmation of the 
great importance attached to the rriendship of the Afghans, 
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they were promised the privilege or transporting across 
Soviet territory, free and untaxed, goods purchased in 
Russia or elsewhere.24 Finally, not overlooking a single 
detail, the Communist propagandists made a special target 
out of Amanullah's nationalistic ego. Lenin personally 
forcasted the Afghan rulerts destiny as one of greatness, 
as signing to him 
••• the great historic task of uniting ••• 
all enslaved Moslem peoples and leading them 
on the road to freedom and independence.25 . 
As it turned out, however, Lenin's Afghan policy 
was not as immediately productive as might have been expected 
in the light of Amanullah's earlier interest in Soviet 
assistance. This was due to the fact that Britain, acting 
late in the summer of 1919, had recognized the independence 
claimed by the Mghan nationalist leader. Consequently, 
the latter's compelling reason for seeking aid had all but 
disappeared though not entirely, since he was anxious 
to continue to play off the British and Russians against 
one another for whatever benefits there were to be obtained. 
Furthermore, Amanullah showed signs of concern over the 
Soviet policy toward his neighbor Iran, a policy which was 
24T.his was included in the Soviet-Afghan Treaty, 
signed February 28, 1921. 
25cited in Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World 
Affairs (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), I, p. 286. 
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more obtrusive and prempted doubts about Moscow's avowed 
motives in the East. Therefore, he delayed the conclusion 
of negotiations until he was sure that the maximum benefits 
possible had been obtained from both the British and Soviet 
suitors and the seeming danger of a Communist coup in Iran 
had been dissipated. 
The dominant feature of Soviet-Iranian relations in 
the last-half of 1919 and during 1920 was the fact that the 
Iranian Government, unlike the Afghan, did not·seek the 
displacement of British influence and, consequently, had no 
need of the type assistance that Moscow was willing to lend. 
On the contrary, the government in Teheran was more than 
anxious to retain the British interest in Iranian affairs, 
particularly as it meant important financial assistance. 
Thus, on August 9, 1919, a treaty with London gave the 
British virtual control over Iran's financial system, army, 
and railways, in return fer which the Iranians received a 
loan of twe million pounds.26 
Lenin's reaction to the latter development was both 
~ediate and strongly worded. The mask of an interested, 
anti-imperialistic friend was dropped long enough to permit 
the issuance of a few revolutionary threats. Characteristic 
was Chicherin's speech on August 30, 1919, in which he 
26cf. The New York Times, ~ugust 16, 1919, p. 4. 
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denounced the treaty as an ttillegal scrap of paperr' and 
made a pointed appeal to the masse~ of Iran: 
The time of your liberatien is near. The 
hour of reckonins will soon strike for British 
capitalism, against which a broad revolutionary 
movement is spreading ever more threateningly 
among the working masses of E;nglam.U itself •••• 
The wo~ki~g people of Russia stretch out to 
you, the oppressed masses of Iran, their fraternal 
hand. The hGur is near when we shall be able to 
carry out in fact our task of a commGn struggle 
against the robbers and oppressors, large and 
small, who are the source of your suffering.27 
To be sure, Soviet revolutionary expectations were hardly 
as high as Chicherin suggested. But the threat of revolu-
tion was one way to attract serious attention. And 
apparently it did, for, according to one British historian, 
the impact of the Communist propaganda was to set off a 
loud clamor among Iran"' s anti-British nationalists and 
to force a postponement of the treaty's ratification.28 
Encouraged by the knowledge that there existed 
definite anti-British sentiment amGrig Iran's nationalists, 
Lenin did not allow the revolutionary-type statements to 
develop into a barrier between them. Repeated offers of 
friendship, embellished with typical protestations of 
concern only tor Iran's national rights, were made. 29 
27Kliuchnikov i Sabanin, op. cit., II, p. 341. 
28cr. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Afghanistan 
~ndon: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1940), II, p. 286. 
29cr. Pravda, November 9, 191~, p. 1. 
As a complement, the small Communist organization in 
Iran, composed mostly of former workers in the Baku oil 
fields, were directed to encourage local nationalist 
sentiment against imperialism generally and the pending 
treaty in particular. The latter's success was marked 
by alliances with same of Teheran's nationalists and by 
favorable notices concerning Soviet intentions in some 
of Iran's conservative, and influential., newspapers.30 
One British correspondent then in the Iranian capital. 
was prompted to interpret the sudden rise of Communist 
influence as evidence of an impending revalutionary 
uprising 1n that city.31 
There was one other aspect of Lenin's effort to 
convince the Iranians that a neutralist, if not outright 
anti-British, policy was in their best interest. It 
materialized in the spring of 1.920, in the form of an 
alliance with an extreme group of Iranian nationalists, 
headed by one Kuchik Khan. On May 20, following a raid 
30cf. Nasroll.ah B. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of 
Persia, 1.917-1923 (New York: R. F. Moore Co., 1952), 
pp. 79-81. 
3lcf. The Times, May 11., 1.920, p. 15. In reality, 
the Iranian Communists were anxious to transform their 
support of Iran's national interests into m0re of a 
revolutionary.policy, and were prevented from dping so by 
Lenin's strict orders against it. Of. A. Sultan-Zade, 
Persiia (Persia) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 
l.925), p. 86. 
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by units of the Red Fleet on the Iranian port city of 
Enzeli to capture ships abandoned there by Denikin, the 
initial contact with Kuchik was made. He agreed to the 
use of detachments of the Azerbaijanian Red Army for the 
creation of an independent republic in Iran's northernmost 
province of Gilan. Two weeks later, Kuchik proclaimed 
the republ~o's existence and the intention to extend its 
jurisdiction southward.32 
While the Iranian rebel declared himself to be an 
nardent supporter of Soviet Russian and a "disciple" of 
Lenin, and promised to preserve the alliance between his 
regime and Moscow in perpetuity, the attitude of the Soviet 
leaders reflected no illusions about his loyalty or role. 
Wrote A. Voznesenskii,, head of the Eastern Section of the 
Commissariat of Foreigh Affairs: 
We do not hide the fact that the new 
government (in Gilan) is far from being 
co:mmunis·tic. At the present mement, it 
is composed only of those who have united 
32This whole episode was related by A. A. Raskol-
nikov in an interview published in Petrogradskaia Pravda, 
July 15, 1920. Part of the interview is translated in 
. Xenia J. Eudin and Robert c. North, Soviet Russia and the 
East 1 20-1 2 : A Documentar Surve (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1957 , pp. 178-180. 
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under the slogans o:f "Away with the Britishn 
and "Away with the Teheran government which 
has sold itself to England".33 
As subsequent events were to bear out, what Voznesenskii 
meant was the Kuehik was important for his provocative 
national symbolism, which Moscow could manipulate in its 
own interest and which could be dispensed with for the 
right price. 
The impact of Lenin 1 s three-pronged psy~cal 
offensive, particularly the use of Kuchik Khan, on Iranian 
opinion, was electric. It put property owners in dire fear 
that the "Bolshevist virus" was spreading rapidly through 
the populace.34 Further, it prompted local nationalists 
to make new demands that the treaty with Britain be 
repudiated and that the British be asked to withdraw their 
troops to the south to avoid provoking the Soviet forces. 
But by far the most important result was the resignation 
of the pro-British cabinet of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh on June 24, 
1920. Its replacement by a cabinet of moderate nationalists, 
headed by Mushir-ud-Dowleh, marked a major step in the 
direction of the realization of the Soviet ambition.35 
Mushir-ud-Dowleh was no Anglophile, but he was no 
33rzvestiia, June 10, 1920, p. 1. 
34cf. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 98. 
35c:r. ~., p. 102. 
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proponent of Sovietism either. His officia~ reaction to 
Kuchik's regime was to appea~ to ~l Iranians to r~y to 
the defense of the country and to warn Moscow that he was 
not b~ind to its invo~vement. In return, Ohicherin offered 
assurances that Soviet Russia was a true friend and w1ehed 
o~y that the Iranian peop~e sho~d enjoy the ful~ right 
of se~f-determination. Then, getting to the point intended 
right along, the Soviet commissar explained that the tropps 
in Gilan wer~ not Russian, but Azerbaijanian, and offered 
the use of Russian influence toward the end of their with-
drawa~ provided the British withdrew their forces from Iran 
as wel~.36 
This proposal to exchange the liquidation of the 
Kuchik regime for the withdrawa~ of British forces, however, 
did not elicit a positive reply from Teheran. Obviously 
cognizant of its implications, the Iranian prime minister 
was not prepared to turn his country into a political vacuum, 
which the Russians might be tempted to fill. 
Communist "Left" Deviationism Presents a Mild Threat. 
In the summer of ~920, stubborn Iranian resistance, Afghan 
hesitancy, and the failure to establish firm contacts with 
the Chinese were not the only problems that plagued Lenin's 
36For that exchange of notes, or.~., pp. 238-239; 
Soviet Russia, August 14, 1920, p. ~74. 
.~24 
Eastern policy.37 An additional one consisted of a new 
outbur~t of "left" deviationism in Communist ranks. It 
occurned in July, at the Second Congress Gf the Comintern, 
at which the role of Asia's Communists in connection with 
the diplomatic offensive was spelled out explicitly for 
the first time. 
In view of the highly successful employment of local 
Communists in the Russian border regionst it was logical 
for Lenin to seek to make use of Asia's Communists in 
connection with the anti-imperialistic diplomatic offensive 
in the East. Writing on the eve of the Comintern's second 
meeting -- the first since the Eastern policy had been 
formulated -- the Soviet leader defined their role as an 
auxiliary one. They were to assist in the promotion of 
any Asian nationalist cause seeking complete freedom from 
Western influence. Though proper respect was paid to long 
range socialist goals in the East, Lenin's emphasis was on 
the need to eliminate Western imperialism first, and 
according to the method he prescribed: 
All the events of world politics are necessarily 
concentrated around one central point: the struggle 
37 As noted 1n the preceding chapter, it,,rwas not until 
the spring of 1920 that the Chinese government in Peking 
received the initial Soviet communication. It was several 
months later before a diplomatic exchange was effected. 
of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet 
Russian republic, which inevitably groups 
about itself, on the one hand, the Soviet 
movements of the advanced workers of all 
countries and, on the other, all national-
liberation movements of the colonies and 
oppressed_nationalities, which are convinced 
by bitter experience that there is no salva-
tion for them except in the vi~tory of Soviet 
power over world imperialism.3~ 
There was, to be sure, ample justification for 
Lenin's attitude in this connection, which temporarily 
ruled out the quest for socialist aims. For one thing, 
Communism in non-Soviet Asia was still in the stage of 
infancy. For another, considering ~he fact of Communist 
weakness, the elimination of Western imperialistic influ-
ences, however achieved, could be regarded reasonably as 
an important step toward the realization of the ultimate 
revolutionary goal. It would remove one obstacle thwarting 
local Cemmunist interests, facilitate the flow of assistance 
from Soviet Russia, and help, by depriving capitalism of 
its control over resources in the East, to foment the 
proletarian revolution in the West. As final confirmation 
of the validity of the Leninist prescript, there was the 
record of successes already achieved. 
Nevertheless, trouble did occur. Some delegates 
to the Comintern congress from non-Soviet Asia, confronted 
38Lenin, op. cit., XXV, p. 286. 
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with the proposition tor the first time, found it impossible 
to perceive the logic of serving internationalist interest 
by supporting the national aspirations of their dedicated 
toes. Their views echoed the earlier protests lodged by 
ttpuren.international;sts. Howev~r, like Piatakov, they were 
also motivated by an intense desire to achieve the socialist 
goal in their own countries, and thus gave priority to the 
particular, as opposed to the general, revolutionary 
i.ntere at. The chief' spokesman to~. this group was the 
youthful delegate from British Indi~~Manabendra Nath Roy. 
The serious debate on the issue of Communist tactics 
1n the East took place during the sessions of the Second 
Congress' commission to study and report on the national 
and colonial questions. Unfortunately its proceedings 
have not been made public. Judging by Lenin's advance 
preparations and the results, however, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the discussions were heated and that Lenin 
succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the less exper-
ienced Indian delegate by adroitly contusing the issues and 
playing upon his youthful adversary's ego~ 
. Ror example, after the commission had completed 
. its.deliberations, Lenin delivered its report to the assembled 
congress. In it he stated that he had modified his original 
views nror the sake of unanimitytt. But the change was 
actually more apparent than real. What he allowed was 
that Asian Communists would not be required to support 
"bourgeois-democratien movements, only ttnational revol-
utionary" movements. And what this meant in fact was 
absolutely nothing: 
There can be no doubt that every nationalist 
movement ean only be a bourgeois-democratic 
movement, because the great mass of the popu-
lation of the backward countries consist of 
peasants, who are the representatives of 
bourgeois-capitalist conditions.39 
In a similar fashion, Lenin 11 agreedrr to greater 
emphasis on the socialist revolution in the East. His 
countervailing note in this connection was contained in 
the stated need to prove first that a socialist revolu-
tion was possible: 
••• the Communist International must set down 
·and theoretically prove that, with the assistance 
of the proletariat of the advanced workers prin-
·eipally, the backward countries ean pass to the 
Soviet system without4an intervening capitalist stage of development. 0 · 
That anyone could have been beguiled into accepting 
such "concessionsn is surprising. But Roy was, and apparent-
ly for the reason of his inability to cope immediately with 
the Leninist nd1al.ect1c 11 • As indicated in a supplementary 
39~., p. 353. 
40
.ill£:,., .P. 354. 
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resolution on the national and colonial. questions, which 
Lenin permitted Roy to write and submit to the congress 
for approval, the Indianmvolutionary actually emerged 
from the commission 1 s sessions so thoroughly confused as 
to be unsure of his own stand on the issue. Thus, in one 
place, he agreed with Lenin 1 s argument that, in the absence 
of a developed proletariat, the revolutionary will of the 
East was largely embodied in the aspirations of the native 
bourgeoisie. However, in another, he contended that the 
bourgeois-nationalist revolutions should be led by the 
proletariat nevertheless. Finally, apparently unable to 
discover the method by which the weak proletarian movements 
could effectively assume the leadership of the bourge_ois-
nationalist revolutions, Roy concluded with the seemingly 
helpless gesture of conceding that nationalist rebellions, 
even without proletarian leadership, would be beneficial for 
the reason ot their anti-imperialistic character.41 
The Second Congress of the Comintern ended up by 
endorsing Unanimously the resolutions on the national and 
colonial questions submitted by Lenin and Roy. It signified 
formally that Lenin had won his first encounter with nleftn 
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deviationism among Asia's Communists. But the Soviet 
leade~ knew that no permanent solution to the problem had 
been obtained thereby. He had been confronted with that 
situation before, as the name of Gregori Piatakov served 
to recall, and he was aware of the implications. Conse-
quently, in a move obviously designed to guard against a 
repetition of the type revolutionary outburst that had 
occurred in the Ukraine, in August, 1918, Lenin decided 
to call a special meeting of all Asian Communists. 
nThe First Congress of the Peoples of the Eastn, 
as the meeting was called, convened in Baku three weeks 
after the Cominter.n adjourned. In sharp contrast to the 
latter, it had all the earmarks of a congress dedicated to 
the single and· immediate purpose of promoting Communist 
revolutions throughout the East. Karl Radek, for example, 
assured the delegates that Soviet Russia's Eastern policy 
implied no betra~al of their revolutionary interests, was 
no mere diplomatic maneuver, but just the reverse.42 And 
he was followed by Gregori Zinoviev and Bela Kun, both of 
whom espoused the revolutionary doctrine in its purest form. 
42cf. Pervii sezd narodov Vostoka, Baku, 1-8 sentia-
bria 1920 g. Stenograficheskie otcheti (The First Congress 
of the Peo lea of the East Baku Se tember 1-8 1 20. 
Stenographie Report Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdate1stvo, 
~~920), p. 70. 
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Their eXhortations were embellished with calls to struggle 
not only against "foreign capitalists", but against ttnative 
profiteers" as well.43 The congress created a Council of 
Propoganda and Agitation, composed of forty-seven members. 
Its purpose was to develop and direct the implementation 
of revolutionary strategy in the East.44 
The meeting at Baku suited Lenints purpose for a 
number of reasons, none of which would have satisfied the 
Asians had they known. For one thing, it added tC? his 
ncarrot and stickrr approach to the situation in Iran, 
providing another nstickrr with which to prod the national-
ists. For another, it provdld~d a vehicle for reassuring 
the Asian Communists after their disappointing experience 
at the Comintern congress. Finally, the extreme character 
of the proceedings notwithstanding, the fact of the matter 
was that the institutionalization of Communist tactics in 
the East served to limit the harmful effects of the impulses 
of the more headstrong radicals. Thus, energies which 
might have been expended on "unscheduledn revolutionary 
outbursts in the East were used up within the confines of 
a Council of Propaganda and Agitation, an organ that was 
43cr. Ibid., pp. 73-75. 
-
44 cr. Ibid., pp. 211-213. 
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short-lived and accomplished nothing of significance.45 
That Lenin was able to stifle the revolutionary.urges 
in his Eastern followers without ~ing them was another 
tribute to his tactical genius. But the preservation of 
order within Communist ranks, important in itself, was not 
the only benefit derived. Apparently, the implied threat 
of revolutionary action issued at Baku was enough to prompt 
the Iranians to try to work out some sort of a settlement 
with Moscow. Early in October, 1920, Mushir-ud-Dowleh 
informed Lenin of his desire to commence negotiations.46 
The War with Poland and the Resumption of Aggression 
Against the Border Resions. During the summer of 1920, of 
course, Lenin's main preoccupation was with the defense of 
Soviet power against the invading Poles. The war lasted 
for five months, during which time each side had an 
opportunity to penetrate deep into the territory of the 
other. Needless to say, the Soviet leader utilized the 
national idea in conjunction with his own military effort. 
For example, he attributed to the Poles anti-Russian, as 
45The Council, over which Moscow exercised a veto, 
planned some strategy, but devoted most of its attention to 
matters of internal organization. But once the organizational 
scheme had been worked out, and that took more than a year, 
the Council was abolished and the Comintern was given its 
duties. Cf. T. R. Riskulov, nKomintern i rabota na Vostoken 
( 11 The Comintern and the Work in the East 11 ), Zhizn Natsional-
nostei (Life of the Nationalities), No. 46, December 15, 
1920, pp. 1-2; Stalin, op. cit., IV, p. 439. 
46cf. Izvestiia, October 10, 1920, p. 3. 
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opposed to anti-Communist, motives. The struggle was 
depicted as a nnational warn of Russia against a foreign 
invader, and all Communists were directed to play up the 
theme of national defense.47 Typical of the effort to 
release Russian patriotic instincts and stir chauvinistic 
emotions was an appeal issued by Karl Radek on July 20, 1920: 
Every bourgeois patriot in Russia understands 
perfectly well that the Poles are not interested 
in overwhelming the Bolsheviks; for the Bolshe-
viks would have peace with Poland any day if 
they would cede enough territory to the Poles and 
pay a large enough indemnity •••• We preach that 
this is a war for Russian independence; when we 
assert that we are employing in this war every 
available source of aid, not primarily to defend 
the Soviet Government and Communism, but to 
defend the independence of Russia •••• The moment 
the Entente backed up the Polish reactionaries, 
it made implacable enemies of the Russian reac-
tionaries. The Soviet government is defending 
the unity and independence of th~8territory inhabited by the Russian nation. 
As a result of th.e new nationalistic line, many 
Russian conservatives -- fo_rm.erly sympathetic to the "whiten 
Russian c-ause, but now with no other way to turn were 
able to climb on the Soviet band-wagon without loss of 
patriotic ttfa.ce". The most notable conversion achieved in 
this connection was that of General A. A. Brusilov, the 
47cf. Pravda, May 18, 1920, p. 1. 
48Translated in Living Age, September 11, 1920, 
pp. 635-638. 
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former commander 1n chief of the Russian Army. On May 2, 
1920, a special military council, headed by Brusilov, and 
composed of other ~ormer Tsarist officers, was organized 
and attached to the Red Army's General Staff. Ostensibly, 
its function was to render military advice, but its actual 
service wa~ contained in its symbolization of the union of 
Communism and Russian nationalism. It prompted still other 
Russian conservatives to offer their services and helped to 
weld peoples of all social categories together for the 
single purpose of defending Russia against the Poles. 49 
Another way in which Lenin exploited the national 
idea to advantage during the war with Poland was his formal 
recognition of the Menshevik government as the legitimate 
government of Georgia and to promise to honor the Georgian 
right to national self-determination. Both were incorporated 
into a treaty, signed on May 7, 1920.5° For this gesture, 
which represented nothing more than sheer opportunism on 
Lenin's part, Georgia's formal recognition of both the 
Russian and Azerbaijanian soviet regimes was obtained. It 
49cf. L. Trotski, Kak voorizhalas revoliutsiia na 
veonnoi rabote (How the Revolution Armed Itself for War 
Service) (Moskva: Visskii voennii radaktsionnii sovet-, 
1923~1925), II, pp. 100-102; Chamberlin, op. cit., II, 
p. 302. 
50cf. Kliuchnikov i Sabanin., op. cit., III, i, 
pp. 22-23. 
served to stabilize the Transcauaasion front for the 
duration of the war with Poland, for it meant that the 
Soviet strategists did not have to concern themselves 
with the problem of Georgia's possible use as a base 
'· 
for an attack by the Western Powers. Furthermore, the 
recognition of Soviet Azerbaijan by the Georgian Mensheviks, 
they being the Transcaucasians who enjoyed the greatest 
prestige in the West, solidified the Communist grip on 
that state. And, finally, this same act of recognition 
also served to becloud the circumstances under which the 
new Azerbaijanian regime had been born and, consequently, 
permitted plans for a repetition of the tactic elsewhere 
as soon as conditions permitted. In Short, what Lenin had 
done was to garb expediency in the cloth of.moral principle 
once again, and with characteristic success. 
With this psychological reinforcement, the Red Army 
was able to halt the Polish advance and then to mount an 
offensive that took it well into Poland. Only French assis-
tance to the Poles, together with Marshal Tukhachevski's 
tactica~ blunder around Warsaw, saved Poland from a stunning 
def'eat. On O~tober 12, 1920, S\tl( armistice and p..:rel.iminary 
peace treaty ended the con:rl1ct.51 .BY its terms~ Foland 
5lc:r. The New York Times, October 12, 1920, p. 1. 
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got West Ukraine, which had been part of the Austrian 
Empire before the World War, and the western portion of 
Belorussia. For Moscow, it meant recognition by Poland, 
confirmation of its grip on the Ukraine and the remainder 
of Belorussia, and freedom to pur?ue the course of conquest 
further in the borderlands, particularly in Transcaucasia. 
Actually, conditions favorable to renewed aggression 
in Transcaueasia materialized much sooner than Lenin pro-
bably expected. That was due to a sudden turn of events 
in Turkey. In October, 1920, while the settling of accounts 
with the Poles was still in progress, Mustafa Kemal, the 
leader of a successful Turkish nationalist revolution, 
reacted to the harsh terms of the Allied-Lmposed Treaty of 
Sevres by invading Armenia. His avowed purpose was to 
reclaim by force the Turkish territory ceded to Armenia 
under the terms of the treaty. But apparently the ease 
with which he accomplished it prompted Kemal to seek even 
more; for the continued advance of the Turkish troops 
eastward made it obvious that the goal was all of Armenia. 
The immediate Soviet reaction to this unexpected 
development was profound concern lest Armenia be lost 
altogether. Implied warnings to the Turkish leader, 
embodied in such expressions as that of "friendly feelings 
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for the Armenian people 11 and udeep concern" for their 
threatened national sovereignty, were emitted.52 But 
it took no time at all for Lenin to recognize that Kemal's 
action not only posed a threat to the Soviet interest, but 
presented an opportunity as well. The Turkish invasion of 
Armenia was an ideal pretext for a countermove of similar 
character. In such case, the principle ot national self-
determination could be much more effectively exploited than 
when applied solely in conjunction with the artificial 
military-revolutionary committee. Thus, late in November, 
1920, as the Turks poised for the complete conquest of 
Armenia, the Red Army, accompanied by an Armenian national 
military-revolutionary committee, swept westward from 
Azerbaijan to take the city of Erivan and to proclaim the 
establishment of the "independent Soviet Republic of 
.Armenian. On December 3, after the new regime signed a 
treaty of alliance with Moscow, it terminated the war with 
Kema1.53 For his trouble, the Turkish leader retained the 
territory occupied by his forces. But the lion's share 
went to the Communists, who got the rest of Armenia and 
52cf. B. A. Borian, Armeniia, Mezhdunarodnaia 
Diplomatiia i SSSR (Armenia, International Diplomacy and 
the U.S.S.R.) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1928-
1929), II, pp. 119-120. 
53cr. Ibid., p. 124; Kliuobnikov 1 Sabanin, op. cit., 
III, i, p. 75. 
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the immediate recognition or the new soviet regime. 
It took oniy two additional months ror Lenin to 
complete his task in Transcaucasia, and ror the Georgian 
Mensheviks to discover just how bad a bargain they had 
struck in the preceding spring.. On February 11, 1921, 
in a modified version or the basic pattern, a Communist-
sponsored rebellion broke out in the Lori district or 
Georgia, near the Armenian border. Two days later, a 
Georgian Communist military-revolutionary committee, 
without attempting to march on Tiflis," pr0claimed the 
establishment of the nindependent Soviet Republic or 
Georgia" and appealed to Moscow for assistance.54 To 
this request, relates the Soviet historian Khachapuridze, 
the latter replied by order&ng the Eleventh Red Army, still 
under Kirov and Ordzhonikidze, trto the assistance or the 
Georgian people n. 55 On February 25, Tirlis was captured .. 
Three weeks later, hostilities were rormally terminated by 
a treaty signed by the representatives of·the dereated 
Menshevik government, the Georgian military-revolutionary 
committee, and the Soviet Russian government.56 
54cf. Kliuchnikov i Sabanin, op. cit., III, i, p. 87. 
·55G. v. Khachapuridze, Bolsheviki Gruzii v boiakh za 
pobedu sovetskoi vlasti (The Georgian Bolsheviks in the Strug-
gle ror the Victory of Soviet Power) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe 
· izdatelstvo, 1951) , p. 235. 
56 6 cr. Ibid., p. 23 -237. 
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The action against Georgia marked the end of the 
first phase of the Soviet conquest of the non-Russian 
border regions of the former Russian Empire. It meant 
that practiwally all of the former empire had been won 
for Communism; a triumph of the first magnitude, to say 
the least.57 Military force had been the essential 
feature, but the exploitation of the national idea had 
served as its vital complement. Though to measure the 
latter's contribution precisely would be speculative at 
best, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that it 
accounted largely for the fact that the initial establish-
ment of Soviet power in the border regions evoked no note-
worthy protests in the West.58 At any rate, Lenin believed 
that the national idea had helped significantly, and he did 
not intend to curtail its use in connection with subsequent 
actions. 
57The exceptions consisted of Poland and the Baltic 
States, which were formally recognized by Moscow in 1920; 
the western portion of Belorussia, which went to Poland; 
Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin, which went to Turkey; and Besse 
arabia, which Rumania had seized on April 8, 1918. 
58rndicative of the uncertainty in the West con-
cerning events in Transcaucasia was the report of the 
British Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Cecil Harmsworth, 
to the House of Commons on March 9, 1921. He reported merely 
that Tiflis had been occupied by n.Armenian forces 11 • Cf. 
The Parliamentary Debatesa Fifth Series (London: H. M. 
Stationary Office, 1922), Volume 139, cols. 476-477. 
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The First Successes of Lenin's Eastern Policy. 
At the same time that the conquest of Transcaucasia was 
being completed, Lenin's diplomatic offensive in the East 
began to bear its first fruit. For example, in February, 
1921, apparently having convinced Amanullah Khan that 
Soviet intentions in the East were not revolutionary, 
Lenin got the Afghan leader to sign a treaty of friendship.59 
It was not all he wanted, since the latter refused to take 
aides definitely against the British; but it was enough to 
stimulate Soviet hopes. Commenting on the treaty, the 
Soviet historian I. P. Trainin had the following to say: 
The recent treaty with Afghanistan will 
undoubtedly be of great value in the consoli-
dation of our political influence in the East. 
Two viewpoints have opposed one another in 
the East and continue to do so. One is the 
Soviet viewpoint and the other is the Entente 
(chiefly the British) viewpoint. 
England, in an attempt to protect her 
colonies from infectious Bolshevism, has done 
everything possible to turn the Near Eastern 
countries against us. English diplomats in 
59cf. Leonard Shapiro, (comp. and ed.), Soviet 
Treaty Series: A Collection of Bilateral Treaties, 
reements and Conventions Concluded Between the Soviet 
Union and Forei n Powers 1 1 -l 2 Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, l950 , pp. 96-97. In the 
following month, the Afghan ruler also signed a treaty 
of alliance with London. 
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Afghanistan and Persia have fomented intrigues 
against us. England has even tried to send 
troops there, definitely and unmistakable to 
deal a blow when the opportunity presented 
itself •••• 
While we were engaged at the (civil war) 
front, our chances were about equal. To the 
broad masses of the adjoining states, our Soviet 
regime was unknown •••• However, the prestige of 
the Soviet federation in the East has grown, for 
our victory made possible the self-determination 
of the Eastern peoples united with us. And it 
has become clear that we are not interested in 
the economic exploitation of those peoples, but, 
on the contrary, only in the alliance with them 
for a struggle against our common enemy, world 
imperialism. 
Since then, and without exaggeration, we are 
proud to say that our Eastern policy has contin-
ued to acquire greater weight on the international 
political scale and that the initiative has passed 
to us. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Thus, by advancing along the designated path 
and consolidating our political gains, we shall 
bring about the complete breakdown of the imper-
ialist policy in the East6and the triumph of the international revolution. 
It was not long after that that the prophetic 
quality of those words achieved a significant measure of 
confirmation; in Iran. As neted before, Lenin's policy 
with respect to Iran had reached the point where, in 
6°r. P. Trainin, '~ dogovorov a Afghanistanom," 
("Concerning the Treaty with Afghanistan") Zhizn Natsion-
alnostei (Life of the Nationalities), No. 7, 1921, pp. l-2. 
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October, 1920, Mushir-ud-Dowleh had requested negotia-
tions with Moscow. These commenced in Moscow on the twenty-
fifth of October. However, a week later, they were suspended 
when British pressure forced the moderate Iranian nationalist 
to relinquish his post. 
For three months thereafter, Teheran was the scene 
of political strife. Sephadar, the pro-British politician 
who had succeeded Mushir-ud-Dowleh, attempted to convene the 
Iranian parliament for the purpose of ratifying the still 
pending treaty with the British. His efforts, however, 
were blocked by the nationalists, who feared that the country 
might be turned into a battlefield of opposing British and 
Soviet armies. As for Lenin, he continued to play with two 
strings to his tactical bow, utilizing Kuchik and the threat 
of revolution, on the one hand, and encouraging the nation-
alists with offers of a compromise, on the other. 
The upshot was the development of the very type event 
sought by the Soviet leader. In February, 1921, Colonel 
Riza Khan, a staunch anti-British nationalist, seized power 
in Teheran. And among his first acts were the formal 
repudiation of the pending treaty with Great Britain and 
the resumption of negotiations with Soviet Russia. 
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A Soviet-Iranian treaty was signed on February 26, 
1921. 61 Briefly, ita provisions included the cancellation 
of all debts owed Huaaia by Iran, and a ringing condemna-
tion of imperialism. Moreover, both agreed to refrain 
from interfering in the internal affairs of the other and 
to prohibit the formation or presence of any organization 
or group of persons on the respective territories hostile 
toward the other. Finally, and most important from Moscow's 
standpoint, Riza Khan agreed to permit the Russians consid-
erable discretion in connection with the problem of hostile 
third forces: 
••• if a third party should attempt to carry out 
a policy of usurpation by means of armed inter-
vention in Persia, or if such Power should desire 
to use Persian territory as a base of operations 
against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should 
threaten the frontiers of Federated Russia or 
those of its Allies and if the Persian Govern-
ment should not be able to put a atop to such 
menace after having been once called upon to do 
so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to 
advance her troops into the Persian interior for 
the purpose of carrying out military operations 
necessary for its defense. 
The term~ of the treaty included no specific reference 
to the foreign troops already on Iranian soil. However, two 
days later, when Teheran inquired about the Soviet promises 
with respect to Kuchik's republic in Gilan, Moscow replied 
by invoking the treaty and declaring the British to be a 
~1cf. Kliuchnikov i Sabanin, op. cit., III, pp. 89-91. 
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force on Iranian soil hostile to it, and made the evacuation 
of the Azerbaijanian Red Army conditional on their departure.62 
This worked also, for, by September, 1921, all British and 
Soviet forces were out of Iran. 
Needless to say, the Soviet withdrawal marked the 
abandonment of Kuohik Khan as well. Having helped to keep 
Iranian politics unstable long enough to permit the emergence 
of a strongly nationalistic regime, Kuohik now represented 
an obstacle in the ~ay of cordial relations with Iran. 
Thus, in characteristic fashion, Lenin east aside the hapless 
revolutionary, leaving him to his own devices. Not sur-
prisingly they proved to be inadequate. In October, 1921, 
Kuchik was captured by Riza Khan's troops, tried for treason, 
and decapitated. Two years later, one Soviet writer curtly 
summed up Kuohik's importance as follows: 
The revolutionary movement in Gilan was fed 
mainly on the slogan nAway with the Britishn. 
Once· the British troops were evacuated from 
Persia, the movement definitely began to 
slow down. 0 3 
That a basically anti-nationalistic regime should 
have engaged in the task of compelling a fundamentally 
??cr. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 288. 
63s. Iranski,· "Sovetskaia Rossiia i Persiia" (Soviet 
Russia and Persian), Novi Vostok ·(The New East), No. 4, 1923, 
p. 218. 
nationalistic one to be even more nationalistic than it 
wanted to be was indeed paradoxical. But it was the type 
of paradox from which the Soviet leaders were able to 
derive significant benefits. In a sense, the diplomatic 
victory over the British in Iran was comparable to the 
Communists~ achievement in the Ukraine back in the summer 
of 1917. In both instances, skillful exploitati:cn of 
the national idea actually compelled the local-regimes 
into more nationalistic postures than they were willing 
to assume. 64 The latest success, however, was by far the 
more dramatic, having been achieved despite such obstacles 
as the ini~~al hostility of the local regime, the absence 
of a large local Communist organization, and the greater 
power of the enemy against whom the whole effort was 
directed. It marked a decisive confirmation of the utility 
of the national idea as an instrument of policy and, of 
course, another tribute to Lenin's skill in applying it. 
64with respect to this point, one authoritative 
account of the Iranian situation concludes as follows: 
11 The combination Communist propaganda and pressure was 
irresistible. Persian nationalists, listening to Soviet 
manifestoes and deciding that Russian imperialism consti-
tuted a lesser threat to their aims than British, gradually 
obtained the upper hand in Tehera.n •••• n K. W. B. Middleton 
Britain and Russia: An Historical Essay (London: Hutchin-
So~, 1~47), p. 126. 
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Additional confirmation of those facts was evidenced 
in the impact of the events in Iran on Soviet re~ations with 
the British, who, both apprehensive about the effects of 
Communist propaganda in the East and anxious to take advan-
tage of the Soviet trade offers, agreed to serious nego-
tiations concerning their differences. As a result, a 
treaty was signed on ~arch 16, 1921.65 B~ its terms, Anglo-
Soviet trade relations were established; which also meant 
British de facto recognition of Soviet Russia.66 But most 
significant from a political standpoint, however, was a 
preliminary provision in which the propaganda issue was set-
tled. According to it: 
95~96. 
••• each party refrains from hostile action or 
undertakings against the other and from conducting 
outside of its own borders any official propa-
ganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions 
of the British Empire or of the Russian Soviet 
Republic respectively, and more particularly that 
the Russian Soviet Government refrains from any 
attempt by military of diplomatic,or any other 
form of action or propaganda to encourage any of 
the peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action 
against British interests or the British Empire, 
especially in India and in the independent state 
of Afghanistan. The British Government gives a 
similar particular undertaking to tl;te Russian 
Soviet Government in respect to the countries which 
formed part of the former Russian Empire and which 
have now become independent. · 
65cf. Kliuabnikov i Sabanin, op. cit., III, i, pp. 
66This was ~onfirmed on May 12, 1921, by a British 
court. Cf. The New York Times, May 13, 1921, p. 4. 
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While the above provision of the treaty was pur-
ported to deal with the propaganda issue exclusively, 
its implications were much more profound. The key sen-
tence was the last one, in which the British accepted the 
independent status of the soviet regimes in the border 
regions. No distinction was drawn between such non-
soviet parts as Poland and the Baltic States and the 
republics established under the protection of the Red 
Ar-my. What this meant, of course, was the the British 
had formally accepted the Communists' definition of their 
own aggression as acts of national liberation. Further-
more~ for the single price of promising to refrain from 
the dissemination of revolutionary propanganda in the 
East -- a promise that would be kept only as long as it 
was useful to do so -- Moscow obtained a free hand in 
dealing with the nindependenttt republics further. 
At this point, it would appear almost trite to say 
that Lenin had scored another smashing victory at no 
price whatever. As a. matter of fact, it was on the very 
same day that the treaty.was signed in London that Lenin's 
next move to force the British out of Asia was taking shape. 
It consisted of a nfriendship treaty" with Turkey, which 
was signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921. 67 In it, each 
~:cr. Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 100-102. 
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party agreed to the right of the other to self-determin-
ation and to the common cause against imperialism. Also 
mentioned was the desire to establish 
••• contact between the national movements 
for the liberation of the Eastern peoples 
and the struggle of the workers in Russia •••• 
and the recognition of 
••• the right of those (Eastern) nations to 
freedom and independence, and their right to 
choose a form of government according to 
their wishes. 
Other clauses dealt with the boundary separating Turkey 
from Transcaucasia. In this connection, Batum was trans-
ferred to Georgia, while Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin went 
to Turkey. 68 Finally, an agreement was made to the effect 
that the Straits issue would be settled only by a confer-
ence of all states bordering on the Black Sea. 69 
68An illuminating sidelight on the Leninist policy, 
and indicative of the Soviet leader's stubborn faith in 
the importance of exploiting the national idea in his own 
way, was the fact that the treaty was concluded despite 
Kema:h's undisguised anti-Communism. Even the latter's 
~xecution of seventeen leading Turkish Communists, in 
February, 1921, d~d·not prevent it. Cf. M. L. Veltman 
(M. Pavlovich), Revoliutsionnaia Turtsiia (Revolutionary 
Turkey) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1921), 
pp. 120-123. 
69Kemal late·r reneged on this point. Though aided 
by the Soviet leaders in establishing himself firmly in 
~urkey, he wisely sought a rapprochement with the West, 
permitting the European Powers to participate in the 
deliberations on the Straits issue, in the winter of. 1922-
• 
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The ~ediate importance.of the Soviet-Turkish 
treaty was contained in the imp~ementation of that part 
estab~ishing a common effort against imperialism, parti-
cular~y against British imperialism. It commenced in the 
fall of 192~, fo~~owing an invasion of Turkish territory 
in the west by British-subsidized Greek forces. Thus 
presented with the opportunity to go to the defense of a 
weak Asian nation strugg~ing to assert its independence 
against imperia~ist aggression, and contrary to the promise 
not to encourage any of the peop~es of the East against 
British interests, Moscow dispatched aid to Kemal in the 
form of munitions and mi~itary advisers. In December, ~92~, 
Mikhail Frunze, who had just returned from his mi~itary 
mission in Central Asia. was sent to Ankara under the 
guise of a dip~omatic representative of the Ukraine.7° With 
L923, and favoring their plan for a comprehensive convention. 
Cf. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Lausanne Conference 
Near Eastern Affairs l 22-~ 2 • Records of Proceedi s and 
Draft Terms of Peace London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1923 , 
pp. 272, 450-451, 454-456. 
70The evidence concerning Frunze's actual role is 
scanty. The most reliable source is Louis Fischer's account, 
which relates that Frunze's "··· short visit of twenty-three 
days (in Ankara) was used to arrange for heavy shipments of 
Russian munitions and for mapping out a detailed plan of 
campaign against the Greeks, in which, if need be, Red 
office·rs would participate. 11 Fis.cher, op. cit., I, p. 393. 
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this help, KemaJ. was able to launch a successful offensive 
against the Greeks in May, 1922. His complete victory was 
registered the following September, when the British agreed 
to negotiate with him on his own terms. Thus once again 
did Lenin help to deny the British a foothold along the 
southern periphery of Asia. 
The Soviet Conquests Solidified. The complete elimin-
ation of BritiSh forces from those Near Eastern countries 
on the Soviet southern flank made the task of solidifying 
the conquest of the border regions much easier than other-
wise would have been the case. Nevertheless, still concerned 
about developing foreign interests, in both Europe and Asia, 
Lenin was prudent about pushing the process to ita logical 
conclusion. For example, all soviet republics retained 
their "independencen for the time being. In the Ukraine, 
the Borotbisti continued as part of the "coalitiontt there, 
while, in Belorussia, Zhilonovich was coaxed into accepting 
the leadership of the now Lithuania-lees republic. In 
Armenia, a few left-wing Dashnaks accepted a Communist offer 
of a coalition, while, in Georgia, some Mensheviks did the 
same~ Oharacteristic of the care exercised by Lenin in 
this connection were his instructions to the Georgian 
Communists concerning the importance of the coalition device: 
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It is extremely important to seek an 
acceptable compromise for a coalition with 
Jordania, or other such Mensheviks, who 
before the rebellion (sic) were not com-
pletely opposed to the idea of a soviet 
regime in Georgia under certain conditions. 
I must remind you that the internal and 
international position or Georgia requires 
or the Georgian Communists not the application 
of the Russian stereotype, but rather an 
original tactic, founded on greater eon-
cessions to the petty bourgeois elements.71 
The nindependentn status of the Far Eastern 
Republic and the ttpeoples' Republicstt of Kb.iva and 
Bukhara also remained unchanged. However, there was one 
notable change effected in Central Asia. On April 11, 
1921, treaties with both Iran and Afghanistan having been 
concluded, a Turkestan .Soviet Socialist Republic was 
created as an autonomous unit of the Russian republic.72 
In reality, the first step toward the unification 
or all soviet republics was already in process. On Septem-
ber 20 and December 28, 1920, for example, treaties had been 
signed between Moscow and the Azerbaijani and Ukrainian 
regimes. On January 16, 1921, Belorussia was added to the 
list, and, on the following May 21 and September 30, 
Georgia and Armenia completed it.73 
71Lenin, op. cit., XXVI, pp. 187-188. 
72cr. Izvestiia, April 12, 1921, p. 1. 
73significantly, all or those treaties were published 
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All treaties were alike in their essential features. 
Each was signed by the respective Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs in the manner of established international rules 
of procedure. Their preambles contained statements of 
acceptance of the right of all nations to self-determin-
ation and affirmations of the independence and sovereignty 
of the contracting parties. Beyond this, the documents 
were devoted to the implementation of an accepted task 
of nuniting for defense and economic constructionu. .And 
what this meant was the creation of "joint commissariatsn 
to deal with such matters as military and naval affairs, 
national economy, foreign trade, finance, labor, communi-
cations, and posts and telegraphs. In all other matters, 
the jurisdiction of each was said to be exclusive. 
Further progress in the solidification of Russian 
control was recorded on April 9, 1921, when Lenin instructed 
Ordzhonikidze to establish a single economic administration. 
In the following Novemper, this was extended to include 
in a volume containing treaties with "foreign governm.entsrr. 
Cf. RSFSR, Sbornik Deistvuiushchikh Dosovorov, Soglashenii 
i Konventsii Zakliuchennikh RSFSR s Inostrannimi Gosudarstvami 
(A Collection of Effective Treaties, Agreements and Conventions 
·Concluded b the R.S.F.S.R. with Forei n Governments Moscow: 
Narkomindel, 193 , I, pp. 191 ; II, pp. 5- ; Kliuchnikov i 
Saba.nin, op. cit., III; 1, pp. 22-23. 
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political unification as welr.74 Then, in December, a 
veiled move toward general integration was undertaken. 
Apparently without invitation, delegates from the five 
nsovereignrr sister republics took seats at the Ninth lUI-
Russian Congress of Soviets in Moscow. Thereupon, the 
Congress, noting the action as a "voluntaryrr choice on 
their part to have representation in the supreme legisla-
tive organ of the Russian republic, approved their admission 
and voted a corresponding increase in the membership of 
the Central Executive Committee.75 
Lenin's gradualist approach to unification, with its 
voluntaristic facade, paid a dividen4 also, for it helped 
to eliminate an important obstacle to full political inbe-
gration of the Russian and non-RUssian Soviet Republics. 
This developed on January 6, 1922, when the Supreme Allied 
Council, apparently following the British lead 1n accepting 
Communism's pseudo respect for national rights at face value, 
put a general stamp of approval on the Soviet conquests. It 
extended to Moscow an invitation to attend a general 
~4cf. Lenin, op. cit., XXVI, p. 191; L. Beria, 
-On the Histor of the Bolshevik Or anizations in Transcau-
casia London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1939 , pp. 17 -175. 
75cf. A. Ia. Vishinskii, (ed.), Sezdi Sovetov RSFSR 
v Postenovleniiakh (The Co~resses of the Soviets of the 
R.S.F.S.R. in Resolutions) Moskva: 11 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo 
Soveta RSFSR,n 1939), p. 219. 
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Economic and Financial Conference at Genoa, but without 
sending the same invitation to the other soviet repub-
lics as we11. 76 
As far as Lenin was concerned, the latter omission 
constituted an invitation of another sort, and he acted 
accordingly. With familiar dispatch, an agreement was 
drawn up between all of the soviet republics, the terms 
of which gave the Russians full responsibility for the 
foreign interests of all not only at the forthcoming 
conference, but in the case of 
••• all international agreements of any kind 
directly or indirectly connected with this 
conference, with states ~epresented at the 
conference, and with anJ other states, and to 
take all measures resulting therefrom.77 
Thus, fa~ all practical purposes, the obstacle of Western 
opinion was overcome. And it goes without saying that no 
time at all was lost in taking advantage of the opportunity 
afforded. On November 10, 1922, the Far Eastern Republic 
proclaimed its own incorporation into the Russian republic.78 
In the following month, with the Russians acting conspicu-
ously ·last, each of the soviet republics passed a resolution 
77RSFSR, Narodni komissariat po inostrannim delam, 
op. cit., III, pp. l-3. 
78af. Kliuchnikov 1 Sabanin, op. cit., III, 1, p. 206. 
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declaring in favor of a union of all.79 
The Leninist Policy Develops Another Snag. The 
full details of the inteJration of the bo~erland regions 
under Soviet Russian domination need not be specified here, 
since they are properly within the scope of a study of 
internal Soviet politics. However, one aspect of that 
process is relevant to our purpose here. It is contained 
in the fact that the final step in the integration of the 
soviet republics into a single political entity was marked 
by a fresh outburst of "righttt nationalist deviationism. 
It illustrated more clearly than before this particular 
danger inherent in the exploitation of the national idea 
in foreign policy. 
By 1923, the evidence to support the conclusion 
that Soviet exploitation of the national idea for tactical 
reasons could breed its own difficulties was not inconsider-
able. As we have already seen in the cases of Piatakov, 
Zhilonovich, and the Asian Communists, the vacillation 
between nationalism and internationalism, however expedient, 
could have a .very profound impact upon non-Russian Communists. 
And to this list had been added three more names during 
79cf. s. s. Studenikina, {ed.,), Istoriia sovetskoi 
Konstitutsii v dokumentakh (The History of the Soviet 
Constitution in Documents (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatelstvo, 1957), pp. 233-242. 
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1921-1922. Following the example set by Zhilonovieh, 
two Georgian Communists, Filip Makharadze and Budu 
Mdivani, had protested strenuously against the orders 
to finite the Transcaucasian states economically and 
politically. 80 The third name had been that of a Tatar 
Communist, Mirza Sultan-Galiev, who had voiced strong 
objections to what he had conceived as an untoward 
development of Russian influence in the Moslem regions. 81 
But the single moat serious manifestation of 
nationalist deviationism among the non-Russian members 
of the Soviet Communist Party was that which occurred 
early in 1923, when the final preparations for the union 
of all republics was taking place. Fallowing the creation 
of a Russian-dominated constitutional commission, on 
January 10, 1923, for example, the Ukrainian Communist 
l'eaders, Khristian Rakovski and Mikol a Skripnik, and the 
8°ct. Beria, op. cit., pp. 170-173, 175-177. 
81Ultimately, the Tatar Communist arrived at the 
conclusion that the Marxist priority to "great" nations 
was invalid. His solution was that the backward nations 
should be given hegemony over the industrialized ones, 
and that the Communist International should be balanced 
by a "Colonial International". Cf. A. Arshurani i Kh. 
Gabidullin, Ocherki panislamizm 1 pantiurkizma v Rosaii 
(Sketches of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russiai}: 
((Moskva): "Bezdozhnik", 1931), pp. 78-79. 
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Belorussian, Zhilonovich, drew up separate drafts of a 
constitution, in which they emphasized the principle of 
equality of all major nationalities composing the state.82 
Then, at the Twelfth Party Congress, held in Moscow, in 
April, 1923, the anti-Russian argument was pressed with 
utmost vigor when it was learned that no alternative to 
the strictest centralism was to be allowed. Skripnik led 
the attack by accusing the Russians of using the Red Army 
for the russification of the Ukrainian people, and bU de-
manding as proof of good faith the reorganization of the 
Red .. :: Army, the Communist Party, and the trade unions into 
separate national components. 83 And he was seconded by 
Zhilonovieh, Makharadze, Mdivani, and Rakovski, the latter 
also hurling the threat of civil war if the demands were 
not met: 
Comrades, this is one of those questions 
that is fraught with very serious complica-
tions for Soviet Russia~·,and the Party.. This 
is one of those questions which -~ this must 
be said openly and honestly at a Party Congress 
82cf. v. I. Ignatiev, Sovetskii Stroi (The Soviet 
Regime) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe ·izdatelstvo, 1928), I, 
pp. 123-137. 
J.57 
threatens civil war if we fail to show the 
necessary understanding with regard to it. 
It is the question of the bond of the revol-
utionary Russian proletariat with sixty 
million non-Russian peasants, who, under the 
national banner, raise their demands for a 
share in the econgmic and political life of 
the Soviet Union. 4 
Such an explosive outburst in defense of the 
national interest by non-Russian Communists was indeed 
remarkable. On the surface, it appeared not at all unlike 
a simple manifestation of the patriotic urge, to which 
most are susceptible by virtue of group ties established 
during the formative years. And yet it appears that, 
under the circumstances, its event was not merely a matter 
of fundamental psychology. Militating against so simple 
an explanation was the fact that not in all cases could 
the rebels be properly labeled radical nationalists, or 
opportunists who had joined the ranks of Marxists only 
after 1917. To the contrary, most were "old Bolsheviks", 
whose loyalty to Leninist Marxism could be traced back 
to the pre-revolutionary period. Some, including Mdivani, 
Makharadze, and Rakovski, at one point had even been 
critics of Lenin's views on the nationality question for 
the reason of their seeming concessions to nationalism. 
The full meaning of the developed nationalist ten-
84Ibid., pp. 529-530. 
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dency among the non-Russian Communists can be understood 
only against the background of the Leninist regard for 
the national issue. For one thing, its basic assumption 
that the nationality problem was solely an aspect of 
capitalist economics had had the effect of preventing a 
realistic appraisal of it prior to 1917. The adamant 
refusal to give countenance to the problem except in 
the strictest Marxian terms, despite the fragmentation 
of West European socialism in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century and a similar development in Austria 
and Russia in the twentieth, had served to deny all 
Communists of even an inkling of what should be done in 
the event that the r~volution in Russia failed to provide 
the solution in one quick stroke. Secondly, though events 
in post-revolutionary Russia completely shattered the 
validity of this premise, there occurred no opportunity 
to seek a practical way o~t of the doctrinal myopia. It 
had been prevented by defensive needs, particularly for 
the reason that Lenin sought to satisfy those needs under 
the guise of champion of national rights. Thus, instead 
of a solution to the dilemma of the contradiction between 
theory and reality, the non-Russian Communists had been 
forced into wild and prolonged espousals of the very 
antithesis of their fundamental faith. Finally, they had 
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next been shouldered with the responsibility of governing 
effectively the nindependent" soviet republics after 
having whipped up the national feelings of the peoples 
inhabiting them. 
All things considered, a rrright 11 reaction by some 
non-Russian Communists should have occasioned no real 
surprise in 1923. Having made the necessary ideological 
adjustment to fulfill the requirements of Soviet Russia's 
defense, they now found it difficult to return to pure 
internationalism as abruptly as the Russian leaders wished. 
Indeed, after more than five years of continuous champion-
ship of national rights, it was not easy to find in Marx-
ism's centralist and assimilationist tenets the justifi-
cation for Moscow's seemingly summary action. Moreover, 
it was nearly as diffi.cul t to dismiss lightly the striking 
resemblance between the Soviet Russian policy and the 
policy toward the border regions pursued by the successive 
Tsars. Against the background of Western capitalism's 
diminishing t~eat, which both lessened the need for 
strictest discipline and afforded an opportunity for the 
demonstration of good faith demanded, Moscow's dictates 
bore ominous implications. 
There is no evidence that Lenin ever did come to 
grips with the problem that his own vaeilaatmon between 
160 
nationalism and internationalism had created. Nowhere 
can there be found evidence that he took aside his non-
Russian followers in order to explain to them that 
Communist internationalism was the only guiding principle 
in fact and that the support of nationalist aspirations 
was purely expedient aad was not to be taken seriously. 
It is possible that the Russian leader simply took it 
for granted that they would understand the meaning of 
his policy. More likely, however, is the conclusion 
drawn by Richard Pipes, which holds that Lenin1 s faith 
in the curative powers of socialism, in the assumption 
that nationalism would disappear along with capitalism, 
rendered him blind to the need for remedial action, 
except to caution the Russian Communists not to appear to 
be "chauvinists'• in their dealings with their non-Russian 
brothers.85 
In any case, one thing is clear: Lenin was too 
satisfied with the results of the exploitation of the 
national idea, and too hopeful about the prospects of 
its success in the East, to even consider abandoning it 
as a tactical device. If a choice had to be made in 1923 
between the continued use of .the device and strict adher-
85 . Cf. Pipes, op. cit., p. 285. 
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ence to the centralist principle, he was prepared to make 
it in ravor or the rormer. As he explained in a rinal, 
unpublished, article on the national question, a copy or 
which has been preserved by Trotski: 
The harm which can berall our government 
rrom the absence or uniried national 
commissariats with the Russian apparatus 
will be incomparably smaller, inrinitely 
smaller, than that harm which can berall 
not only us but also the hundreds or millions 
in Asia who in the near ruture are to enter 
the stage of history in our wake. It would 
be unrorgiyable opportunism ir, on the eve 
of the emergence or the East and at the 
beginning or its awakening, we should undermine 
our prestige there with even the slightest 
rudeness or injustice to our own minorit1es. 86 
For the moment at least, the promise or rurther anti-
Western nationalist rebellions in the East overshadowed 
even the problem or solidirying the Soviet world. 
Lenin was unable to attend the Twelrth Party 
Congress, at which the national issue was debated so 
seriously. He was already disabled by the two strokes or 
arterioscleratic paralysis that would lead to his death 
within a year. Stalin took his place as the party 
spokesman on the subject, and, as the record reveals, the 
Georgian demonstrated that he had made signiricant progress 
in coping with the nationality problem since his rirst, 
86 Quoted in Ibid., p. 277 • 
. -
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fitrul, start back in 1913. For example, he displayed 
tactical ability and a sense of timing that bore the 
Leninist trade mark. After disarming his rebellious 
colleagues from the borderlands with a candid admission 
of guilt of chauvinism and by sponsoring a resolution 
condemning it, he turned the whole argument back against 
them, labelling their demands equally chauvinistic. 
Singling out the Georgians and Ukrainians particularly, 
Stalin charged them with putting their own national 
interests ahead of all others. 87 And to this he added 
some appropriate anti-nationalistic qu0tations from 
Lenin's writings and a concluding appeal to all for 
mutual confidence and party solidarity. 88 
Reinforced by a number of nconcessionsn to the 
border regions -- which included the formation of national 
militias, equal status for all major nationalities in a 
second chamber of the All-Union Central Executiv~ Committee, 
the Council of Nationalities, and an affirmation of the 
right of secession-- Stalin's appeals for unity produced 
the desired results. Formal instructions were drawn up for 
the constitutional commission. On July 26, 1923, the 
87An English translation of Stalin's remarks are 
to be found in Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National 
Question (New York: International Publishers, 1942), 
pp. 148-149, 159. 
88cf. Ibid., P• 161 
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completed document was submitted for approval. Though 
formal ratification by the All-Union Congress of Soviets 
wss not obtained until January 31, 1924, the Constitution 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics actually became 
effective on the earlier date. 
Despite the admission of chauvinism and the con-
cessions made, Stalin's demeanor suggested a new approach 
to the pr~blem of Communist nationalist deviationism. 
As compared to Lenin's "soft" policy, which invariably 
meant excusing the deviationist tendency as a natural 
mistake, Stalinns was nhard''. His condemnation of the 
Georgians and Ukrainians had been a bitter one, much more 
so than Lenin's had ever been. And, soon after the 
meeting, he admitted that he had had Sultan-Galiev 
arrested.89 Furthermore, Stalin saw to it that Makharadze 
and Mdivani were prevented from returning to Georgia; they 
were "reassignedrr to duties in Moscow instead.9° The 
rest were permitted to return home, but, even in their 
cases, the last word had yet to be spoken. Addressing 
the Fourth Conference of the Communist Party, on June 10, 
89cf. Stalin, op. cit., v, p. 305. 
9°cf. Beria, op.cit., pp. 175-177. 
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1923, Stalin had the following to say: 
We must whip up the Rights in order to 
make them, in order to teach them, to fight 
nationalism, so as to forge real·communist 
cadres from among the local people. But we 
must also lash the nLefts" in order to teach 
them to be flexible and to maneuver skill-
fully, so as to win over the broad masses of 
the population. All this is essential be-
cause, as comrade Khodzhanov correctly 
remarked, the truth lies "between ths; twou, 
between the Rights and the "Leftsn.9J.. 
While Stalin·f:·s nhard" approach to the problem was 
an alternative to Lenin's it remained to be seen whether 
or not it constituted a satisfactory solution. Inasmuch 
as his words bespoke the continued exploitation of the 
national idea in foreign policy, and his undefined 11truth 11 
between tt:r,ighttt and "left 11 attitudes left as big a gap 
in the definition of the Soviet policy as before, it was 
clearly obvious that the last of Communist nationalist 
deviationism had·not been seen. 
The Chinese National Revolution Initiated. The 
effective implementation of Lenin's Eastern policy with 
~espect to China, as has been pointed out already, got 
off to a slow start because of the unsettled conditions 
in Siberia. The original message of sympathy for Chinese 
91stalin, Marxism and the National Question, 
p. 171. 
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national aspirations was sent out on July 25, 1919, to 
the rival Chinese regimes in Peking and Canton, but it 
was not before March 26, 1920, that Peking became the 
first to acknowledge receipt or it.92 Because delivery 
to Canton was further delayed, and due to the enthusiastic 
reception it received in Peking, particularly among the 
intelligentsia, Lenin decided to concentrate his atten-
tion on the Northern government. Thus, in August, 1920, 
Ignatius Yurin, posing as a representative or the Far 
Eastern Republic, arrived in Peking.93 Less·than two 
months later, the semi-official diplomatic exchange was 
completed with the arrival of a Chinese military and 
trade mission, headed by General Chung Shih-lin, in 
Moscow. 94 
out of that exchange, Moscow obtained de factlb 
recognition and Peking secured the formal renunciation 
Of the 11uneqUal IT treatd!eS Of the pre-reVOlUtionary periOd • 95 
92cf. Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 
1917-1923 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953), III, p. 506. 
93cf. R. T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations, 
1917-1931, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), pp. 133-134. 
94cf. Izvestiia, October 22, 1920, p. 1. 
95cr. H. G. w. Woodhead, (ed.), The China Year Book, 
1924-1925 ~Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1924-1925), 
pp. 870-872 •. -. 
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In addition, judging by an article in Izvestiia, on Oct- · 
ober 9, 1920, in which the writer alluded to the possibility 
of an alliance with Peking against Japanese and Western 
interests in China, Lenin apparently expected that his 
task would be a relatively easy one. But nothing more 
substantial materialized. Due to Japanese pressure, 
Peking broke off the negotiations on October 18.96 
Lenin's reaction to this development was typical 
in that it was marked by a stubborn determination to find 
other ways of approaching the problem in China. It was 
less than unique also for the reason that he tried to 
duplicate the modus operandi in Iran. The Soviet leader's 
new tack was designed to exert pressure against the reluc-
tant Peking government through the creation of a nationalist-
separatist regime within the te.rritory claimed by it. The 
site selected for the creation of the Chinese equivalent 
of the ttRepubl1c of Gil ann was OUter Mongolia. 
-The ostensible pretext for a Soviet move into Outer 
Mongolia was provided by the presence there of remnants 
of Kolchak's ttwhitett army, under the leadership of Baron 
Ungern-Sternberg. 97 But the real clue to Moscow's inten-
96cf. Pollard, op. cit., p. 137. 
97rn November, 1920 and February, 1921, Moscow did 
offer Peking aid to combat the 11White" forces. The Chinese, 
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tion was embodied in the proclamation of a "Mongolian 
People's Republicrr, on March 19, 1921, and on Russian 
soil.98 Following the usual pattern, the latter immed-
iately requested Soviet aid against Ungern-Sternberg 
and obtained an affirmative reply. It took three months 
for military preparations to be completed, and then 
little more than a week to caJ?ture and execute the "white" 
Russian leader and to seize the Mongolian capital of Urga. 
Completing the process, the newly installed Mongolian 
government addressed a brief request to Moscow not to 
withdraw its forces n ••• pending the complete liquidation 
of the threat from the common enemy.n99 
It would not be unreasonable to assume that Lenin 
did not regard his Mongolian creation as any more perman-
ent than Kuchik's regime had been. More than likely, he 
however, turned it down. Cf. Izvestiia, January 5, 1921, 
p. 3; Pollard, op. cit., p. 163. 
9Baf. Siren Shoizhelov, "Zapadnaia Mongoliian 
(ttWestern Mongolia"), Novi Vostok (The New East), No. 4, 
1923, p. 152; V. Iudin, 11Piat let mongolskogo narodnogo 
pravite1stvan (rtFive Years of the Mongolian People's 
Government"), Novi Vostok, No. 13-14, 1926, pp. 465-466. 
99af. I. Ia. Zlatkin, Mongolskaia Narodnaia 
Respublika -- strana novoi demokratii (The Mongolian 
People's Republic-- the country of new democracy) 
(Moskva: Izdate1stvo Akademii NaUk SSSR, 1950), p. 131. 
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viewed it as a point to be bargained, as a stick with 
which to prod the hesitant Chinese. As much can be 
deduced from the tactical pattern established in the 
case of Iran, and from the exchange of notes with Peking. 
The replies to the latter's protests against the inter-
vention in Outer Mongolia were marked by fresh statements 
of sympathy for Chinese national aspirations and the 
promise that the Soviet troops would leave Chinese 
territory when 
••• the Chinese free themselves from the 
yoke of their appressors, when they chase 
from their borders the soldiers of the 
foreign imperialist nations.lOO 
As further evidence of his desire to win the confidence 
of the Peking regime, Lenin also permitted a few verbal 
barbs to be directed against Canton. It was accused of 
lOOcited in T. R. Riskulov, 11Veliki Kb.uruldan 
Mongolia -- Pizmo iz Mongoliin ·( 11 The Great Khuruldan of 
Mongolia-- A Letter from Mongolia 11 ), Novi Vostok, No. 
8-9, 1925, pp. 218-219. As late as January 17, 1924, 
Moscow assured Peking that: rreur position in the Mongol-
ian question is sufficiently clear and sincere: we 
consider that Mongolia is part of China and we are 
ready to withdraw the Red Army detachments stationed at 
Urga as soon as the Chinese government will give the 
necessary guarantees for the security of our frontier." 
Cited in A. A. Ivin, Kitai i sovetski soiuz (China and 
the Soviet Union) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 
1924), p. 120. . 
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having an affinity for American capital.lOl 
Though the nstick and carrotn technique did 
elicit Peking's request for a resumption of negotiations, 
it led to no settle~ent of their differences. When a 
new Soviet mission, headed by Adolph Joffe, arrived in 
the northern Chinese capital in August, 1922, it was 
informed that the opening of formal discussions depended 
on the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Outer 
Mongolia. In reply, Joffe defined the issue as only a 
part of.the general problem of their relations, the 
resoaution of which could be obtained only through serious 
negotiations.l02 
Neither side was willing to concede the point, 
and five months of futile bickering followed. Then, at 
the beginning of 1923, Lenin a11 but gave n~ hope of 
getting anywhere with Peking. So far, there existed no 
evidence that the Chinese were about to accept the need 
of an alliance against foreign interests, or that the 
lOlcf. Pervi sezd revoliutsionnikh-ore;anizatsii 
Dalnego Vostoka. Sbornik materiali• (The First Congress 
of the Revolutionar Or anizations of the Far East. A 
Collection of Materials Petrograd: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatelstvo, 1922), pp. 21-23, 166-167. 
·l02cf. H.G.W. Woodhead, (ed.), The China Year 
Book' 1924-1925 (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, Ltd., 
1925 ' pp. 859-860. 
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Chinese equivalent of Riza Khan would emerge. In January, 
the Soviet leader instructed Joffe to investigate the 
possibility of establishing close relations with the 
Chinese nationalist leader in the south, Sun Yat-sen. The 
moment seemed propitious for the added reason that SUn was 
then in forced exile in Shanghai, the result of a milinary 
eoup in Canton in the previous May. Accordingly, Joffe 
traveled to Shanghai nfor reasons of health" and, on 
January 26, he and the Chinese nationalist signed a pledge 
to cooperate toward the end of Chinars unification and 
complete national independence. On this occasion also, 
the Soviet diplomat vowed that his government had no 
intention of encouraging Outer Mongolia to secede from 
China.103 
The agreement apparently had a beneficial effect 
on sunrs political~fortunes; for, in a matter of three 
weeks, another coup in Canton restored his leadership 
there. Thereafter, Moscow .maintained a diplomatio 
mission in Peking, and, on May 31, 1924, even reached 
an agreement with the regime there.104 But it repre-
103cf. ~., p. 863. 
104cf. Ibid., pp. 880-883. In that case also, . 
Moscow formally recognized Outer Mongolia as being an 
i:g,tegral part of China and promised to withdraw all Soviet 
troops whether or not other foreign troops were evacuated 
from China. 
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sented nothing more than a screen ror the real interest 
in Canton. Lenin had abandoned his "Iranian" policy in 
China for a nTurkishrr one. Having railed to move the 
Chinese leaders in Peking through a combination or sweet 
reasonableness and nationalist-separatist pressure, he 
had decided to. promote Sun~·Yat-sen as a Chinese nation-
alist hero after the Kemalist model. 
For the sake or this new opportunity in China, 
Lenin spared no expense or efrort. The assistance he 
gave Sun Yat-sen rar exceeded that given Kemalist 
Turkey. In August, 1923, ror example, Chiang Kai-shek, 
Sunts protege, was received in Moscow and given a 
thorough briefing in revolutionary tactics, including 
party and military organization. Then, in the rollowing 
month, a group of more than rorty Soviet advisers, led 
by Mikhail Enrodin, arrived in Canton and proceeded 
immediately to the task or developing the political and 
military strength of the regime. The Whangpo Military 
Academy, which Chiang Kai-shek superintended after his 
return home, was established and the Kuomintang Party 
was reorganized after the model or the-Russian Communist 
Party.l05 
l05cf. T'ang Leang-li, Wang Ching-wei: A Political 
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In addition, Moscow instructed the Chinese 
Communists to cooperate with the national revolutionary 
movement, which they did formally in January, 1924, at 
the Kuomintasg Party Congress. On that occasion, their 
admission to membership was based on the following pledge: 
In joining the Kuomintang, the members of 
the Communist Party of the Third Internation-
al propose to abide by its constitution and 
submit to its discipline. Their aim is to 
take part in the national revolution. They 
have absolutely no idea of converting the 
Kuomintang into a Communist Party. Further-
more, they join the Kuomintang not collectively 
as a party, but separately as individuals.106 
Finally, also on behalf of the developing nation-
alist revolutionary movement in Canton, the Soviet diplo-
matic mission in Peking secretly conducted negotiations 
with the warlords of northern China. Among the converts 
Biography (Peiping: China United Press, 1931), pp. 112-113. 
According to T'ang, it was the Comintern that paid most of 
the initi~l expense of the Whangpo Academy and even pre-
sented it with a gift of three thousand rifles. 
106cited in Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia 
(Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), p. 48. In addition, 
Borodin constantly reassured Sun about Soviet intentions. 
For example: ~The only Communism possible in China today 
is the Communism of poverty • • • • At present and for 
many years to come, Communists and capitalists alike in 
China must have the same ideals of a prosperous and much 
more highly developed industrial China and a general rise 
in China's standard of living.n Quoted in T'ang Leang-li, 
The Foundations of Modern China (London: N. Douglas, 1928), 
p .. 168'. . 
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gained, the most important was Marshal Chang Tao-lin, 
the Manchurian warlord, whose army was to attack the 
pro-Peking forces of Wu Pei-fu in the fall of 1924. A 
second notable convert was Feng Yu-hsiang, Wu's aide, 
who was to rebel during the conflict with Chang and 
attack his former commander from the rear.l07 
All in all, the Soviet-sponsored Chinese nationalist 
rebellion was growing by leaps and bounds. It gave promise 
of still another decisive triumph for Leninist diplomacy 
in the East. But then the unexpected occurred: on Jan-
uary 21, 1924, Lenin died. 
Communist nLeftn Deviationism Wreaks Havoc. The 
relevance of Lenin's death to this study was that it 
revealed in no ftnoertain terms the extent to which the 
exploitation of the national idea in Soviet foreign 
policy had depended upon his presence and personal dir-
ection. Once he was gone permanently from the scene, 
all those in high Communist circles who had harbored 
doubts about the promotion of nationalism abandoned 
their restraint. Leon Trotski, for one, whose extremist 
107Authoritative accounts of this aspect of Soviet 
activity are contained in Wei, op. cit., pp. 55-56; 
Pollard, op. cit. , p. 180; Mal bone W. Graham Jr. , !J'A 
Decade of Sino-Russian Dt]llomacy, 11 The American Political 
Science Review, XXII, February, 1928, pp. 45-69. 
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revolutionary bent had been constrained by an even 
greater devotion to Lenin, emerged as the spokesman 
ror the "internationalistsn. Trotski began to denounce 
openly the promotion or nationalism as un-Marxist and 
unworkable as a tactical device. Moreover, he demanded 
that an order be issued to all Communists in the East 
to take-over the nationalist movements supported by 
them, to conclude the national revolutions as quickly 
as possible, and, 11ithout pause, to press ror socialist 
objectives.108 
Stalin defended the established policy in the 
East, and probably ror two reasons. He undoubtedly 
believed that it was the best possible policy under the 
circumstances. More important however, was his rear 
that the immediate success of Trotski's views would 
constitute a lethal blow to his own power aspirations. 
Even so, he was unable to stem the rising tide in ravor 
or the changes demanded. For example, at the Firth 
Congress or the Comintern, held in Moscow rrom June 17 
to July 8, 1924, many Asian delegates eagerly took 
advantage or the situation to register their own demands 
l08cr. Leon Trotski, Problems or the Chinese Revol-
ution (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1932), pp. 28, 48-59. 
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ror an immediate revolutionary efrort through the East. 
Once again the attack was pressed by M. N. Roy, and he 
was ably assisted by the delegate rrom French Indo-China, 
Ho Chi-minh. 
Now unimpeded by Lenin's prestige and persuasive-
ness, both Roy and Ho insisted stubbornly on the primacy 
of the colonial issue and the need for the Comintern to 
underwrite a rull scale revolutionary program in the 
East.l09 They criticized a report of Zinoviev's for not 
having devoted sufficient attention to the East and then 
repudiated outright Manuilski's contention that bour-
geois-nationalist revolutionary movements needed to be 
supported in all cases in the interest of the world revo-
lution. The Asians insisted that such support, according 
to their interpretation of Lenin's thesis at the Second 
Congress, could only be conditional and thus permitted 
the promotion of Communist revolutions wherever possible. 
At a la t_er point, Roy added the following: 
We shall support the ruling bourgeoisie in 
its demands against imperialism, but at the 
109cf. Piati Vsemirni Kongress Kommunisticheskogo 
Internatsionala, 17 iunia - 8 iulia 1924 g (The Fifth 
World Con ress of the Communist International June 1 
July , 192 Moskva and Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatelstvo, 1925), pp. 150-151, 237. 
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same time we shall also carry ~n our policy 
according to the interests of the working 
class. OUr tactics must force the.native 
bourgeoisie to present greater demands and 
to undertake a greater measure of interven-
tion ih the power sphere of imperialism. In 
a word, we must render it impossible for the 
struggle for independence to be sacrificed 
on the altar of compromise between native 
bourgeoisie and imperialists.llO . 
The adamant stand of the Asians was not the sole 
significant feature of the Comintern's Fifth Congress. 
Apparently, it was then that Stalin, more out of fear 
of Trotski's competition than anything, decided that 
some change on his part was necessary. He did not act 
suddenly, for the reason that it might have been inter-
preted as an act of surrender to Trotski's wisdom. 
However, certain events suggested a behind-the-scenes 
move. For one thing, for no apparent reason, Roy declined 
an offer to present his conclusions on the national and 
colonial questions. For another, he remained strangely 
silent when Manuilski later accused him of being a 
nnihilistn and of having grossly underestimated the 
importance of the bourgeois-nationalist movements to the 
::rrevolutionary cause. Finally, the Asian delegates to the 
congress ended up by endorsing unanimously Stalin's 
llOibid., p. 650. 
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policy, which called for the continuation of the Leninist 
tack. That,.of course, amounted to a severe rebuke of 
Trotski .. 
Just what all that amounted to can be seen readily 
in the proceedings of the Comintern's Executive Committee, 
which met in Moscow from March 21 to April 6, 1925. It 
was announced then that Roy, along with Stalin, Zinoviev, 
and Bukharin, had been appointed to the committee's pre-
sidium and to its commission on colonial affairs, and had 
e~en named secretary of the Comintern's Eastern Bureau.lll 
Roy's sudden prominence in high Comintern circles actually 
meant more than a simple promotion, or that he had been 
placated by such attention: it signalled the triumph of 
the accelerate¢!., as opposed to the gradual, revolutionary 
policy in the East. Stalin undoubtedly regarded this 
concession as preferable to seeing the Asians throw their 
support behind Trotski. In addition, Stalin was aided in 
making the decision for a·change by the death of Sun Yat-sen, 
on March 12, 1925. Thus, in a sense relieved of the obliga-
tion of Lenin's pledge to the Chinese nationalist leader, 
it became possible to speak openly or a new course of action. 
lllcr. Demetrio Boersner, The Bolsheviks and the 
N.a.tional and Colonial Question (Geneva: Droz, 1957), p. 186. 
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The first formal notice of the change also occurred at 
' 
the meeting of the Executive Committee, when Zinoviev 
declared: 
The problem of the East is maturing at a 
much greater speed than we could have ima-
gined before. In the course of the nine 
months which separate us from the fifth 
congress, the situation in the East has 
evolved with a particular speed.ll2 
The outcome of the discussions on the question of 
the new tactics need only be summarized here.113 The 
Chinese and Dutch East Indian Communists were instructed 
to maintain their contacts with native nationalists and 
to press the fight against imperialism. At the same 
time, however, they were to be permitted to develop the 
proletarian and peasant bases of their organizations as 
quickly as possible. The Indian Communists, who were much 
weaker, were given orders to work within the Indian National 
Congress Party, to win its left-wing over to their side, 
and to agitate among the workers and peasants for the 
formation of a revolutionary coalition of workers and 
peasants. Furthermore, all Arab Communists of the Near 
112cited in Ibid., p. 187. 
113A11 resolutions are contained in a special edition 
of the Comintern's publication; International Press Corres-
pondence, April 28, 1925. 
179 
East, who were barely organized, were assigned the task 
or supporting all national-revolutionary movements. 
Finally, ror the first time taking a serious view of 
the Western Hemisphere, the Comintern directed its mem-
bers in Centnal and South America to work with anyone 
against foreign interests. 
In a sense, Stalin's new tack represented a logical 
extension of the policy developed by Lenin. A parallel 
was possible between it and the type transrormation 
erfected by Lenin himself with respect to the non-Russian 
border regions, wherein the meaning of national self-
determination was rederined in nproletariant' terms so 
as to racilitate the change over to a s~rict revolutionary 
course. However, it is unlikely that, had he lived, Lenin 
would have switched his policy in the East before condi-
tions had become much more favorable. Certainly no Com-
munist Party in the East possessed the physical strength 
necessary to take over a national revolution and channel 
it along a more radical course. The barest possibility 
existed in China, but there the Communists were faced 
with a strong nationalist army, trained and equipped by 
the Russians themselves. In the Dutch East Indies, where 
rebellions were also to break out, no amount of appeals 
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to the native poeple, and to the workers of the world to 
come to their assistance, could compensate for the fact 
that the Dutch possessed superior forces. 114 
The outcome of the revolutionary effort was a 
devastating defeat for Soviet policy. In China, for 
example, the Communists began with a series of nanti~ 
imperial1st 11 strikes that closed the.port of Canton to 
all ships trading with the British colony of Hong Kong. 
Under the leadershiP. of Moscow-trained Li Li-san, a 
strikers 1 delegates' committee was organized and it 
invited workers to leave Hong Kong.ll5 In reaction to 
this obvious violation of the pledge to abide by the 
Kuomintang's constitution, the right-wing of the 
Kuomintang ordered the assassination of the Communist 
leader of the party's Workers' and Peasants' Section, 
Liao Chung-kai. It was done on August 20, 1925. 
This, however, marked only the beginning of the 
end of the alliance between Moscow and Canton. The com-
114cr. International Press Correspondence, Dec-
ember 2, 1926, p. 1438. 
ll5According to one account, about one hundred 
thousand workers in Hong Kong responded to the Communist 
invitation. Cf. Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chi-
nese Revolution (London: Becker and Warburg, 1938), p. 77. 
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plete rupture was postponed when Mikhail Borodin, who 
had been careful to conceal his own role in the Communist 
activities, succeeded in placating the majority of the 
Kuomintang's members-and persuading them to take 
disciplinary action against the assassins. Nevertheless, 
mutual suspicions persisted and soon developed into a 
subtle competition for pow.er. For their part, the Rus-
sians maintained an official facade of dedication to 
Chinese nationalist aspirations and, at the same time, 
issued new directives to the Chinese Communists to speed 
the development of a· mas.s wo~ker-peasant following. 116 
Meanwhile, the Kuomintang's leaders, among whom Chiang 
ll6The complete terms of the new Communist policy 
in China were spelled out by the Comintern's Central 
Executive Committee, which met February 17 to March 15, 
1926. For one thing, it relegated the Kuomintang to the 
position of ally of the Chinese Communists, and not the 
reverse. For another, distinctions were made between 
factions of the Kuomintang with respect to their relia-
bility, with the less reliable earmarked for liquidation. 
Finally, and most important, the Chinese Communists were 
assigned the "••• historical task of leading China's 
toiling masses in their anti-imperialist struggle 11 • 
Ct. Kommunisticheski Internatsiona1 y dohumentakh, resh-
eniia, tezisi i vozvaniia kongressov kominterna 1 p1enumov 
IKKI, 1919-1932 (The Communist International in Documents, 
Decisions Theses and A ea1s of the Co resses of the 
Comintern and the Plenums of the E.C.C.I. 1 19-19 2 
Moskva: Partinnoe Izdatelstvo, 1933 , pp. 19- 23. Cf. 
also, Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise 
of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 53. 
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Kai-shek was about to emerge as Sunts successor, maint~ned 
a respectful silence in order to keep the flow of material 
assistance from Russia unimpeded. But they also began to 
lay plans for the ultimate showdown.ll7 
The final phase of the Moscow-Canton alliance opened 
in October, 1926, when, with Chiang's army moving northward 
against Peking, BPnodin convoked an extraordinary congress 
of the Kuomintang in Canton and persuaded it to transfer 
the capital to Hankow, in Wuhan province, where Communist 
strength was concentrated.ll8 Chiang's reaction to this 
obvious bid for power came in the following April. With 
his military success in the north all but completed, he 
severtid all ties with the Communists, established a new 
Kuomintang government in Nanking, and declared war against 
his rivals. Within a few months, it was sufficiently 
clear that the latter were no match for his troops, which, 
ironically enough, had been trained and equipped by the 
_$oviets. 
117According to Chiang, the turning point for him 
occurred on March 18, 1926:.n ••• I could no longer put off 
a decision. Early next morning, in my capacity as Cantonts 
defense commander, I declared martial law and had Li Chih-
lung and other (Chinese) communists arrested and members of 
the Communist-dominated Canton-Rongkong Strike Committee 
aisarmed.u Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957) , pp. 39~40. 
118 Cf. Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 290. 
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In China, Stalin lost not only the revolutionary 
battle, but an ally as well. And the same was true through-
out the non-Communist East. Nationalists everywhere were 
put on guard against Soviet promises of assistance in 
their struggles for national liberation. In the Near East, 
the Arab nationalists abruptly broke off their alliances 
with Communists and came to terms with the Western Powers.ll9 
In Iran, Riza Khan, after forcing the abdication of the 
Shah and then declaring himself Shah, on December 16, 1925, 
solidified his ties with the West. In addition, he and 
Kemal signed a treaty that was clearly a defensive measure 
against Soviet Russia. 12° For his part, Kamal also solid-
ified his own relations with the West and intensified his 
campaign against Communists in Turkey. Finally, in India, 
the Communist agitation, when viewed in the light of the 
events in China, resulted in a decisive reaction by the 
Indian nationalists and punitive measures by the British 
colonial administration.l21 
ll9cf. Communist Party of Great Britain, The 
Communist International Between the Fifth and Sixth 
World Con resses 1924-1928 (London: Communist Party 
of Great Britain, 192 , pp. 415-417. 
12°cf. International Press Correspondence, 
Octooer 22, 1926, pp. 44-48. 
12lcf. Philip Spratt, Blowing Up India: Remin-
iscences and Reflections of a Former Comintern Emissar 
Calcutta: Prachi Prakashan, 1955 , pp. 27-28, 35-3 • 
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Thus, by the end of 1927, the Soviet Eastern 
policy was a shambles. Stalin did succeed in triumphing 
over Trotski at home and he could claim the People's 
Republic of OUter Mongolia as a prize. It remained in 
the Soviet grip in the wake of Chiang's successful 
counterrevolution. But the price paid was a very high 
one. The rapport with Asia's nationalists, which Lenin 
had cultivated so assiduously, was shattered completely. 
More than that, the abortive revolutionary effort had 
helped Western capitalism to solve the problem presented 
by the rise of nationalism in the East; by forcing the 
developing Asiatic bourgeois classes to turn to the West 
for aid against the Communist menace, many even before 
they had obtained independence. It was indeed a profound 
setback, recovery from which would necessitate a pain-
staking process of rebuilding. 
Conclusion. The importance of the years from 
1919 to 1927 in the record of Soviet exploitation of the 
national idea in foreign policy was contained in the 
remarkable clarification of the positive and negative 
qualities of the tactical device that took place. Before 
his death in 1924, Lenin was again able to demonstrate the 
v~lidity of his faith in the promotion of nationalism. 
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However, the Russian leader did more than this: he 
pointed the way in the development of new forms of the 
tactic and applied them with consummate skill. The 
result of his effort was the transformation of a weak 
revolutionary regime into a vast Soviet empire and a 
powerfUl force in world politics. 
It would be difficult to cite the outstanding 
examples of the Leninist skill during this period, since, 
considered from the standpoint of the obstacles faced 
and the benefits derived, all were little short of 
astonishing. Thus, a comparison of the merits of the 
nationally-based facade of legitimacy that screened the 
military conquest of the ,separated border regions and 
Lha nationalistic foundation of the diplomatic offen-
sive against Western imperialism along the Asian peri-
phery could be no more than speculative. The same would 
be true of any attempt to develop a scale of priority 
that properly assigned importance to Auah Leninist 
artifacts as the fictionally sovereign People's Republics, 
Soviet Republics, national military-revolutionary com-
mittees, nationalist-separatist regimes, and the Far 
Eastern Republic, not to speak of the skillfully contrived 
general appeals to the national emotions of Russians and 
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non-Russians alike. About all that can, or need, be said 
is that, taken together, they added up to perhaps the 
most remarkable paradox in world diplomatic history; 
namely, an immensely beneficial promotion of the national 
idea by a regime whose real policy aimed to eliminate 
nationalism altogether. 
This is not to say that Lenin succeeded in 
developing the exploitation of the national idea into 
a tactical device that was foolproof. Far from it, very 
significant shortcomings were revealed. For one thing, 
the dual role of theoretical anti-nationalist and prac-
tical nationalist, as happened before, proved too much 
for some Communists to appreciate. nRight 11 nationalist 
deviationism manifested itself again, when, after achieving 
power in their homelands, some non-Russian Communists 
demonstrated that the extended promotion of national 
values had caused them to lose sight of Marxism's funda-
mental ntruthsn. Its nleft 11 counterpart was made up of 
doctrinaire Communists, who, together with others 
impatient to attain the socialist goal in their own 
countries, argued against the promotion of bourgeois-
nationalist interests. 
The explosive content of both forms of Communist 
~~~~==-c-~~~~---------- -- --- ·-------- -- --- --- .. ------------------------------------~~ 
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nationalist deviationism was no more decisively illus-
trated than in 1923 and 1925-1926. In the first instance, 
the ttrightsn, from the Ukraine, Georgia, and Belorussia, 
forced the Russians to retreat on the issues of national 
assimilationism and political centralism. In the second, 
the "leftsu, in Russia and from the East, compelled a 
rechanneling of the Soviet Eastern policy into a revolu-
tionary course. That not only proved unsuccessful but 
cost Moscow practically every non-Communist friend it 
possessed outside the Soviet world. 
For another thing, not all Eastern recipients of 
Soviet assistance in their quests for freedom from Western 
domination accepted the pretentious Communist concern for 
nationality rights at face value. Both Afghanistan and 
Turkey, for example, displayed reservations about their 
benefactor's motives and sought to guard against the 
possibility of a new ::.imperialism as much as against the 
old. The fact of the matter was that the Soviet exploi-
tation of the national idea in the East was found to be 
subject to a sort of law of diminishing returns, its 
effectiveness lessening in proportion to the decline of 
the threat of Western imperialism. In the wake of the 
abortive Communist revolutions in China and the Dutch 
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East Indies, in 1925-1926, in which case the threat of 
Soviet imperialism became more definitively outlined, ita 
effectiveness disappeared altogether. Thus it appears 
evident that even if he had lived to avert the modifi-
cation of his Eastern policy, Lenin would have been hard 
pressed to develop new methods for the maintenance of the 
anti-Western alliances with Asia's nationalists. 
In the record of Soviet Russian exploitation of 
the national idea in foreign policy, then, the period from 
1919 to 1927 can be described as one of great extremes. 
The use of the tactical device first permitted the Soviet 
cause to scale the heights of success and then plunged it 
down to the depths of defeat. Accordingly, there existed 
sufficient grounds to arguereasonably both for and against 
its continued use. That issue was already settled, however, 
by; Stalin's victory over Trotski. Stalin's interest 1n 
the national issue generally, and the Leninist tactics 
particularly, assured that the national idea would again 
figure prominently in Soviet foreign policy as defensive 
needs and offensive opportunities arose. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NATIONAL IDEA AGAINST FASCISM 
The abortive revolution in China marked the first 
crest of the developing wave of Soviet penetration 0f 
world politics. For the next five years, the frustra-
tion of defeat and exposure as the ndevil's advocatetr 
in connection 'with the principle of national self-deter-
mination compelled Stalin to devote his full attention 
to problems closer to home, principally to the further 
consolidation of his personal power and to the develop-
ment of the economic and military strength of the Soviet 
Union. Its corollary in foreign policy was a defensive 
posture, couched in the proposition of peaceful coexis-
tence between socialist and capitalist states. Revolu-
tionary responsibilities, as the instructions to the 
Sixth Congress of th~ Comintern in 1928 made clear, belonged 
almost exclusively to the Communist Parties abroad. 
But the pendulum of Soviet interest swung back to 
foreign problems early in 1934. It was prompted by the 
spread of fascism generally and the rising threat of German 
and Japanese aggression in particular. Still weak mili-
tarily, Stalin's reaction was decisively defensive. And, 
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for the same reason, his regard for the national idea 
as an instrument of policy was revitalized. 
From the spring of 1934 until June 22, 1941, when 
Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the national idea occu~ 
pied a prominent place in the complex of Stalin's 
foreign policy. Initially, ita exploitation marked the 
basis of a quest for a network of mutual assistance pacta 
with European and Asian countries similarly threatened. 
In ~rder to draw attention to the threat of war and to 
convince others that the Soviet Union was a worthy ally, 
national sentiment was promoted at home and appealed to 
abroad. Then, after 1938, when the collapse of that effort 
made the acquisition of the western approaches to the 
Soviet Union a military necessity, the national idea 
became a shield for territorial aggrandizement. 
The importance of this particular chapter in the 
record of Soviet Russian exploitation of the national idea 
in foreign policy can be expressed as follows. For one 
thing, it represented the moat comprehensive and thorough-
going use of the device ever undertaken for .a single pur-
pose. For another, the failure of the initial diplomatic 
effort illustrated the limitations of its usefulness to 
the Soviet purpose, not all of which, as will be seen, 
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were due to uncontrollable factors. Finally, its appli-
cation as a weapon of conquest in Eastern Europe, during 
the period of the nonaggression pact with Germany, not 
only provided an excellent example of how it could be 
applied successfully, but completed the demonstration of 
the wide range of its manifold uses. 
Diplomacy Begins at Home. In his quest for a 
network of mutual aid pacts with other European and Asian 
countries that would frustrate German and Japanese ambi-
tions, Stalin's first step was to eliminate as a major 
stumbling block the persistent and widespread suspicion 
of Soviet motives. Toward this end, he undertook to 
nationalize Communism completely, beginning with the 
Soviet Union itself. For example, on March 16, 1934, a 
joint decree of the Council of People's Commissars and 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party set in motion 
a process that was to bring the teaching of history in 
Soviet schools into line with Western practice. It 
ordered a sweeping revision of textbooks and the content 
of oral instruction on the ·subject of history at all 
educational levels. ·significantly, particular emphasis 
was placed on the need for the 
• • • observance of historical and chrono-
logical sequence in the exposition of his-
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torical. events, with due emphasis on the 
memory of the pupil.s of the names of 
historical figures and chronol.ogical. dates.l 
Thereafter, abstract Marxist universalism and 
gl.obalism, which had dominated the thinking of Soviet 
historians, receded rapidly. Its pl.ace was taken by a 
whol.esale revival of pre-revolutionary Russian history, 
shorn of its alleged dark, chaotic, and oppressive 
character. And with it fell the name of M. N. Pokrovski, 
hitherto revered as the father of Soviet historical 
research. Pokrovski, who had died in 1932, became the 
scapegoat upon whom all "erroren were heaped. The chargee 
against him and hie "schooln included narrow economic 
materialism, anti-Marxist conceptions of history, under-
estimations of the subjective factor and the role of 
personality in history, and distortions ~~ the genuine 
historical process of the development of Russia. 2 
lizvestiia, March 1.6, 1934, p. 2. 
2cr. Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklo ediia ( The 
Large Soviet Encyclopedia Moskva: Akteionernoe ObShchestvo 
sovetskaia entsikl.opediia, 1926-1939), XXX, p. 14. Of. 
also, Max M. Laeerson, Russia and the Western World (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 151-152; Stuart 
Tompkins, "Trends in Communist Historical Thought," 
The Slavonic and East European Review, XIII, January, 1935, 
pp. 294-319. 
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The historical reeducation of the Soviet citizenry 
was not confined to the formal institutions of learning, 
but was conducted on the broad popular level as well. 
The vast Soviet communications system complemented the 
work of its pedagogues; the very same propaganda machine 
that had been used to eli~inate national sentiment now 
became the principal tool of its revival. According to 
Bukhar1n, words like patriotism, motherland, and father-
land, hitherto deprecated as counterrevolutionary, had 
become n~t only acceptable but symbolic of the Soviet 
citizen's duty.3 An editorial in Pravda, on ~uly 9, 1934, 
entitled rrFor the Motherland 11 , played up the theme of 
"creative and self-sacrificing patriotismn and demanded 
the destruction of all who would betray the motherland. 
Three months later, the journalistic chorus on patriotism 
was officially joined by the chief newspaper of .Soviet 
youth, Komsomolskaia Pravda, which exhorted its readers 
to foster the love of the motherland among the you~h so 
that they would consider it an honor to die for it. 4 
. , . 
Such appeals to a common patriotic consciousness 
3cf. Izvestiia, March 30, 1934, p. l 
4Reported 1n The New York Times, October 19,1934, 
p. 10. 
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did not preclude attention to the particular sentiments 
present 1n the multi-national polity. On the contrary, 
within the broader unity of Soviet partiotism, specific 
national unities were encouraged by dramatic conc~ssions 
to tradition and national greatness. ~n a veritable flood, 
books on folklore, art, li ter.a ture, science, geographic 
exploration, and technology poured from the Soviet 
publishing houses. The worship of political, military, 
cultural, and scientific heroes became the order of the 
day. OUt of the limbo of Marxist historiography appeared 
such notables as the Russians Alexander Nevski, Dimitri 
Donskoi, Peter the Great, Alexander Kutusov, Mikhail 
Suvorov, and Prince Bagration, the Ukrainian Boghdan 
Kmelnitski, the Tartar poet Gahbdullah Tukay, and the 
Cossacks Steilka Razin and Emelian Pugaohev. Furthermore, 
attention was moused on the contributions of the differ-
ent nationalities to the creation of the Russian Empire, 
which, for the reason of its culmination in the first 
Soviet society, sudden:t,y1beoame nprogressiven in oharacter.5 
5rn some oases, the national histories of peoples 
inhabi.ting the vast Soviet community received recognition 
for the first time. For example, in 1935, at the Samarkand 
Conference of Central Asian Historians, the peoples of 
CeBtral Asia, who, both by Tsarist and Soviet definition, 
had been regarded as tribes of Turkestan, were elevated to 
tbe status of Uzbek, Tadzhik, Kirghiz, and Turkman nations. 
Cf. G. A. von Stakelberg, nThe Tashkent Conference on ·:hlle 
195 
Not unexpectedly, there was one obvious note of 
restraint throughout the kaleidoscopic pattern of the 
new Soviet patriotism. Deliberately excluded from the 
list of the rehabilitated were such names and events 
which might have symbolized the >,past in a way detrimental 
to the purpose to be served. Such paucity was particularly 
noticeable in the case of the non-Russian nationalities, 
whose political, economic, and cultural histories gener-
ally reflected an anti-Russian leitmotif. But partial 
compensation for this failure was afforded in the form: .. or 
a simultaneous extension of the patriotic idea into a 
broader cult of conventionalism, applicable to all 
nationalities composing the Soviet Union. For example, 
the Communist view of the family, hitherto def'iled as a 
"bourgeois relic", and which Alexandra Kollantai had 
proclaimed "ceases to be a necessity", was altered radi-
cally.6 Beginning in 1935, freedom of divorce and abortion 
History of the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan --
1954," Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the His-
tory of Culture of the USSR, May, 1954, p. 12. Cf. also, 
V.I. Lebedev, 11Bashkirskoe Vosstanie, 1705-1711 ggn (ttThe 
Bashkir Rebellion, 1705-171ltt), Istoricheskie Zapiski 
(Historical Notes) , I, 1937, pp •. 81-10e.z 
6Alexandra Kollontay, Communism and the Family 
(San Francisco: The Richmond Record, (n .. d.)), p. 8. 
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were severe~curtailed. Conversely, articles in news-
papers began to extol the virtues of marriage and parent-
hood.7 Moreover, the child's respect for parental aunhor-
ity was stressed with equal vigor. "One must respect and 
love his parents, even if they are old-fashioned 11 was the 
way Pravda put it on August 4, 1935. And this was extended 
to include respect for elders generally. School teachers 
in particular were singled out as worthy of respect, as 
the old revolutionary system in education fell before the 
reintroduction of such nbourgeoisn institutions as class-
room discipline, academic rank, examinations, and grades. 8 
Similarly, conventionalization was the order of the 
day for the Soviet armed forces. It was a change that 
Stalin undoubtedly took special pleasure in effecting, 
inasmuch as the turn from revolutionary military values 
would help eradicate from the public mind the memory that 
the Red Army had been organized originally by Leon Trotski.9 
First, in June 1934, the Revolutionary War Council, the 
7cf. Pravda, June 4, 1935, p. 3; Izvestiia, Septem-
ber 9, 1935, p. 2. 
8For a more thorough account of the changes made, 
Qt. Nicholas Timasheff, The Great Retreat (New York: E.P. 
Dutton and Co., Inc., 1?46),-pp. 203-225. 
9cf. nThe Seventeenth Anniversary of the Red Army,u 
T~e Communist International, No. 3, March 5, 1935, p. 197. 
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supreme military body since 1918, was abolished. All of 
its authority was transferred to a newly created Commissar-
iat of Defense.l0 Then, a year later, the army and navy 
were given all the symbols of the old regime: personal 
rank, iron discipline, and saluting.11 The new military 
order was a far cry fromthe erstwhile "comradely" atmos-
phere, which had been free of obvious dist~nctions between· 
officers and enlisted men and in which such usocialistn 
practices as open discussions of orders at all levels and 
petitions of grievance against higher officers had been 
common. 
There were still more changes in the Soviet scene 
to come, particularly in the political and religious areas. 
These will be discussed at a later point. Suffice it to 
say here that the character of the changes effected ini-
tially was indicative of the extreme end to which Stalin 
would go for the sake of security against threatened 
aggression. At the same time, however, not to be over-
1°ot. The New York Times, June 21, 1934, p. 11. 
llu.s.s.R., Sobranie Zakonov i Rasporiazhenii 
Raboche-Krestianskosa Pravitelstva SSSR (Collection of 
the Laws and Ordinances of the Worker•s-Peasantts 
Government of the U.S.S.R.) (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatelstvo, 1936), p. 822. 
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looked was the fact of their purely expedient nature. 
In reality, Stalin's return to the national idea 
could be understood completely only in terms of its 
application within the framework of the Leninist ''one 
step backward, two steps forwardtt tactical maxim. It 
was indeed a new example of the calculated Soviet para-
doxism, which combined superficial change with fundamental 
sameness. Following Lenin's prescription, Stalints reforms 
were not based on any recognition of Communism's failure, 
but on the fact of military weakness in the face of an 
outside threat. The promotion of nationalism-traditionalism 
at home offered the best hope for a quick welding of the 
population in the spirit of devotion to the homeland and 
resistance to all threats from the outside. At the same 
time, its projection abroad prov&ded the most serviceable 
basis for alliances with governments, political groups, 
clasees,c:and national movements similarly threatened. 
The National Idea in Diplomacy. Stalin's national-
izing effort at home did not fail to impress a number of 
observers abroad. For example, on September 25, 1935, 
the French newspaper Le Temps interpreted it as a ndeep 
change": 
Revolutionary habits and customs are giving way 
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within the Soviet family and Soviet society 
to the feelings and customs which continue 
to prev~il within the so-called capitalist 
countries. 1The Soviets are becoming bour-geoisified. 2 
But perhaps the best testimonial was that one 
presented unwittingly by Leon Trotski, whose bitter 
denunciations of the changes as a betrayal of the 
proletarian revolution resounded throughout the West.l3 
To be sure, subjection to the vituperative pen of Marx-
ism1s most persistent revolutionary was not bW itself 
the complete mark of respectability. But it was helpful 
to the extent of lending a measure of confirmation to 
the developing impression that the Soviet Union was 
indeed becoming_ nbourgeoisifiedtt. 
The strategy of the Soviet dictator, however, was 
not based on the assumption that allies could be won 
merely by altering the Soviet scene along conventional 
lines. This was only one of its aspects. A second con-
sisted of the extension of the new respect for national 
rights into diplomacy. The principle of national self-
determination, hitherto applied eKclusively on behii.lf of 
12cf. also, William H. Chamberlin, "Russia Today 
and Tomorrow, n International Affairs, XIV, March, 1935 ,_ 
pp. 217-230. 
-- 13Cf. Leon Trot ski, The Revolution Betrayed 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 
1937). 
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the peoples of the Asian and African colonies, became 
a moral imperative applicable to any nation, large or small, 
menaced in any way by German or Japanese aggression. Its 
-
first test occurred on May 18, 1934, at the Geneva Dis-
armament Conference, when, taking advantage of a short 
adjournment, Litvinov held informal talks with the French 
Foreign Minister, Louis Barthou.14 Though no record of 
their conversations has been published, the gist of them 
can be deduced reasonably from the events that followed. 
After the delegates reconvened, Litvinov proposed trans-
forming the obviously sterile disarmament coni'erence into 
a permanent body devoted to the preservation of the 
security of all nations.l5 Over a British objection, 
Barthou seconded the proposa1.16 
While not producing the general change sought, 
Litvinov's effort did set the stage for a sharp improve-
ment in the relations between the Soviet Union and France. 
Equally fearful of Germany's intentions, and perturbed by 
the British reluctance to become too deeply enmeshed in 
the politics of continental Europe, the French interest 
14Reported-in The New York Times, May 19, 1934, p. 1. 
15cf. Pravda, May 30, 1934, p. 1. 
16cf.· The New York Times, May 31, 1934, p. 1. 
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in the Soviet bid for respectability rose by leaps and 
bounds. Paris suddenly emerged as Moscow's patron, 
gaining for it, during the summer of 1934, ~ jure 
recognition by Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and 
Albania, and admission to the League of Nations. 
Even more significant, however, was the French 
response to a Soviet offer of a mutual assistance treaty. 
One was signed on May 2, 1935, and it bound each to go 
to the assistance of the other in the event of an unpro-
voked attack by a European State. And then its value 
was enhanced exactly two weeks later, when, with French 
encouragement, Czechoslovakia became the third party to 
the budding mutual security system. 
From the Soviet standpoint, the results achieved 
after little more than a year of promoting the national 
idea at home and in diplomacy were encouraging, though 
not as yet decisive. The nucleus for a general European 
mutual security system had been created, and the prospects 
that the other members of the Little Entente, Rumania and 
Yugoslavia, would soon follow the French lead seemed 
bright. But most -States of Europe and Asia were still 
hesitant to lend a hand to the realization of Stalin's 
ambition. Despite repeated overtures, two key countries, 
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Great Britain and China remained aloof. Consequently, 
it was then that the Soviet dictator put into motion the 
third, and final, aspect of his strategy: the national-
ization of the,Comintern. 
Communist Nationalist Deviationism .Ae;ain. Stalin's 
recourse to the Comintern in conjunction with his quest 
for allies in 1935 merits particular attention. For one 
thing, the Seventh Congress of the Cominter.n, which met 
in the summer of 1935, demonstrated again how that organi-
' 
zation fitted into the Soviet scheme to exploit the national 
idea in foreign policy. For another thing, and also once 
again, it revealed the inherent weakness of the tactic, 
particularly its tendency to evoke among non-Soviet Commun-
ists resistance to the idea of sacrificing internationalist-
revolutionary interests tor the sake of expedient narrow 
nationalism. And finally, close attention to details is 
necessitated by virtue of the fact that the manifestation 
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of deviationism at the Seventh Congress has been overlooked 
entirely by most, if not all, students of Communist politics.17 
1~For example, in one of the early authoritative 
works on the Communist International by a Westerner, Franz 
Borkenau has described the Seventh Congress in the following 
way: "It was the first world-congress without any disagree-
ment. The debates of this congress are therefore of limited 
val.ue for the understanding of the new turn to the right.n 
World Communism: A History of the Communist International 
To begin with, a few comments are in order oon-
oerning the true oharaoter of the relationship betwean . 
Moscow and the Communist Parties abroad in 1934-1935. 
An important olue has been provided by no less an author-
ity than Stalin himself. While many have aooepted the 
idea that his control ovel" Comintern affairs by that 
ttme was virtually complete, Stalin's method in broach-
ing the new policy to the international Communist organi-
zation clearly suggested the existence of a condition 
quite different. For example, the Soviet dictator did 
not get around to doing it until more than a year after 
the national campaign on the home front and in diplomacy 
had oommenoed. Apparently, the idea of convening a 
eongress was considered in the summer of 1934, but, in 
October, it was postponed until an unspecified time in 
,the following year.18 Actually, it did not meet until 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Ino., 1939), p. 385. 
Similar misinterpretations are to be found in Max Beloff, 
_The Foreign Polio* of Soviet Russia (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 19 7-1949), I, p. 190; Barrington Moore, 
Soviet Politics -- the Dilemma of Power (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1956), p. 200; Isaac Deutscher, 
Stalin: A Political Bio~raphY (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1949), pp. 19-420. 
18"The Seventh Congress of the Communist Interna-
tional Postponed to 1935,n The Communist International, 
No. 10, 00tob~r 20, 1934, p. 655. 
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July 25, 1935-
In addition to this delay, which was inconsi.stent 
with the hasty development of the national theme in other 
ways, Stalin's preparations for the congress were too 
carefully contrived for circumstances in which acceptance 
of the new policy could be regarded as automatic. For 
one thing, it was not until the very end of 1934 that the 
Communist Parties abroad were given evidence of an impend-
ing change in tactics, and at that 1n a most prudent manner. 
In December, an article in ~ Communist International 
spoke of revolutionary issues in a conspicuously watered 
down form. Thus, at one point it stated the following: 
The revolutionary crisis is maturing, but 
the process of this maturing does not follow 
a uniform straight line, but goes 1n zigzag 
fashion. 
Then it added later: 
For the present time, the characteristic 
feature is the coming of sharp sudden changes. 
SUch changes require changes of tactics. 
And finally: 
The new situation is now such that we must 
make bold efforts to extend the tactics of the 
united front if we wish to take advantage of 
the favorable objective situation in order to 
attract to our struggle the broad masses of 
Social-Democratic workers who are not yet 
ready to become Communists, if we wish to take 
advantage of the favorable situation to win 
over the majority of the working class, to 
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ra1ly together all the anti-fascist forces, 
to mobilize the broad masses in the struggle 
against fascism and the war danger, and to 
lead these masses to the oncoming deci!ive 
struggles for power, for Soviet Power. 9 
The article did not define specifically the charac-
ter of the extension of the tactic of the united front, 
and thus did not explain how it was possible to attract 
non-Communists to the causes of anti-fascism and Soviet 
power simultaneously. Instead, the following exp1anation 
was offered: 
In the present article we have by no means 
exhausted the questions which wil1 arise at 
the Seventh Congress. We have practically 
not touched on the concrete problems .and the 
practical tasks whic·h face the various Parties. 20 
But there could be no doubt that a sharp turn to the right 
was in the offing. For the article also contained a sec-
tion which dealt at length with the twin problems of 
n'Left' sectarianism" and'!t-ight opportunismu in Communist 
ranks.21 Apparently, it was expected to arise shortly. 
l9nFrom Shaken Stabilization to the Second Round·of 
Revolutions and Wars, 11 The Communist International, No. 12, 
December 20, 1934, pp. 855, 860, 864. 
2oibid., p. 867. 
2lcr. Ibid., pp. 865-867. 
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For another thing, in the six months prior to the 
actual meeting of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, 
a careful check was made on all Communist Parties abroad. 
Each was required to submit a written report of its 
preparations for the meeting, based on an agenda drawn 
up in Moscow. 22 As they were submitted, the reports were 
published in The Communist -International, under the heading 
of 11Discussions for the Seventh Congress of the C.I.rr 
Also printed were Moscow's criticism of their shortcomings 
and pointed reminders that the Comintern must become fully 
11bolshevizedrr. Finally, on the eve of the congress itself, 
a final editorial made it crystal clear that nothing less 
than strict discipline and obedience to orders would be 
tolerated: 
Now, as never before, ideological firmness, 
adherence to principle, and purity in the 
ranks of the Sections of the Comintern, are 
important. This is why the struggle on two 
fronts must be waged stubbornly. The Gom-
munist Parties were victorious by carrying 
on an irreconcilable struggle against counter-
revolutionary Trotskyism and against Right 
and nLeft rr opportunists. In order to guar-
antee further successes, sectarianism, the 
chief stumbling block which prevents the 
Commtinist Party from penetrating into the 
22cr. A. Berg, n:B:ow to Prepare for the Seventh Con-
gress of the Communist International, 11 The Communist Inter-
national, No. 1, January 20, 1935, p. 37. 
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ranks of .the masses, must be eradicated •• 23 
In view of this meticulous preparation for the 
Seventh Congress of the Comintern -- the repeated warnings 
against Communist rropportunism" and nsectarianismn, and 
the demands that the Comintern be fully "bolshevizedrr --
it would appear that Stalin's own conception of his influ-
ence over the policies of the Communist Parties abroad 
was marked by something less than a high degree of confi-
dence. The Soviet dictator apparently was possessed by 
the fear of a possible negative reaction to his projected 
shift from a left to a right policy, from revolutionism 
to nationalism, as had occurred in the past. To be sure, 
since the Sixth Congrees of the Comintern, in 1928, many 
known unreliable elements either had been removed from 
the scene, or else had been reduced to an ineffectual 
status.24 But Stalin knew from experience that an absolute 
23nThe Eve of the Seventh Congress of the Communist 
International, u The Conimunist International, No. 7, July 20, 
1935, pp. 857-85 • 
24Notable among the missing were Trotski and M.N.Roy, 
the latter having left in 1929 for the reason, as he ex-
plains it, of Stalinrrs anti-Marxist pol'icy toward India. 
Cf. M.N. Roy, The Russian Revolution (Calcutta: Renaissance 
Publishers, 1949), p. 218. Still present; though without 
effective voice, were Grego.ri Piatakov and Kb.ristian Rakov-
ski. They, with a host of others, were to be liquidated in 
the great purges that commencea in 1936. 
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guarantee against deviationism had not been obtained 
thereby. Moreover, it required no great power of insight 
to calculate the probable effect of its manifestation on 
his effort to convince non-Communists in Europe and Asia 
of the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally in the 
struggle against expansionist fascism. 
It is a matter of public record that Stalin's fears 
were borne out at the Seventh Congress of the Cominter.n, 
which met in the Hall of Columns of the Moscow House of 
Trade Unions from July 25 to August 25, 1935. By the time 
all business had been completed, and a full month was the 
longest a congress was ever in session, there was good 
reason to suspect the reliability of at least one of the 
Comintern's Sections: the French. 
To begin with, the leaders of the French Communist 
Party apparently arrived in Moscow with a conception of 
their role in the general scheme of things at variance 
with Stalin's, the advance warnings against sectarianism 
notwithstanding. The French attitude was clearly one of 
revolutionary expectation, which stemmed from significant 
achievements in the preceding year. Whereas some of the 
major Communist Parties, like the Italian and the German, 
had been crushed completely, while others had failed to 
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register any notable progress in penetrating the working 
masses, the French successes had been phenomenal by 
comparison. Party membership had tripled, while that 
of the Young Communist League had increased fivefold. 
Furthermore, in advance of the Comintern congress, they 
had taken the initiative in effecting a rapprochement not 
only with the French Socialists, but with the Radical 
Socialists as well. Finally, in the municipal elections 
of May 5, 1935, they had won forty-three municipalities 
and had emerged as the single strongest party in Paris. 
The French delegation wasted little time in pre-
senting to the congress its view that the situation in 
France was developing rapidly in the direction of a 
revolutionary upheaval. This occurred immediately after 
the opening report by WilheLm Pieck, in which all Sections 
(with the exception of the Russian) were roundly berated 
for culpable sectarianism; which, of course, was Stalin's 
way of establishing discipline. 25 But it had no effect 
on the French whatsoever. Marcel Cachin replied to the 
Qharges on behalf of his colleagues, and, after repudiating 
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them, sounded a note that was clearly alien to the intended 
spirit of the meeting: 
• • • in the stage of decisive social struggles 
that we have now reached everyone understands 
that he must devote himself to the defense of 
the Soviet Union, that he must identify it with 
his own defense. 
• • • The duty of the Communists is now tremen-
dous; it is their task to prepare themselves to 
direct these coming struggles in the light of 
the precedent of the October Revolution in 
Russia.26 
What Cachin had espoused was the "left 11 deviationist 
concept of establishing the defense of the Soviet Union 
through the extension of the proletarian revolution. From 
the standpoint of long range objectives, it was not without 
validity. Under existing conditions, however, the idea 
could be no more appreciated in Moscow than when it had 
been expressed in the summer of 1918 by Gregori Piatakov.27 
Consequently, Stalin, who directed the proceedings from the 
background, reacted swiftly to put an end to such revolu-
tionary notions. In Pieckts reply to the discussion of 
his report, Cachin was singled out as one whose speech had 
revealed a dangerous ttspirit of self-satisfaction with the 
6 . 2 Ibid., p. 97. 
27cf. above, pp. 69-71. 
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successes achievedrr. Moreover, the French delegation 
was reminded that its task was to fight against fascism 
on the basis of a united front with the proletariat and 
a "peoplets frontn with all other anti-fascists.28 Before 
he had finished, Pieck made it clear that, for the time 
being at least, the revolutionary issue was a dead one: 
We must learn to lead in a common fight 
millions of people, holding.different views, 
convictions and outlookse We must therefore 
so adapt the style and methods of our work 
as to achieve the maximum contact with these 
masses in the shortest possible time.29 
Before the French delegation had a chance to reply 
to the latest charge, which it &ntended to do, the congress 
was directed to its main business; the formal pronouncement 
of the new policy. Georgi Dimitrov, a Bulgarian whose 
recent election to the post of General Secretary of the 
Comintern was Stalints way of demonstrating to the world 
the independence of that organization from Soviet politics, 
handled this task. 
Dimitrov began with a recapitulation of the serious-
ness of the threat of fascism to the world and to the Soviet 
Union in particular. He reiterated the importance of the 
28communist International, 7th Congress 
29Ibid., p. 122. 
. . . ' p. 116. 
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united front with social-democrats. His main point, 
however, stressed the need to expand the united front 
into a broad npeople's front" with all anti-fascists, 
irrespective of political outlook. The ttcorrect approach 11 
toward that end embraced the following points: (1) the 
cessation of revolutionary tactics; (2) the support of 
democratic institutions; and (3) the promotion of anti-
fascist national sentiment. 
The immediate overriding concern of the Comintern, 
according to Dimitrov, was not the extension of the pro-
letarian revolution, but the defeat of fascism. Accord-
ingly, he advised all in attendance to be strong, militant, 
and vigilant, and to approach the working classes, the 
peasantry, and the petty-bourgeoisie with patience, guided 
by the fact that they " •.•• must be taken as they are, and 
not as we should like to have them.tt30 Moreover, he 
.. 
instructed them to explode the "bogey of the Red Periln 
by supporting democratic institutions and legitimate national 
aspirations. For example, the American delegation was told 
to create a mass party that was neither socialist nor 
communist, but anti-fascist, while the British was given 
30Ibid.' p. 138. 
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the task of cooperating with the Labor Party.3l Finally~ 
indicating apprehension over the outburst of revolutionary 
sentiment, Dimitrov singled out the French for instruc-
tions specified down to the last detail. No mention was 
made of revolutionary tactics.32 On the contrary, the 
chief emphasis was placed on the need to preserve the 
Franco-Soviet pact and to support an anti-fascist 11people 1 s 
front" government should one materialize, Communism 1 s 
fundamental opposition to nbourgeois" governments notwith-
standing.33 
Signifying its importance, if not the fear that it 
would be the most difficult for Communist intenationalists 
to accept, Dimitrov devoted special attention to the 
national issue. For example, from Lenin 1 s article non the 
National Pride of the Great Russiansrr, he selected a few 
choice quotations to prove that Communists were not 
rtnational nihilists n.. To demonstrate the point, he extolled 
3lcf. Ibid., pp. 151-153. 
32Later on, Dimitrov defined sectarianism as 
n9~-~·tpan:t1Dill!arly in overestimating the revolutionization 
of the masses.n Ibid., p. 186. 
33cf. ~., p. 155. 
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his own pride in being a. Bulgarian. With this as his 
basis, he then proceeded to define the essentially com-
plementary characters of nationalism and proletarian 
internationalism: 
Comrades, proletarian internationalism must, 
so to spea.Ir, 11 acclimatize itselfn in each coun-
try in order to sink deep roots in its native 
soil. National forms of the proletarian 
class struggle and of the labour movement in 
the individual countries are in no contra-
diction to proletarian internationalism; on 
the contrary, it is precisely in these forms 
that the international interests of the4pro-letariat can be successfully defended.3 
Dimitrov•s report no doubt was intended as the 
complete policy package, which everyone, inciuding. the 
French Communists, were expected to accept dutifUlly. 
But the results were not entirely according to plan. For 
one, Maurice Thorez, the fiery French leader, arose to 
demonstrate that the revolutionary sparks struck by Cachin 
were as yet unextinguished. Obviously piqued by the im-
plications of the special attention accorded his party, 
Thorez .replied to the report forcefully enough to suggest 
an open challenge to Moscow's authority in such matters. 
Thorez began by adding to Cachin's earlier denial 
of French sectarianism one of his own. His account of the 
34Ib1d., p. 182. 
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French party's record highlighted only ita achievements, 
while weaknesses and ;.)J!llllissions within the Communist 
movement were ascribed to parties in nother countriean 
and in Germany n above all n • 35 This was Thore z' s way of 
getting back at Pieck. Moreover, he credited the Comin-
tern only with nvaluable advice 11 and Stalin with pin-
pointing the probiema facing Communism, and then went 
on to state his own preference :for MarxJ~s thesis, es-
poused in The Class Strusgle in France, as a better basis 
for evaluating conditions in France.36 
With that, Thorez went on to deliver what amounted 
to an open declaration of independence; for his definition 
of what the French Communist Party intended to do contra-
dicted Dimitrov's instructions on every major point. For 
example, on the subject of cooperating with non-Communists 
in the united and people's fronts, Thorez stated his aim 
to be that of influencing the movement ideologically and 
politically, of raising it to a ''higher stage", and of 
-c-onvincing the masses n ••• of the necessity of marching 
35c:r. Ibid., p. 200. 
36Ibid., pp. 213, 217. 
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forward towards a Soviet Repub1icn.37 Thent with res-
pect to the matter of a peoplets front government, he 
made it clear that his objective was not merely to support, 
or join, such a government, when and if it materialized in 
France, but to interpret its advent as decisive evidence 
of an intensification of the class struggle. In short, 
the position of the French Communists would then be al-
tered to the extent that preparations for a revolutionary 
seizure of power, utilizing all ministerial posts held, 
would be necessitated: 
If, ••• the Communist Party launches, 
propagates, popularizes, and gets adopted, 
in time, a minimum of measures of a trans-
itory nature, the drive of the mass movement 
can impose a Peoplets Front government, 
which our Party would support and in which, 
if necessary, it might even participate. 
The anti-fascist battle would become 
fiercer, since the reactionary and fascist 
assault would be brutal and immediate. But 
the Peoplets Front and the Communist Party 
would have occupied new positions, which we 
would have to utilize to prepare for the 
establishment of Soviet power, the dicta-
torship of the pro1etariat.38 
According to the stenographic report of the pro-
ceedings of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, Thorez's 
37~., pp. 213, 217. 
38Ibid., pp. 217-218. 
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speech was followed by nLoud and prolonged applause, 
rising to an ovationn.39 Even more significant, however, 
was the fact that its central revolutionary theme was 
echoed by other speakers, including Pollitt, Florin, 
and Linderot. Their strongly worded anti-capitalist 
expressions, and references to unew rev(!)lutionary per-
spectives", made it crystal. clear that the French posi-
tion was not exactly an isolated one.40 
From Stalin's vantage point in the Hall of Columns, 
the development was both obvious and disturbing. What he 
had feared most, had striven diligently to avert, had 
come to pass. More than that, he was now faced with a 
serious dilemma. For example, if any Communists returned 
home to pursue revolutionary policies after the meeting 
in Moscow, all hope for the success of his quest for allies 
would be shattered irrevocably, particularly if it was to 
occur in France. However, he could not prevent them from 
doing so by force; for it would explode the fiction of the 
Comintern's independence of Moscow's direction and probably 
lead to devastating consequ~nces in the field of diplomacy. 
Furthermore, an added argument against recourse to a swift, 
39.!.!;U4.. ' p. 228. 
40cf. ~., pp. 228, 242, 249. 
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harsh purge of the rebels against the national policy 
was the apparent popularity of the French stand. A purge 
at this time more than likely would have destroyed the 
Comintern altogether. 
The only course open to Stalin was to follow the 
example set by Lenin in the comparable circumstances of 
the Second Congress of the Comintern.41 That was to try 
to restore unity behind the Soviet leadership through 
reasoned argumentation and cajolery. For good measure, 
however, he added a number of obvious threats so as to 
make sure that everyone knew him to be deadly serious. 
For example, on the day after the general outburst 
of approval for the French revolutionary sentiment, on 
August 5, 1935, the congress' proceedings were halted for 
two days. The fortieth anniversary of the death of Frie-
drich Engels was given as the reason. But, as events 
demonstrated, the anniversary was secondary to dealing 
with the more important matter at hand. 
Dimitri Manuilski, the first Russian to deliver a 
major address at the Seventh Congress, was the principal 
speaker. However, he spoke of Engels only sparingly, and, 
at that, only to provide authority for his definition of 
4lcr. above, pp. 162-165. 
the correct proletarian tactics under existing conditions: 
In 1889, in a letter to the Danish Social-
ist, Trier, Effgels recommends that other 
parties be utilized in the interests of the 
working class, that ttother parties and measures 
should be temporarily supported which are 
either of direct advantage to the proletariat, 
or which represent a step forward in the 
direction of economic4~evelopment or of political liberty.~ •• 
Without mentioning names, Manuilski went on to 
accuse "not a fewn delegates of conceiving of the pro-
letarian revolution mechanically and not dialectically, 
of being "pure revolutionistsn, and of suffering f'rom 
"'Lef't-wing' sickness". Then, more directly to the point, 
he warned that the party which starts out with vulgarized 
conceptions of revolutionary needs would be regarded as 
incapable of playing the part of organizer and leader of' 
the revolution in its country.43 
Evidence of behind-the-scenes activity to stem the 
deviationist tide among non-Soviet Communists is not 
available, but its event can be speculated reasonably. 
When the congress returned to its regular business, there 
were definite signs of amelioration. The French delegation 
42communist International, 7th Congress •••• , p. 265. 
43c:r. ~., pp. 262-265. 
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did not speak at all, not even to reply to a sharp note 
of criticism leveled against it by the Austrian delegate 
Koplenig.44 But the battle was still not over; there 
remained one more voice to be heard. It belonged to Wang 
Ming, the Chinese delegate, who, apparently encouraged 
by the action of his European colleagues, arose to stress 
the revolutionary importance of the East in a manner 
reminiscent of M.N.Roy. According to Wang, the people's 
front in Ohina had to be directed not only against imper-
ialism, but against the Kuomintang as well: 
••• it is only our Party that can unite 
all the best, all the honest, and all the 
revolutionary sons and daughters of the 
Chinese people, who no longer want to 
tolerate the transformation of their country 
into an imperialist colony, the enslavement 
of their people and the4death by starvation of millions of toilers. 5 
When Dimitrov replied to the stormy discussion of 
his report, on August 13, 1935, he opened with the obser-
vation that no previous Oomintern congress had displayed 
such ideological and political solidarity as the present 
one. He concluded with a promise of Communism's ultimate 
victory on a world scale. In between, however, he made 
44cr. Ibid., p. 340. 
45Ibid., p. 290. 
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it clear that such glowing remarks constituted little 
more than a screen to conceal from outside view the fact 
that the congress was in the midst of a sharp contest 
over the issue of tactics. 
For example, it took Dimitrov only four short para-
graphs to dispense with the unanimity theme and to get to 
the task of inveighing against the proponents of revolu-
tionary tactics. In the latter connection, he denounced 
the weaknesses of the comrades and demanded that they be 
corrected immediately. He rtdiouled the idea that the 
people's front must be raised to a higher level, calling 
it sheer nonsense, and reminded Caohin and Thorez person-
ally that the paramount task of the French Communist Party 
was to fight fascism and to help defend the Soviet Union 
on the basis of the instructions issued earlier by him. 
Moreover, to the American, British, Scandinavian, Austrian 
and Asian delegations he directed a warning against trout-
and-dried sohemes 11 , which, however consistent with the 
Russian revolutionary experience, bore no direct relationship 
to existing conditions and needs.46 The correct policy, 
Dimitrov stated bluntly, was that the decisions of the 
46cf. Ibid., 357, 360-361, 362, 373. 
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of the congress be carried out in fact: 
What Comrade Stalin said at the Seventeenth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union about the conditions necessary to carry 
out the line of the Party oan and should be 
applied also, in its entir$ty, to the decisions 
which our Congress adopts.47 
Dimitrov was followed immediately by the Italian 
Communist Ercoli (Togliatti), who deliyered still another 
lengthy address on behalf of the new policy and against 
deviationism. The struggle for peace and the defense of 
the Soviet Union were the twin slogans of Communism, 
insisted Ercoli, from which there could be no deviation. 
An allowance for revolutionary tactics was made, but only 
after an attack on the Soviet Union was launched. Until 
that time, however, he demanded that all Communists, and 
particularly the French, do everything possible to gain 
the support of the masses of workers, peasants, and petty 
47Ibid., p. 371. The quotation from Stalin's 
speech wasa:B follows: nsome people think that it is 
sufficient ·to draw up a correct Party line, proclaim 
it from the housetops, enunciate it in the f.orm of 
general theses and resolutions, and then carry them 
unanimously in order to make the victory come of itself, 
automatically, so to speak. This, of course, is wrong. 
This is a great delusion. • • • After the correct line 
has been given ••• success depends on the way in which 
the work is organized, on the organization of the struggle 
for the application of the line of the Party, on the 
proper selection of people, on supervising the fulfillment 
or the decisions of the leading organs.n 
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bourgeoisie so as to prevent its occurrence.48 
The open pleas for unity and the warnings against 
deviation, with a probable assist from less open activi-
ties, did silence the revolutionary chorus. The French, 
apparently mindful that Stalin's wrath was no asset, made 
their amends publicly. Andre Marty, the hernof the Black 
Sea revolt in 1919, performed this task for his colleagues. 
In sharp contrast to what Cachin and ThDrez had said 
earlier, Marty's words were eonspicuously free of the 
glorification of the French Communist Party. More impor-
tant, however, was his definition of the French task, 
which excluded the need for "ordinary anti-capitalist 
action": 
Of course, we understand full well that 
only the final overthrow of capitalist domin-
ation will abolish wars. But, if we know how 
to mobilize the masses, we shall be able to 
postpone or even prevent an imperialist war, 
and first of all a military attack upon the 
Soviet Union. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Armed with the decisions of the Seventh 
World Congress, enlightened and guided by our 
great Comrade Stalin, we shall redouble our 
efforts to correct our weaknesses in rapid, 
shock-brigade tempo, as the present grave 
48cf. Ibid., pp. 415-416, 450. 
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situation demands~ in order to be ready 
to conquer new positions that will assure 
new victories foe socialism!49 
Marty's words could be taken as evidence that the 
tactical issue had been settled, and that unity had been 
restored. But Stalin was not entirely satisfied. Hence~ 
when Dimitrov delivered the closing speech of the congress, 
the problem of deviationism was touched on once again. 
This time, lavish praise was heaped on the French Commun-
ist ~arty, and on Thorez in particular.5° The Chinese; 
too, were accorded recognition for their achievements. 
But the General Secretary also took time to reiterate the 
importance of the ttnew tactical orientation" of the Comin-
tern's, and to warn against deviating from it. Those who 
persist in their mistakes, he asserted, must be nflayed 
without mercy n, and: 
Anyone who tries to break the iron unity of 
our ranks by any kind of factionalism will be 
made to feel .what is meant by the Bolshevik 
discipline that Lenin and Stalin have always 
taught us. Let this be a warning to .those 
few elements in individual Parties who think 
they can take advantage of the difficulties 
of their Party, the wounds of defeat, or the 
49rbid., pp. 469, 470. 
50cf. ~., p. 552. 
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blows of the raging enemy, to carry out 
their factional plansi and to further their 
own group interests.5 
Thus did the Comintern become an integral part of 
Stalin's scheme to win allies in Europe and Asia against 
the menace of German and Japanese expansionism. There 
could be no doubt, however, that it represented the weakest 
aspect of the whole strategic complex. In view of the 
Comintern's general record, in which case it had never 
responded well to a policy shift from left to right, and 
particularly in view of the proceedings of the latest 
congress, the basis for misgivings was present. Never-
theless, short of a complete abandonment of the new policy, 
Stalin had no alternative but to proceed as shheduled. 
Soviet Diplomacy Makes Further Progress. Following 
the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and almost as if to 
compensate for its threatened deficiency, Stalin's pursuit 
of a system of mutual aid pacts was pressed with renewed 
vigor. On the home front, for example, additional efforts 
~o bring the Soviet society into line with the Western 
model were undertaken. On February 2, 1936, Izvestiia 
proclaimed the need to recognize the contributions of the 
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Russian Orthodox Church tc the historical advancement 
of Russia. This signaled a sharp toning down of the 
anti-religious sentiments hitherto frequently expressed 
by Communists.52 Even more dramatic, however, was the 
promulgation of a new constitution. 
The Constitution of the U.S.S.R., or, as it is 
more popularly known, the nstalin Constitutionn, was 
declared effective on December 5, 1936. It preserved the 
federal form of the Soviet state and the right of each 
Union Republic to secede. But its departure from the 
past pattern of Soviet constitutionalism was notable in 
several respects. For one, the preambular link between 
the Soviet state and world revolution was dropped. For 
another, the earlier indirect, open electoral system, 
favoring the industrial workers, was replaced by direct 
elections, the secret ballot, and equal suffrage for all, 
including the hitherto disfranchised 11bourgeoisierr. This 
much was intended to demonstrate to the world that the 
process of nbourgeoisificationn in the Soviet Union was 
profound in its ramifications. 
52an September 21, 1936, for example, E. Yaroslav-
ski, head of the League of the Militant Godless, publicly 
announced his support of suffrage for the clergy. Reported 
in The New York Times, September 22, 1936, p. 17. 
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More directly to the point o~ the diplomatic 
interest to be served, however, the new constitution 
~or the ~irst time speci~ied Soviet treaty obligations 
as binding absolutely. Furthermore, the method by which 
such obligations were to be met was o~~icially accelerated. 
Hence~orth, it was to be possible ~o~ the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet to proclaim a state o~ war without 
~irst obtaining the approval o~ the Supreme Soviet in the 
case o~ an attack, or 
• • • when necessary to ~ulfill international 
treaty obligations concerning mutual de~ense 
against aggression.53 . · 
The real meaning o~ the "Stalin Constitution" can 
be understood only in terms of the singular purpose it 
was intendedto serve. In no ~ndamental way was the real 
constitutional arrangement o~ the Soviet Union altered. 
The single-party dictatorship, at the apex o~ which was 
located the all-powerful secretary-general, controlling 
the electoral process at the nominating stage, selecting 
an obedient governmental majority, and imposing his will 
on all aspects of Soviet society, still remained. As a 
53The Constitution o~ the U.S.S.R., Article 49, 
Section m. 
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further example of calculated duplicity, combining 
superficial change with fundamental sameness, the docu-
ment represented the ultimate rrcarrotn in the promotion 
of confidence in the Soviet regime both at home and 
abroad. Remarking on the international interest to be 
served, Stalin offered the fo~lowing: 
The international significance of the 
new Constitution ••• can hardly be ex-
aggerated. 
Today, when the wave of fascism is be-
spattering the Socialist movement of the 
working class and besmirching the demo-
cratic aspirations of the best people of 
the civilized world, the new Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment 
against fascism, proclaiming Socialism 
and democracy to be invincible. The new 
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will give 
moral assistance and real support to all 
those who are fighting fascist barbarism 
today.54 
Not surprisingly, there were some non-Communists in the 
West who accepted the new constitution as further evidence 
of Soviet nbourgeoisification 11 .55 
In the meantime, Stalin's diplomats continued 
54J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (New York: 
International Publishers, 1934), p. 5B9. 
55cf. Sidney Webb, "Soviet Russia's New Deal,n 
Th~ Nation, November 21, 1936, pp. 596-598; Maurice 
Hindus, 11Russia Grows Up, 11 Harpers Magazine, May, 1937, 
pp. 611-620. 
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tirelessly to foster the impression abroad that concern 
for the principle of national sovereignty and national 
security for all was Moscow's ~~pamount preoccupation. 
In the League of Nations, for example, the Soviet dele-
gation became the single most vocal champion of peace 
based on respect for national rights. By mid-1935, the 
foundation for this stance had been carefully laid through 
such acts as the presentation of a dispute with Uruguay 
before the League Council, an agreement not to export 
arms to the belligerents in the "Chaco Warn, Bolivia and 
Paraguay, and the support of Yugoslav demands on Hungary, 
which arose out of the assassination of King Alexander. 
However, this represented merely-the prologue to an even 
greater ef~ort on behalf of national self-determination 
that developed in September 1935, when the Italian-Ethio-
pian border dispute was drawing to its fateful climax. 
Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affaire, 
and Moscow's chief delegate to the League of Nations, 
trumpeted the national theme on.the behalf of Ethippia 
with the fullest possible volume: 
Nothing in the Covenant of the League entitles 
us to discriminate between Members of the 
League as to their internal regime, the colour 
of their skin, their racial distinction or the 
stage of their civilization, nor accordingly 
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to deprive some of them of privileges 
which they enjoy in virtue of their mem-
beship of the League, and, in the first 
place, of their inalienable ~ight to 
integrity and independence.56 
It would not be unreasonable to conclude that 
Litvinov, as a self-appointed conscience of the League, 
was instrumental in Shaping that organization's reaction 
to the Italian attack on Ethiopia on October 3, 1935. 
While the British Foreign Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
was publicly for strong action, he was privately against 
any move which might antagonize the Italian dictator to 
an extreme.57 And exactly the same could be said of the 
French Premier, Pierre Laval. Hence, it was more than 
likely that, without the blunt-speaking Soviet Commissar 
around, the League membership would have found an excuse 
for even lighter sanctions than those voted on October 11. 
At any rate, Moscow viewed the imposition of sanc-
tions in that light and heralded the event publicly as 
not only a step in the direction of effective collective 
a~tion against aggression, but as a triumph for the prin-
5~League of Nations, Official Journal, July to 
Becember 1935, p. 1142. 
57As much has been borne out by subsequent events 
and by the testimony of Winston Churchill. Cf. Winston 
L.S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 175-176, 182. 
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ciple or national selr-determination.58 Privately, 
no doubt, the Soviet belier in the promotion of the 
national idea as a userul diplomatic technique was 
reinforced. 
There occurred in the next five months develop-
ments benericial to the Soviet cause and new opportunities 
to strengthen the pose 1as champion or national rights. 
For example, when, on December 21, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare 
was replaced by the more pro-Soviet Anthony Eden, the 
event was hailed in Moscow as both a victory for British 
democracy and the cause or international security, and as 
a decisive step in the direction or improved Anglo-Soviet 
relations.59 To lend impetus to the latter prospect by 
a showY display of respect for British national institutions, 
Litvinov and Marshall Tukhachevski were sent to London at 
the end of January 1936 to attend the funeral of King 
George v. Then, when, on January 24, 1936, Pierre Laval 
58cf. Pravda, October 12, 1935, p. l. 
59cf. Ibid., January 12, 1936, p. 1. Cause ror 
Soviet jubilat~on on that occasion can be seen in Chur-
chill's thumbnail sketch of Eden: ttHe was a devoted 
adherent or the French Entente. He had just insisted 
upon n starr conversa'tlions". He was anxious to have more 
intimate relations with Soviet Russia. He felt and reared 
the Hitler peril.rr Churchill, op. cit., p. 240. 
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was succeeded by Albert Sarraut in Paris, that event was 
also greeted affirmatively in Moscow, though with the 
reminder that the French had not fulfilled the obliga-
tion of ratifying the Franco-Soviet pact.60 
On March 1, 1936, in a much-wublicized interview 
given to Roy Howard, Stalin personally contributed to 
his own cause by reiterating the Soviet respect for the 
right of nation-states to govern their own affairs free 
of outside interference, and by terming the Western notion 
of Communism t s revolutionary aspirations a 11 tragi-comic 
misunderstandingrr.6l A more important assist, however, 
was provided a week later by Hitler, who reoccupied the 
demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. In response to that 
violation of the Versailles Treaty, a treaty that he had 
long denounced, Stalin offered Paris and London assistance 
for whatever remedial steps they might decide to take.62 
Stalinrs seeds of conciliation, fertilized by 
Hitler 1 s aggressive demeanor, produced a small, though 
60cf. Izvestiia, January 27, 1936, p. 1. 
6lrrsta11n-Howard Interview,n The Communist Inter-
national, No. 4, April, 1936, pp. 487-493. 
62cf. The New York Times, March 9, 1936, p. 30. 
233 
significant harvest. On February 26, 1936, for example, 
the French Chamber of Deputies approved the mutual assis-
tance treaty. A week later, the French Senate followed 
suit, thus opening the way to discussions for a military 
convention~ In addition, relations with London improved 
to the point where secret naval talks were begun in May, 
and economic credits up to ten million pounds were ac-
quired.63 Finally, also in May 1936, Rumania and Yugo-
slavia followed the Western lead with declarations in 
favor of the principle of collective s~curity and of readi-
ness to improve relations with the Soviet Union still 
further.64 
The spring of 1936 was significant from the Soviet 
standpoint for still another reason; for it was then that 
the nationalization of the Comintern registered its most 
dramatic return. Generally, in the eight months which 
had elapsed since the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, 
the nationalized Communist Parties had not been as sue-
cessful as Moscow had hoped. Chiefly because memories of 
past Communist duplicity remained undimmed, most parties 
63Both are reported in The New York Times, July 31, 
1936, p. 18. 
64cf. ~., May 8, 1936, p. 1. 
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had failed in their attempts to establish either united 
or people's fronts. It had been true especially in the 
United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, 
Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian States, and China. In 
those countries, socialists and non-socialists alike had 
regarded the sudden manifestation of Communist nationalism 
with the deepest suspicion. 65 
Even so, there had occurred two exceptions to the 
general rule of failure. On the one hand, in France, Com-
munist nationalism had served to weld a firm alliance with 
the Socialists and Radical Socialists.66 On January 11, 
1936, the three parties, together with the French trade 
unions, a small Socialist-Republican Party, and four 
pacifist and anti-fascist groups, had declared themselves 
65Indicative of the hard sledding encountered by 
the Communists was the impassioned, though fruitless, plea 
of non-Communist G.D.H. Cole's on behalf of the united 
front. Cf. G.D.H. Cole, The People's Front (London: V. 
Gollancz Ltd., 1937). 
66Alexander Werth, the noted English correspondent, 
comments on the French Communists' successful propaganda 
in the following manner: 11 It tended to reconcile the revo-
lutionary spirit with the national spirit; it touched the 
~entimental strains of the guarante huitard revolutionism 
dormant in many a Parisian's hear.t -- be he a workman or a 
little bourgeois. Many a French paDriot, feeling that the 
Communists had put something 'dynamic' into the somewhat 
moth-eaten jacobinism of the Radicals, was tempted to vote 
f.or themn. A. Werth, The Twilight of France, 1933-1940 
(London: H. Hamilton, 1942), p. 72. 
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the rassemblement populaire and had issued a single 
program with the threefold aim of struggle against 
fascism, improvement of working class conditions, and 
defense of France through collective security. On the 
other hand, in Spain, the Communists had also achieved 
an alliance with the Socialists and Republicans, though 
not with comparable solidity.67 In the general election, 
held on February 16, 1936, the.group had won a majority 
in the Spanish Cortes. But the Communists had obtained 
only seventeen seats for themselves, which, although an 
improvement over the past, had not been sufficient to 
afford them any voice in the formulation of governmental 
policy. 
The truly dramatic achievement of the Comintern 
occurred in France in April-May 1936. In the general 
election, the rassemblement populaire, or Popular Front, 
won a decisive majority in the Chamber of Deputies. 
~7:According to one Spanish Communist, J. Hernandez, 
the Communist Party in Spain suffered the dilemma of 
dealing with a Socialist Party that was further to the 
left than it and a Republican Party that was deeply sus-
picious. Cf. J. Hernandez, ~The Development of the 
Democratic R~volution in Spain, 11 The Communist Interna-
tional, No. B, August, 1936, pp. 956-969. Cf. also, 
David T. Cattell, Communism and the Spanish Civil War 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955). 
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Furthermore, the election marked a signal triumph for the 
French Communists, whose popular vote was increased over 
the preceding election (in 1932) by more than ninety 
percent and whose representation in the Chamber rose from 
ten to seventy-two. This ·latter development was enough:to 
prompt the Socialist leader, Leon Blum, to invite the 
Communists to participate directly in the government that 
he was forming. It was also enough to prompt Moscow to 
interp~et the event as evidence that France was clearly 
emerging as the West European pillar of a general anti-
fascist mutual security network. 68 
Thus, late in the spring of 1936, Stalin was in a 
position to view the results of his strategy, as well as 
its prospects, with some satisfaction. New modifications 
of the Soviet system had evoked a positive reaction. abroad. 
Moreover, steps t~en in the League of Nations and outside 
had established him as an obvious champion of national 
rights and of collective security against aggression. And 
for such efforts, notable returns had been recorded. Hoare 
had been replaced by Eden in the British Foreign Ministry, 
Laval had been replaced in France and the treaty with 
68c:r. "May Day, 1936, n The Communist International, · 
No. 6, June 19~6 1 p. Boo. 
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that country had been ratified, and Rumania and Yugo-
slavia appeared to be on the way to joining the mutual 
security system. More than that, despite general failure, 
the Comintern had fulfilled its task ~ one vitally impor-
tant country, France. From that victory could be deduced 
two gratifying conclusions; namely, that the French Com-
munists were holding firm in their adherence to the Comin-
tern's policy and that the implementation of the pact with 
France was practically assured. All in al+, the prospects 
were very encouraging. 
The Nationalistic Bubble Bursts. But the spring of 
1936 marked only the apogee of Stalin's strategy, and not 
the threshold of its complete success. At that very time, 
the whole effort lost its momentum, began to decline, and 
ultimately collapsed. 
In part, the Soviet diplomatic defeat that resulted 
can be attributed to such factors as the resolute refusal 
of one Western Power, the United States, to be drawn into 
the whirlpool of European politics and the general failure 
of the Communist Parties to fulfill their assigned tasks. 
For these, Moscow cannot be held responsible.· However, 
though contributory, such factors as these cannot be 
regarded as exclusive, or even decisive. They did not, 
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for example, account for the failure of the mutual assis-
tance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia, or the 
failure to reap the benefits of the rapprochement with 
the British in 1936. All things considered, a collective 
security system with at least France, Czechoslovakia, 
Great Britain, Rumania, and Yugoslavia was not beyond the 
realm of possibility. 
Looking back, it appears evident that the Soviet 
strategy failed principally because of its own inherent 
weakness and three tactical errors committed by Stalin. 
To begin with, the facade of Communist nationalism lost 
one of its major props when, in what can only be regarded 
as a new outburst of deviationism, the French Communists 
suddenly executed an oblique turn to the left. Whereas 
they might have participated directly in the Popular Front 
government, and thus have enhanced their own position as 
champions of the French national interest, they rejected 
Blum's invitation. Furthermore, though they still could 
have concentrated their efforts on the promotion of the 
cause of collective security with the Soviet Union against 
Germany, the French leaders elected instead to emphasize 
the issue of domestic economic and social reform. They 
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became involved in the famous "sit-inn strikes which 
broke out immediately after the general election, posing 
as the champions of the workers' cause. 
It was significant that the negative tack of the 
French Communists came at· a time when Moscow was publi-
cizing its jubilation over the results of the election 
and advising that support of France's Popular Front 
government was the paramount task.69 It underscored the 
discrepancy between the French Communist and Soviet view-
points. More important from the standpoint of its conse-
quences, however, was the fact that it caused Leon Blum, 
not to speak of the Radical Socialists, to become ex-
tremely wary about the intentions of his Communist. allies. 
On the eve of taking office, for example, Blum's deep 
misgivings were voiced in the form of the following warning: 
I really hope that the Government which 
the Socialist Party is going to form will not 
be a Kerensky Government. But, if it were to 
be so, believe me, in the France of today it 
is not a Lenin who would replace it.70 
69"This victory has shown that successful resistance 
to fascism and war is possible only along the lines of the 
united roletarian front and the anti-fascist eo le's 
front." 1!2!Q.. Italics theirs 
70cited in Denis w. Brogan, France Under the Republic, 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), pp. 702-703. 
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Though the evidence is not conclusive, it is 
probably correct, as one French observer has reported, 
that Moscow actually intervened to stifle the internation-
alist urge of the French Communists.7l Nikolai Shvernik, 
head of the international Communist trade union organiza-
tion, Profintern, was in Paris at that time and more than 
likely cautioned Thorez. That would account for the 
latter's statement, on June 7, 1936, that the Communists 
had nothing in common with the Popular Front government, 
and would soon replace it, and his agreement five days 
later to help settle the strikes.72 
Even so, Thorez was not deterred entirely. On 
July 8, 1936, for example, his own internationalist bent 
pushed the Comintern-styled nationalism aside long enough 
to threaten to withdraw his party's support of the Blum 
government over a minor strike issue.73 Then, less than 
7laf. Jacques Bardoux, 11 Le complot sovietique contra 
la patrie francaise, 11 La Revue de Paris, August 15, 1936, 
pp. 721-741. 
72af. Ibid. Significantly, at just that time Thorez 
also published a definitive tract on Communist aims. In it 
he not only raised the revolutionary issue once again, but 
described a three-stage process by which he planned to seize 
power as well. Of. Maurice Thorez, France Today and the 
People's Front (London: V. Gollancz Ltd., 1936), pp. 40-41. 
73af. The New York Times, July 9, 1936, p. 14. 
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three weeks later, after the civil war in Spain had 
broken out, and particularly after Blum had responded 
negatively to Madrid's request for arms, it emerged even 
more prominently. The French Socialist leader became the 
target of a Communist campaign of vilification, which 
included new and stronger threats to overturn the govern-
ment by withdrawing support.74 And it continued at a very 
high pitch until the second week in August, when Moscow, 
doing its best to play an agreeable diplomatic role, con-
sented to Blum's proposal that all governments re~rain from 
interfering in the Spanish conflict. 
The effect of the actions of the French Communists 
on the relations between Paris and Moscow cannot be deter-
mined precisely. According to the testimony of the left 
Socialist Minister for Aviation in the Popular Front 
government, Pierre Cot, who makes no secret of his sympathy 
for the Soviet cause, or of his untir&mg efforts to promote 
the implementation of the pact with Moscow, the failure of 
the government and the ultimate nullification of the mutual 
assistance treaty was due as much to the rtmistakesn of the 
74According to one correspondent in Paris at that 
time, Richard L. Stokes, the Communist newspaper l'Humanite 
issued headlines every morning nscreaming for in,tervention 11 • 
Ri&.nard L. Stokes, Leon Blum: Poet to Premier (New York: 
Coward-McCann Inc., 1937), p. 259. 
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Communists as those or any partyts.75 Regrettably, Cot 
does not bother to specify the umistakes" committed. 
At any rate, two things are clear. For one, by 
their actions, the French Communists had certainly thrown 
away whatever chance had existed ror a decisive voice in 
th~ rormulation of the policies of the Popular Front. 
Blum ultimately concluded that they were nothing more 
than Moscow's agents in quest of a revolutionary seizu~e 
or power.76 For another, their obstructionist tactics, 
particularly in connection with the Spanish civil war 
issue, arforded convenient evidence for the extreme 
French right wing's anti-Communist and anti-Soviet charges 
and caused many moderates to doubt the wisdom of an alli-
ance with Communists under any circumstances.77 Under the 
circumstances, it was little wonder that the Popular Front 
government proved hesitant to expand the mutual aid treaty 
with Moscow into a firm military alliance. 
75cr. Pierre Cot, The Trium~h of Treason (Chicago: 
Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, 19~), p. 96. 
76cf. Leon Blum, For All Mankind (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1946), p. 47 • 
. 77cr. Charles A. Micaud, The French Right Wing and 
Nazi Germany (Durham, N. Carolina: Duke University Press, 
1943)' p. 113. 
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It is more than likely that the Franco-Soviet 
treaty would have collapsed ultimately under the weight 
of the French Communist tactics. But Thorez was never 
made to suffer the pain of the type Stalinist discipline 
that Dimitrov had threatened at the Seventh Congress of 
the Comintern.78 He was undoubtedly saved from this 
ordeal for the reason that S~alin himself committed a 
few serious errors, which rendered the collapse of the 
whole nationally-based strategy confusing enough to deny 
a precise definition of its cause. 
Stalin's tactical errors were threefold. Two 
stemmed from an overestimation of the impact of his ex-
ploitation of the national idea on Western thinking, while 
the third was a pure blunder. For example, at the very 
time that he was currying favor with Paris and London on 
the Spanish issue, the Soviet dictator elected to dispute 
with them on still another one. This occurred in connection 
with proposals to amend the CQvenant of the League of.Nations, 
in the summer of 1936. 
78rron1cally, it was Andre Marty, a Stalinist rather 
than a deviationist, who, on the occasion of his expulsion 
from the French Communist Party in 1952, was made the scape-
goat for the deviationist "errorsn in the 1930's. 
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The proposals to rerorm the Leaguers Covenant 
arose directly out or the failure or the international 
organization to deal efrectively with the Ethiopian 
crisis. Its logic was contained in the ract that sanctions 
had not prevented Mussolini from doing exactly what he had 
intended, and that no member, with the exception of the 
Soviet Union, was prepared to take the risk of war implied 
in any stronger remedy. Hence, there was widespread sup-
port for a British suggestion, which Chile formally pro-
posed on June 26, 1936, that the League should abandon its 
coercive powers and leave sanctions to whatever States 
might be interested. It was also recommended that the 
absentee Powers, Japan and Germany, be permitted to return 
to rull membership.79 
The Soviet reaction made it plain that Stalin 
either failed to recognize the popularity or the proposals 
in the League, or, what is more likely, assumed that the 
strongest possible demands for the protection of all 
79cr. League of Nations, Official Journal, July 1936, 
pp. 751-752. On that occasion, the French delegate, Delbos, 
gave his assent to the proposal. ~., p. 754. cr. also, 
s. Engel, Lea ue Rerorm: An Anal sis of Official Pro osals 
and Discussions, 193 -1939 ,Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 
1940). 
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nations through effective collecti~e security would 
compel ita acceptance. The Soviet dictator apparently 
was counting on public opinion in Western Europe to react 
positively to his stress on the principle of national 
integrity and the League of Nations as the agency to 
uphold it. Thus, on August 22, 1936, his reply to the 
proposed watering down of the Covenant consisted of a 
counterproposal to permit three-quarters of the Council 
to commit all members to a policy of sanctions against 
a future aggressor, including military sanctions. In 
addition, making it appear as though Moscow was the sole 
champion of international law and order, the reply re-
jected the idea of admitting, or readmitting, any govern-
ment that had violated world peace, international agree-
ments, or decisions of the League.so 
No agreement on changing the League's Covenant 
was ever achieved. The discussions lasted for more than 
two years, and their only apparent effect was that they 
80cf. League of Nations, Official Journal, Special 
Supplement 154, pp. 10-11. Stalin probably had been 
encouraged by the demands of the British Labor Party two 
months earlier that the League be strengthened to preserve 
the peace. Cf. The New York .Times, June 19, 1936, p. 2 
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served to erode the relationship between Moscow and 
Paris and London. The Soviet insistence on turning 
the League into an effective police agency not only 
failed to overcome a popular belief that peace could 
be maintained best without foroeful measures, but dampened 
the ardor of many French and British officials. who, 
correctly or incorrectly, were also-acting on the 
assumption that a better way to avert a general war was 
to pursue more temperate policies. 
The Soviet action on the reform issue in the League 
of Nations was, in fact, the first of two parts of Stalin's 
effort in the latter half of 1936 to accelerate the devel-
opment of an effective collective security system. Even 
more dramatic, and disastrous, was his decision in October 
to declare the Soviet government no longer bound absolutely 
to the nonintervention agreement with respect to the civil 
war in Spain and then to dispatch shiploads of food and 
arms to the defending regime in Madrid. 81 The justifica-
tion for it was contained in the fact that other parties. 
to the agreement, notably Portugal and Italy, were doing 
·essentially the same on behalf of Franco's rebel forces. 
Blcf. The New York Times, October 21, 1936, p. 4; 
Jose Martin Blazquez, I Helped Build an Army ~London: 
Seeker and Warburg, 1939), pp. 246-251. 
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However, Stalin's objective, as told by the Spanish 
Socialist, Juan Negrin, was not only to aid the Madrid 
82 
regime, but to compel Paris and London to rollow suit. 
But Stalin again encountered resistance by the 
British and French to a more rorcerul policy toward Italy 
and Germany, the latter involving itself in the Spanish 
civil war soon arter. For example, in an obvious display 
or displeasure over the embarrassing Soviet insistence 
upon a more stringent derense or the principle or national 
sovereignty, the British, on October 25, 1936, suggested 
an investigation or three alleged violations ot the non-
intervention agreement by Moscow. Then, three days later, 
acting on an earlier Soviet charge, the Non-Intervention 
Committee in London voted almost unanimously to clear Italy 
and Portugal of violations. The sole negative vote cast 
was by the Soviet member, Ivan Maiski. 83 
82According to Negrin, who headed the government in. 
Madrid when the bulk or the Soviet aid was sent: nMoscow 
tried to do tor France and Britain what they should have 
done tor themselves. The promise of Soviet aid to the 
Spanish Republic was that ultimately Paris and London wpuld 
awake to the risks involved to themselves in Italian and 
German intervention in Spain and join the U.S.S.R. in sup-
portingt•us .. 11 Cited in J. .Alvarez del Vayo, Freedom 1 s 
Battle (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1940), p. 76. 
83cr. The New York Times, October 29, 1936, p. 1. 
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The effect of the new Soviet policy toward Spain 
was almost the opposite of what had been intended. It did 
not cause either Paris or London to become similarly in-
volved. Furthermore, despite Moscow's effort to prevent 
its action from being interpreted as an attempted Communist 
coup in Spain, many accepted the widely proclaimed conten-
tion of fascists that nothing else was intended.84 Finally, 
taking advantage of both factors, the division between 
Moscow and the Western democracies and the growing belief 
in the former's revolutionary intent, Italy and Germany, 
on November 18, 1936, simultaneously extended de jure 
recognition to Franco as the legitimate head of the Spanish 
govennment and lent increased assistance to his cause.85 
Not even Stalin's adherence to a joint British-French pro-
posal, on December 4, 1936, to mediate the conflict in 
Spain could undo the damage already done.86 
In the mea~time, Stalin's third, and final, tactical 
error had begun to take shape. It was contained in the 
84cf. Micaud, loc. cit. 
85cf. The New York Times, November 20, 1936, p. 22. 
86cf. The Times, December 5, 1936, p. 12. 
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series or purges, trials, and executions that rocked 
the Soviet world rrom August 1936 until the rall or 1938. 
And it cost Stalin whatever benerits had been obtained 
through the nationalization-conventionalization of the 
Soviet Union .. 
For example, in the first series or trials, which 
were based on the allegation or a Trotskyist conspiracy, 
Stalin lost much or the ground gained among Western 
liberals. The propaganda value or the new Soviet consti-
tution was blunted; its so-called democratic quality was 
rendered meaningless by the character of Soviet justice 
displayed. Not only did it raise doubts in the West about 
the reality or the changes said to have been errected.in 
the Soviet Union, but evoked vigorous protests. In the 
United States, for example, Professor John Dewey headed a 
private committee to investigate the charges against Trotsky, 
and it conoluded that they were unfounded •·87 The general 
feeling, however, was best summed up by fhe New Statesman 
and Nation: 
There may well have been a plot. But the 
disadvantage of these methods of justice, 
coupled with unconvincing confessions and 
broadcast propaganda, is that they reflect 
87cr. The New York Times, December 13, 1937, p. l. 
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among those who retain any integrity of judgement, at least as much upon the State 
which emp~gys them as upon the victims it 
condemns. · 
By itself, the method of procedure against the so-
called Trotskyist conspirators probably would not have 
been of tremendous consequence. As a matter of fact, 
skillrul handling could have turned the situation to 
advantage. Whatever losses were incurred among Western 
liberals could have been compensated for by gains among 
more moderate and conservative elements. 89 Among the 
latter, a choice between Stalin's attempted conservatism 
and Trotsky's continued agitation for a world revolution 
easily would have favored the former. Thus, Stalin might 
have played up the theme of Trotskyist subversion, and his 
measures against it, as further evidence of the sincerity 
with which the reshaping of the character of the Soviet 
system and the pursuit of a rapprochement with the Western 
democracies had been undertaken. The plot could have ·been 
88The New Statesman and Nation, August 29, 1936, p. 
274. Cf. also, Edouard Latour nReflexions Sur L'U.R.S.s.,n 
L'Annee Politigue, Mars 1937, pp. 27-49. 
89rnterestingly enough, one figure who refused to 
believe that the great purge detracted from the apparent 
conversion o~ the Soviet Union into a conventional type 
state was Alexander Kerensky. Cf. Alexander Kerensky, 
_"The Turn Toward Freedom, .n The Slavonic Review, July 1937, 
pp. 89-92. ' 
251 
depicted credibly as one conceived by die-hard revo-
lutionists for the purpose of seizing power in the Soviet 
Union, eradicating all of its new conventional features, 
and seeking to promote proletarian revolutions throughout 
the world. 
But Stalin did not do this. Instead, he compounded 
his error with a new series of purges, trials, and execu-
tions, and with an entirely new charge. The new charge 
was one of treasonable activity by Soviet citizens on 
behalf of Japanese and German agenta.90 
The new Soviet trials and executions added to the 
rising doubts in the West about the democratic character 
of Soviet justice. More than that, however, inasmuch as 
they involved not only political figures, but many high-
ranking military persons as we~l, including Marshalls 
Tukhachevski and Gamarnik, the result was that many in 
the West also began to question the hitherto held assump-
tion that Soviet military strength was considerable. 
The prospect of an alliance with a Power whose armed forces 
were shown to be riddled with enemy agents was certainly 
less than attractive. Commenting on that fact, the United 
9°cr. The New York Times, July 11, 1937, p. 15. 
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States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, 
wrote on July 4, 1937: 
The pity of it all is that in so doing he 
(Stalin) has destroyed the confidence of 
western Europe in the strength of his army 
and in the strength of his government; that 
he has also weakened the confidence of both 
England and France in the strength of the 
Russian army, and has weakened the democratic 
bloc in western Europe, and that is serious, 
for the only real hope for peace is a London-
Paris-Moscow axis.91 
Though Stalin continued to seek a collective secur-
ity system for another year and a half, the adverse effects 
of his, and the French Communists',tactical errors were 
already apparent early in 1938. For example, opposition 
within the British Cabinet hampered Eden's attempts to 
develop an active policy against Hitler at every turn, and, 
on February 20, forced him to resign.92 Meanwhile, similar 
pressures were building up in the French Chamber, and with 
91Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1941), p. 116. Cf. also, Churchill, 
op. cit., p. 251. 
92churchill·recounts the following: 11In February 
1938, the Foreign Secretary conceived himself to be almost 
isolated in the Cabinet. The Prime Minister had strong 
support against him and his outlook. A whole band of 
important Ministers thought the Foreign Office policy 
dangerous and even provacative.n op. cit., p. 250. 
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comparable results. On April 8, the Radical Socialists, 
in obvious disgust with the vacillations or the Communists 
and app~ehensive about the alliance with Moscow, withdrew 
their support or the Popular Front. Two days later, they 
took over the reins or government, but with no intention 
either to continue the Popula~ Front program, or to imple-
ment the treaty with the Soviet Union. 
The maj,or blow to Stalin's diplomatic effort came 
at the Munich Conference, at the end of September 1938, 
which marked the intention or·London and Paris to disre-
gard the interests of the So.viet Union altogether. Cogni-
zant of what was taking place .at the expense of the Czechs, 
Stalin did attempt to dissuade the democratic Powers by 
threatening that their support of Hitlerts invocation of 
the principle of national self-determination on behalf of 
·the Sudeten Germans could have serious repercussions: 
In agreeing to robbery at Czechoslovakia's 
expense and in giving it their b~essing, 
Great Britain and France are playing with 
fire; for tomorrow the same questions may 
be put before them with reference to some 
territories in Asia and Africa under the 
domination of the 11democraticn·Powers.93 
This obvious play on the national idea could be 
taken in terms or a twofold threat against French and 
93Pravda, September 21, 1938, p. 1. 
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British colonial interests, posed not only by the .Axis 
Powers, but, in the light of earlier experience, by the 
Soviet Union as well. However, by this time, both Paris 
and London had decided to regard anything Moscow had to 
say as unworthy of consideration. Wrote Churchill: 
Stress has also been laid upon Soviet 
duplicity and bad faith, and the ~oviet 
offer was 1n effect ignored. • • Events 
took their course as if Soviet Russia 
did not exist.94 
The results of the Munich Conference had a double 
effect on Soviet foreign policy. For one thing, it led 
to a general toning down of the quest for collective action 
against German aggression, in which case the use of the 
national idea also was dropped. Alliances with Britain 
and France were still sought, but without the high degree 
of urgency as before. Instead, Soviet propaganda sought 
to badger them into some form of diplomatic accommodation 
through alternating accusations of pro-Hitler sympathies 
and dire warnings of the consequences should the German 
dictator get control of a sizeable part of Europe's 
resources. For another thing, aware of his comparative 
isolation, Stalin came to accept the view that his purpose 
94churchill, op. cit., p. 305. 
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might be served next best by some formal arrangement with 
Hitler, provided the Nazi leader could be persuaded to 
abandon his designs on the Soviet Union for the sake of 
expansion elsewhere. 
For the next eleven months, Stalin played a double 
hand. Toward both the democracies and Germany, the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry and press emitted alternating admonitions 
and conciliatory gestures; the idea being to offer Soviet 
friendship to.the highest bidder. The outcome, of course, 
was the decision to sign a nonaggression treaty with Hitler, 
completed on August 23, 1939. By its terms, Stalin agreed 
to play the role of a benevolent neutral, while Hitler ex-
panded his domain. In exchange, he received a generous 
piece of Poland and a free hand in the Baltic region north 
of Lithuania and in unspecified parts of the Balkans. It 
was more by far than Britain and France had been willing 
to offer. At the same time, however, Stalin probably re-
gretted the fact that it signalized the complete defeat of 
his first major diplomatic undertaking in which the national 
idea figured as the key instrument of policy. 
Other Uses of the National Idea. The nonaggression 
pact with Hitler notwithstanding, Stalin did not become 
lulled into any high degree of optimism about guarantees 
against a future attack. He still viewed the German 
dictator as the number one threat to the Soviet Union. 
As much had been written into the secret protocol of 
the treaty, which Stalin had demanded, and which had 
divided Eastern Europe into Soviet and German spheres of 
interest.95 
The importance of that piece of Machiavellian 
virtuosity to the Soviet leader was contained in its pro-
mise of a protective zone about one hundred miles in depth 
along the western border. But the arrangement.still lacked 
the final touch. It was one thing to be the recipient of 
Hitler' a !~grantn of territorial rights in Southeastern 
Europe, in Poland as far west as the Narew, Vistula, and 
San Rivers, and in the Baltic region exclusive of Lithuania. 
However, it was something else again to take full advantage 
of it.. At that time, Stalin apparently was unsure of just 
how his territorial 11rights" could be implemented without 
provoking Paris and London to an extreme. After the German 
attack on Poland, on September 1, 1939, that problem became 
an even more perplexing one. 
Though Stalin was not surprised by the aggression 
95Cf. Raymond J. Sontag and James s. Beddie, (eds.), 
Nazi-Soviet Relations 19 9-1941 (Washington; D.C.: The 
Department of State, 19 , p. 78. 
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of his German counterpart, he was obviously unprepared 
for two significant developments that accompanied it. 
For one thing, he did not anticipate th~ unprecedented 
speed with which the Wenmacht was able to sweep across 
Poland. 96 Consequently, he was not prepared for Berlin's 
request for similar action by the Soviets, or at least 
permission to enter the zone allotted to the Soviet 
Union in pursuit of the retreating, and disintegrating, 
Polish army.97 For another thing, he did not expect that 
the French and British would honor their treaty obligations 
to Poland to the extent of declaring war on Germany.98 
Thus, when the unexpected occurred, the Soviet dictator 
found himself caught in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, 
the failure to send the Red Army into Poland promptly could 
mean the loss of the benefits of the secret protocol, if 
not an early attack by Hitler. On the other hand, the use 
' of armed forces in any way comparable to Hitler's could 
result in a new war declaration by France and Britain. 
96cf. Ibid., p. 91. According to Leon Noel, Molotov 
informed the Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Gryzbowski, that 
the Soviets were willing to l~nd Roland indirect assistance. 
Cf. Leon Noel, L' ression allemande contre la Polo ne 
(Paris: Flammarion, 19 , pp. 9- 50. 
97cf. Sontag and Beddie, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 
98cf. Noel, op. cit., p. 499. 
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To escape his quandary, Stalin turned to the 
national id.ea. On September 10, 1939·, after evading 
repeated German requests for a decision one way or the 
other, he informed Berlin that the Red Army would be 
given the order to march very soon, and that the action 
would be based on the ostensible purpose of protecting 
Ukrainians and Belorussians in Poland threatened by the 
German advance. When Berlin objected to being made the 
scapegoat, the blame was easily shifted to .the Poles.99 
On September 12, the Soviet press opened a strident cam-
paign against the Polish treatment of minorities.lOO Less 
than a week later, the Red Army. crossed the Soviet-Polish 
frontier with the announced purpose of protecting the 
Ukrainians and Belorussians in Poland and assisting the 
Poles in the reconstruction of their national existence.lOl 
Embodied in that recourse to the national idea was 
Stalin's chief hope.of satisfying Soviet strategic needs 
99According to von der Schulenburg, the German Am-
bassador to Moscow: nThis argument was to make the inter-
vention of the Soviet Union plausible to the (Russian) 
masses and at the same time avoid giving the Soviet Union 
the appearance of an aggressor.n Sontag and Beddie, .QE.• 
ill·' p. 91. 
J.0¢>cf. Pravda, September 12, 1939, p. 1. Polish 
White Book, !{;tondBji'i-tJ.H'Utchinson and Co. , Ltd. , 1940) , 
pp. 187-189, 210-211. 
lOlcf. Izvestiia, September 17, 1939, p. l. 
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without becoming involved in a war. The pretext of pro-
tecting the rights of kindred nationalities and helping 
a neighboring nation saved explaining that the action was 
directed against the Germans primarily. More important 
as a consideration, however, was that, from a strictly 
legal standpoint at least, it took the onus of aggression 
from Soviet shoulders and thus could afford Paris and 
London a way out of a compelling ~ accompli. That 
loophole was obviously uppermost, since the attempt was 
made to broaden it as much as possible. On the day of 
the atnack, Moscow informed all governments that it re-
garded its action as in no way altering its neutral posi-
tion with respect to the war in Europe. 10~ 
Undoubtedly, there were some anxious moments spent 
in the Kremlin pending the reaction of Paris and London. 
But the tactic did succeed; for there was no war declara-
tion forthcoming. To the contrary, if anything, the demo-
cratic Powers seemed almost satisfied with Stalinrs choice 
of motives. The lightning success of the new German 
military machine had had an equally profound effect on 
them, and the obviously wiser course lay in preventing its 
marriage to the armed might of the Soviet Union. Thus, 
102cf. The New York Times, September 18, 1939, p. 1. 
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characteristic of the French and British response to the 
Soviet action was an implicit sense of relief at being 
able to circumvent a declaration of war without the 
appearance of applying a double standard. For example, 
almost as if apologizing for the Soviet move into Poland, 
if not blaming the Poles for it, Churchill, in a paper 
written for the British War Cabinet on September 25, 1939, 
offered the following explanation: 
Although the Russians were guilty of the 
grossest bad faith in the recent negotiations, 
their demand, made by Marshal Voroshilov that 
the Russian armies should occupy Vilna and 
Lemberg if they were to be allies of Poland, 
was a perfectly valid military request. It 
was rejected by Poland on grounds which, though 
natural, can now be seen to have been insuffic-
ient. In the result, Russia has occupied the 
same line and positions as the enemy of Poland, 
which possibly she might have occupied as a 
very doubtful and suspected friend. The 
difference in fact is not so great as might 
seem.l03 
It goes without saying that Stalin was very much 
encouraged by the Western reaction, and ita implications 
concerning the usefulness of the national idea. As much 
became evident on September 20, 1939, when he suggested 
to Berlin a more definitive settlement of the Polish 
question. Eight days later, a new Soviet-German treaty, 
l03churchill, op. cit., p. 448. 
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also with a secret protocol, concluded that task. It 
left no residual Polish state. Instead, Berlin got all 
Polish territory to the west of the Piasa, Narew, Bug, and 
San rivers, while Moscow took everything.to the east and 
obtained the inclusion of the greater part of Lithuania 
in its sphere of influence.104 
Stalin continued to make use of the national idea 
with respect to Poland, even after its conquest. While 
Hitler made no pretense of the fact that the newly acquired 
land was to be no more than a part of his developing empire, 
Stalin's method followed a course of constitutional gesta-
tion, with new pretensions of respect for national rights 
as the screen. For example, though without serious regard 
for the geographic disposition of the Polish, Ukrainian, 
and Belorussian populations, the Soviet zone was first 
divided into West Ukraine and West Belorussia, with Lemberg 
.(Lvov) and Bielostok, respectively, as the capital cities. 
Then, after a month of intensive work, national assemblies 
were elected.105 Their first official acts were to request 
l04cr. Sontag and Beddie, op. cit., pp. 105-107. 
lOSer. Pravda, October 22, 1939, p. 2. On the follow-
ing day, Pravda emphasized the purely nvoluntaryn character 
of the election, reporting that the Count and Countess Poto-
tozki, a well-known noble couple, and sixty nuns had parti-
cipated. 
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incorporation into the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics 
or the Soviet Union. Finally, on November 1-2, 1939, both 
requests were formally approved by an extraordinary session 
of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow.l06 
The ease with which Eastern Poland had been acquired 
also had a salutary effect on Stalin's concern for the rest 
or his territorial allotment. With hardly any delay, atten-
tion was turned to the Baltic States. 
There existed in the cases of Estonia, Latvia, Lith-
uania, and Finland no pretext for aggrandizement comparable 
to that arforded in Poland. There were no kindred minor-
ities there to be defended against either an invading army 
or an allegedly oppressive government. But that neither 
deterred the Soviet dictator, nor disqualiried the national 
idea as a primary instrument of policy. Enlarging upon 
the earlier tactic or acting in the name of minority rights 
within the State, Stalin's new shield for conquest took the 
form of ostensible concern ror the rights of small nation-
states threatened by larger ones. Thus, whether they liked 
it or not, and they did not, the Baltic countries were 
earmarked ror the bear-like protective grasp that the Soviet 
monolith was capable or extending. 
Mutual assistance treaties, heavily weighted to the 
106cf. Pravda, November 2, 1939, p. 1; November 3, 
1939, p. 1. 
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Soviet advantage, were the first objectives of Stalin's 
diplomacy in the Baltic region. Suggestions to this effect, 
underscored by charges of unneutral conduct and publicized 
Red Army maneuvers along the Soviet northwest frontier, 
had the intended impact.107 On September 28, 1939, Estonia 
became the first victim of the latest s~yle of Stalinist 
conquest. 
The Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Treaty obli-
gated each party to go to the aid of the other in the event 
of aggression, or the threat of aggression, originating in 
Europe. More than that, however, the Soviets were granted 
the right to maintain naval bases and military airfields 
on a number of Estonian islands and to station a limited 
land and air force in Estonia proper. As one other pro-
vision explained, the presence of Soviet forces on Estonian 
soil was in no way.to alter that country's sovereignty. 
While the Estonians knew otherwise, Moscow characteristi-
cally heralded the treaty as further proof of its respect 
for the principle of national self-determination: 
Aggression and oppression of small nations are 
contrary to the intention of the U.S.S.R. The 
Soviet people are interested in penmnent peace 
107cf. Pravda, Septe~ber 18, 1939, p. 1. 
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and brotherly cooperation with other peoples. 
Such cooperation can be achieved only if it 
is baaed on mutual trust and noninterference 
in the internal affairs of each other's. Be-
cause it respects the sovereignty of other 
states, the Soviet Union will not interfere 
in their internal affaira.l08 
It was but a short diplomatic step to similar 
treaties with Latvia arid Lithuania, signed on October 5 
and OctQber 10, 1939, respectively. The only notable 
departure occurred in the case of the latter, since it 
contained a clause awar4ing the district of Vilna to 
the Lithuanians. Not deterred by the fact that it had 
just been seized from the Poles, Moscow was quick to 
proclaim that gesture as the finest type example of 
respect for the legitimate demands of a nationality.l09 
Inasmuch as the extension of Soviet influence 
into Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian affairs under the 
guise of defending their national interests provided no 
occasion for a serious adverse reaction in the West, 
Stalin had no further cause for satisfaction.1l 0 But if 
108pravda, September 30, 1939, p. 1. 
l09cr. Ibid., October 23, 1939, p. 1. 
llOThe extent of the reaction in the West was to 
refuse to recognize the new Baltic governments. Cf. ~ 
New York Times, August 10, 1940, p. 6. 
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he was operating on the assumption that the national idea 
had suddenly emerged as an invmiblable curtain behind which 
free rein to all territorial aspirations was possible, 
subsequent events soon proved otherwise. In contrast to 
what the early successes seemed to portend, the remaining 
Baltic country coveted, Finland, proved an extremely diffi-
cult nut to crack. 
The Finns registered their resolute rejection of 
the idea of a mutual assistance treaty with Moscow at a 
meeting held in the Soviet capital the second week of 
October 1939. Thereupon, after a variety of threats failed 
to move them, Stalin turned to still another of the mani-
fold ways in which the national idea could be used to 
screen aggression. On November 30, men and tanks of the 
Red Army crossed the Finnish frontier, while its planes 
bombed Helsinki. That action opened a military conflict 
that lasted for one hundred and four days. From the Soviet 
standpoint, however, the conflict was no war at all. 
Instead of declaring war, Stalin explained his action in 
terms of a desire to protect the nlegii::imaten interests of 
the Finnish people.111 And to complete the tactic, he set 
up a revolutionary 11 People 1 s Republic of Finland rr. Headed 
lllcf. Pravda, December 1, 1939, p. 1. 
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by Otto Ktiuainen, a long time resident of Moscow, the . 
new government requested the "aid" that Moscow was 
rendering and granted all the territorial concessions 
aought.ll2 
Though it can only be speculated, Stalin probably 
intended the "People's Republicn as the nucleus of a new 
Finnish government, to be established after the Red Army 
had defeated the defending army.113 But that plan was 
soon thwarted. No sooner had recognition been extended 
to Kuuainen'a regime when the Soviet dictator discovered 
that the pattern of events in Finland would not be governed 
by Soviet military might primarily. Contrary to all calcu-
lations, the Russian Blitzkrieg became bogged down by ita 
Olm glaring deficiencies and the stubborn resistance of 
the F1nns.114 
The coat of that delay was a heavy one. It showed 
112cr. World News and Views, December 9, 1939, 
p. 1129. 
113Pravda, on December 1, 1939,·p. 1, declared that 
the npeople'E? Army of Finlandn would be accorded the honor 
of bearing the flag of the Finnish People's Republic into 
Helsinki and of raising it over the Presidential Palace. 
114william L. Shirer has reported that the Soviet 
Embassy in Berlin informed him that the fighting in Finland 
was not expected to last more than three days. cr. William 
L. Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1941), pp. 
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up the Soviet military weakness. More than that, it 
permitted time for popular indignation in the West to 
crystallize fully. Thus, by the time changes in command 
had been effected and enough reinforcements had been 
sent to the Finnish front to allow the Red Army to re-
gain the initiative, the intended smokescreen of legi-
timacy was dissipated entirely. 
Whether or not he thought of himself as an aggres-
sor, Stalin soon found out that practically everyone else 
did. With the exception of the Nazi regime, every govern-
ment in Europe and the Western Hemisphere voiced disap-
proval in some form, while many lodged formal protests and 
sent material aid to Finland. And if that was not enough, 
the Soviet leader learned on December 14, 1939, that his 
was the first government to be expelled from the League of 
Nations for aggression. 
The intensity of the Western storm of protest rose 
to a peak early in 1940, when there appeared evidence that 
Paris and London were seriously considering a route through 
Norway and Sweden in order to provide the Finns with 
additional military assistance.115 Soviet anxiety over 
115cf. Churchill, op. cit., pp. 553-554. 
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the prospect of a war was registeti>ecF: on .~afiUary·"' 20'{'when 
Pravda leveled an accusation against the democracies to 
the effect that they were planning to attack the Soviet 
Union. And it reached its climax nine days later, when 
the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow was aSked by Molotov to 
inform the Finns that a negotiated settlement of their 
differences had become possible. 
This sudden volte face automatically rendered the 
rrPeople's Republic of Finland 11 a "Kuchikrr regime; it was 
earmarked for extinctio~. Consequently, during the peace 
negotiations, which were held in Moscow on March 6-12, 
1940, and which Kuusinen did not attend, no direct refer-
ence to the revolutionary government was made.ll6 Accord-
ing to the terms of the treaty, which excluded provision 
for a mutual assistance pact, all territorial demands 
made by Moscow originally were met. In exchange, the Finns 
received territorial and financial compensation.ll7 As to 
the fate of the "People's Republic 11 , Molotov personally 
disposed of it in typical Communist style on March 18, on 
the occasion of the treaty's ratirication by the Presidium 
ll6cr. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign 
Polio{, 1939-1942 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), 
p. 19 • 
117 cr. Ibid., p. 192. 
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of the Supreme Soviet: 
The Finnish People's Government, so as to 
avert blooashed and to alleviate the burdens 
of the Finnish people, agreed that every effort 
should be made to bring the war to an end at 
once. The question of dissolving the People's 
Government then arose. This it has already 
done of its own free will.ll8 
Since the blame was squarely on the military, the 
near disaster in Finland had no adverse effect on Stalin 1 s 
regard for the national idea as a useful instrument of 
policy. For example, in a postscript to the war with 
Finland that was apparently designed to satisfy ideolog-
ical needs, Molotov revived the anti-imperialist theme 
long enough to remold the characterization of the Soviet 
action into the form of a defensive move against a rrnumber 
of imperialist States".119 But its use thereafter was 
redirected to the original channel of aggrandizement. 
Hitler 1 s rapid conquest of most of Western Europe already 
had put a new complexion on Stalin's regard for him. With 
the Nazis in control of the larger part of Europe's 
resources, the prospect of an attack on the Soviet Union 
118rzvestiia, March 19, 1940, p. 1. 
119Pravda, March 30, 1940, p. 1. 
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loomed even larger.l20 Thus, expediency militated for 
a hasty realization of the full benefits of the secret 
division of Eastern Europe. 
The first step in that connection occurred on 
July 6, 1940, four days before Italy's entry into the war, 
in the form of a warning to Rome against interfering in 
Balkan affairs. The warning was couched· in terms of an 
expressed interest in preserving the sovereignty of the 
Balkan countries.l21 Then, three weeks later, with a 
cynical disregard of the very same rights, Moscow addressed 
to the Rumanian government an ultimatum for the cession of 
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. According to its text, 
the return of Bessarabia after twenty-two years of Rumanian 
domination was a nsimple act of justice". Northern Bukovina, 
it went on to explain, was included for the reason that its 
population, historically and linguistically, was bound up 
with the Soviet Ukra1ne.l22 
120Ev1dence of a growing Soviet fear was noted by 
the Germans, who took special pains to relieve it. C~. 
Sontag and Beddie, op. cit., pp. 145, 147. 
12lcf. Izvestiia, June 7, 1940, p •. 1. 
l22Pravda, June 28, 1940 1 p. 1. 
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With no choice, Rumania agreed to meet the de-
mands.l23 On August 2, 1940, Northern Bukovina and the 
predominantly Ukrainian districts of Bessarabia were 
formally incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine. Further-
more, the Moldavian Autonomous Republic was detached 
from the Ukraine and joined with the predominantly Re-
manian district of Bessarabia to form the Moldavian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. Both actions attested to the rrlegi-
timacy" of the Soviet seizure. More important, however, 
they helped avoid giving the Germans the impression that 
they were directed agains·t them primarily. Judging by a 
note sent to the German Foreign Office on July ll, 1940, 
von der Schulenburg apparently believed an explanation of 
Stalin's to the effect that the seizure of Rumanian terri-
tory really had not been his doing, but rather had been 
prompted by Ukrainian pressure.124 
Simultaneously, Stalin was c.ompleting. the course 
of conquest in Eastern Europe with the incorporation of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. 
Preserving the familiar legalistic fa~ade, the action 
l23cf. The New York Times, June 28, 1940, p. l. 
l24cf. Sontag and Beddie, op. cit., p. 164. 
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commenced in the second week of June 1940 with the 
charge that the three States were secretly plotting an 
anti-Boviet military alliance and the demands that new 
governments be installed and additional units of the 
Red Army be permitted entry.l25 Thereupon, all three 
governments resigned and were replaced by new ones, com-
posed of Communists and extreme left-wing elements. On 
July 14-15, Communist-style general elections were held 
and, a week later, the parliaments elected met in special 
sessions for the express purpose of applying for admission 
to the Soviet Union.l26 By August 8, an equally rrspecialn 
session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow had approved all 
requests. 
Thus did Stalin achieve what he had set out to do 
after abandoning the quest for a general anti-Axis mutual 
security system in favor of a nonaggression treaty with 
Hitler. The western approaches to the Soviet had been 
acquired through the utilization of the national idea in 
conjunction with military force. However, as events were 
soon to prove, that effort was insufficient for the ulti-
mate purpose of preventing a German attack. 
125cf. The New York Times, June 16, 1940, p. 1. 
126cf. ~., July 18, p. 13; July 22, p. 1; 
August 4, p. 29; August 6, p. 4. 
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Conclusion. In a sense, Soviet foreign policy 
from 1934 to 1941 marked the opening of a new phase in 
the exploitation of the national idea; the Stalinist 
phase. Prior to that time, the uses of the device had 
been conceived and directed personally by Lenin. And, 
following Lenints death, Stalin 1 s struggle for power had 
caused interest in it to be displaced almost completely. 
Thus, when the decision to revive the national ~dea as 
a major instrument of policy was taken in the spring of 
1934, Stalin's debut in connection with it commenced. 
The result of the Soviet dictator's initial ef-
fort, as we have seen, was complete failure. After four 
years of an intenai ve quest for alliances with any and 
all countries threatened by Germany and Japan, and later 
Italy, baaed chiefly on appeals to national sentiment, 
the project had to be abandoned entirely. 
But there was one thing to be said for Stalin in 
that connection. At least from the standpoint of the 
interested student of Soviet foreign policy, his objective 
and method left little to be desired. For example, his 
attempt to convince most non-Communist countries that the 
Soviet Union was a worthy ally, and after more than two 
decades in which Communist propaganda had railed constantly 
2.74 
against them as despicable foes of everything politically, 
economically, and culturally progressive, was about as 
ambitious an enterprise that could have been undertaken. 
Its success undoubtedly would have ranked among the out-
standing diplomatic achievements of all time. Wtireover, 
his conversion of virtually every internationalist fiber 
of Communism into its nationalist opposite by far exceeded 
anyt~ing attempted by Lenin in connection with the national 
idea. To be sure, Lenin had exploited nationalism at home 
and abroad, through diplomacy and the Comintern, but never 
so thoroughly for a single purpose. 
Contained in the latter fact was undoubtedly an 
important clue to the difference between the tactical abil-
ities of the two Soviet leaders, and to the reason why 
Stalin failed. Lenin, as was demonstrated time and again, 
was keenly perceptive. He could strike a balance readily 
between his needs and opportunities, and without sacri-
ficing entirely freedom of maneuver in the event of an 
unexpected development. By comparison, Stalin•s percep-
tiveness was obviously more limited, his conception of 
needs and opportunities was oversimplified, and his 
modus operandi was rigid. 
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As a consequence, Stalin was ill-prepared to cope 
with the major problems that arose. Indeed, the total 
commitment to a single objective and a single method 
rendered him virtually a prisoner of his own strategy. 
For example, when it was discovered that the transforma-
tion of the Comintern into an organization of ostensibly 
nationalistic parties had been too sudden to be credible, 
it was already impossible to turn back for the sake of a 
more gradual approach, or to eliminate the embarrass~ngly 
sharp line of contrast between the old and the new policies. 
Consequently, in most instances the Communists found it 
impossible to achieve either united or people's front 
alliances in their respective countries. 
But that was not Stalin's only miscalculation in 
connection with the use of the Comintern. In addition, 
his allowance for the possibility of deviationism was 
inadequately conceived. Despite warnings in advance, the 
new national line did evoke dissatisfaction among some 
delegates to the Seventh Congress. While Stalin might 
have applied stern disciplinary measures then and there, 
the obvious danger of destroying the illusion of a real 
change in Communism's character militated against it. 
T.nstead, he merely issued new warnings. As a consequence, 
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the French Communists, who had shown themselves to be 
the most reluctant to abandon revolutionism for the sake 
of expedient nationalism, returned home and deviated just 
enough from the Comintern's instructions to contribute to 
the failure of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty. 
The Soviet dictator's propensity for oversimpli-
fication and methodological r~gidity was costly for still 
another reason. His dedication to the principle of nation-
al sovereignty at one point reached a fanatical intensity, 
and it blinded him to the fact that others would regard 
his adamant insistence on the creation of a strong col-
. 
lective security system as provocative. Thus, Stalin 
stubbornly insisted that the League of ~ations should be 
strengthened to deal with aggressors, while practically 
everyone else favored a less belligerent, approach. More 
than that, after a brief display of self-restraint, he 
actively intervened in the Spanish Civil War on behalf 
of the Loyalists. 
Generally, Stalin can be credited with more insight 
into European politics during the thirties than his 
democratic counterparts. Even so, he obviously failed 
to match it with an estimate of the effect of his persia-
tence on the outcome of the quest for allies. Instead of 
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sympathy, it evoked the fear that Europe might become 
divided into two armed camps, if not engulfed by a general 
war. Such fear, of course, was not conducive to the 
achievement of new mutual assistance treaties, nor the 
implementation of those already obtained. 
Finally, Stalin made a serious error when he decided 
to publicize the famous Moscow trials. Undoubtedly, the 
intention was to demonstrate the new democratic quality 
of Soviet justice, Communist anti-internationalism, and 
a deep concern for the threat of German and Japanese 
aggression. But its impact was largely negative. For 
one thing, the trials of the so-called ~Trotskyist conspir-
ators caused many liberals in the West to question the 
character of Soviet justice. For another, those involving 
the alleged agents of Japan and Germany, including the 
Red Army's Chief of Staff, Marshal Tukhachevski, evoked 
grave doubts among Western political and military experts 
about the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally. 
The extent of Stalin's contribution to the failure 
of his own strategy cannot be determined exactly. As 
contributing factors, his errors were not exclusive. An 
additional serious obstacle was embodied in the form of 
relentless and skillful anti-Communist propag,anda by 
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fascists. That undoubtedly had an effect on the thinking 
of many conservatives and some moderates. Furthermore, 
one democratic Power, the United States, quite apart from 
ideological considerations, simply refused to become em-
broiled in the developing whirlpool of European politics. 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the principal 
fault was the Soviet dictator's. That his aim and method 
were fundamentally sound was attested in the fair measure 
of success that marked the high point of the strategy. 
The mutual~assistance treaties with France and Czechoslo-
vakia, the friendlier relations with Great Britain, and 
the clear prospect of a rapprochement with Rumania and 
Yugoslavia were no mean achievements, and further pro-
gress seemed assured. Moreover, the decline in the effect-
iveness of the use of the national idea set in only after 
the French Communists executed their turn to the left, 
Stalin's more insistent demands for measures to guard 
against aggression, and the opening of the Moscow trials. 
It would be difficult indeed to contend that the relation-
ship between them was purely coincidental. 
The totality of the failure of Stalin's initial 
effort to exploit the national idea as an instrument of 
foreign policy could have been no more dramatically repre-
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sented than in the fact that it ended up with almost 
the opposite of what had been intended; namely, the 
conclusion of a nonaggression treaty with Hitler. As 
it turned out, however, that treaty, particularly its 
secret protocol, provided the vehicle for still another 
opportunity for Stalin to test his tactical ability; 
and he partially redeemed himse~f. 
The method by which Stalin implemented his terri-
torial "rights 11 in Eastern Europe was essentially mili-
tary, but he used the national idea to good advantage 
also. In the case of Poland, for example, he avoided 
the charge of aggression by acting on the pretext of 
defending the rights of kindred nationalities. Then the 
territory was incorporated into the Soviet Union according 
to an established constitutional procedure. A Communist-
type election was held, the national assembly-elect imme-
diately petitioned for admission to the Soviet Union, and 
the Supreme Soviet in Moscow approved. It was a method 
that could be used over and over again, or for as long 
as it was possible to match one of the Soviet nationalities 
with one found in a neighboring State. 
The very same method was employed for the acquisi-
tion of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania. And 
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it served to screen the fundamental purpose -- which was 
indeed anti-German -- from the Germans. 
Stalin tried to do the same against Finland, with 
the extra precaution of creating a puppet national regime. 
It was an old device, having been used by Lenin for the 
conquest of most of the border nationalities. And it 
probably would have worked again, had not an underestima-
tion of Finnish resistance occurred, causing a delay in 
the Red Army's military sweep and permitting a Western 
reaction to build up to decisive proportions. Instead, 
the Soviet leader had to be content with limited terri-
torial gains, which, following the established pattern, 
were duly incorporated into the Soviet Union. 
Finally, the conquest of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania was achieved somewhat more crudely. That was 
undoubtedly due to the fact that conditions necessitated 
speed and required dispensing with calculated preliminaries. 
Thus, they were meracy charged with ·violating their treaties 
with the Soviet Union and forced to form new governments 
and admit additional units of the Red Army. Thereafter, 
the regular cycle of election, petitio~, and admission was 
executed for their incorporation into the Soviet Union, 
which, according to the Communist way of thinking, made 
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it legitimate. 
Apparently, Stalin had discovered.his particular 
:rorte,:.cin the exploitation of' the national idea in conjunc-
tion with military :force. But as events were soon to 
demonstrate, it was a poor second best under the cirnmm-
stances. Despite the :ract that the western approaches 
to the Soviet Union had been acquired, it failed to prevent 
Hitler :from launching an attack. 
CHAPTER V 
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 
Hit+er's surprise attack on June 22, 1941 opened 
still another important period in the record of Soviet 
Russian use of the national idea as an instrument of policy. 
It lasted until Yugoslavia's defection from the Communist 
bloc in the summer of 1948. In the seven years intervening, 
Stalin's calculated respect for national institutions served 
as a regular adjunct to his military and diplomatic policies. 
And as much as any factor, it contributed to the most signi-
ficant Soviet success in foreign affairs since Lenin's death; 
namely, the defeat of the German invader and the extension 
of Communist power farther into Eastern Europe. 
But recourse to the national idea in this case was 
even more important for the reason that it illustrated the 
essential continuity of Soviet foreign policy. The point is 
that, under conditions roughly comparable to those of 1919-
1924, Stalin's method was typically Leninist. He relied on 
the national idea initially to win allies at home and abroad 
against the invader. Then, after the tide of battle had 
been turned in his favor, he used it to screen the forcible 
establishment of Communist power in adjacent countries over-
run by the Red Army. He also used it_against new claims to 
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national distinctiveness voiced by non-Russian Communists. 
As many of its details will evidence, the parallel 
with the pattern of policy developed earlier by Lenin was 
too close to doubt that it was consciously pursued. 
Hitler Saves the Great Patriotic War. Stalin's in-
tention to follow Lenin's tactical precedents was evident 
from the beginning. The announcement of the grim news of 
the German attack on June 22, 1941 was accompanied by a 
plea to all Soviet citizens to wage n ••• a victorious 
1 Patriotic was for our country. 11 And it was followed soon 
after by an appeal to organize guerrilla units behind the 
2 enemy's lines. For defensive purposes, the promotion of 
national unity and partisan resistance had been two pillars 
of Lenin's policy. 
But the response to these appeals was much less than 
anticipated. Initially, the people of Belorussia and the 
Ukraine, apparently mindful of past experience, paid little 
attention to them. They either welcomed the Germans as 
liberators, or else did nothing to hinder their advance.3 
1 Izvestiia, June 23, 1941, p. 1. 
2 Cf. Ibid., July 3, 1941, p. 1. 
3cf. Vakar, op. cit., pp. 172-175; Alexander 
Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occu-
pation Policies (London: Macmillan and Company Ltd., 1957), 
p. 64; Johri Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1935-1945 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 73-100. 
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Faced with the problem of mass defections, Stalin 
undoubtedly was hopeful that Hitler would make the same 
mistake that the "whiten Russians and the Allies had made 
in 1919. And the German dictator unwittingly obliged. 
The German occupation policy, executed by gauleiters of 
the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 
embodied the full measure of Hitlerian barbarity. Thus, 
bit by bit, and then in a veritable flood, the stories of 
German brutality against prisoners of w~r and civilians 
began to circulate on both sides of the line. Its effect, 
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as might have been predicted, was to cause a wholesale re-
4 
orientation of loyalties. 
This changing tide of popular opinion, propelled 
even more rapidly by the news of the successful defense of 
Moscow in December 1941, prompted Stalin to speak with re-
newed confidence. A note of grim satisfaction was evident 
in his observation, on February 23, 1942, that ncertain 
lovers of foreign lands have already felt this (Soviet) 
might on their hides". 5 This obviously referred to the 
4rt is worthwhile to repeat the testimony of the 
German General, Heinz Guderian: "Unfortunately, the favor-
able attitude to"'"lard the Germans continued only as long as 
there was military government; the so-called Reichskommissar 
quickly destroyed the good will of the people 11 • Quoted in 
Vakar, op. cit., p. 175. 
5rzvestiia, February 24, 1942, p. l. 
Soviet campaign of reprisals against collaborators already 
underway. But even more illuminating was his address on 
the occasion of the May Day celebration of that year, in 
which he publicly acknowledged that many in the armed 
forces also had been guilty of an unpatriotic attitude and 
spoke of a "radical change" for the better: 
The complacency and heedlessness of the attitude 
towards the enemy observed among Red Army men 
during the first months of the patriotic war 
have disappeared. 6 
The stimulation and channeling of the patriotic 
spirit in the Soviet Union was one of the piliars of 
Stalin's hope to withstand the terrible devastation that 
the Nazi war machine was still capable of effecting. He 
counted on it to compensate for the material deprivation 
that the Soviet civilians and military personnel would 
have to undergo. Hence, he employed every conceivable 
device -- going much further than Lenin had, but short of 
an open repudiation of Communism itself -- in an effort to 
raise patriotism to the highest possible level. 
These included an endless torrent of stories, songs, 
poems, plays, movies, speeches, and newspaper articles, all 
of which emphasized the theme of devotion to the Russian 
6 Ibid., May 1, 1942, p. 1. 
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"motherland'' • 7 Special propaganda trains, containing 
printing facilities in several languages and entertainment 
troupes, shared the rights to the Soviet rails with military 
transport. 8 In addition, the list of national heroes, 11re-
habilitated11 out of the Russian past, was enlarged rapidly. 
Along with the names of Nevski, Donskoi, Minin, Pozharski, 
Suvorov and Kutusov appeared those of Peter the Great, Ivan 
the Terrible, and Catherine. New military honors -- the 
Orders of the Patriotic War, of Suvorov, and of Kutusov 
and new heroes were created. And still another example of 
Stalin's method was contained in the religious overtones of 
Pravda 1 s appeal on July 13, 1942, as the first battle of 
Voronezh was reaching its climax: 
It is the holy tradition of our nation to defend 
the motherland stubbornly and without consideration 
of one's own life. Knowing about our glorious 
traditions and military deeds, our soldiers are 
without fear in the battle of today. 9 
7cf. E. Iaroslavski, Velikaia Otechestvennaia 
Voina Sovetskova Naroda Protiv Gitlerovskoi Germani (The 
Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Peo le ainst Hitler-
Germany Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 19 2 ; 
Helen Iswolsky, 11War and Soviet Literature," The Commonweal, 
December 25, 1942, pp. 242-251. 
8 Cf. Ella Winter, I Saw the Russian People (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1945), p. 218. 
9This represented an early instance of Stalin's 
intention to exploit religious sentiment as well. In addi-
tion, all anti-religious museums and publishing houses were 
closed down. However, apparently for the reason of un-
certainty about:lts impact on die-hard atheists in Commu-
nist ranks, it was not until late in 1943 that the Russian 
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While this intensive propaganda campaign emphasized 
Russian traditional values primarily, it did not preclude 
attention to those of the non-Russian nationalities. 
Several non-Russian national heroes were expediently "re-
habilitated 11 , including the Ukrainians Kb.melnitski, 
Shevchenko, and Danilo, the Belorussian, Kupala, and the 
Georgian, Rustaveli. In addition, writers, playwrights, 
poets, composers, and pictorial artists were permitted a 
measure of freedom to express the patriotic theme in the 
local national idiom.10 But this aspect was severely cir-
cumscribed, undoubtedly as a result of two considerations. 
On the one hand, there was the problem that most national 
heroes and holidays of the non-Russian nationalities re-
fleeted a definite anti-Russian bias. It would have been 
difficult, for example, to reconcile simultaneous recogni-
tion of Pugachev's rebellion and Catherinets "progressive-
ness", since it had been she who had put down the rebellion 
with typical Russian ruthlessness. On the other hand, 
there was the potential problem posed by .the non-Russian 
Communist, who, called upon to sacrifice his international-
istic urge. This, of course, had been known to happen 
before. 
Orthodox Church was formally recognized as a national body. 
Cf. Nicholas S. Timasheff, "Religion in Russia,n Current · 
History, January, 1945, pp. 105-110. 
10cf. Iaroslavski, op. cit., passim; A Protest 
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As a solution to this problem, Stalin continued the 
promotion of non-Russian national sentiment on a limited 
scale and complemented it with the exploitation of popular 
fears. Thus, agents were sent into the occupied zones to 
provoke German reprisals against the civilian population 
11 
and to murder known collaborators. Furthermore, as an 
example to others, whole nationalities were stripped of 
12 their political rights for reasons of alleged disloyalty. 
Abetted by the brutal German occupation policy, 
Stalin's own campaign to unite the peoples of the Soviet 
Union behind him proved highly successful. By the end of 
1941, the general apathy which had been marked with frequent 
oases of outright disloyalty, was replaced largely by 
national pride and a profound hatred of the enemy. This 
was demonstrated in the great battles fought before Moscow, 
Leningrad, and Stalingrad, in which civilians fought hero-
ically alongside the Red Army, and in the great effort that 
transported whole factories eastward, where they were re-
assembled to turn out vitally needed military equipment. 
ainst Fascist Vandalism: Re ort of the Anti-Fascist Meet-
i of Soviet Workers in Art and Literature Moscow: Foreign 
Languages Publishing· House, 19 2 • 
. 
11
cf. Vakar, op. cit., p. 193. 
12The first were the Volga Germans, on August 28, 
1941. Later, the Crimean Tartars, the Cheohens, and the 
Kalmuoks Y.Tere added. Cf. Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her 
Colonies (New York: Frederick A..__ Praeger, 1952), pp. 75, 
8o, 86. 
289 
It was illustrated also by the emergence of a vast network 
of guerrilla units behind the German lines, which, by all 
accounts, provided an invaluable auxiliary to the Red Army 
during the critical moments of its desperate defensive 
effort.13 Hitler's "Fuehrer Ordertt of September 6, 1942 
bore poignant testimony to this fact: 
The (guerrilla) bands in the East have beaome 
an unbearable menaae during the last few months, 
and are seriously threatening the supply lines 
to the front. 14 
Thus, onae presented with the opportunity by the in-
vading Germans, the Soviet dictator was able to dupliaate 
Lenin's earlier successful application of the national idea 
as a weapon of defense at home. Inasmuch as it was to be 
expeated that all conaessions to national sentiment would 
be denied effeative meaning once the crisis had passed, it 
meant that Communism once again had gained important allies 
at practiaally no cost whatever. 
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Communist Nationalism Fosters the Resistance Movement. 
Another aspect of Stalin's defensive strategy that exhibited 
Leninist influence was his promotion of national sentiment 
in the aountries ocaupied by the enemy. Whereas Lenin had 
13cf." c. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn, Communist 
Guerilla Warfare (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1954); Lieutenant-General Ponomarenko, et al, Behind the 
Front Line (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1945). 
14Quoted in Dixon and Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 55. 
found his opportunity in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Turkey, Stalin found his in Europe, where the 
Axis occupation of many countries made it profitable to 
project the promise of national liberation as an incentive 
to popular resistance. Characteristic of the propaganda 
used in this connection was the following pronouncement: 
In contradistinction to Hitlerite Germany, the 
Soviet Union and its Allies are waging a war of 
liberation, a just war, for the purpose of liber-
ating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the 
U.S.S.R. from Hitler tyranny. 
• • • • 
We have not, and cannot have, any such war aims 
as that of imposing our will and our regime on the 
Slavonic and other enslaved nations of Europe, who 
are expecting our help. OUr aim is to help these 
nations in their struggle for liberation against 
Hitler's tyranny and then to leave them quite free-
ly to organize their life in their lands as they 
think fit. No interference in the internal affairs 
of other nations! 15 
As a logical corollary, instructions were issued to 
Communists throughout Europe to.abandon their revolutionary 
programs temporarily and to organize resistance movements 
on the basis of appeals to patriotic sentiment. Their im-
mediate task was to tie down as many enemy troops as possi-
ble, and so relieve pressure on the Ru~sian front. 
The results of this effort were impressive and un-
. 
doubtedly exceeded Stalin's expectations. The Comm~ists 
l5Izvestiia, November 7, 1941~ p. 1. 
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of Europe responded to this call to action with a zeal that 
even true patriots found difficult to match. In Western 
Europe, for example, the prestige of the Soviet Union as 
a member of the anti-Axis coalition, its new championship 
of national rights, and local Communist dedication to the 
national cause provided the basis for the recruitment of 
powerful underground resistance movements, particularly 
in France and Italy. Smaller, though equally active, or-
ganizations were formed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Norway.16 Together with other resistance groups, they 
conducted campaigns of widespread sabotage and assassina-
tion. Strikes were staged, communications were disrupted, 
and, on occasion, substantial enemy forces were engaged. 
The contribution.to the war effort was by no means incon 
17 
sequential. 
16For authoritative accounts of the Communist role 
in the resistance movements in Western Europe, Cf. Arnold 
Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee, (eds.), Hitler's Europe, 
1936-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954); Jan-
Albert Goris, (ed.), Belgium Under Occupation \New York: 
Moretus Press for The Belgium Government Information Center, 
1947); A. Rossi, A Communist Part in Action: An Account of 
the Or anization and erations in France New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 19 9 • One of the interesting features 
of this period is that the Germans unwittingly aided the 
Communist cause by blaming them, and thus giving them cred-
it, for practically every act of sabotage and assassination 
committed. 
17Indicative ot the anguish caused in Berlin is one 
of the entries in Goebbels' diary: "One might think it 
would be a good thing if the English were to bomb hell out 
of Paris and the other western European capitals, so that 
their inhabitants would at last come to their senses.n 
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Elsewhere in Europe, the Communist response materi-
alized in other, even more dramatic, ways. In Yugoslavia, 
for example,. Josip Broz, or Tito, exploited the national 
idea to great advantage. Unlike his Chetnik rival, Draza 
Mihailovich, who acted on the basis of narrow Serbian 
nationalism, Tito appealed to all Yugoslav nationalities 
to join the struggle against foreign domination.18 To 
compensate for the traditional enmity between some of them, 
he maintained separate subordinate commands in the national 
provinces, each of which bore the title of National Libera-
tion Partisan Detachment. As a result, within two and a 
half years, Tito 1 s forces grew from a relative handful of 
resolute revolutionaries into a popular army of more th?n 
three hundred thousand. Operating out of mountain bases, 
it harassed the occupation relentlessly and with great 
effect, causing the Axis to utilize troops there which might 
have been used on ~he Russian front or in Italy.19 
Louis P. Lochner, (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1948), p. 333. 
18cf. Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1953), pp. 156-157. 
1 9According to Dedijer, Tito 1 s official biographer, 
the Germans were forced to divert to Yugoslavia a division 
from the Russian front, one from France, and a regiment 
from Greece, all in the fall of 1941. He adds, that by the 
end of 1943, the total number of Axis forces in Yugoslavia 
was more than six hundred thousand, including twenty-two 
German divisions. Cf. ~., pp. 116-117, 211. The effect-
iveness of the Yugoslav Partisans is told also by a member 
of the British mission in Yugoslavia. Cf. Fitzroy McLean, 
-~e Heretic: The Life and Times of Josi Broz-Tito (New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957 • 
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Tito also organized the Communist resistance move-
ment in Albania, in November 1941, and directed its union 
with local nationalists to form the Albanian National 
20 Liberation Movement a year later. While widespread sabo-
tage and assassination hampered the Italian occupation, the 
most important single contribution of the Albanians to the 
war effort occurred after Mussolini 1 s downfall in the summer 
of 1943. By an all out effort to free Albania, the Libera-
tion Army compelled the Germans to divert two and a half 
divisions from other fronts. 
A Communist-sponsored partisan movement appeared in 
Greece also. Called the National Liberation Movement, its 
ttnationaln character was established by including left-wing 
Agrarian, Republican, Popular Democratic, and Socialist 
members. Its program emphasized national independence, 
democracy, and resistance to the enemy. Its armed force, 
the National Popular Liberation Army, bore the initials 
E.L.A.S., which were identical ·in pronunciation, and nearly 
identical in spelling, with the Greek name for Greece. 21 
20 c Cf. Julian Amery, Sons of the Eagle: A Study in 
Guerilla War (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1948), p. 54. 
21The most authoritative account of the events in 
Greece during the Second World War is contained in C. M. 
Woodhouse, Apple of Discord (London: Hutchinson and Co. 
Ltd., 1951). A brief, useful, study is provided by William 
H. McNeill, The Greek Dilemma (New York: J. B.,Lippincott 
Co., 1947). 
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During 1942-1943, the Greek Communists contributed 
to the war effort by promoting strikes in Athens and Saloni-
ka, which obstructed a German attempt to conscript workers 
for the factories in Germany. They also helped a British 
demolition team, in November 1942, to destroy the Gorgopo-
22 tames Bridge in the Pindus Mountains. This prevented 
the Germans from reinforcing Rommel's Africa Corps imme-
diately after its defeat at El Alamein. 
In Bulgaria, an alliance of the Communists with 
Agrarians, Social Democrats, and Zvenos led to the creation 
of the Fatherland Front. 23 However, their opportunity to 
aid the Soviet cause at first was very limited. Bulgaria 
and the Soviet Union were not at war until September 4, 
1944. Furthermore, there were no German troops in the 
country and the Bulgarian regime was neither totalitarian 
no.r disposed to accept German advice in all matters. Under 
the circumstances, there was little to be done except make 
life difficult for the local police and a few Bulgarian 
military units. The Communists had to wait until the fall 
of 1944 before playing a more important role. 
Very small Communist resistance groups appeared also 
in Slovakia and Poland, but their activities were very 
22cr. Denys Hamson, We Fell Among the Greeks (Lon-
don: Jonathan Cape, 1946), 
23cf. Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in OUr Time 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 244. 
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24 limited and their contributions negligible. 
With a view to subsequent developments, it is useful 
to point out here that the general success of Stalin's plan 
to exploit the national idea against the Axis in occupied 
Europe was also accompanied by a fresh incident of Commu-
nist nleftrr national deviationiam. The offender on this 
occasion was Tito, who, apparently encouraged by his rapid 
success as a partisan leader, failed to hide his revolu-
tionary ambitions completely behind the prescribed national-
istic facade. Tito organized some of his men into a "pro-
letarian brigade n, which displayed the hammer and sickle 
and the five-pointed star conspicuously. In addition, in 
those parts of Yugoslavia that he controlled, he replaced 
the old political and administrative system with npeople'a 
authoritiea 11 • 25 
The Soviet dictator discovered this departure from 
the prescribed course of action early in 1942, after a 
24 It is worthwhile to mention that, without the 
benefit of Moscow's public encouragement, though with ita 
instructions, Comm~ist resiatan~e movements were active 
against the Japanese in the Far East as well. The moat 
important, of course, was that of the Chinese Communists. 
Another important one was organized in Malaya and received 
supplies from the Allied Southeast Asia Command. Leas im-
portant Communist resistance movements appeared in Burma, 
Indonesia, Indo-China, and the Philippines. 
25For an eyewitness account of Tito'a system of 
local government, Cf. McLean, op. cit., pp. 112-113. 
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revolutionary-sounding proclamation of Tito 1 s prompted him 
to request a report on the Yugoslav tactics. After study-
ing it carefully, the following message was sent as a 
corrective measure: 
Study of all the information you sent gives one 
the impression that the adherence (~) of Great 
Britain and the Yugoslav government have some 
Jjustification?) in suspecting the Partisan move-
ment of acquiring a Communist character and aiming 
at the Sovietization of Yugoslavia. Why, for 
example, did you need to form a special Proletarian 
Brigade? Surely at the moment, the basic, immediate 
task is to unite all anti-Nazi currents, smash the 
invader and achieve national liberation. 26 
The Yugoslav tactics, of course, were a cause for 
serious concern in Moscow. Past experience with overanx-
ious non-Russian Communists was still too fresh to overlook 
their implications. But there was little that could be 
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done under the circumstances except try to persuade Tito to 
restrain his revolutionary impulses. Fortunately for Stalin, 
26 Cf. Dedij er, op. cit., p. 180. (The word "adher-
ence" appears in the English translation, though it proba-
bly should have been ttadherentsn.) There was one other 
aspect of Titors "left" tendency that Stalin was able to 
correct without even knowing of its existence. The Yugo-
slav leader wanted to eliminate Mihailovich as early as 
November 1941; not only for the reason that he represented 
a stumbling block to revolutionary ambitions, but also 
because he was getting all the credit in the West for the 
Yugoslav resistance. What prevented this from happening 
was a Soviet broadcast overheard, which also extolled 
Mihailovich and failed to mention the Partisans once. Ac-
cording to Dedijer, Tito was stunned by it, but complied 
with the evident Soviet desire: "We must not destroy Draza 
Mihailovich, although we have surrounded him. We must be 
careful not to cause difficulties in the foreign relations 
of the Soviet Union. 11 Ibid., p. 168. 
this worked; that is, at least until the end of 1943. 27 In 
the meantime, it was possible to continue using the nation-
al idea to good advantage. 
~e National Idea in Wartime Diplomacy. Stalints 
situation differed from Lenints in one notable respect: 
his defense of Soviet power against a powerful invader was 
conducted with assistance from the world's two most power-
ful democratic States, the United States and Great Britain. 
But the distinction actually ended there. The fact that 
they had taken the initiative in offering an alliance in 
no real sense altered his conviction that capitalism, what-
ever its political form, was the mortal foe of Communism 
and the Soviet Union. As far as he was concerned, it 
meant only that circumstances necessitated a different 
strategy with respect to them, on the order of the Leninist 
tactical maxim none step backward, two steps forwardn. For 
the sake of the assistance offered~ he would execute a 
retreat ideologically; he would play the role of a sincere 
ally, motivated by the same principles and interests as 
they. But once the crisis was passed, he would use that 
aid as a springboard for advancing the revolutionary cause 
against them. 
Reinforced by the nationalist-traditionalist revival·--
27 cr. below, p. 311. 
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at home, which he refurbished from time to time with new 
concessions, 28 and the espousal of the national cause by 
Communists abroad, the Soviet dictator skillfully executed 
this phase of his over-all defensive strategy. He began 
to create the image of himself as a conventional diplo-
matist in the summer of 1941 by establishing diplomatic 
relations with the Yugoslav, Polish, Czech, and Belgian 
governments-in-exile and by recognizing DeGaulle as the 
head of the Free French. On September 24, he followed this 
up by publicly subscribing to the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter. 29 These moves were complemented by public state-
ments emphasizing the solidity of the alliance with the 
United States and Great Britain and reaffirming his dedi-
cation to the common aims. For example: 
The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-Ameri-
can coalition is: the abolition of racial exclu-
siveness; the equality of nations and the inviola-
bility of their territories; the liberation of the 
enslaved nations and the restoration of their 
sovereign rights; the right of every nation to 
arrange its affairs as it wishes; economic aid to 
the nations that have suffered and assistance to 
them in achieving their material welfare; and the 
restoration of democratic liberties; and the 
destruction of the Hitlerite regime. 30 
28For example, on April 5, 1942, the curfew in 
Moscow was lifted temporarily to permit observance of the 
Easter service in the churches. And, less than two months 
later, the Internationale was replaced by a national anthem. 
29af. Izvestiia, September 25, 1941, ·p. 1. 
3°Pravda, November 7, 1942, p. 1. 
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But Stalin also discovered early that relations 
with the United States and Great Britain did not have to 
be so one-sided as to preclude the promotion of the Soviet 
interest altogether. For example, when the British Foreign 
Minister, Anthony Eden, visited Moscow in December 1941 to 
negotiate a formal treaty of alliance, he requested recog-
nition of the western Soviet frontier as it had been at 
the moment of Hitler's attack. This was in spite of the 
fact that the restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
Poles had been marked by a formal repudiation of the Soviet-
German treaties partitioning Poland. Going a step fu~ther, 
apparently to test Western opinion, he made recognition of 
his claim a precondition to accepting the treaty.3l 
Because Roosevelt objected stubbornly to any terri-
torial settlements before the end of the war, Stalin ended 
up accepting a treaty with the British that excluded refer-
ence to the frontier issue. This occurred on May 26, 1942. 
But he knew that the gambit had been a success.neverthe-
less. For one thing, during the negotiations, .Churchill 
had indicated his willingness to recognize·the Soviet 
claim. 32 For another, the obvious eagerness of the British 
31cr. Winston s. Churchill, The Hinse of Fate 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 326. 
32en March 9, 1942, Churchill sent Stalin a note 
telling him that he was urging Roosevelt to approve the in-
clusion of recognition of the Soviet frontier claim in the 
Anglo-Soviet treaty. Cf. ~., p. 328. 
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for a treaty had attested to the effectiveness of his 
effort to convince the West that Communism was no longer 
the credo of revolutionary anti-capitalism. 33 Thus; as 
formally an equal partner in the anti-Hitler coalition, 
he would be able to make demands henceforth on behalf of 
alleged Soviet national interests with less fear of their 
being interpreted as opportunistic. 
For the next two years,.the Soviet dictator utilized 
his dual role as defender of Soviet Russiars interests and 
devoted ally with consummate skill. For example, he re-
acted with extreme. bitterness to Churchill 1 s announcement 
the following August that the projected Anglo-American 
invasion of Europe through France was being postponed for 
the sake of an invasion of North Africa. Speaking in the 
voice of a political head of state anxious to defend the 
interests of his country, he even impugned the veracity of 
34 his allies. But failing to dissuade them by it, he 
quickly softened the impact of his words by accepting the 
33rn this connection, retrospective comment of 
Churchill's is relevant: rrr could not see twenty years 
ahead, but we had nevertheless made a treaty for twenty 
years. I thought Russia would concentrate on reconstruc-
tion for the next ten years. There would probably be 
changes: Communism had already been modified n. Ibid., p. 
710. Churchill's willingness to reach a formal agreement 
with Stalin was probably also conditioned by a fear that 
the Soviet dictator would make a separate treaty with 
Hitler. 
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decision with good nature and by offering dramatically a 
religious blessing for the success of the African landings: 
rrMay God prosper this undertaking.rr35 
This conduct was employed with greater success in 
April 1943, when the pose as an aggrieved ally was made 
possible by the apparent credence that the Polish leaders 
in London gave to the German charge that the Soviets had 
been guilty of murdering several thousand Polish officers 
in the Katyn Forest. Recognizing it as a suitable pretext 
for eliminating all obligations to the exiled Polish govern-
ment, Stalin declared their action to be a violation of 
international standards of conduct, charged them with seek-
ing to wrest territorial concessions at the expense of 
Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belorussia, and Soviet Lithuania, 
and promptly severed diplomatic relations.36 Soon after, 
a convention of supposedly representative Poles was staged 
in Moscow. Not surprisingly, it denounced the London group 
as an ally of Hitler'·s and announced its own readiness to 
co-operate with the Soviet government in restoring an 
independent, democratic Poland.37 
35cf .. Ibid. 
36cf. Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: 
A Pattern in Poland (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1958), pp. 127-128. 
37 4 Cf. Ibid. , p. 13 • 
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To placate Roosevelt and Churchill, who were piqued 
at the summary diplomatic break, Stalin postponed recog-
nizing the Poles in Moscow, most of whom were Communists, 
as the legitimate claimants to power in Poland. 38 Further-
more, he was able to divert attention away from it with 
another dramatic gesture. On May 22, 1943, he announced 
that the Comintern was about to be dissolved.39 But so 
far as he was concerned, the critical fact was that the 
basis for a Polish national revolutionary committee, a 
device that Lenin had applied so effectively back in the 
twenties, had been established. 
Still another illustration of the Stalinist wartime 
diplomatic strategy was provided by the meeting of the 
Allied foreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943. On 
this occasion, Molotov refused absolutely to accept a West-
ern proposal that the small Danubian countries be federated 
in the postwar period. His argument was that the Soviet 
38However, the Western leaders did make it clear 
that they were interested less in defending Polish national 
rights than in preserving the unity of the "Big Threen. Cf. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Correspondence 
Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime 
Ministers of Great Britain Duri the Great Patriotic War 
of 19 1-19 6 Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1957), I, pp. 124-125, 129-139; II, p. 61; Eduard Benes, 
Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes (London: G. Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., 1954), pp. 184-185. 
39cr. Izvestiia, May 22, 1943, p. 1. 
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people would be reminded of the policy of the "cordon 
sanitaire" directed against the Soviet Union in the twen-
ties.40 But, characteristically, he was careful to balance 
this with seeming concessions to other Western objectives, 
including a stated desire to see an independent, democrat-
ic Poland restored, acceptance, after expressing concern 
about its effect on Soviet-Japanese relations, of a Chinese 
signature on a declaration of intention to create a world 
organization after the war, and an agreement nin prinQiplen 
to collaborate closely with the West on such matters as 
shuttle bombing over Germany; to establish regular air 
i ti d t h t 1 i 1 data.41 commun ca ons, an o exc ange me eoro og ca 
Stalin personally capped these gestures with an 
unexpected, unsolicited, offer to join the attack against 
Japan once Germany had been defeated, and with an effect 
that was electric. Cordell Hull, whose long-standing 
suspicion of Soviet intentions was well known, was capti-
40cf. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), II, pp. 1298-1299. 
41The concession on the Polish issue was qualified 
by the proviso that there be n ••• a Polish Government 
friendly to the Soviet Unionn, which ruled out the Poles 
in London. This implication was overlooked by Hull. cr. 
Ibid., p. 1306. Furthermore, the purely expedient 
character of the agreement nin principleu was later re-
vealed in the difficulties encountered in getting it 
implemented. Cf. John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: 
The Stor of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-o eration with 
Russia New York: The Viking Press, 19 7 , p. 21. 
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vated immediately by this seemingly unselfish move. 42 It 
prompted him, speaking before a joint session of Congress 
upon returning home, to express great hope that the post-
war period would provide the setting for a final elimina-
tion of such traditionally troublesome features of inter-
national politics as the balance of power, competing alli-
ances, and spheres of influence. 43 This echo of Wilsonian 
idealism bolstered hopes in Moscow also, though for an 
entirely different reason. It meant that the first bid 
for a voice in postwar Asian affairs had been made effect-
ively. 
The first meeting of the nBig Three 11 , held in 
Teheran in December 1943, marked the climax of the first, 
defensive, phase of Soviet wartime diplomacy. By this 
time, Stalin knew that his bargaining position via-a-via 
his democratic allies was stronger than ever. For one 
thing, the Red Army had demonstrated ita superiority over 
the WeP.macht in the past year, first at Stalingrad and 
then during the summer offensive, in which more than half 
the occupied Soviet territory had been recaptured. For 
42Hull, who was both ttaatonaished and delighted" 
by the offer, relates: ."The Marshal' a. statement of his 
decision was forthright. He made it emphatically, it was 
entirely unsolicited, and he asked nothing in return." 
Hull, op. cit., p. 1310. 
43cf. Ibid., pp. 1314-1315. 
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another, new factories and those which had been moved east-
ward were now turning out guns, tanks, and aircraft in 
sufficient quantity to render the Soviet military less 
dependent upon outside assistance. Finally, it was no 
secret that Washington and London were very anxious to 
secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan. 
Reassured by the more favorable conditions, the 
Soviet dictator began to speak with greater authority. For 
example, he refused to accept Roosevelt's suggestion that 
the second front be effected through Albania and Yugoslavia 
and that the juncture with the Red Army take place some-
where in Rumania. Mindful of its implied challenge to his 
revolutionary aspirations in Eastern Europe, he dismissed 
44 it as an unwise scattering of forces. And when Churchill 
later brought up the subject again, his temper flared to 
the point where he charged the British with fear of meeting 
the Germans in France. 45 This settled the issue of the 
second front at Teheran. 
Subsequently, Churchill and Roosevelt all but for-
mally accepted Moscow's claim to the Polish territory 
seized in 1939. But it was an error by the Soviet transla-
44cf. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: 
An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 
p. 780. 
45cf. ~·, p. 788. 
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tor in connection with an American oroposal on the inter-
nationalization of the Kiel Canal that produced an unex-
pected gain on the question of the Baltic States as well. 
Stalin apparently thought that Roosevelt was raising this 
part~cular issue, for he insisted adamantly that the 
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, albeit under pressure 
from Moscow, had already expressed their will on the sub-
ject of union with Soviet Russia. 46 
The confusion was cleared up without the Western 
leaders registering a protest against this claim and noth-
ing further was said about it until Roosevelt brought it up 
in a private conversation with Stalin, explaining that he 
had to respect the wishes of some seven million Americans 
of East European extraction. On thi~ occasion, acting 
obviously on the premise that the earlier silence had 
sealed the fate of these countries, the Soviet leader 
offered only a sardonic expression of sympathy and a flip-
pant suggestion that some "propaganda work'r be done among 
them. 47 The implication was an obvious one; the issue was 
considered closed. 
Once again, however, attention was paid the task of 
leaving the impression that the Soviet position was founded 
46cf. Ibid., p. 782. 
47af. Ibid., p. 796. 
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upon concern for national, as opposed to revolutionary, 
interests. Thus, to demonstrate that he was still firmly 
committed to the principles of the alliance, the Communist 
dictator reiterated his approval of the idea of a world 
organization as the institutional basis for lasting peace, 
his commitment to co-operate fully in the struggle against 
Hitler Germany, and his promise to enter the war against 
Japan once the former had been defeated. 48 And to these 
he expediently added support of the restoration of the 
British Empire and approval of a British proposal that 
Poland be compensated territorially on her western border 
at the expense of Germany. 49 
When the meeting at Teheran concluded, Stalin un-
doubtedly was sure that his diplomatic strategy had been 
a success. Over the period of two and a half years since 
Hitler's attack, the muting of revolutionary propaganda 
and the adoption of a conventional diplomatic pose had 
convinced the West that Communism had undergone a profound 
change in character. His allies had responded by sending 
48At this time, Stalin was treated to an unsolic-
ited Western offer ot access to the Manchurian port of 
Darien for commercial purposes, which he accepted grac~ous­
ly. Cf. Ibid., p. 792. As later events were to reveal, 
this was not the only reward he expected for declaring war 
against Japan. 
49cf. Winston s. Churchill, Closing The Rin~ 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), pp. 359-3 2. 
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valuable military assistance and by recognizing what were 
purported to be the legitimate national interests of the 
Soviet Union. 5° Furthermore, a notable gain had been 
scored at the popular level in the West. Memories of the 
purges of the late thirties and the Nazi-Soviet pact had 
given way to growing respect and admiration for the "Rus-
sian ally".5l Whatever anti-Soviet sentiment remained was 
drowned in a reservoir of good will fed by accounts of 
changes in the Soviet system and the heroics of the Red 
Army and the guerrillas. Never before had the Soviet Union 
enjoyed such prestige in the West. 
From Stalin's standpoint, however, the occasion 
was one for grim satisfaction rather than rejoicing. There 
was to be no re-examination of relations with the West in 
the hope of shattering all barriers to peaceful coexist-
ence. The fundamental conviction that Communism and capi-
5°Sherwood describes Roosevelt's attitude after the 
Teheran Conference as follows: rrRoosevelt now felt sure 
that, to use his own term, Stalin was 'getatable', despite 
his bludgeoning tactics and his attitude of cynicism toward 
such matters as the rights of small nations, and that when 
Russia could be convinced that her legitimate claims and 
requirements ••• were given full recognition, she would 
prove tractable and co-operative in maintaining the peace 
of the postwar world. 11 Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 798-799. 
Churchill describes his own in the following way: "Sur-
veying the whole military scene, as we separated in an 
atmosphere of friendship ~d ynity of immediate purpose, 
I personally was well content.n Churchill, Closing The 
Ring, p. 405. 
51Perhaps the most dramatic achievement of Stalin's 
in this respect was the effect on Alexander Kerensky. 
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talism were ineompatible remained as firm as ever. As far 
as he was eoncerned, Western expressions of friendship and 
sympathy, the willingness to let bygones be bygones, had 
been useful in the defense against the German invader. It 
would also facilitate the reintroduction of the temporarily 
dormant revolutionary offensive strategy, a move that he 
was already contemplating. 
The Third Military-Revolutionary Offensive. The 
success at Teheran was all the encouragement that Stalin 
needed to commence the "two steps forward" aspect of his 
strategy. Its timeliness was underscored by the approach 
of the Red Army to the prewar frontier with Poland. But 
his plans were almost upset by an unexpected event •. It 
was learned, that while the meeting in Teheran had been in 
progress, Tito had taken it upon himself to convene a 
political congress in Yugoslavia and to declare the Yugo-
slav government-in-exile, including the monarch, illegit-
imate.52 
Needless to say, this new breach of Communist 
Kerensky, it will be recalled, was the very man ejected 
from power in Russia by the Communists. After that, as an 
exile in the West, he had been an outspoken critic of the 
Soviet regime. However, by 1943, he, too, had become con-
vinced by the ostensible changes in the Soviet character. 
Cf. Alexander Kerensky, "Russia is Ripe for Freedom,n 
American Mercury, August, 1943, pp. 158-165. 
52cr. Dedijer, op~ cit., p. 207. 
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discipline on Tito's part was a cause for rage in Moscow. 
He was charged with n ••• a stab in the back of the 
Soviet Union and the Teheran decisions.n53 However, it 
caused no real complications, for the anticipated chain 
reaction of protests in the West failed to materialize. 
Thus~ if anything, it demonstrated once again the extent to 
which the effort to conceal Communism's revolutionary 
character had succeeded. Nevertheless, Tito was not to be 
forgiven for this episode. 
The gambit in Poland was executed according to 
Schedule. It was a carbon copy of the old Leninist tactic: 
pursue the enemy into the adjacent country under the banner 
of national liberation and then, behind a screen of osten-
sible ~espect for national rights, liberate it from all 
political elements except the Communist. For example, on 
December 31, 1943, Polish Communists, who had been sent 
behind the German lines earlier to undermine public confi-
dence in the exiled government and the Western Powers, dis-
tributed leaflets announcing the formation of a Polish 
National Council and a People's National Army and the in-
tention to create a new Polish government.54 Three days 
53cf. Ibid., p. 209. 
54cf. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland: 
Pattern of Agsression (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948)~ 
p. 49; Rozek, op. cit., pp. 167-168. 
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later, the Red Army crossed the frontier accompanied by 
units of the new "people's" army. The Moscow press de-
clared the liberation of Poland from the Nazi yoke as the 
sole objective. 55 
Also following Lenin's example, Stalin was careful 
to avoid a premature disclosure of revolutionary intent. 
He withheld recognition of the Polish National Council. 
At stake was the continued effectiveness of the national-
istic guise, which he planned to use as a screen for the 
extension of Communist power throughout Eastern Europe. 
The wisdom of this restraint was underscored de-
cisively the following May, when Churchill made all offer 
to share influence in the Balkans.56 His purp0se was to 
guard British interests in Greece, and apparently he ex-
pected that the Soviet leader would be ~enable to an 
arrangement along lines of traditional power politics. 
The British Prime Minister was correct in one 
respect. Stalin was agreeable to an arrangement of this 
sort. But his motives were of a different nature. For 
one thing, it presented an opportunity to duplicate one of 
Lenin's most striking achievements in foreign affairs: 
the procurement of British recognition of the Soviet 
55cf. Izvestiia, January 4, 1944, p. l. 
56cf. Winston s. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), p. 73. 
312 
interest in neighboring states. It is to be recalled that 
Lenin had been presented with a comparable opportunity back 
in 1921 and had obtained British recognition of his inter-
ests in the then theoretically independent borderland 
republics in exchange for recognition of the British inter-
ests in Asia. 57 For another~ inasmuch as Churchill had 
not consulted Roosevelt before making his proposal, it 
provided an unusual chance to divide them over the issue 
of spheres of influence and thus render their potential 
common front against the revolutionary advance more diffi-
cult to obtain. 
With characteristic facility, the Soviet dictator 
fitted himself neatly into the role marked out. He readily 
recognized Britain's "primary concerntt in Greece and ac-
cepted a similar consideration for himself in Rumania. 
But he also added the qualification that the United States 
be consulted before final commitments were made. 58 The 
success of this move was crowned by Roosevelt's initial 
negative reaction and then, after being assured by Chur-
chill that the arrangement would be only temporary, by his 
agreement to allow a trial period of three months. 59 
58cf. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy~ p. 73. 
59Ind1cative of the displeasure created in Wash-
ington a~ the British expense was Secretary Hull 1 s imme-
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But then a curious thing happened: the Soviet 
leader requested an additional delay. His explanation, on 
July 12, 1944, was that the American attitude made him 
60 
reluctant to act hastily. However, the real reason, as 
can be inferred reasonably from the events, was that he 
had discovered new evidence or "left 11 national deviation-
ism, which threatened to upset his plans·. It involved the 
Greek Communists, who had just rejected a British offer to 
participate with Greek royalists and republicans in a 
coalition provisional government. 
To correct this situation, Stalin risked the dis-
pleasure or his allies and sent an unannounced military 
mission to Greece. Though all of the facts of this episode 
are not known, the implication of one that is known seems 
obvious. Soon after the Soviet mission arrived, the Greek 
Communists suddenly dropped their opposition to the propo-
61 
sal. Whatever they were told, the chances are that it 
diate comment: 11 I also called attention to what I termed 
an 1 extremely disturbing aspect or this matter' --namely, 
that the British had not discussed a proposal of this 
nature with us until after it had been put up to the 
Russians and the latter enquired whether we had been con-
sulted.11 Hull, op. cit., II, p. 1456. 
60 Cf. Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R., op. cit., 
I, p. 238. 
6lwrites c. M. Woodhouse about the occasion or the 
Soviet mission's arrival and the events in its wake: nAs 
if by a magic wand, the angry, anxious, bewildered 
obstinacy of the early summer was translated into good-
wi-ll. n Woodhouse, op. cit. , p. l99. 
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didn't include Moscow's willingness to sacrifice their 
revolutionary interests for the sake of gaining a foothold 
in Rumania. 
The delayed acceptance of the British offer to 
share influence in the Balkans, however, did not prevent 
Stalin from taking advantage of it. For example, in August 
1944, the Red Army swept across Rumania, arriving in Bucha-
rest on the last day of the month. The pro-Axis regime 
was ousted and its successor was instructed to declare war 
on Germany. The armistice was signed in Moscow, on Septem-
ber 12, with the Soviets acting on behalf of the United 
States and Great Britain. By its terms, authority was 
vested in the "Soviet (Allied) High Command". 62 As one 
observer of the Rumanian scene has no neatly put it: 
11They (the Allies) never got out of the brackets 11 • 63 
In Rumania, as in Poland, attention was paid to 
the need of maintaining a proper facade. With the Red 
Army appeared Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnaris, 
Rumanian Communists who had spent the war in Moscow. To-
gether with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who was freed from 
prison, they comprised the Rumanian version of the national 
62The salient points of the armistice agreement are 
listed in Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke 
(Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), pp. 166~188. 
63Ibid., p. 185. 
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revolutionary committee, the nucleus o~ the Communist 
regime that would be established in due time. However, 
their ~irst task was to establish a pseudo-national front, 
behind which this objective could be pursued "legallyrr. 
The appearance of wuch patriotic-sounding organizations 
as the Union of Rumanian Patriots, Patriotic Defense, 
Plowman's Front, and a Rumanian-Soviet friendship society 
64 
called ARLUS soon after attested to their diligence. 
Simultaneously, Stalin began to raise the tempo of 
the revolutionary offensive at two other points, in Poland 
and Bulgaria. On the one hand, encouraged by a public 
statement of Churchill's .on behalf o~ the Soviet claim to 
eastern Poland, which contrasted sharply with the refusal 
of the Poles in London to concede anything, he invited 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to Moscow to disc1;1ss their differ-
ences.65 But when the head of the exiled Polish regime 
arrived, on July 30, 1944, he was presented with a fait 
accompli in the form of Soviet recognition of a Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (the nLublin Committee") 
as the temporary legal authority in Poland. 66 He was also 
64 C~. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 278-280. 
65cf. Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R., op. cit., 
I, p. 242. Speaking before the House o~ Commons, on 
February 22, 1944, Churchill had stated the following: 
nr cannot feel that the Russian demand for reassurance 
about her western ~rontiers goes beyond the limits o~ what 
is reasonable or just.n The Times, February 23, 1944, p. 6. 
66cf. Mikolajczyk, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 
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·--) 
made to witness the beginning of the destruction of the 
Polish underground movement in Warsaw by the Germans, 
brought about by Moscow's encouragement that it rise up in 
anticipation of the arrival of the Red Army and then the 
deliberate failure of it to arrive on time. Finally,he 
was compelled to return to London a month later without 
having obtained an agreement on any of the points at issue. 
On the other hand, a surprise move was made to 
establish a foothold in Bulgaria. On September 4, 1944, 
while that country was negotiating an armistice with the 
British and the Americans, the Soviet leader declared war 
and called upon the Bulgarian people to overturn the 
rtruling cliquen. 67 This was the signal for the Communist-
led Fatherland Front to perform its most important task 
for Moscow. Within two weeks, the Red Army had overrun 
Bulgaria and the Fatherland Front became the provisional 
government. Its first act was to declare war against Ger-
many. This, of course, rendered the armistice talks with 
the West superfluous. On October 28, an armistice was 
signed in Moscow, one that was a duplicate of the Rumanian 
68 
armistice in its essential features. 
The Soviet conduct in Poland did stir some anger in 
67cf. Pravda, September 5, 1944, p. 1. 
68cf. Izvestiia, October 29, 1944, p. l. 
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the West, particularly on the part of Churchill. 69 But 
neither it nor the actions in Rumania and Bulgaria dis-
pelled his impression that it was still possible to work 
out some mutually beneficial agreement on a division of 
interests in the Balkans. Thus, by September 28, 1944, 
the British leader had recovered sufficiently from his 
disappointment to reiterate publicly his faith in nour 
great Eastern ally 11 and his conviction that the Russian 
claim to eastern Poland was justified.70 This was a pre-
liminary to his trip to Moscow the following month to 
propose an even broader arrangement in the Balkans than 
before. According to the new terms, the Soviets were to 
get a ninety percent nprimary concernrr in Rumania and 
seventy five in Bulgaria, while the British were to get 
ninety percent in Greece. In addition, in Hungary and 
Yugoslavia, each was to get fifty percent.71 . 
It goes without saying that Stalin did not hesitate 
69The British leader noted the 11 strange and 
sinister 11 behavior of the Russians and wished to send them 
a strongly worded message. However, it was not sent because 
Roosevelt, apparently anxious about the promise of Soviet 
aid against Japan, refused to support it. Cf. Churchill, 
Triumph and Tragedy·,. pp. 139-143. 
7°cr. The Times, September 29, 1944, p. 6. 
71cr. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 227. 
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to agree on this occasion.72 The broader delimitation of 
areas of "primary concern 11 was even more satisfactory. It 
provided the element of legal sanction for the projected 
extension of Communist power into Rumania and Bulgaria 
and it also afforded a foothold in Hungary and Yugoslavia. 
Concerning the fact that it necessitated the sacrifice of 
the revolutionary interests of the Greek and Yugoslav 
Communists, this certainly was consistent with past 
practice. But the Soviet leader undoubtedly was even less 
concerned about them and regarded his action as suitable 
punishment for their failure to do the utmost on behalf 
of Soviet Russia's defense. 
The Yugoslavs heard rumors about the Anglo-Soviet 
division of the Balkans into spheres of interest, but, 
according to Dedijer, refused at first to believe that it 
had occurred.73 The Greeks, however, apparently thought 
otherwise, for they staged an attempt to seize power in 
Greece late in December 1944.74 
72churchill, who outlined the scheme on a half-
sheet of paper and pushed it across the conference table 
to Stalin, records the climax as follows: nThere was a 
slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made. a 
large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all 
settled in no more time than it takes to set down.n Ibid • 
. 73cf. Dedijer, op. cit., p. 223. 
74Though all the facts are not known, it is likely, 
as Woodhouse suggests, that the proponents of forceful 
action in the Greek Communist Party managed to gain the 
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While the immediate reaction in Moscow to this out-
burst of "left" national deviationism has not been made 
public, it is reasonable to assume it was even more violent 
than the rage that Tito had evoked.75 But once again, 
attesting to the effectiveness of the Soviet nationalistic 
guise, the event provoked neither protests nor suspicions 
in the West. On the contrary, Churchill attributed it to 
the Greek Communists exclusively, while Roosevelt put the 
blame on the British policy in Greece.76 
At the Yalta Conference, in February 1945, Stalin 
tested his strategy against the sagacity of the Western 
leaders once more, and with characteristic success. He 
reinforced his facade of respect for national rights by 
accepting the 11 Declaration on Liberated Europe" and a 
separate agreement on Poland, both of which embodied 
upper hand at the time. Of. Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 212. 
Woodhouse, however, does not note the deviationist impli-
cation. Of. also, George Papandreou, The Third War 
(Athens: (n.p.), 1948), p. 35 •. 
75Evidence of Stalin's reaction can be seen in the 
dispatch of Nicholas Zachariadis to Greece in the summer 
of 1945 to become the party's leader and to put its policy 
back on a more nationalistic course. Of. Woodhouse, 
op. cit., p. 243. Later, Zachariadis wrote an article in 
which he charged those responsible for the uprising with 
having become ndizzy with success 11 , a disparagement that 
obviously referred to the 11leftn national deviationist 
tendencies. Of. N. Zachariadis, 11The Struggle For Freedom 
and Democracy in Greece," For a Lasting Peace, For a 
People's Democracy, No. 2, December 15, 1948, p. 4. 
76af. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy:, pp. 292-293 • 
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principles familiar to the democratic philosophy.77 Fur-
thermore, taking advantage of the American desire for 
Soviet participation in the war against Japan and a 
relatively free hand in dealing with the Japanese after 
the war, he obtained important concessions in the Far East. 
The status guo was to be preserved in Outer Mongolia, which 
meant continued Soviet domination there, Russian rights 
and properties lost in the war with Japan in 1904-1905 
were to be restored, and the Kurile Islands were to be 
acquired. 78 
Both Churchill and Roosevelt left the Crimea, as 
they had left Teheran more than a year earlier, confident 
that Stalin was indeed as good as his word. 79 But as· 
subsequent events were to demonstrate, the Soviet dictator 
interpreted the results of the meeting as all the encour-
agement he needed to continue the revolutionary program 
in Eastern Europe. 
77cf. Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Roosevelt and the 
Russians: The Yalta Conference (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946), pp. 343-344,346-347. 
78cf. ~., pp. 93-94. 
79upon his return from Yalta, Churchill had the 
following to report to the House of Commons: "The im-
pression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my 
other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet 
leaders wish to live in Honourable friendship and equality 
with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word 
is·their bond." Cf. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 
pp. 400-401. According to Sherwood: tiThe mood of the 
American delegates, including Roosevelt and Hopkins, 
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The Fiction of National Sovereignty in Eastern 
Europe. The Soviet method in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 
1948, when the conquests of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary were completed, and power was seized in Yugoslavia, 
Albania, and Czechoslovakia, need not be spelled out in 
great detail here. This subject is a familiar one. It 
has been covered in reports by Western diplomats and jour-
nalists who witnessed it, in accounts by anti-Communist 
leaders who managed to escape its terror, and in several 
excellen~ studies undertaken by Western scholars. For our 
purpose, the important point is that Stalin continued to 
follow Leninrs tactical prototype closely. His objective 
was to convince his Western allies that the forceful 
extension of Communism was an expression of the popular 
will in the countries where it took place. And for this 
he superimposed a conventional character on the basic 
revolutionary technique by manipulating nationalistic 
symbols, by establishing artificial national coalition 
regimes, and by continuing to display a showy concern for 
national rights in diplomacy. 
For example, in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and 
Bulgaria, where local Communists would have constituted 
could be described as one of supreme exultation as they 
left Yalta. They were confident ••• that this had been 
the most encouraging conference of all •••• 11 Sherwood, 
op. cit., p. 869. 
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negligible political forces except for the presence of the 
Red Army, the revolutionary course unfolded with deliberate 
gradualness. Initially, a phantasy of veneration for 
national and democratic institutions was carefully fostered. 
National heroism was freely espoused and national resur-
80 
rection was promised loudly and incessantly. For the 
time being, religious freedom was tolerated. Communists 
also assisted in the re-establishment of prewar democratic 
parties and played the role of a minority in the provi-
81 
sional national coalition governments. 
At the same time, preparations for the ultimate 
achievement of power were made. The pretext of military 
necessity was used widely to justify politically inspired 
actions. Local Red Army commanders, acting purportedly 
on behalf of public order and the security of their linea 
of communication and supply, arrested troublesome anti-
80cr. Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron 
Curtain (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948),p. 77; 
Markham, op. cit., p. 233; Hugh Seton-Watson, nThe Danu-
bian Satellites: A Survey of the Main Social and Political 
Factors in the Present Situation, 11 International Affairs, 
No. 22, April, 1946, pp. 240-253. 
8lRelatea Ferenc Nagy: 11 0f one thing the Commu-
nists were especially careful. At every step they sought 
to clothe their acts in a show of constitutionality in 
order to invest with a semblance of legality all their 
terroristic activities until such time as absolute power 
should be theirs." Nagy, op. cit., pp. 72-73. Cf. also, 
Markham, op. cit., pp. 213-215; Mikolajczyk, op. cit., 
p. 132; Andrew Gyorgy, Governments of Danubian Euro e (New 
Y~: Rinehart and Company, 19 9 , pp. 115-117, 21 -219. 
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Communists and requisitioned buildings and other facili-
ties in use by democratic parties. They seized large 
stores of food, which they used for their own troops and 
distributed to local Communists and fellow travellers. 
Furthermore, they provided protection for the local 
Communist organizations, which, not by coincidence, in-
variably managed to gain control or three key posts in the 
provisional regimes, the Ministries of Interior, Justice, 
and Agriculture. Through the first two, loyal police 
forces and judiciaries were created, staged mass demonstra-
tions on behalf of more "progressive" governmental policies 
and terrorism by armed gangs were protected, and the charge 
of pro-Fascism was leveled indiscriminately at the opposi-
tion. Through the last, using radical land reform pro-
82 grams as bait, the favor of the peasantry was curried. 
To prevent close Western scrutiny and disclosure 
• 
of the real situation in the occupied countries, Stalin 
continued to make use of the national idea. Thus, based 
on an alleged defense of national sovereignty and dignity, 
he refused to admit Western observers and exiled national-
ists to Poland. 83 The very same argument was used to 
82For example, r N p it p 111 c • agy , o • c • , • • 
83In answer to a protest by Churchill, Stalin 
explained: nyou wonder why the Polish military theatre 
should be veiled in secrecy. Actually there is no secrecy 
at all. You forget the circumstances that the (Lublin) 
Poles regard the dispatch of British or other foreign 
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justify negative replies to British and American requests 
that elections in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary take 
84 place under the direct supervision of the Allies. And 
whenever the overly-protective nature of Soviet policy was 
questioned, he switched over to the argument that the 
Soviet Union had the right to ~nsure against unfriendly 
neighbors and_possible future attacks. 85 Only when 
expediency dictated, as will be seen, were such requests 
as these honored. 
As compensation for the unyielding attitude on 
issues related to Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, 
other familiar Leninist devices were employed. For example, 
following the tactical line applied in Central Asia in 
1919-1920, when the ostensible independence of Turkestan, 
Bukhara, and Khiva had been preserved for the sake of 
appeasing Moslem sentiment on the periphery of Asia, Fin-
land and Czechoslovakia were selected as prime examples 
observers to Poland as an affront to their national 
dignity •••• " Ministry of Foreign Affairs of.the 
U.S.S.R., op. cit., I, p. 313. 
84rn the same way, on May 4, 1945, Stalin nimbly 
sidestepped a precedent-setting proposal of Churchillrs 
that a Soviet representative help oversee the Greek 
election: '1 S~ah control of the people of an allied 
country would of necessity be assessed as an affront and 
a gross interference in their internal affairs. Such 
control is out of place in relation to former satellite 
countries which subsequently declared war on Germany and 
ranged themselves with the Allies, as demonstrated by 
electoral experience, for example, in Finland, where the 
election was held without outside interference and yielded 
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ot Stalinist respect for national rights. Although over-
run by the Red Army, they were left unaffected by the 
revolutionary tide for the time being. Both were evac-
uated within reasonable periods of time, unfettered elect-
ions were permitted to take place, and truly non-Communist 
86 governments were formed. But considering Finland's 
proximity and the tact that the Communist Party emerged 
as the single largest in Czechoslovakia, there was little 
doubt that either would be able to act independently of 
Moscow's influence. 
Equally reminiscent was Stalin's recourse to the 
national-cultural autonomy theory for use as part or his 
diplomatic smoke screen. 87 This occurred in April 1945, 
when the aged Austrian Socialist leader, Karl Renner, was 
named to head a Soviet-sponsored provisional government 
in Vienna. If the Soviet leader had in mind creating an 
Austrian equivalent of the Far Eastern Republic, he was 
thwarted by Western insistence upon zones of occupation. 
positive results."~., p. 347. 
85 cr. Ibid., pp. 315, 331. 
86cr. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The 
Story of the Communist Cou* d'Etat (London: Victor 
Gollancz Ltd., 1950), pp.4-48; The New York Times, 
May 28, 1946, p. 13. 
87rt is to be recalled that Lenin had incorporated 
the national-cultural autonomy principle into the consti-
tution of the Far Eastern Republic as testimony to its 
non-Communist character. cr. above, pp. 111-112. 
Even so, the choice of Renner, who, along with Otto Bauer, 
had been the originator of the national-cultural autonomy 
scheme and the target of bitter Communist criticism as a 
result, did enhance the contention that old revolutionary 
h t d h d .d 88 a re s a been abandone • 
Completing the display of Communist respect for 
national and democratic institutions at this time was the 
revival of the "popular front" tactic in Western Europe. 
Its most dramatic manifestations occurred in Italy and 
France, where, for the reason of their roles in the resist-
ance movements,' .the Communists emerged from the war with 
enormous prestige and considerable followings. On orders 
from Moscow, they concealed their revolutionary interests 
89 behind the familiar nationalistic screens. In unpre-
cedented moves, they even participated in the provisional 
"bourgeoisn governments formed. 90 
88cf. Harry s. Truman, Memoirs by Harry s. Truman 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), 
I, pp. 217-218. 
89stalin's instructions to the West European 
Communists are attested to in Dedijer, op. cit., p. 296. 
An excellent account of the French Communist policy is 
afforded by Gordon Wright: nThe current party line was 
above reproach. No other group beat its breast quite so 
violently in protesting its patriotism, or in condemning 
foreign interference in French affairs." Gordon Wright, 
The Reshaping of French Democracy (New York: Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 1948), pp. 68-69. 
9
°For the occasion, the Italian Communists dropped 
their opposition to the monarchy and, contrary to the 
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Needless to say, Stalin was not unmindful of the 
danger of recurrent nleft 11 national deviationism among his 
Communist followers in non-Soviet Europe. To guard against 
it~ he had sent Togliatti and Thorez back to Italy and 
France, respectively, with strict orders about the policies 
they were to pursue. Furthermore, he could count on the 
Red Army to prevent its occurrence in the countries occu-
pied. But there were, of course, definite weak links in 
this security chain. The Red Army was not in Yugoslavia, 
Greece, or Albania, and the Communist.leaders in two of 
these countries already had records of deviationist ten-
dencies. 
It was not long before these fears obtained their 
justification, for Tito, contrary to the general rule of 
muted Communist revolutionism, hastened to realize his own 
ambitions in Yugoslavia and prompted the Albanians to 
follow suit. By the end of 1945, both countries were 
transformed into monolithic "peoplets republicsu, patterned 
after the Soviet model.9l 
Under the circumstances, there was little the 
Socialists and Liberals, voted to renew the very same 
Lateran Pacts which Mussolini had concluded with the 
Vatican. Cf. Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 59. 
9lThe Yugoslav constitution was an exact duplicate 
of the Soviet Unionrs, while the Albanian excluded only 
its national-federal character. 
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Soviet leader could do to prevent this from taking place. 
It was extremely important to avoid overt action against 
the headstrong Hugoslav, for an open rift then might well 
have resulted in a disclo·sure of Moscow r s real purpose in 
Eastern Europe. It did, of course, serve to increase his 
determination to get rid of Tito ·once and for all, prepa-
rations for which were already underway. The Soviet mili-
tary and economic specialists sent to assist the Yugoslavs 
had also been given instructions to foment a native anti-
Titoist movement.92 
Tito's revolutionary antics and those of the 
Albanian Communists aroused suspicions in London, where 
Churchill apparently viewed with chagrin the rapid evapo-
ration of his fifty percent nprimary concerntt in Yugosla-
via.93 But there was still time for Stalin to reap 
additional benefits from the use of the national idea, 
for it helped to keep alive in American political circles 
Roosevelt's hopes for the postwar world.94 Thus, early in 
92cf. Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 260-262. 
93Though Churchill was clearly dubious, Stalin was 
more than likely telling the truth at the Potsdam Confer-
ence, in July 1945, when he explained that often he did 
not know what Tito was going to do. Cfo Churchill, Triumph 
and Tragedy, Po 636. 
94writes Secretary of State Byrnes about the 
American attitude in 1945: nit is true that following 
Yalta we were somewhat disillusioned. Such things as the 
• • • Soviet violations of the agreements on Poland and 
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the spring or 1945, it was possible to get American 
acquiescence to a request that the Red Army be permitted 
to liberate Prague. 95 Then, at the end or June, arter 
expediently admitting Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and rour 
other non-Communist Poles to the Communist-controlled 
Polish provisional government, the request that it be 
recognized was also accepted. 96 
Encouraged by the latter, which was viewed as the 
rrlegal" basis sought ror the Communization or Poland, the 
Soviet dictator next pressed ror recognition of the Hungar-
ian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian regimes. The aim apparently 
was to rortiry their positions ror the rorthcoming nego-
tiation or peace treaties with them. Hence, at the Potsdam 
Conrerence, in July-Alllgust '1945, when the decision to 
create a Council of Foreign Ministers to drart the peace 
treaties with Italy, Finland, and the three rormer Axis 
satellites was made, he tried to exchange acceptance or 
Rumania warned us that in the days to come we would en-
co~ter serious difrerences and would have to overcome 
deep seated suspicions. ~owever, rresh in our minds were 
the words of President Roosevelt's last message to Prime 
Minister Churchill, based on his experience with the 
Russians, that such difficulties would straighten out.n 
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 71. 
95churchill advised Truman against this, though 
without success. He also railed to persuade the President 
to exploit the advanced positions or the Anglo-American 
armies for political purposes. Cf. Churchill, Triumph and 
Tragedy, pp. 506-507, 514-516. 
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Western favors to Italy for the recognition sought. 97 But 
when it, and a promise rrto discussn the matter of Allied-
supervised elections in these countries, failed to produce 
the desired results, he switched to a more aggressive 
tack. The British were charged with interference in Greek 
affairs and demands were made that Italy's North African 
colony of Tripolitania be turned into a Soviet trust 
territory and that the Dardanelles be placed under joint 
Soviet-Turkish administration. 
This open challenge to British interests in the 
Mediterranean was undoubtedly underscored by the hope that 
Attlee, Churchill 1 s successor, could be induced to bargain 
on a balance of power basis. But it failed. Consequently, 
to forestall an additional hardening of the Western posi-
tion, the Soviet leader executed a typical retreat, prom-
ising to permit greater freedom of movement for the Allied 
representatives in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. 
When the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London 
in September 1945 to begin drafting the five peace treaties, 
the right of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to recognition 
by the West was equated repeatedly with Italyts, particu-
96 Cf. Truman, op. cit., I, pp. 321-322. 
97cr. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 74 
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larly on the ground that they, too, had aided the Allied 
cause after surrendering. However, progress on this score 
was made only with the addition of conciliatory gestures. 
Hence, the Hungarian regime was recognized the following 
November, after an election had been held there and allowed 
to res.ul t in an ostensible victory for the non-Communist 
Smallholders Party. 98 Then, in February 1946, it was 
obtained for the Rumanians as well, after a commission 
composed of the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow 
and Andrei Vishinski npersuadedn them to include representa-
tives of other parties in their government. 99 
A similar result for Bulgaria undoubtedly would 
have occurred at this time except for an unexpected event. 
After promising the West nto advise 11 the Bulgarians to add 
two non-Communists to their government, Stalin discovered 
that the invited leaders of the Agrarian and Socialist 
parties refused absolutely to accept any posts but the 
100 Ministries of Interior and Justice. This price turned 
out to be higher than he was willing to pay, particularly 
in view of the fact that the ulegalizationtt of the con-
quest of that country depended on the completion of the 
98c~. N it 164  agy, op. c ., p. • 
99cf. Markham, op. cit., pp. 267-268. 
100cf. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 298-299. 
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peace treaties. 
The close connection between the Soviet interests 
in Eastern Europe and the tactics pursued at the confer-
ence table was evident. Up to this point, no significant 
progress had been made. For the sake of getting the 
recognition sought, Molotov had challenged the national 
interests of Britain and the United States repeatedly. 
Renewed demands for Tripolitania and the Dardanelles were 
made, and to them were added demands for heavy reparations 
from Italy and the creation of an Allied Control Commission 
for Japan, a persistent championship of the Yugoslav claim 
to Trieste, and a refusal to allow disposition of the 
Dodecanese Islands without a settlement on the issue of 
101 
the -Italian colonies first. For good measure, Stalin 
had even harked back to the twenties, had invoked the 
Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, to make an issue out of 
the evacuation of the Red Army from that country.102 
101cf. Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 94-108, 127-129. 
102Following Lenints example, Stalin also used the 
Red Army to support an Iranian Communist effort to set up 
an autonomous republic in the northern province of 
Azerbaijan, in December 1945. Like its predecessor in 
Gilan, it was allowed to collapse once ita usefulness to 
the Soviet purpose had expired. Cf. George Lenczowaki, 
Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1 48: A Stud in Bi -
Power Rivalry Ithaca: Cornell University Preas, 19 9 , 
pp. 284-315. 
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It goes without saying that the Soviet leader would 
have been pleased to win on each one of these points. But 
the purpose in raising them was clearly to gain satis-
faction on the more important issues alive in Eastern 
Europe. Thus, after the attempt to gain recognition for 
the Bulgarian regime failed, the Soviet tack changed 
decisively. When the Council of Foreign Ministers met in 
Paris in June 1946, Molotov began to make important con-
cessions. He suddenly agreed that the Dodecanese Islands 
should be given to Greece immediately and accepted a 
Western proposal that a settlement on the issue of the 
Italian colonies should be postponed for a year. Then, 
even more dramatically, he made a private offer to Secre-
tary of State Byrnes to drop support of the Yugoslav claim 
to Trieste if the Soviet demand for Italian reparations 
was accepted. But all of this turned out to be preparation 
for still another offer to bargain. The Soviet Foreign 
Minister did not complete his sequence of concessions until 
he had asked Byrnes if an agreement on the reparations 
issue satisfactory to the United States could be exchanged 
for the signature of all the peace treaties, u •••• in-
103 . 
c4.uding the one with Bulgaria 11 • The success of this 
a~tonishing volte face was registered with the latter's 
103cf. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 133. 
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affirmative reply, the immediate settlement of the repara-
tions issue, and the subsequent decision of the Council to 
call a general peace conference. 
At the peace conference itself, which opened in 
Paris on July 27, 1946, the Russians almost fell victim to 
their haste to acquire the final legalistic trimmings for 
their conquests in Eastern Europe. Their desire to obtain 
speedy confirmation of the treaties met with a comparably 
stubborn Western insistence that each proposal for each 
treaty be considered individually and that they be voted 
on by the full membership of the conference. Consequently, 
the proceedings were delayed three weeks by prolonged 
debate on procedural matters, during which time recrimina-
tions were exchanged heatedly. 
There is no telling how long this would have gone 
on, though it is clear that Stalin did. not intend to allow 
the stalemate to degenerate into a complete collapse of 
the negotiations when they were so close to a conclusion. 
Three unexpected events, however, did combine to break the 
deadlock and speed the process to a conclusion. · Two 
originated in the Communist camp and consisted of fresh 
outbursts of "left" national deviationism. For example, 
on August 19, 1946, the Yugoslavs shot down an American 
airplane, killing five of its passengers. Then, apparently 
wittLTito's encouragement, the Greek Communists initiated 
335 
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civil war in Greece a month later. 
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Coming at a very critical point in the peace nego-
tiations, these two events undoubtedly were a cause for 
anxiety in Moscow. It is known, for example, that Tito 
satisfied the American demand for an explanation concerning 
the airplane incident only after Molotov's intervention.105 
Less clear is the character of the immediate reaction to 
the events in Greece. However, considering the importance 
attached to the signature of the peace treaties, the stony 
silence of the Soviet press, and the ultimate charge of 
deviationism against Markos Vafiadis, the Greek rebel 
leader, it is safe to assume that it was anything but appre-
ciative. 
The effect on the peace conference was immediate. 
The Soviets modified their stand sufficiently to permit 
completion of its work by October 17, 1946. Then, after 
104The only evidence I found suggesting Stalints 
direct connection with the Greek uprising is a report in 
The Times, August 21, 1946, which attributes to a 11 reliable 
source 11 the fact that a Russian agent laid the plans for 
it. But against this is ranged considerable evidence to 
the contrary. For example, an equally "reliablen report 
in The New York Times, April 20, 1947, VI, p. 8, tells 
that Markos Vafiadis, the leader of the Greek rebels, was 
in fact leading a group of dissident Communists. This 
might explain why Vafiadis and not Nicholas Zachariadis, 
a Stalinist, was in charge. Furthermore, it is known that 
Tito was most anxious to include Greek Macedonia in his 
projected scheme for a Balkan federation and provided the 
principal assistance to the Greeks. Finally, it is also 
known that Stalin advised Tito to stop lending them aid 
oa-at least one occasion, failed to invite the Greeks to 
returning to Moscow for instructions, Molotov arrived in 
'New York for the final session of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers bearing an even more perceptible conciliatory 
attitude. Criticism of the United States was dropped com-
106 pletely and personal relations improved significantly. 
Furthermore, when questioned about a Yugoslav threat to 
refuse to sign the treaty with Italy unless the claim to 
Trieste was accepted, the Soviet Foreign Minister agreed 
that such a refusal should deny Tito all the benefits of 
the treaty.107 
The third factor that helped to speed up the nego-
tiating process materialized at this time. It originated 
in the West and consisted of a surprise proposal by Byrnes 
privately to Molotov that the negotiations be suspended 
indefinitely. Whether out of conviction or by design, he 
justified it with the opinion that agreement on the trea-
108 
ties did not seem likely. And its effect was electric, 
membership in the Cominform, and ultimately charged Va-
fiadis with national deviationism. Of. Dedijer, op. cit., 
pp. 293, 321-322. 
lOSer. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 145. 
1o60f. Ibid., p. 152. 
1070f. Ibid., p. 147. 
108 ' Of. Ibid., pp. 152-153. Though he doesn't ex-
plain his motives, it is more than likely that the Secre-
tary of State was in fact engaged in a bit of diplomatic 
bluffing. 
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for Molotov then proceeded to accept practically all of 
the recommendations made by the peace conference. The 
five treaties were signed on December 11, 1946. 
Though it appeared as though he had been forced 
into it, the signing of the peace treaties, particularly 
those with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, signalled 
Stalin's successful duplication of Lenin's earlier success. 
Using the national idea as a screen, he had been able to 
gain Western acceptance of the conquest of neighboring 
countries overrun by the Red Army in pursuit of an enemy 
invader. To be sure, the treaties did contain provisions 
for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from those 
countries and the guarantee of civil rights. However, 
the Soviets retained the right to station military units 
in them to ensure uninterrupted lines of communication 
and supply with their occupation forces in Austria and 
Germany. This, together with the fact that local Communist 
organizations were sufficiently prepared to assume full 
power overtly, meant that the guarantee of civil rights 
would be given the characteristic Communist interpretation. 
Comniunist National Deviationism Becomes nTitoismu. 
At this point, there is no way of telling exactly what 
Stalin intended to do with the newly acquired East European 
countries beyond the formal establishment of Communist 
power. Just how he planned to tie them to the Soviet Union 
338 
remains a mystery. There is evidence that he contemplated 
their union on a confederate basis. For this it is neces-
sary to go back to the early twenties, when he expressed 
the following opinion to Lenin as an answer to the question 
of dealing with future Communist governments in such 
countries as Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Finland: 
• • • they would regard the Soviet type of 
federation as a device to reduce their political 
independence • • • • I have no doubt that the 
most expedient form of bringing about a 
rapprochement would be a cdnfederation, a union 
of independent states • • • • 109 
But this, of course, does not mean that he sub-
scribed to the same view in 1947. As indicated, the 
confederate idea was regarded as an expedient only; it did 
not preclude ultimate union on a federal basis. Further-
more, it was offered at a time when Russia was economically 
backward and militarily weak, and when it was assumed that 
revolutions elsewhere in Europe would have to take place 
without significant assistance from the Red Army. Thus, 
since Stalin permitted no public discussion of the subject 
before his death on March 6, 1953, and no answer to the 
question has been forthcoming since, it is equally possible 
that the circumstances of the early postwar period may well 
110 have caused him to change his mind. 
109
cited in Lenin, op. cit., XXV, p. 624. 
110 Suggestive in this respect was an exchange of 
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-~fuatever the case, one thing seems fairly certain: 
the reason for this enduring mystery can be traced chiefly 
to a ne'\'1 manifestation of Communist 11rightu national 
deviationism, or, as it has come to be known, "Titoism". 
To begin with, the Soviet dictator still had the task of 
getting rid of Tito before him in 1947. One aspect of 
his plan in this connection has already been described: 
Soviet diplomats and .. military and economic specialists in 
Yugoslavia were instructed to recruit an anti-Tito movement 
among native Communists. But it also entailed measures 
designed to keep the Yugoslav leader off his guard. For 
example, interference in the internal affairs of all 
satellites was held to a minimum; there was no mention of 
their future status. In addition, favors were heaped on 
Tito. At the funeral of Kalinin in the spring of 1946, 
he alone among the foreign visitors was given the honor of 
standing with the Soviet Politburo on the main stand.111 
Then, in the fall of 1947, at the founding of the Communist 
ideas between the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Kardelj, and 
the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Sadchikov, in June 
1945. On this occasion, Kardelj expressed the desire that 
his country be regarded as one of the future Soviet 
Republics. However, Sadchikov, reflecting Moscow's concern 
for relations with the West, advised against the expression 
of such sentiment publicly: n ••• it was necessary to 
recognize the facts as they are at present, namely to 
treat Yugoslavia as an independent state and the Yugoslav 
Communist Party as an independent Party.n Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute 
(London: R.I.I.A., 1948), p. 38. 
lllcf. Dedijer, op. cit., p. 277. 
340 
-Information Bureau, or Cominform, the Yugoslav delegation 
was encouraged to criticize openly the wartime policies 
of such giants of the Communist world as the French and 
Italian parties.112 
Before.an adequate anti-Tito force in Yugoslavia 
could be recruited, how.ever, the Stalinist scheme was 
thwarted by the spread of deviationism. The first evidence 
of it appeared in the summer of 1947, when the Polish and 
Czech Communists, without consulting Moscow first, de-
clared themselves interested in the American offer to 
participate in the drafting of the Marshall Plan for 
Europe.113 But it took an even more definite shape the 
following November, when the Communist Parties met in 
Warsaw to discuss the founding of the Cominform. On this 
occasion, Wladyslaw Gomulka, head of the Polish party, 
argued against following the Soviet example in agricultural 
matters. At this time, he was supported by the Czechs. 
Furthermore, Gomulka opposed the organization of the 
112This clearly w~s designed to serve the additional 
purpose of generating hostility between the Yugoslavs and 
the French and Italians. The same was true of Stalin's 
criticism of Georgi Dimitrov for alleged incompetence in 
Tito's presence, at a time when they were developing a 
scheme for a ~alkan federation! Cf. Ibid., p. 296.· 
ll3It was stopped, of course, after instructions 
from Moscow. Cf. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European 
Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 185 
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Cominform itself, on the ground that it would depreciate 
Poland's sovereignty. He later qualified this by accept-
ing the new Communist institution on the condition that 
114 it be kept a secret. 
Attesting to his determination to liquidate Tito, 
Stalin raised no fuss over Gomulka'a obvious opposition 
to domination by the Soviets. He was simply ove~ruled by 
the other delegates, who warmly endorsed the creation of 
the Cominform. However, the absence of harahcretaliation 
did have ita effect on thinking in the satellites. To-
gether with Tito's continued prominence, it encouraged 
the belief that Moscow did not intend to demand strict 
obedience to ita will and a consequent rush to get on the 
"Titoiat" bandwagon. The Yugoslav leader was invited to 
visit all capitals and his appearances were greeted with 
great enthusiasm. On one trip, to Bucharest, he even 
neglected to advise Moscow of his plana, which apparently 
was a cause for consternation in the Soviet capital.ll5 
But this was not enough to cause a change in the Soviet 
tactics. They remained the same until January 1948, when 
Georgi Dimitrov spoke publicly on the question of a Balkan 
ll4cf. Dedijer, op. ·cit., pp. 296-297 
115
cf. Ibid., p. 305. 
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federation. According to the oldest of the "old 
Stalinists" in Eastern Europe: 
When the question (of federation) matures, as it 
must inevitably, the peoples, the nations of 
people's democracy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, 
Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and 
Greece -- mind you, and Greece -- will settle it. 
It is they who will decide whether it will be a 
federation or confederation, and when and how it 
will be formed. n •••• when it comes to creating 
such a federation or confederation, our peoples 
will not ask the imperialists arid will not heed 
their opposition, but will solve the question 
themselves, guided by their own interests bound 
up with the interests and international co-opera-
tion necessary to them and to other nations. 116 
Dimitrov's statement, which, incidentally, made no 
provision for assistance from the Soviet Union, was 
obviously all that Stalin needed to read to convince him 
that the plot against Tito was becoming too costly on the 
existing basis. His reaction on this occasion was one of 
unconcealed fury. Through Pravda, he denounced the 
. 117 Bulgarian leader's ideas unequivocably. Then he ordered 
the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs to Moscow for a meeting, which 
Dimitrov attended but Tito did not. At the meeting itself, 
held on February 10, 1948, he heaped abuse on both, 
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charging them with connivance behind his back. . But, 
116Pravda, January 27, 1948, p. 2. 
117cf. Ibid., January 29, 1948, P• 1. 
118
cf. Dedijer, =op._.;::;......;:;o=i...;;.t., pp. 315-324. 
apparently for the reason that Tito was not there, he 
conceded to the federative idea on a limited scale.119 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia, and Rumania and Hungary were to be federated. 
This was only a calculated retreat, for the full Stalinist 
fury was about to descend. 
Immediately after the meeting in Moscow, open 
pressure against Tito commenced. Dedijer relates that all 
pictures of him with Stalin were removed from public places 
in Rumania and that the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Albania 
qualified a toast to him with an implied asperson against 
. 120 his ideological integrity. Then, at the beginning of 
March 1948, Soviet-Hugoslav trade relations were severely 
curtailed and all Soviet military and civilian advisers 
were recalled from Yugoslavia. This marked the complete 
abandonment of the subtle Stalinist tack and its replace-
ment by open economic and political warfare. 
There is no need to dwell on the details of the 
. campaign against Tito, which culminated in the Cominform's 
formal denunciation of him as an rrimperialist spyu on 
119
rt is not unreasonable to assume that the results 
would have been different if Tito had attended the meeting. 
Stalin probably would have taken measures to prevent l;tis., 
return home. 
120cf. Dedijer, op. cit., pp. 346-347. 
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June 28, 1948.121 The indictment touched on every conceiv-
able point, from the trivial to the most profound ideo-
logically. Appeals to all rrtruen Communists in Yugo-
slavia to rise up against their traitorous leaders were 
issued repeatedly. In reply, the Yugoslav leader pleaded 
for understanding, acknowledged the leading, if not 
dominant, role of the Soviets, and requested recognition 
of his own responsibility as the leader of a non-Russian 
state in which Communism had been introduced recently. 
In this latter respect, echoing sentiments that Stalin 
certainly had heard before, he revealed clearly the habit 
of mind that distinguishes the Communist "right" national 
deviationist from the Soviet "internationalist": 
No matter how much each of us loves the land of 
Socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his 
country less, which also is developing socialism 
in this case the Federal People's Republic of 
Yugoslavia, for which so many thousands of its 
most progressive people fell. 122 
Despite the fact that the other satellites echoed 
Moscow's sentiments and copied its actions against Yugo-
slavia, Stalin did not achieve his objective. He failed 
12lcf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
op. cit., passim. An excellent analysis of this episode 
is contained in Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform 
pp. 96-134. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 
pp. 96-134. 
l22Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
op_.._ cit., p. 19. 
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for the reason that he had underestimated the national 
spirit of the Yugoslavs, Communist and non-Communist alike, 
who could rally against the threat of foreign domination 
almost out of habit. But he also failed because he had 
underrated the ability of the West to take advantae;e of 
the opportunity to exploit one of Communismts inner contra-
dictions. He did not anticipate that, just three weeks 
after the publication of the Cominformts explosive resolu-
tion, an agreement would be reached between Yugoslavia 
and the United States, that Tito would be able to exchange 
compensation for American losses in Yugoslavia due to 
nationalization and a settlement of the deb~ for lend-
lease and relief assistance for the unblocking of Yugoslav 
assets in the United States, which included $47,000,000 
worth of gold.123 He was undoubtedly surprised by the 
rapid expansion of Yugoslav economic ties with the West 
generally and then President Truman's statement to the 
effect that he did not· intend to stand aside in the event 
of overt aggression against Yugoslavia by its Communist 
124 neighbors. This ruled out the initiation of another 
"war of national liberation". 
~23of. Wolff, op. cit., p. 410. 
124cf. The New York Times, December 23, 1949, P• 6 
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The realization that Tito was to be the first 
successful Communist "right" national deviationist de-
scended upon the Kremlin with stunning impact. It under-
scored the need for a thorough purge in Eastern Europe, 
which was not long in coming. The familiar methods of 
purge, trial, imprisonment, and execution were employed 
to expurgate the remaining "Titoistn elements. Thousands 
comprised the list of those removed, part of which read 
like a n'Who's Whon of the Communist world. Gomulka and 
Dimitrov dropped quickly from the scene. The former ended 
up in prison, while the latter was called to Moscow, where 
he remained until his death on July 3, 1949. And they 
were followed soon after by the Albanian, Koohi Xoxe, the 
Hungarian, Laslo Rajk, and the Bulgarians, Traioho Kostov, 
Anton Yugov, and Dobri Terpesohev. In 1952, the Rumanians, 
Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, and the Czechs, Rudolph Slansky 
and Vladimir Clementis.were added to the roll of allege~ 
deviationists. In scope, this spectacle of the revolution 
devouring some of its own progenitors rivaled the great 
purges of the late thirties. 
Stalin's death, on March 5, 1953, halted this 
process abruptly. Since then, Moscow's control over the 
Communist satellites has been relaxed to the point of 
sanctifying "right" national deviationism under the title 
of "separate roads to socialismn. Equally spectacular 
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have been the abject apologies tendered Tito, Gomulka's 
complete rehabilitation, and Poland's strikingly inde-
pendent course of action.125 It seems probable that the 
nnew course 11 in Hungary would have paralleled Poland's 
if not for the popular uprising that took place in 
October 1956. 
As yet, the evidence is too undertain for a 
definitive explanation of this surprising turn of events. 
For example, sufficient public respect has been paid by 
the post-Stalinist Soviet leadership to the principle of 
national sovereignty and the idea of a "commonwealth of 
socialist nations 11 to make it appear as though sincere 
recognition of national convictions among Communists as a 
126 
viable and acceptable force has finally crystallized. 
But it is also possible, in view of the record, to con-
ceive of this as an expedient designed to take the wind 
out of the sails of latent national Communism during the 
period of internecine struggle within the Kremlin. Though 
apparently one of the original sponsors of the new modus 
vivendi with the satellites, Khrushchev, notably in the 
125For example, the Polish delegation did not vote 
against the United Nations General Assembly resolution 
urging H~gary to admit observers in the wake of the up-
rising there. Contrary to the action of the other Oommu 
nist delegates, it abstained. Cf. Ibid., November 22, 1956, 
p. l. 
126cr. Khrushchev's statements in Pravda, July 16, 
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oases of Hungary and Poland, has made it abundantly clear 
that definite limits to the application of the idea of 
separate roads to socialism do exist.127 He may be biding 
his time until his own power position is sufficiently strong 
to permit the reintroduction of a right rein over European 
Communism. 
Finally, not to be overlooked as a factor in this 
connection has been the rise of Chinese Communism and its 
assertive quality since Stalin's death. This subject will 
be considered fully in the next chapter. Suffice it to 
say here that the evidence of Chinese insistence on equali-
ty with the Soviet Union in the determination of general 
Communist policy, particularly its intervention in East 
Europea~ affairs on behalf of the satellite claims to 
national sovereignty, has added a new dimension to the 
meaning of national deviationism. 
Conclusion. In the record of Soviet Russian use of 
the national idea· as an instrument of foreign policy, the 
period that opened with Hitler's surprise attack on June 
22, 1941 and closed with Stalin's death on March 5, 1953 
is to be regarded as important for three reasons primarily. 
1956, p. 1; October 31, 1956, p. 1. 
127an July 21, 1956, Bulganin admonished the Poles 
fOr their II • • • gUiSe Of COnforming tO alleged 1 national 
characteristics" and attempts to undermine the authority 
of people's democracy on the pretext of 'extending 
democracy • • • • • " Pravda, July 22, 1956, p. 1. 
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For one, it illustrated again how the Soviet leadership 
has been able to utilize expedient nationalism in meeting 
its defensive needs and promoting its revolutionary 
interests. To a significant, if not decisive, degree, 
the appeals to national sentiment at home and abroad con-
tributed to the successful defense against the invading 
Germans. Of comparable value was the affected respect 
for national institutions that served to screen the force-
ful extension of Communist power into those countries in 
Eastern Europe overrun by the Red Army. 
For another, the recourse to the national idea and 
the method of its application furnished an important clue 
to the meaning of Stalin's policy. Under conditions 
roughly comparable to those of 1919-1924, its pattern 
followed Lenin's with sufficient preciseness to make it 
doubtful that Stalin's purpose from the beginning was any-
thing but a consc-ious duplication. The parallel was an 
obvious one from the start, when the call for a patriotic 
defensive effort was first issued. It was developed 
further with the organization of guerrilla bands, the 
utilization of Communists in Central and Western Europe, 
and the introduction of a conventional diplomatic pose. 
But perhaps the strongest element of similarity was the 
automatic reintroduction of the revolutionary policy once 
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the crisis had passed, which the conversion of the national 
idea from an instrument of defense to one of revolutionary 
offense indicated. 
Stalin•s careful screening of the imposition of 
Communist power in those East European countries overrun 
by the Red Army was typical of the tactic applied earlier 
by Lenin against the separated non-Russian border regions 
of the former Russian Empire. Furthermore, his expedient 
concessions to national sentiment among non-Russian 
Communists in Eastern Europe preliminary to an attempt to 
eradicate it were also consistent with the tactical pre-
cedents. Finally, as will be seen in the chapter following, 
the parallel was completed with t4e renewal of serious 
attention to the task of promoting Communist revolutions 
in the West by encouraging national rebellions in the 
co~onies in Asia and Africa. 
Finally, this episode demonstrated even more 
dramatically than before the inherent weakness of the 
Soviet use of the national idea. The paradox of theoret-
ical anti-nationalism and practical nationalism once again 
proved incomprehensible to some non-Russian Communists. 
Consequently, the promotion of nationalism to meet wartime 
military needs evoked nleft" national deviationism on the 
part of the Yugoslav and Greek Communists. Then, as 
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Stalin prepared to switch back to the theoretically cor-
rect internationalist posture in the postwar period, the 
Yugoslav position immediately became ftright." And this 
tendency spread_ throughout the Communist satellites with 
amazing speed, as Stalin's calculated·concessions to Tito 
were incorrectly interpreted as evidence or a decisive 
transrormation or Soviet policy toward new Communist 
states. 
Stalin managed to stem the rising tide or national 
Communism, but at the highest cost paid to date. Tito's 
re·sistance to the Soviet will to dominate absolutely turned 
out to be the rirst successful one on record, and it split 
the Oommunist world decisively into two parts. Though it 
is still too early to speak in terms of its full implica-
tions, there does exist evidence suggesting that the event 
may well have marked the ultimate point in the Soviet abil-
ity to promote nationalism expediently and still maintain 
unqualified leadership among Communists who remain osten-
s~vely loyal to Moscow. 
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CHAPTER VI 
STALIN AGAINST THE WEST IN ASIA 
Though his attention in the first year after the Sec-
ond World War was devoted mainly to the consolidation of 
Communist power in Eastern Europe, Stalin did not overlook 
developments in Asia. From the Soviet dictator's standpoint, 
the postwar situation in the East offered the best oppor-
tunity for a successful revival of Lenin's anti-imperialist 
strategy since the abortive Communist revolutions back in 
1926-1927. For one thing, there was r~ason to believe that 
a good deal of the anti-Communist feeling among Asian nation-
alists had disappeared. Soviet Russia's wartime alliance 
with the Western powers against the Axis, Communist resist-
ance to Japanese rule in Asia, and the nationalism dis-
played by Communists generally were factors favoring this 
assumption. An offer by Chiang Kai-shek to restore diplo-
matic relations seemed to confirm it. For another thing, 
there was reason to believe that new anti-Western alliances 
with Asia's nationalists could be created. Japan•s defeat 
had set in motion powerful national revolutionary move-
ments in the colonies, which could be expected to se.ek out-
side assistance. With these two considerations in mind, 
then, Stalin set out to attack the West through its soft 
11~derbelly" in the East, to undermine Western capitalism by 
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forcing it out or Asia and cutting it orr from the resources 
and markets hitherto available. 
New Respect for National Rights in the East. The 
first phase of Stalints postwar effort to rid Asia of all 
Western control and influence began on the very day the war 
in the Pacific ended, and it lasted for about seven months. 
During this time, the Soviet policy was conditioned by two 
~actors. On the one hand, since the establishment of Com-
munist power in Eastern Europe was still not completed, it 
was necessary to refrain from the extreme anti-imperialist 
propaganda in order to kee.p the Western powers on friendly 
terms. On the other hand, the situation in the Far East it-
self demanded a large measure of sobriety, particularly in 
view of the fact that the United States, with its preponder-
ant power, was actively interested in the region also. Con-
sequently, the Russian leader sought his objective on the 
basis or a moderate policy, with the traditional Communist 
polemic against imperialism conspicuously absent. In its 
place appeared mild encouragement of the Asian quest for 
full freedom, coupled with a willingness to cooperate with 
all principals to bring it about peacefully. 
Stalin put to good· use the skill he had developed 
since Lenin's death. With respect to China, for example, 
where Chiang Kai-shekts suspicions and American presence 
constituted serious obstacles, he worked diligently to 
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restore the "old spirit of friendship and collaborationn 
that had marked the relationship between Lenin and Sun Yat-
sen, and thus to force the Americans to leave.1 His proof 
of sincerity consisted of a series of concessions to the 
Chinese national interest. First, on August 14, 1945, he 
agreed to a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, one that com-
mitted Soviet Russia to China's defense in the event of re-
newed Japanese aggression. 2 Then, in an exchange of notes 
relative to the treaty, he promised to withdraw all Russian 
troops from Manchuria within three months, formally acknow-
ledged Chiang's sovereignty over Manchuria, and gave assur-
ances that he would not interfere in China's internal af-
fairs. By this last point, of course, Stalin meant that he 
would not assist the Chinese Communists. 
The Soviet dictator also offered a compromise on the 
unresolved issue of Outer Mongolia's status in the form of 
a bid to let the Mongolians settle it themselves by means of 
a plebescite.3 Furthermore, in restoring the pre-war joint 
1or. Pravda, August 27, 1945, p. 1. 
2An excellent analysis of the treaty and related notes 
is provided in Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 
1944-1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 32-35. 
3stalin could claim this as a retreat from his demand 
at Yalta that the status guo in Outer Mongolia be preserved, 
meaning that the Mongolian People's Republic should be 
recognized. In fact, of course, it represented no real 
concession, since Communist control over the people made 
the ou~e of a plebescite a foregone conclusion. 
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Sino-Soviet administration of the Manchurian railway system, 
he left the security of the railway to the Chinese and 
agreed not to make use of it to transport Russian troops 
except during hostilities with Japan. Finally, on the 
joint use of the Port Arthur area, Stalin agreed to leave 
the problem of civil administration in Chinese hands. 
In the guise of nationalists, the Chinese Communists 
made their contribution to this effort to convince Chiang 
Kai-shek and the United States that Communist revolutionism 
356 
was a dormant issue in the East. Obviously on instructions 
from Marshal Rodion Malinovski, the commander of the Red 
Army in Manchuria, Mao Tee-tung responded affirmatively to 
an American offer to mediate the civil war and, on August 28, 
4 1945, flew to Chungking to begin negotiations. Though a 
final settlement was not achieved after seven months of bar-
gaining, a formal truce was signed on January 10, 1946. In 
the meantime, Chinese Communist spokesmen engaged in the 
familiar practice of emphasizing the purely national and 
democratic character of their aims. One went so far as to 
threaten anyone who would attempt to introduce communism 
into China at that time: 
The Communist Party's program for China at 
present is one of democratic capitalist devel-
4cf. The New York Times, August 29, 1945, p. 1. 
opment, based on state, private and cooperative 
enterprise •••• 
The program of the Chinese Communists is 
comparable to the political and economic con-
cepts in the United States at the time of Jef-
ferson and Lincoln. The Chinese Communist Party 
maintains no liaison with the Russian Communist 
Party or any other foreign Communist party. 
Considering that true communism is not suited 
to China in the present stage of political and 
economic development, the Chinese Communist Party 
would oppose any party that attempted to intro-
duce communism of the classical or Russian pat-
tern into China. • • • 5 
Based on this combined Russian and Chinese Communist 
effort to make Communism as respectable as the philosophies 
of Jefferson and Lincoln, Stalin gently prodded the United 
States on the question of withdrawing from China. On Novem-
ber 6, 1945, Izvestiia expressed concern lest the American 
troops stationed in China complicate the settlement of the 
civil war by lending inadvertent encouragement to Chiang 
Kai-shek in his discussions with the Chinese Communists. 6 
And the matter was broached formally by Molotov at the Mos-
cow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, with 
a tone of urgency that irritated Secretary of State Byrnes.7 
However, when the latter raised the issue at a meeting with 
Stalin, the Soviet leader qualified the insistence of his 
5~uoted in Ibid., December 5, 1945, p. 
6rzvestiia, November 6, 1945, p. 4. 
7cf. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 227. 
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Foreign Minister with the explanation that it was not to 
the presence of American troops in China he objected, but 
rather to the possibility that Chiang Kai-shek would lose 
prestige at home for the reason of seeming to rely on the 
8 
-support of a foreign power. Though transparent, this 
excuse was consistent with the general Russian display of 
concern for national rights. In the meantime, excuses 
were found for delaying the withdrawal of the Red Army 
from Manchuria. 9 
The situation in Korea was different than Chinats. 
Because Korea had been a part of the Japanese Empire for 
more than three decades, there was no central government 
to which Soviet offers of friendship and assistance could 
be directed. However, there were other factors favorable 
to the Russian purpose and methods. For one thing, Korea 
presented a promising field for Communist propaganda. Con-
sidering the widespread illiteracy and the years of suffer-
ing under Japants imperalistic domination and exploitation, 
the Korean people could be expected to respond to the type 
of patriotic appeals Communism had to offer. For another 
thing, Soviet access to Korea had been established in ad-
vance; the Red Army had been assigned the task of accept-
8ar. Ibid., p. 228. 
9ar. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 247. 
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ing the surrender of the Japanese armies north of the thir-
ty-eighth parallel by the Supreme Allied Commander in the 
Pacific, General MacArthur. 1° Finally, there were few na-
tive politicians with experience in Korea, and no Korean 
government-in-exile enjoyed the recognition of the Allies. 
This setting undoubtedly prompted high expectations in 
Moscow. 
On August 14, 1945, with Japanese control over the 
Korean peninsula completely shattered, and with the United 
States Army still absent from the scene, the Red Army com-
mander led a familiar procession into Korea. In addition 
to his own troops, he brought with him a Korean rrnational 
liberation·armyrr and the nucleus of a "national governmentn, 
both composed of Korean refugees who had fled to Russia 
after the First World War. 11 Most of the returning Koreans 
were not Communists, but the customary sprinkling of Com-
munists and fellow-travelers provided Mos~ow with the means 
for exercising the necessary degree Of direction. And be-
hind them, of course, the Red Army remained ready to give 
effect to their wishes. 
Communist propagandists naturally took full advantage 
of the opportunity to heap credit on the Soviet Union for 
liberating Korea. Organized demonstrations of welcome paved 
10cf. Beloff, op. cit., pp. 155-156. 
11cf. Dailin, op. cit., pp. 255-257. 
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the procession of the Red Army down to the thirty-eighth 
. 12 
parallel. And other tasks were performed as well. Very 
quickly, "people's committeesn were organized throughout 
Korea to handle civil administration at the local leve1.13 
Then 1 on September 6, 1945, just two days before the first 
American troops landed in Korea, a Congress of People's Com-
mittees was convened in Seoul. It proclaimed a "Korean 
People's Republic", appointed a provisional commission to 
draw up a constitution, and set March 31, 1946 as the date 
on which a general election would be held.14 Dr. Lyuh Woon 
I 
Reung, a non-Communist, provided the whole effort with its 
11nationalistrr character. 
Stalin apparently intended to confront the late-
arriving Americans with a fait accompli, following the pat-
tern employed in Eastern Europe. But this time the ruse 
failed to work. The United States flatly rejected the 
authority of the Congress of People's Committees; and, when 
General John Hodge arrived on the scene on September 8, 
1945, he eliminated the local ttpeople's committeesn south 
of the thirty-eighth parallel altogether. Not surprisingly, 
the Korean Communists called this a blatant disregard for 
12cf. ~.,·p. 259. 
13cf. E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in 
Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 42. 
14cf. The New York Times, September 11, 1945, p. 9. 
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the Korean right to national self-determination and demanded 
the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops.15 
But Stalin reacted differently. Though undoubtedly 
disappointed for having failed to prevent the United States 
from exercising its prerogatives in Korea, he decided to 
wait for a more opportune moment to make use of his own 
national-liberation movement as a spearhead for unification. 
Consequently, he accepted the American action without pro-
test and played the role of one who was anxious to cooperate 
with everyone interested in the fate of Korea. At the Mos-
cow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, for 
example, he proposed the establishment of a four-power 
trustee-ship ovev Korea and the creation of a provisional 
Korean government that would assume power at that time. 
Also, he agreed to the creation of a joint Soviet-American 
commission to facilitate the economic reunificati·on of the 
country.16 
By this method,: the Soviet dictator undoubtedly hoped 
to depict himself as still faithful to the principles of the 
wartime alliance and sympathetic to Korean national aspira-
- tiona. But, judging by later events, it is also likely 
that he didn't expect his proposals and agreement to serve 
15 Gt. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 261-262. 
16 Cfo Byrnes, op. cit., p. 222. 
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any other ruture purpose than a basis upon which disagree-
ments could be founded in order to prevent a settlement 
of the Korean issue on any but Soviet terms.17 
The most perplexing problem that Stalin faced in his 
early postwar effort to limit American influence in the Far 
East occurred in Japan. The chief obstacle in this case 
consisted of the adamant insistence of the United States to 
possess an almost exclusive right to occupy the Japanese 
18 
main islands and execute the terms of surrender. This, 
of course, eliminated the possibility of using the Red 
Army as an instrument of policy, as was being done in China 
and Korea. Furthermore, the absence of a central Japanese 
government and the depression of Japanese nationalism under 
the impact of total defeat precluded a basis for conducting 
an effective propaganda campaign ror local favor. As a 
result, the Soviet dictator tried to make use of the nation-
al idea in another, though not unfamiliar, way. Following 
the pattern established during the war, he based his claim 
to a greater voice in Japan's affairs on a defense of 
Russia's national interests; on the contention that anal-
liance between sovereign states obligates each to respect 
17 Cf. below, p. 
18For a description of the American policy, Cf. Deane, 
op. cit., pp. 278-279; United States Department of State, 
Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 75. 
the interests, and reward the contributions, of the rest. 
In this connection, Stalin automatically accepted an 
American invitation to join with the United States, Britain, 
and China to create a ten-power advisory commission to 
19 
assist in the execution of the surrender terms in Japan. 
It seemed an easy way to satisfy his desire to gain· a voice 
in Japanese affairs without sacrificing the appearance of 
cooperativeness. But he changed to a more forceful tack 
soon after. A British objection to the American proposal 
because India was not to be included on the commission, and 
because the commission's powers were to be advisory only --
offered the opportunity to be slightly more forceful without 
appearing singularly obstructive. And the Communist dicta-
tor was probably hopeful that a beneficial alliance with 
the British on this point could be developed. 
The first sign of Soviet obdurateness appeared in 
September, 1945, at the Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting 
in London. Molotov began it by lodging a complaint against 
the American occupation policy in Japan. His contention 
was that the rapid demobilization of the Japanese Army 
would result in an early renascence of militarism in Japan, 
20 
and thus posed a serious problem to Soviet Russia. 
1 9cf. B it 213 yrnes, op. c ., p. • 
20cf. Ibid., p. 214. 
However, the Soviet Foreign Minister did not explain why 
he thought rapid demobilization was more conducive to mili-
tarism than a slower process. Instead, he went on to pre-
sent what was his main point. This consisted of a proposal 
that an Allied Control Council, similar to the one in 
Germany, be .created to carry out the terms of surrender in 
Japan. To underscore the point, Molotov temporarily with-
drew Moscow's consent to participate in the Far Eastern 
21 
Advisory Commission. 
When this Soviet effort was rebuffed, Stalin added 
his own voice to the controversy. Speaking in Moscow, and 
in a manner suggesting the attitude of an extreme nation-
alist, the Communist dictator offered a version of the war 
in the Pacific that made it appear as though Russia alone 
had defeated Japan and then demanded that the Allies res-
pect Soviet fears over the possibility of resurgent Japa-
nese militarism. He also included a pointed reminder that 
• American, British, and French hostility toward Russia back 
in 1918 had encouraged the Japanese to invade Siberia. 22 
Shortly thereafter, the Soviet representative in Tokyo, 
Lieutenant-General Kuzma Derevianko, was recalled to Moscow. 
Stalin explained this with the statement that it was beneath 
21cf. Ibid. 
22cf. Pravda, September 17, 1945, p. 1. 
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the dignity o~ the Soviet Union to be treated as a 
satellite rather than an A11y. 23 
After ~urther negotiation, spiced by new demands on 
behal~ o~ Soviet Russia's national interests, a ~our-power 
Allied Council ~or Japan was created at the end o~ 1945. 
However, it was not the rr control 11 council that Stalin 
sought. Like the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, to which 
approval was given once again, the Council's role was to be 
a very limited one, ·permitting the United States to do what-
24 
ever it wanted without serious inter~erence. Soviet 
acceptance was probably prompted by the realization that 
it was the most to be gained under the circumstances, and 
by the expectation that it would serve as a convenient 
rostrum ~or disputing with the United States and possibly 
stirring up anti-American resentment in Japan. 
It is worthwhile to mention here that the customary 
supporting role in the Soviet e~~ort to create a respectable 
national image was played by the Japanese Communist Party. 
Its leaders, Tokuda and Shiga, were released by the Ameri-
cans ~rom eighteen years o~ imprisonment to become virtu-
23c~. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 216. 
24The American Supreme Commander's power to issue 
all orders ~or the implementation o~ the surrender terms 
and the occupation and control o~ Japan was in ~act pro-
tected by the veto power in the Allied Council and the 
Far Eastern Advisory Commission. C~. Ibid., p. 218. 
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ally the only local politicians who could deny convincingly 
any responsibility for Japanese militarism. Before any 
other parties could effect the transition to democracy, 
they reorganized the Communist Party, publicly welcomed 
the American occupation, staged demonstrations on behalf 
of democratic development in Japan, and naturally dis-
claimed all ties with Communist parties abroad, especially 
with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Such an 
effort as this 11 ••• tended to create generally the im-
pression that the Communists constituted the mainstay of 
democracy in Japan.n25 Moscow could not have hoped for a 
better display of political respectability on the part of 
its Japanese followers. 
The range of the early postwar Soviet interest in 
Asia also included the colonial issue; the purpose being to 
dislodge the British, French, and Dutch from their colonial 
holdings. In this case also, Stalin's method was note-
worthy for its moderation and caution. Conspicuously absent 
were the traditional Communist polemics against Western 
colonialism and the overt encouragement of local Asian ~a-
tionalist movements. Not even the existence of a strong, 
Communist-led nationalist movement in French Indo-China, 
25Rodger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: 
International Communism in Action 1919-19 1 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1952 , p. 9. 
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and an even stronger Indonesian nationalist movement in the 
Dutch East Indies, provided sufficient cause for jeopard-
izing the carefully constructed image of Communist respect-
26 
ability. The main effort in this respect centered on a 
proposal to solve the colonial problem by placing all 
colonies under temporary United Nations trusteeship and 
27 thus preparing them for eventual independence. Its basis 
apparently was in a hope that the rising momentum of nation-
alism in the colonies and an evident reluctance of the 
United States to help in the restoration of--the pre-war 
empires would make. it seem reason~ble ·to the British, French 
and Dutch. 28 
26The situation in Indo-China was an interesting one, 
since the leader of the nationalist movement there was none 
other than the Communist Ho Chi-minh. Earlier, as we have 
seen, Ho had preferred to pursue a revolutionary policy 
when Moscow's interests had dictated the opposite. (Cf. above, 
p. ) While the evidence is scant, considering that the 
Soviet press paid almost no attention to Indo-China in these 
early months, it is reasonable to assume that Stalin must 
have spent some uneasy moments thinking about the possibili-
ties there. 
27cf. The New York Times, September 2, 1945, p. 15. 
28 . . . Stalin appa~ently wa8 ~~~o cuunt1ng on American 
writers l~ke Owen Lat~~more, ~he Pac~f~c Director of ~he w~r­
time U.S. uffice of War Inrormation, ~o provide unwi~~1ng 
assistance to the Soviet cause in the form of recommenaat1ons 
for a policy in the Far East. A review of Lattimore's 
book, Solution in As~a (Bos~on: Little, Brown and Oo.; 
1945), underscored h~s proposal tn~t ~ne United States 
sho~d play an active role in liberating the colonies. 
Cf. New Times, No. 13, December 1, 1945, pp. 29-31. 
The trusteeship plan for the colonies, however, 
failed to win acceptance; and Stalin resorted to slightly 
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more aggressive tactics. For example, in the United Nations, 
the Soviet delegate chided the Western Powers for refusing 
29 
to honor the Indonesian quest for self-determination. In 
addition, one Soviet writer accused the United States of 
setting a new style of colonialism in the Philippines, which 
he described as a facade of sovereignty screening continued 
economic imperialism. 30 .Another writer reproved the British 
for what was termed the paradox of India's membership in 
the United Nations while lacking the right of national self-
determination.31 But this was the extent of the pressure 
exerted. Evidently concerned about the Soviet interests 
elsewhere in Asia and in Europe, the Communist dictator 
elected to wait for a more opportune moment before trying 
the extreme anti-colonial propaganda he ~as keeping tempo-
rarily hidden. 
29af. The New York Times, December 25, 1945, p. 12. 
3°of. E. Zhukov, "Porazheniie Iaponskogo imperializma 
i natsionalno-osvobiditelnaia borba narodov vostochnoi Aziin 
(ttThe Defeat of Japanese Imperialism and the National-
Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of East Asian), Bolshevik, 
No. 24, December, 1945, pp. 86-87. What the Soviet leader 
obviously feared at this point was that the independence of 
a colony would not have the effect of cutting off its 
economic resources from Western capitalism. 
3lof. A. Dyakov, 11 India After the War,u New Times, 
No. 2, January 15, 1946, pp. 10-13. 
Stalin Changes Tactics. In 1946 and 1947, Soviet 
policy in Asia exhibited its second phase, characterized by 
a more aggressive attempt to force the United States and the 
European colonial powers off the continent. The decision to 
change tactics was prompted partly by the evident limita-
tions of the moderate policy. Chiang Kai-shek had not re-
sponded positively to the Soviet effort to revive the "old 
spirit 11 of Sino-Soviet friendship, the United States had not 
retreated a bit on the Japanese and Korean issues, and the 
plan to put all colonies under United Nations trusteeship 
had failed to win approval. But the new intensity of the 
Soviet effort-stemmed from other sources as well. One was 
Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, 
which called for an anti-Soviet Anglo~American alliance. 
Another was the signature of the five European peace t.rea.o;; 
ties on December 11, 1946. And a third was the announcement 
of the Truman Doctrine and the Mapahall Plan in the spring 
of 1947. What these events meant was that Stalin no longer 
needed to limit himself by the hope of exploiting the war-
time spirit of collaboration, or by concern for the pro-
tection of Communist interests in Eastern Europe. 
Though tougher, the new Soviet policy in the East 
continued to rely on nationalism for the achievement of 
its goals. The change consisted of a revival of some of the 
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old tactical devices conceive~ and applied by Lenin. Open 
encouragement or the nationalist movements in the colonies 
to press ror independence, attempts to compel reluctant 
nationalists in the independent states to assert their 
sovereign rights against the West, and vigorous assertions 
on behalf of Russia's national security were the principal 
features of the new erfort to rorce the Western Powers out 
or the East and then deny them access to the resources 
available there. 
The new Soviet policy toward China, ror example, was 
reminiscent or Lenin's policy toward Iran back in 1920.32 
It was based on the premise that Chiang Kai-shek could be 
coerced into a more agreeable frame of mind, or possibly 
could be rorced out of power by those Kuomintang·elements 
which still wished to achieve an·agreement with both Soviet 
Russia and the United States. With this in mind, Stalin 
threatened to keep the Red Army in Manchuria until all 
American troops had been withdrawn from China. He added 
to this a warning that all Japanese property in Manchuria 
might be seized as war booty.33 But he retreated rrom this 
stand soon after in the face of anti-Russian demonstrations 
in several Chinese cities and a stern note of protest from 
32cf. b a ove, pp. 
33cf. Beloff, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
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the United States. 34 For these reasons, he promised to 
withdraw from Manchuria within three months and offered 
the Chinese partial ownership of the Japanese assets, in 
some cases as much as fifty-one percent. 35 
This did not, however, terminate the Russian effort 
to turn Chiang against the United States, or to force him 
out of power altogether. Other methods were employed. 
· One consisted of a rising tone of impatience with the 
Chinese policy; expressed chiefly through the Soviet press. 
On April 10, 1946, for example, Izvestiia denounced what 
it termed a ncampaign of lies 11 about Soviet Russia that was 
being waged by ttreactionary elements 11 in the Kuomintang. 36 
Later, these same Chinese "elementsn were charged with col-
lusion with the United States to keep American forces in 
China as protection against the formation of a truly demo-
cratic government. 37 And before the year was over, Pravda 
added the accusation that the real American interest in 
China was imperialistic, that American monopolists, with 
the assistance of reactionary Chinese, were seeking to turn 
34 Cf. Dallin, op. cit., pp. 316,319. 
35cf. Chiang Chung-Cheng (Chiang Kai-Shek), Soviet 
Russia in China: A Summin -U at Sevent (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Cudahy, 1957 , p. 1 9. 
36rzvestiia, April 10, 1946, p. 4. 
37cf. Pravda, June 26, 1946, p. 3; September 15, 
1946, p. 4. 
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38 the country into a semi-colony. The Communist Party news-
paper also decried a Sino-American commercial agreement, 
· made on November 4, 1946, as a return to t~e old system o~ 
unequal treaties: 
The conclusion of the American-Chinese 
agreement represents a new example of the re-
treat of the Kuomintang Government before the 
onslaught of the American monopolies. For the 
security of its anti-democratic regime, the 
Kuomintang Government is willing to sacrifice 
the vital interests of the Chinese people. 39 
Throughout ~1947, these same charges were repeated by 
Moscow, and, with a view to turning the Chinese against the 
Americans, particular attention was devoted to creating an 
image of the United States as dangerously imperialistic. 
On one occasion, the United States was alleged to seek the 
reinstatement of Japan as the dominant military power in 
40 Asia.. On another, ttproof" of current American intentions 
., .:gresented in the form of a detailed history of their imperi-
41 
alistic interventions in the Far East. · 
The Chinese _Communists were also used by Stalin in 
this connection. When the Red Army withdrew from Manchuria, 
38Pravda, December 19, 1946, p. 3. 
39Ibid. 
40 Of. M. Markov, 11 American Policy in the Far East," 
New Times, No. 15, April 11, 1947, pp. 13-16 •. 
4laf. v. Avarin, "A New Stage in American Interven-
tion in Ohina, 11 New Times, No. 46, November 12, 1947, pp. 
-10-14. 
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the schedule of its departure was deliberately withheld 
from Chiang Kai-shek in order to permit Communist troops 
from Yenan to move in; and fighting between the Communist 
42 
and Kuomintang forces followed. At the negotiating table 
also, the Chinese Communists resorted to obstructionist 
tactics. Chiang Kai-shek recounts that his efforts to 
achieve a cease-fire in Manchuria in the summer of 1946, 
and a settlement of the larger civil war issue, were met 
by Chou En-lai's demands that the authority of the Commu-
nists in Manchuria be recognized and that the United States 
43 be asked to leave China immediately. This brought the 
negotiations to a standstill. Then, in the fall, additional 
Communist demands to the effect that the Kuomintang govern-
ment should be reorganized, with the Communists having a 
decisive voice in both its reorganization and subsequent 
policies, caused the discussions to break down altogether 
and prompted the United States to abandon its effort to 
44 
mediate the civil war. 
Throughout 1947, the Chinese Communists continued 
their forceful tactics. Despite military defeats in south-
42stalin's explanation for the secret withdrawal was 
that the simultaneous presence of Kuomintang and Russian 
troops in the Manchurian oities might generate friction.and 
cause incidents. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., p. 314. 
43chiang Chung-Cheng, op. cit., pp. 164-165. 
44 Cf. Ibid., pp. 175-178. 
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ern Manchuria, they managed. to retain control of the rural 
areas in the north. Furthermore, they echoed the Soviet 
attack against Chinese 11reaotionariesn and .American rrimpe-
ria1ismrr and promoted popular demonstrations against the 
45 
continued presence of Americans in China. 
Stalin, of course, abetted the Chinese Communists. 
Besides the advantage of the unannounced withdrawal of the 
Red .Army from Manchuria, he gave to them large supplies of 
arms and ammunition that had been taken from the Japan-
46 Further, the Soviet began to distinguish be-ese. press 
tween the "Kuominta.ng .Army 11 and the Communist uunited 
47 Democratic .Army 11 in its reports on China. But the Soviet 
dictator was careful to allow just the suspicion of compli-
city, without providing the die-hard anti-Soviet elements 
inside the Kuomintang with a basis for convincing the rest 
48 that the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 should be renounced. 
45af. Ibid., pp. 186-187; United States Department of 
State, United States Relations with China (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1949),pp.265-267. 
46rt was impossible to prove that the Red Army turned 
over the captured equipment to the Communists. However, 
Beloff 1 s conclusion on this point appears most reasonable: 
n ••• it was these arms which must supply the reason why 
the Communist forces, so poorly armed before the autumn of 
1945, appeared to be so well provided in the subsequent 
campaigns. n Op_.. cit., p. 55. 
47 Of. Pravda, July 4, 1946, p. 4. 
48Both Moscow and the Chinese Communists repeatedly 
denied the evidence of connivance between them. Of. Beloff, 
op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
,·· 
Under different circumstances, he might have promoted a 
diplomatic break to add to the tension. But the prospect 
of drawing the United States wholeheartedly into the civil 
war on Chiang's side as a result provided the chief deter-
ent.49 
Toward Japan, Stalin's new forcefUlness was manifes-
ted.:.on the basis of expressed fears for Russia's national 
security and a developing concern for the sovereign rights 
of the.Japanese. For example, frequent and sharp criticism 
was directed at the United States occupation policy, which 
was depicted as seeking to recreate Japan in the form of an 
American base against Soviet Russia. The preservation of 
the Emperor, the failure to indict as war criminals the 
leaders of Japants great economic combines, and the slow 
process of the trial of the major war criminals was offered 
by Moscow as evidence of an American effort to cater to 
powerful Japanese elements in order to turn them into anti-
Soviet allies. 50 In addition, General MacArthur was accused 
of repudiating the Potsdam Declaration, of disregarding the 
advice of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, and attempt-
4 9chou En-lai was undoubtedly echoing Moscow's sen-
timents when, on September 8, 1946, he expressed the fear 
that American aid to Chiang Kai-shek would be increased if 
Soviet Russia openly threatened the Nationalist regime. 
Cf. The New York Times, September 9, 1946, p. 10. 
5°c:r. M. Markov, "The Approaching Trial of Major 
Japanese War Criminals," New Times, No. 8, April 15, 1946, 
pp. 7-10. 
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51 ing to lighten Japan's reparations responsibilities. 
There were also charges that the United States was reviving 
Japanese militarism and, in this connection, was training 
52 Japanese pilots in the United States Army Air Force. 
Besides this direct assault against the United 
States, Stalin also opened a campaign or direct appeals to 
Japanese sentiment, intended to stimulate nationalism and 
direct it against the Americans. In this connection, the 
Soviet propagandists centered their attention on the idea 
that the United States was not only interested in turning 
Japan into·an anti-Soviet military bastion in the Far East, 
but sought to preserve it as a colony ror economic exploita-
tion as well. An alleged railure to provide sufficient 
work, food, and shelter for the Japanese masses was de~ 
scribed as illustrative of a new era of imperialistic ex-
ploitation, and the same objective was said to be implied 
in the American refusal to undertake an extensive land 
reform program and to provide relief for the small business-
man from the pressure of monopolistic capitalism. 53 
In Xorea, the main objective of the Soviet dictator 
during 1946 and 1947 was to protect the Communist foothold 
5laf. "Anniversary of the Victory over Japan," New 
Times, No. 17, September 8, 1946, pp •. 1-2. 
52cf. The New York Times, December 5, 1946, p. 36. 
53af. v. Avarin, ttThe Situation in Japan,n New Times, 
No. 9, May 1, 1946, pp. 12-18. · 
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north of the thirty-eighth parallel by preventing the im-
plementation of the agreements made in Moscow. His method 
in this case was very similar to that followed in Eastern 
Europe after the Yalta Agreement. For example, at the 
first conference of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, 
held in Seoul from January 16 to February 5, 1946, nothing 
of significance was achieved on the issue of Korea 1 s eco-
nomic unification. 54 The Russian contention was that the 
creation of a provisional Korean national government must 
precede it; which, of course, meant that obstructionism was 
to be accomplished without impairing the Communist image as 
defender of Korean national rights. To foster this illu-
sion, Moscow issued a direct appeal to Korean national 
sentiment, arguing that it had prevented a United States 
plan to place Korea under trusteeship for as long as ten 
years and to exclude a provisional national government. 55 
At the second meeting of the Joint Commission, which 
began on March 20, 1946, the head of the Soviet delegation, 
General Terenti Shtikov, presented Stalin's plan for the 
creation of a Korean government. Following a familiar pat-
tern, it sought to eliminate in advance practically every 
54
cf. United States Department of State, Korea's In-
dependence (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1947), pp. 3-4. · 
55cf. Izvestiia, January 25, 1946, p. 2. 
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anti-Communist Ko~ean politician. Aware that only Koreans 
north of the thirty-eighth parallel and Communists and fel-
low travelers south of it were on record as favoring trus-
teeship, acceptance of the Moscow agreement from the time 
it had been announced was made a qualification for partici-
56 pation in the government. Hence, when the head of the 
American delegation, General Hodge, persuaded the Korean 
nationalists in the south to accept trusteeship for the 
sake of organizing a provisional regime, Shtikov refused to 
allow their participation on the ground that they were al-
ready disqualified. After six weeks of fruitless negotia-
tion on this issue, the Commission adjourned sine die. 
The Soviet explanation for the breakdown of the 
negotiations was carefully spelled out for the benefit of 
the Koreans in the American zone. The United States was 
held responsible on two counts. For one, the American mili-
tary commander was charged with giving preference to reac-
tionary elements in the formation of the provisional govern-
ment. This was attrib~ted to an American aim to turn Korea 
57 into a colony. The second, related to the first, was that 
the United States refused to permit the formation of a 
government because it wanted to determine the character of 
56cf. G. M. McCune, Korea Today (London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1950), pp. 279-281. 
57cf. Izvestiia, May 15, 1946, p. 4. 
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Korea's economy before any Koreans were allowed a voice in 
their own affairs.58 Moscow naturally claimed that its only 
interest in Korea was to prevent it from falling under 
new imperialistic domination. 
Stalin probably intended this to be the terminal 
point of the Joint Commission's function; unless, of course, 
the United States would prove willing to pay for economic 
unification by accepting a Korean government dominated by 
Communists and loyal to Moscow. More than a year later, 
however, he did agree to another meeting. He was prompted 
then not by any greater hope for success, bu.t rather by a 
need to forestall an American plan to provide import~t 
assistance for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy 
south of the thirty-eighth parallel. This was evident in 
his condition for the meeting that the implementation of 
the American plan be suspended until a provisional Korean 
government was established.59 The United States agreed to 
this, apparently hopeful that a compromise could be 
achieved.· 
What was to be definitely the final meeting of the 
Joint Commission opened on May 21, 1947, and lasted for five 
months. For the sake of appearing agreeable, the Soviet 
delegate consented to admit all Korean political leaders to 
58cf. Pravda, June 3, 1946, p. 4. 
59cf. Dallin, op, cit., p. 304. 
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participate in the formation of the provisional government, 
provided they presented written support of the Moscow 
60 decision on the trusteeship question. This seemed like 
a Communist concession to the American position. However, 
to avoid the possibility of a government in which the Kor-
ean Communists would play a subordinate role, the Soviet 
delegate demanded that the northern and southern zones be 
61 
represented equally in the government. 
Inasmuch as southern Korea contained more than twice 
as many people as were located in the north, the United 
States rejected this new condition. Stalin·probably ex-
pected that it would. And he probably anticipated a nega-
tive reply to his more radical suggestion, made in Septem-
62 
ber, 1947, that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea. 
When the United States refused, the Soviet leader used this 
as a pretext for announcing his decision to cease member-
ship in the Joint Commission. Thus, 9n October 21, 1947, 
all members of the Soviet delegation left Seoul. 
Though he didn't expect the United States to accept 
the suggestion, Stalin probably would have welcomed a with-
drawal of' all foreign troops from Korea. During the twenty 
60cr. United States Department of State, op. cit., 
pp. 8-10. 
61cf. Belof'f, op. cit., p. 169. 
62cf. The New York Times, September 27, 1947, p. 1. 
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months of inconclusive bickering, he had made significant 
progress in preparation for the day when the Americans 
would in fact leave. By this time, the Soviet zone had 
been given an almost completely sovereign character. A 
provisional "People's Committee of Northern Korean had been 
created as the central organ of authority and a number of 
economic and social reforms -- including land reform, na-
tionalization of large industries, and encouragement of 
trade unions-- had been carried out. 63 In addition, in 
mid-1946, the Communist Party had been merged with the 
fellow travelling People 1 s Party to form the Korean Workers,. 
Party, which, in typical Communist fashion, provided the 
nucleus and motive force for a broader Korean Democratic 
National Front. 
Completing this postwar Korean version of the old 
Communist nationalist-revolutionary committee was its mili-
tary force, composed of more than a hundred thousand Rus-
sian trained and armed members of the People's Militia. 
Its strength far exceeded that of the fifty thousand police-
men in south Korea. 64 It goes without saying that the 
People 1 s Militia would be transformed into a Korean "nation-
63 . 
Initially, Dallin writes, the land reform program 
in the Soviet zone made a deep and favorable impression in 
the .American zone, especially amont the sizeable rural 
population. Cf. Dallin, op. cit., p. 290. 
64 Cf. Ibid., p. 292. 
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al liberation armyn once the Ameriean forces had been 
withdrawn. 
For his second stage assault against the British, 
French, and Dutch posi ti.ons in Asia, Stalin shifted from 
moderate anti-colonialism to anti-imperialism on a broad 
scale. Mandates, protectorates, and sovereign Asian eoun-
tries in which the West enjoyed economic privileges were 
added to the colonies as prime objects of the Soviet liber-
ating mission. The new approach to the colonial issue, for 
example, embodied increased criticism of the colonial powers, 
with the British and Dutch getting most of the abuse. The 
former were taken to task for their 11 • • • desire to 
restore the former colonial regime (in the Far East) as 
early as possible.rr65 And both the British and Dutch were 
berated for their joint effort against the Indonesians: 
During the (past) five months the effort to 
reestablish Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia by 
force proved fruitless, and the role played by the 
British armed forces as instruments for the restora-
tion of Dutch imperialism has been giving rise to 
increasing and deserved criticism. 66 
Criticism of the French in Indo-China was also 
67 
expressed, though in a more reserved manner. Continued 
65P! Polyak, 11 Problems of the British Empire," New 
Times, No. 10, May 15, 1946, p. 13. Of~ also, Pravda, 
August 7, 1946, p. 4. 
66A. Guber, 11 The Situation in Indonesia," New Times, 
No. 4, February 15, 1946, p·. 7. 
67af. A. Guber, nFrench Indo-Ohina,n New Times, No. 
14, Ju~y 15, 1946, pp. 20-26. 
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restraint in this case was dictated by a need to avoid too 
close an identification 'between Moscow and the Communist 
leader of the Indo-Chinese nationalist movement, Ho Chi~ 
minh. In this particular phase of policy, Stalin aimed 
to win the confidence of the Asian nationalist leaders, 
on which basis anti-~festern alliances between Communists 
68 
and nationalists could be founded. Thus his encouragement 
of their efforts to achieve independence had to be as free 
of Communist revolutionary sentiment as Lenin's had been. 
Within each colony, native Communists were assigned 
the task of collaborating actively with all anti-imperialist 
elements. They were to help in the achievement of indepen-
dence and to gain a voice in the nationalist governments 
that would follow. National liberation was to take prece-
dence temporarily over the Communist revolutionary interest. 
However, in this connection, Stalin's strategy encountered 
two serious obstacles. One was contained in a cool recep-
tion that the Communist o'ffers of friendship evoked from 
nationalists generally. In Indonesia, for example, the 
Communist leader, Tan Malaka, organized a npeople's Front" 
·. 
on February 1, 1946 in an effort to persuade the nationa-
lists to take more forceful action in their negotiations 
68cf. E. Zhukov, nvelikaia oktiabrskaia sotsialist-
icheskaia revolutsiia i kolonialnii vostokn ("The Great 
October Socialist Revolution and the Colonial Easttt), 
Bolshevik, No. 20, October, 1946, pp. 38-47. In this arti-
cle, the Russian revolution is described as similar to the 
383 
with the Dutch~ Leas .than a mo~th later, however, he w~a 
arrested by them on a charge of having attempted to dis-
rupt the Indonesian state and was placed in prison without 
69 
a trial. A similar difficulty was encountered in Malaya, 
where Chinese Malayans, diaturbe~ by worsening relations 
between Moscow and Chungking, refused to transfer the war-
time cooperation against the Japanese to a similar effort 
against the Britiah. 70 And almost the same problem arose 
in Burma.71 What the nationalists obviously feared was a 
repetition of 1926-1927. It was, of· course, not diffi·cul t 
to recall that the Communist offers of assistance in the 
past had been nothing more than an expedient device, under 
which lay revolutionary motives. 
The se.cond obstacle encountered took the form of a 
left deviationist tendency among some of India's Communists. 
This crystallized in the summer of 1946, following an at-
tempt by R. Palme Dutt, the British Communist leader, to 
bring Indian Communist policy into line with Moscow's. 
During the spring, it had appeared that Dutt would be suc-
cessful, for his discussions with both the Communists and 
colonial rebellions for self-determination. 
69cf. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Left 
Wing in Southeast Asia (New York: William Sloane Associates, 
1950), pp. 176, 285. 
70Cf. ~., pp. 132, 134. 
71
cf. Ibid., p. 92. 
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the Indian nationalists gave promise of a fruitful alli-
72 
ance. But, in August, after Dutt had left for home, 
the radical wing of the Indian Communist Party b~gan to de-
mand that Communists should take the initiative and turn 
the national, anti-imperialist revolution into a socialist 
revolution.73 As a consequence, for the rest of 1946 and 
during 1947, the Indian Communists vacillated between sup-
port and criticism of the nationalistic Congress Party and 
thus failed to achieve the sort of alliance that Stalin 
74 
wanted. 
Elsewhere along Asia's southern periphery,- the Sta-
linist campaign against the Western powers also displayed 
new vigor during 1946 and 1947. One very interesting epi-
sode in this connection took place in Iran. There the So-
viet dictator attempted an almost exact duplication of a 
720ne of the leaders of the Indian Congress Party, 
Sardar Patel, who was noted for his past hostility to Com-
munism, responded to Dutt's overtures with"· •• full 
friendliness to the desirability of reconciliation with the 
Communists and letting·the past difficulties be bured.tt 
R. Palme Dutt, "Travel Notes Number 2, 11 Labour Monthly, 
XXViii, June, 1946, p. 188. 
73cf. Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, 
Communism in India (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1959), pp. 242-243. 
74The Soviet dictator refrained from overt interfer-
ence in the affairs of the Indian Communist Party, wishing 
to preserve its "nationalu character. However, Soviet com-
mentators did reveal displeasure in the form of references 
to the leaders of the Congress Party as rrleft-wing progres-
sives.rr Cf. Pravda, October 24, 1946, p. 3. 
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tactic employed earlier by Lenin. The opportunity was pre-
sented as a result of the joint Soviet-British military 
occupation of Iran since August, 1941, which had placed 
the northern part of the country under the control of the 
75 Red Army for the duration of the war plus six months. 
Following the old pattern, a revolt took place at the end 
of 1945 in the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan and a 
"National Government of Persian Azerbaijan" was proclaimed. 
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Headed by Sayed Jafar Peeshahvari, an Azerbaijanian Commu-
nist who had helped Kuchik Khan back in 1920, the revolution-
ary regime demanded natio~al autonomy. 76 The Red Army, of 
course, protected it against the Teheran government. 
Stalin's justification for the tight control exer-
cised by the Soviet forces over northern Iran was twofold. 
It was to defend the Russian oilfields in Baku against sabo-
tage by Fascist elements in Iran and to protect the national 
rights of the Azerbaijani an minority. His demands on be-
half of the rebellion naturally were sufficiently extreme 
to make sure that they wouldn't be accepted in Teheran.77 
In the meantime, he armed the rebels, began to encourage 
. 75cf. Winston s. Churchill, The Grand Alliance 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950), pp. 484-485. 
76cf. Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy (New 
York: Whittier Books, Inc., 1954), pp. 277-278. Fatemi 
offers the most complete and reliable description of the 
events in Iran available. 
77cf. Ibid., p. 295. 
revolutionary movements in such other provinces as Gilan, 
Za.njan, Qazvin, and Semnan, and sponsored a nKurdish 
Republic of Mahabad. tt 78 
During February and early March, 1946, the prospect 
for a Soviet success in Iran appeared bright. Due to the 
Russian pressure, and the demands of the Iranian Communists, 
organized in the Tudeh Party, a new government was created 
in Teheran at the end of January. Headed by Qavam-us Sal-
taneh, who was supposed to be pro-Russian, it represented 
an important step toward the goal of forcing the British 
out of Iran altogether. 79 Furthermore, in compliance with 
the wartime agreement, the British withdrew their armed 
forces from the country by March 2, thus leaving the way 
open for Stalin to apply even greater pressure in pursuit 
of his objective. 
Whatever hopes the Soviet dictator had in this re-
spect, however, were soon shattered. For one thing, the 
Qavam government proved decidedly less pro-Russian than 
expected. It refused to accept the Russian demands on 
behalf of the Azerbaijanian rebels. It also protested for-
78 Cf. Ibid., p. 286; Zygmunt Litynski, "Kurds in the 
Way, 11 The Commonweal, XLIV, August 30, 1946, pp. 473-476. 
19m his discussions with Qavam, Stalin attempted to 
convince the Iranian leader that Iran's economic develop-
ment depended on the liquidation of all British assets in 
the country. Cf. Fatemi, op. cit., p. 294. 
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mally against the presence of the Red Army on Iran's ter-
80 
ritory after the March 2 deadline. 
In reply to the demand that the Red Army be with-
drawn, Stalin announced that it would remain in Iran until 
the situation was clari~~ed. Then, for emphasis, he sent 
additional units, with tanks and planes, into Iran. The 
Soviet dictator may well have been preparing to put the 
Tudeh Party in power, for the Red Army moved to within 
twenty miles ot Teheran and remained there despite protests 
from Teheran, Washington, and London and a move to bring 
the issue before the Security Co~cil of the United Na-
tions.81 But then a second, more serious, obstacle to the 
Russian purpose appeared. On March-6, 1946, Stalin received 
what amounted to an ultimatum from President Truman, to the 
effect that American military and naval forces would be sent 
82 to Iran if the Red Army was not evacuated immediately. 
The Russian dictator knew that he could not challenge 
the American threat and therefore he retreated. The Red 
Army left Iran six weeks later. And though continued pres-
sure from Moscow delayed military action by the Teheran 
80cr. ~., p. 295. 
81cr. The New York Times, March 6, 1946, p. 3. 
82This note has not been made public; but its exist-
ence has been confirmed by President Truman. Cf. The New 
York Times, April 25, 1952, p. 4. 
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government against the rebels in Azerbaijan provincet they, 
too, had to be abandoned. In December, 1946, with American 
encouragement, Iranian troops advanced northward, forcing 
Peeshahvari and all other Communists to flee to Russia. 
Unlike Kuchik Khan, they did not attempt to test their 
strength against the Iranian Army. 
Elsewhere in the Near East, Soviet attention was 
directed to the task of cutting off the British and French 
from.the oil resources and preventing the United States 
from acquiring concessions. In this·connection, Communist 
propaganda encouraged Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqi, Saudi Arabi-
ans, and Egyptians to assert their sovereign rights against 
European and American imperialism •. They were warned, for 
example, that Britain intended to turn the Arab League into 
an instrument for the " • • protection of imperial commu-
nications, transport and oilfields throughout the whole 
83 
stretch of territory from Egypt to Basra.n Another warn-
ing was that Britain and the United States were cooperating 
for the purpose of a more complete penetration of the Near 
East for the sake of oil and would turn the governments in 
the region into secret police forces to combat the growth 
83K. Serezhin, ITThe Problems of the .Ar_ab East, n New 
Times, No. 3, February 1, 1946, p. 14. Cf. also, Izvestiia, 
May 30, 1946, p. 3. 
of democratic ·movements. 84 
In 1946, the Communist Parties in the Near East were 
still weak; but they performed their task well. On June 
28, 1946, Iraqi Communists led a worker-student demonstra-
tion in Baghdad against the presence of British troops in 
85 the country. In Egypt, a "Democratic Movement of Nation-
al Liberationn was the chief contribution of the Communists 
there. Its counterpart in Jordan was called uThe League 
. 86 
for National Liberation.n Except for their nuisance 
value, however, none of these efforts were of great impor-
tance to Moscow. The fact was that although Arab national-
ists generally had little respect for the· Western powers, 
their fear of Russia and Communism made them unreceptive 
to the offers of assistance put forth by Moscow. 
The opportunity for success was much more promising 
in the case of Palestine, since it was still a British man-
date. Pressure to force the British out could be exerted 
both within the country and through the United Nations. At 
the same time, however, the task was a complicated one, due 
to the bi-national character of Palestine's population and 
84cf. M. Kogan, nThe Contest for Oil in the Middle 
East," New Times, No. 18, September 15, 1946, pp. 8-11; 
The New York Times, June 1, 1946, p. 4. 
85cf. The New York Times, June 29, 1946, p. 7. 
86cf. Walter z .. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism 
in the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), 
pp. 44, 126. 
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the variety of solutions to the problem that appeared as 
a result. Among Arabs, opinion divided between indepen-
dence with limited Jewish immigration from Europe and union 
with a neighboring Arab state. Among Jews, some favored 
partition into separate Jewish and Arab states while others 
preferred a bi-national independent state with unlimited 
immigration. 87 
Stalin avoided the problem by merely demanding that 
the British be forced to give up their mandate. The Pales-
tinian Communists, organized on separate national bases, 
likewise were vague beyond the demand that the British get 
out. But difficulties-did arise in l947, when the Jewish 
Communists attempted to define a solution. They called'for 
an independent Arab-Jewish state, in which Jews would occupy 
88 
one-third of the key governmental posts. This was reject-
ed by their Arab counterparts. And then both were thrown 
into a state of confusion and disappointment when Moscow, 
seeing an opportunity to force the British out with the 
assistance of the United States, agreed to an American and 
Zionist plan to create separate Arab and Jewish states.89 
This helped to get the British out in 1948, but it left 
87cf. The New York Times, January 4, 1946, p. 17; 
January 23, l946, p. 17. 
88cf. Lacqueur, op. cit., p. ll3. 
89
cf. The New York Times, October 14, 1947, p. 3. 
the Palestinian Communists without any prestige whatever. 
While the Arabs were alienated altogether, the Zionists 
permitted the Jewish Communists to serve merely as an ad-
junct of their liberation movement. From Stalin's stand-
point, however, the effort had been a successful one, and, 
as one can judge from the record, it made little difference 
that the local Communists had suffered temporary setbacks. 
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Communism Takes the Offensive. Before 1947 was over, 
Stalin's postwar policy in Asia entered a third, and final, 
stage, becoming even more intensive than before. The So-
viet dictator changed again because the results he sought 
were far from realized and seemed unlikely to be realized 
on the existing basis. In China, Chiang Kai-shek remained 
as stubbornly pro-Western as before, while, in Korea and 
Japan, the United States still refused to bow to Russian 
demands and intimidations. Furthermore, President Truman's 
ultimatum on the Iranian issue, and his aid to Greece and 
Turkey, had made it clear that further territorial gains 
would be hard to win by purely diplomatic means. 
Equally frustrating had been the developments on the 
colonial issue. Independence had been achieved by the In-
dians, Pakistani, Ceylonese, and Burmese, and was being 
achieved by the Indonesians, without Communist participation. 
Consequently, the governments of these new states were being 
___ formed without Communist participation or influence. And, 
what wad even more disturbing, the new Asian governments 
were retaining close economic ties with the Western powers. 
This meant, of course, that Marxist-Leninist expectations 
on the colonial question were not being borne out by the 
facts; the independence of the colonies was not resulting 
in a complete severance of economic ties with the former 
colonial rulers. 
Of necessity, then, Stalin's new strategy went a 
step beyond Lenin's. Recognizing that the only way to out 
off the Western powers from Asia economically was to gain 
control of the Asian governments first, he assigned to the 
Communists the task of seizing power by revolutionary means. 
Henceforth, they were to wage a general offensive against 
imperialism, against both the Western powers in the remain-
ing colonies and the independent governments which favored 
the retention of close economic ties with the West. The 
keynote address in this connection was delivered by Andrei 
Zhdanov at the first meeting of the Cominform, in September, 
1947: 
The Communist Parties must therefore head the resis-
tance to the plans of imperialist expansion and ~g­
gression along every line. • • • They must rally 
their ranks and unite their efforts on the basis.of 
a common anti-imperialist and democratic platform 
and gather around them all the democratic and 
patriotic forces of the people. 90 
9°For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, 
No. 1, November 10, 1947, p. 4. 
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Three months later, the new tactical viewpoint was 
given added emphasis by E. Zhukov, the Soviet expert on 
Eastern affairs, who denounced the big bourgeoisie in Asia 
as having betrayed the national interests of their people 
91 by coming to terms with Western imperialism. The Indo-
nesian nationalists, on whose behalf Moscow had hitherto 
argued, were singled out as especially culpable on this 
score. The sharpness of the tactical shift was underscored 
also by Zhukov's inclusion of the Indo-Chinese bourgeoisie 
in the category of national traitors. This represented the 
first real encouragement to Ho Chi-minh offered by the So-
viet leadership in the postwar period. 
The precise character of the new Communist offensive 
in the East was determined by local needs and opportunities 
and thus varied from place to place. With respect to China, 
for example, it did not lead to an immediate diplomatic 
break between Moscow and the Kuomintang government. Fear 
of American intervention on the latter's behalf obviously 
92 
was the main factor of restraint. But, in a sharp depar-
ture from past practice, the Soviet leadership did begin to 
9lcf. E. Zhukov, "Obostrenie krizisa kolonialnoi 
sistemin (nThe Sharpening of the Crisis of the Colonial Sys-
tem"), Bolshevik, No. 23, December 15, 1947, pp. 51-64. 
92Evidence in this respect was provided by frequent 
accusations against American plans to intervene militarily 
in China. Of. Pravda, August 30, 1948, p. 4; September 27, 
1948, p. 3. . 
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show definite signs of bias on behalf of the Chinese Com-
munists. In the Russian press, a sharp increase in the. 
publicity of Communist military successes took place. Pro-
nouncements of the Chinese Communist leaders were promi-
nently displayed and articles on the organization of the 
"liberated areasn of China began to appear. 93 Also indica-
tive of Stalin's partiality was his refusal to accept an 
offer from the Kuomintang, in January, 1949, to act as a 
mediator in the civil war. Earlier, under conditions where-
in the Kuomintang enjoyed a clear military advantage, such 
an offer probably would have been accepted as a means to 
promote the Chinese Communist cause. However, by this time, 
the balanced of power had shifted, in fact, had almost re-
versed. In the previous fall, the Communist armies had cap-
tured Mukden, hundreds of thousands.of Chiang's troops, and 
a great quantity of American-made military equipment. Man-
churia was securely in Communist hands and the chances for 
a successful advance into north China proper was growing 
brighter by the day. 
Under the circumstances, the Soviet dictator res-
ponded with logical negativeness to the offer to act as me-
93cf. Pravda, January 6, 1948, p. 2; V. Vladimirova, · 
"The Struggle for Democracy in China,u New Times, No. 28, 
July 7, 1948, pp. 27-31; B. Pagirev, "A Book About China,n 
New Times, No. 31, July 28, 1948, pp. 28-31. 
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diator. Typically, he explained his refusal on the ground 
that the principle of non-intervention in the internal af-
fairs of other countries prohibited the Soviet Union from 
undertaking the task. 94 On January 19, 1949, however, 
such dedication to principle did not prevent Pravda fro~ 
printing the eight conditions of peace announced by Mao 
Tse-tung. 95 
In the meantime, the Chinese Communists pressed 
southward across China proper, taking Peking at the_end of 
January, 1949 and crossing the Yantse River three months 
later. Ostensibly, it was not a Communist revolution, but 
rather a national liberation movement, combining all true 
96 Chinese patriots in a struggle against imperialism. The 
nnationaln characrer of the offensive was emphasized by the 
Communists in statements promising to cooperate with all 
97 
countries in the establishment of peace. But the implied 
neutralism in the cold war between the West and the Soviet 
bloc was soon dispelled. In an article in the Cominform 
newspaper, on July 15, 1949, Mao Tee-tung made it clear 
that his sympathies were definitely on the side of the So-
94 C:f'. Beloff, op. cit., p. 63. 
95Pravda, January 19, 1949, P• 3. 
96cr. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. 
Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cam 
bridge: Harvard University Preas, 1952), p. 453-454. 
97cf. Ibid. 
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viet bloc: 
• the Chinese people must either side with 
imperialism or with Socialism. There can be no 
question of remaining between them, there is no 
third path. • • • Internationally, we belong to 
the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet 
Union, and for genuine friendly aid we must look 
to this front and not to the imperialist front. 98 
In the summer of 1949~ almost all public Soviet re-
straint with respect to the Chinese civil war was dropped. 
The Chinese Communists began to participate openly in the 
activities of the world Communist movement. Chinese dele-
gates, for example, appeared at the World Federation of 
Trade Unions congresses held in Moscow and Warsaw and took 
99 part in the World Peace Congress held in Prague. But 
Stalin still maintained diplomatic relations with the Kuo-
mintang. Despite the fact that the last American marines 
had left China the previous May, he was still wary lest 
the United States be prompted to return. This fear lin-
gered for only a few more months, however. On October 2, 
one day after Mao Tse-tung proclaimed a People 1 s Republic 
of China, the Soviet leader formally transferred recogni-
100 tion to it. It was the first real Communist success 
98For a Lasting Peace, For a People 1 s Democracy, 
JUlY, 15, 1949, P• 5. 
99cf. Izvestiia, June 4, 1949, p. 3; pravda, July 15, 
1949, p. 4. 
100cf. Izvestiia, October 3, 1949, p. 1. 
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in Asia in the postwar period and, quite naturally, it 
gave rise.to the hope that others would follow before 
101 long. 
In Japan, also, the rule of greater Communist mili-
tancy was applied, though not with the same intensity exhi-
bited in China. The knowledge that General MacArthur would 
not tolerate any extreme outbursts by the Japanese Commu-
nists dictated restraint during the remainder of 1947 and 
for most of 1948. However, in an obvious protest against 
the occupation policy of the United States, Stalin kept 
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his chief delegate to the Allied Council, General Derevianko, 
in Russia for more than a year. The Soviet press continued 
to attack the American policy as imperialistic, while the 
Japanese Communists, still maintaining their ostensible 
independence of Mosco'\i', took every opportunity to criticize 
102 the occupation and to promote working class unrest. 
In the fall of 1948, Stalin suddenly switched back 
to a more moderate tack in Japan: an action that was most 
101nThe Imperialists are now gazing in fear and dis!"" 
may on the glorious creation of the era ushered in by the 
October Revolution-- on the Chinese People's Republic, 
with its 475,000,000 people. The situation in other colo-
nial countries is likewise of a kind to inspire optimism 
in the masters of the capitalist world." nThe Soviet State 
in the Struggle for Peace and Democracy," New Times, No. 
45, November 2, 1949, p. 2. 
102 Cf. Evelyn S. Colbert, The Left Wing in Japanese 
Politics (New York: Institute for Pacific Relations, 1952), 
pp. 270-271. 
likely related to the events in China. The Soviet dicta-
tor apparently wished to avoid provoking the United Sta~es 
to an extreme as long as the Chinese Communist victory 
103 
remained incomplete. Consequently, General Derevianko 
was sent back to his post on the Allied Co~cil, with 
instructions to be temperate on the issue of American poli-
cy and to appeal to Japanese national sentiment by proposing 
greater opportunity for Japan's economic development at 
home and abroad and the conclusion of a peace treaty right 
104 
away. 
The Japanese Communists automatically followed this 
change in course. Once again they became mainly champions 
of the cause of democracy in Japan, with new emphasis on 
their strictly national character.105 Aided by a rise in 
unemployment, they even managed to poll about three million 
votes in the national election of January, 1949, adding 
thirty-one seats in the Japanese Diet to the four they held 
in the past. 
The relationship of this more moderate line in Japan 
to the Chinese revolution was pointed up in the summer of 
103stalin's desire to protect the Chinese revolution 
was evident in his fear of provoking the United States as 
he had in the case of Iran. Cf. above, p. 
104cr. Beloff, op. cit., p. 134. 
105cr. SWearingen and Langer, op. cit., p. 178. 
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1949, when, concurrent with thr suecess of the Chinese 
Communists, and despite the new popularity of the Japan-
ese Communists, Stalin reverted back to a policy of 
greater militancy. Soviet criticism of American policy 
appeared again with the old bitterness 1 and there was also 
a reprimand for the Japanese Communists for failing to do 
106 
their utmost to force the Americans out. Thereupon 
the Japanese revolutionaries intensified their own efforts 
to create a united patriotic front of workers, peasants, 
fishermen, and intellectuals by appealing to national senti-
ment and by stirring up labor unrest. 107 This pattern 
continued throughout 1949, spiced on one occasion at least 
by an open fight between Japanese Communists and American 
soldiers.108 
In Korean, as in Japan, the new Soviet militancy 
developed its intensity only gradually through 1948 and 
1949. At first, while the general campaign against the 
West in Asia was rising steadily, Stalin continued on the 
defensive in Korea for the purpose of protecting the Com-
munist foothold north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Os-
tensibly on behalf of Korea's national rights, he refused 
106cf. For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, 
January 6, 1950, p. 3. 
l07Cf. The New York Times, July 24, 1949, P• 11. 
108cr. Ibid., May 30, 1950, p. 18. 
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to recognize a decision by the United Nations to hold elec-
tiona in each of Korea's occupied zones and, on this basis, 
to create a national government. The action of the inter-
national organization was decried as a screen for the Ameri-
can policy of turning Korea into a colony and a base for 
109 
expansion in the Pacific. On April 23, 1948, a confer-
ence of North and South Korean npatriotatt echoed this denun-
ciation of the United Nations and the United States.110 And 
when the United Nations election commission supervised the 
elections held in the southern zone and was denied access 
to the northern zone, the Soviet dictator attempted to com-
pensate for his psychological disadvantage by stating that 
111 the size of the Soviet occupation force would be reduced. 
When the Republic of Korea was proclaimed on June 30, 
1948, based on the elections held in the south, Stalin 
countered by holding elections, drafting a constitution, 
and establishing a Korean Democratic People's Republic in 
the north. He recognized the new Communist regime on 
October 12, and announced that all remaining units of the 
112 Red Army would be withdrawn from Korea. With attendant 
109cf. Pravda, March 17, 1948, p. 4; April 12, 1948, 
p. 3. 
110
cf. The New York Times, April 24, 1948, p. 8. 
lllCf. Ibid., May 9, 1948, p. 1. 
112
cf. ~.,.October 13, 1948, p. 2. 
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fanfare, emphasizing Soviet Russia's true respect for the 
rights of small nations, the Red Army was evacuated by the 
113 
end of the year. 
The Soviet leader withdrew the bulk of his troops 
from Korea because the United States had begun a gradual 
reduction of ita forces the previous fall. It was under-
taken confidently also because the North Korean army of 
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over a hundred thousand troops, organized, trained, and 
armed by the Russians, was more than a match for the twenty-
six thousand armed police in the south. The North Koreans 
reflected this confidence by encouraging and supporting 
114 guerrilla activities against the pro-Western government. 
On June 25, 1949, in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, 
a rrunited Korean Patriotic Frontn was organized, composed 
of Communists and fellow-travellers from the south. Hence-
forth, it issued propaganda calling for the unification of 
Korea and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops 
115 from the country. The fact that only an American mili-
tary mission of five hundred men remained to assist the 
South Koreans after the end of the month served as encour-
113cf. Izvestiia, December 31, 1948, p. 1. 
114Though the North Koreans referred to the guerrillas 
as ndissatisfied democratic elements" in the south, their 
knowledge of the guerrilla activities indicated a close 
relationship between them. Cf. For a Lasting Peace, For 
a People's Democracy, March 24, 1950, p. 3. 
115
cf. Ibid.-; Izvestiia, June 29, 1949, p. 4. 
agement to the Communists. 
Elsewhere along the periphery o:f Asia, Stalin faced 
no obstacles comparable to those posed by the United States 
in Japan and Korea. There:fore, during 1948 and 1949, a 
greater militancy characterized the e:f:fort to :force the 
European powers out of their remaining colonies and to cut 
them o:f:f economically :from the newly-independent countries. 
Quite naturally, the local Communists responded eagerly to 
the call to arms. Historically, they had not been enthusi-
astic participants in Moscow's attemps to win allies among 
leading nationalists; and they now welcomed the chance to 
pursue revolutionary objectives with Russian approval. 
In India, for example, .where the :first independent 
Indian government was operating without Communist participa-
tion, the radical wing seized control o:f the Communist 
Party and began an open campaign o:f villification of the 
Nehru government, denouncing it as a tool o:f the n.Anglo-
Am.erican Imperialist Camp.u116 At a Party Congress, held 
in February-March, 1948, in Calcutta, these sentiments were 
repeated and joined to an appeal for a npeople's democratic 
frontn - - composed of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, 
and progressive intellectuals -- that would wage an all-out 
117 
struggle to create a truly national government. 
116cf. Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., p. 269. 
ll7Cf. Ibid., pp. 272-274. 
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At this very same time, a Communist-sponsored South-
east Asia Youth Conference also met in Calcutta. In at-
tendance were delegates from India, Pakistan, Burma, In-
donesia, Malaya, I~do-China, the Philippines, North and 
118 South Korea, and Soviet Russia. The proceedings or this 
meeting have not been made public, but it is reasonable to 
assume that its purpose was to establish the new Communist 
tactical line uniformly among Asia's revolutionaries.119 
Within six months, Communist-led armed insurrections broke 
out in Indonesia, Malaya, and Burma, each one organized as 
a national liberation movement against Western imperialism 
and the local nationalist leaders who were charged with 
120 
supporting it. In November, guerrilla activity by Ho 
Chi-minh's Indo-Chinese National Union League was intensi-
fied, and, in the following month, a full-scale revolution 
ll8cf. John H.. Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party 
of India (Cambridge and New York: The Technology Press of 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 33-34. 
119ane of the Russian delegates, A. Kharlaniov, men-
tioned in Moscow News, April 3, 1948, that the Conference 
unanimously adopted a resolution supporting national liber-
ation struggles against imperialism. Cited by Joseph Fran-
kel, "Soviet Policy in South East Asia,u in Belofr, .2E.!.. 
.Qlh., p. 209. 
Cf. Captain Malcolm Kennedy, A History of Communism 
in"East Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 
pp. 441, 451, 465. 
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against French rule developed. Elsewhere in Asia, where 
the Communists were still too weak to wage guerrilla war-
fare, an intensified effort to stir local opinion against 
the West was undertaken. 
Despite the greater aggressiveness along the south-
ern periphery of Asia, the Communists achieved very little 
success. The revolutionary upsurge was met by determined 
resistance on the part of the local governments or the colo-
nial powers. In India,· the national and state governments 
reacted swiftly and resolutely; the Communist Party was 
. banned in most states·, its newspapers were suppressed, and 
most of its leaders were arrested.122 Comparable firmness 
met the· Communi.st effort in Burma, Indonesia, and Malaya, 
. 123 
and throughout the.Near East. The only exception to the 
general rule of a.ereat occurred in Indo-China, where some 
thirty thousand troops of Ho Chi-minh's army, fighting on a 
semi~guerrilla basis, presented too great a force for the 
French to overcome. However, .it required six years of 
fighting before the decisive Communist·victory materialized. 
Korea: Stalin's Final Effort. In ~950, despite the 
121cf. The New York Times, November 17, 1948, p. 5; 
December 19, 1948, p. 30. 
122 Cf. Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., pp. 276-278. 
123
cf. Kennedy, loc. cit.; Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 45, 
154, 191. 
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numerous defeats of the Communist-led national-liberation 
movements, Stalin continued to press his own campaign 
against the West in Asia. On January 31, despite sharp 
criticism from the Western powers, he recognized Ho Chi-
124 
minh' s Democratic Republic·:of Viet Nam. And during the 
year, the Soviet press became extremely critical of the 
Franch and the Americans for their alleged interference 
in the national affairs of the Indo-Ch1nese.125 There was 
criticism also for the nationalist governments in India, 
Burma, and Indonesia, which were blamed for the failure of 
126 
the Asian peoples to achieve true independence. But the 
major effort undertaken by the Soviet dictator .in this year 
occurred in Korea, when the North Koreans undertook the 
"liberation" of South Korea from the West. 
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The North Korean attack, launched on June 25, 1950, 
was staged on the pretext that the South Koreans had at-
tacked first. Officially, it represented a defensive action. 
Howe~er, the statements of the Korean Communist leader, Kim 
II Sung, made it clear that the action was intended to be 
124
cr. The New York Times, January 31, 1950, p. 3. 
125cr. Ibid., February 7, 1950, p. 14; March 25, 1950, 
p. 7. 
126 Ct. V. Berezhkov, nForeign Policy Manoeuvres of 
Indian Reaction," New Times, No. 22, May 31, 1950, pp. 30-
32. 
otherwise. As reported in the Soviet press, Kim's purpose 
was to free South Korea from imperialist American control 
and to unite it with North Korea in the formation of the 
first truly democratic Korean national state.127 
When Stalin set loose the Korean Communists on this 
liberating mission, he had good reason to expect another 
success. With the exception of the American military mis-
sion, there were no foreign troops in South Korea. And 
South Korea's relatively small armed force was obviously no 
match for the well-equipped North Korean army. Furthermore, 
it seemed unlikely that the United States would cause any 
more than diplomatic troubles, since, on January 12, 1950, 
the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had given 
the impression that South Korea was not regarded as parti-
cularly significant in the United States' defensive strate-
128 gy in the Pacific. 
On the first point, of course, the Communist estimate 
was correct; the North Korean army had little trouble in 
pushing the South Koreans back. But a miscalculation did 
occur on the second point. Instead of standing by and let-
ting the Communists overrun all of Korea, the United States 
l27cf. Izvestiia, June 27, 1950, p. 4. 
128cr. Richard P. Stebbins, (ed.), The United States 
in World Affairs, 1950.~ (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub-
lishers, 1951), p. 200. 
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reacted forcefully. Almost simultaneously, President Truman 
ordered the Americans in South Korea to help resist the at-
tack and called upon the United Nations to take decisive 
action.129 Since the Soviet delegation was temporarily 
out of the Security Council, owing to a dispute over the 
continuing membership of the Chinese Kuomintang government, 
United Nations approval was easy to obtain. As a result, 
the North Koreans found themselves confronted with the 
impossible task of overcoming the resistance of a United 
Nations armed force, composed largely of American tropps. 
The details of the Korean conflict are not relevant 
to the purpose here, and need not be spelled out. The 
important point is that it marked the terminal point of 
Stalin's attempt to exploit nationalism in Asia after the 
Second World War, and, for that matter, in his life. The 
Communist national-liberation offensive had achieved only 
a partial success. The revolution had succeeded in China 
and it was still on in Indo-China. Elsewhere it had failed, 
and, in 1950, it appeared as though the postwar gains in 
Korea were to be lost. Consequently, the Soviet dictator 
• 
reverted to a defensive position. ttNational liberationtt 
was replaced by "world peace 11 as the dominant theme of 
Communist propaganda, and Communists everywhere, with the 
l29cf. Truman, op. cit., II, pp. 337-338. 
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exception of China.and Indo-China, set aside their anti-
imperialist slogans temporarily for the sake of gathering 
names for 11peace petitionsn and staging npeace congresses". 
Their purpose, obviously, was to force the United Nations 
out of Korea and to prevent the formation of the North 
Atlantic Alliance that :·,the Korean conflict had prompted. 
Until his death on March 5, 1953, the Soviet leader main-
tained this position. 
Conclusion. Considering that the victory of the 
Chinese Communist revolution added China's massive terri-
torial expanse and population to the Communist bloc in 
1949, it is not easy to argue that Stalin's postwar policy 
in Asia was anything but a complete success. And yet, as 
the evidence·indicates, the Soviet dictator accomplished 
much less than he intended. The fact of the matter is 
that, contrary to his expectations, he failed to turn 
Asian nationalism against the West in a manner consistent 
with the aim and method established by Lenin. 
In China, for example, Stalin's effort to revive 
the 11 old spiritn of Sino-Soviet cooperation against the 
West simply had evoked no positive response on the part 
of the Chinese nationalists. Not even the exercise of 
moderate pressure had moved them. And the same result had 
occurred in connection with an attempt to develop anti-
409 
Western alliances with the leaders of the nationalist 
movements in the colonies. In both China and the colo-
nies, the Russian leader had underestimated the degree to 
which old suspicions of Communism conditioned nationalist 
thinking, while, in the colonies alone, he had made the 
same miscalculation with respect to the ability of the 
nationalists to gain independence without Communist assist-
ance. In this connection, it might be added that he also 
misjudged British capabilities on the colonial issue, for 
the enlightened postwar British policy contributed to 
the difficulty that the Communists had in generating a 
truly profound anti-Western feeling among the peoples of 
Asia. 
The setbacks suffered by the Russian leader in 
Korea, Japan, and Iran also had stemmed from an important 
miscalculation. In those three cases, he had underesti-
mated the ability of the Western democracies to resist 
Soviet territorial ambitions when screened by appeals to 
the spirit of wartime collaboration, by demands put forth 
in the name of Russia's national interest, or by a propa-
ganda campaign charging the Western powers with rapa-
cious imperialism. To be sure, not since Wilson's Four-
teen Points had a Western state shown itself disposed to 
challenge actively the Soviet claim to primacy in the 
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championship of national self-determination. But that 
experience might have served at least as a reminder of its 
possible recurrence. In such case, Stalin undoubtedly 
would have been better prepared to cope with one of Wil-
son's more belligerent successors, Harry Truman. As it 
turned out, however, the Soviet dictator was surprised 
to find in President Truman a worthy foe, one who obvious-
ly was not to be taken in by Communism's nationalistic 
pretensions. The American ultimatum in the case of Iran 
and the immediate forceful reaction in Korea illustrated 
the point. 
When the Soviet dictator switched over to open 
revolutionary tactics late in 1947, retaining only the 
slightest nationalistic coloration, it signified his aban-
donment of the attempt to rely on the exploitation of na-
tionalism as a primary weapon against the West in Asia. 
The one redeeming feature of this policy change was that 
it paved the way for the Chinese Communist revolutionary 
success. However, the cost was otherwise a heavy one. 
Elsewhere in the East, except for the sustained Communist-
led nationalist rebellion in Indo-China, all Communist 
revolutionary efforts met with decisive defeat. And this, 
of course, precluded in Stalin's time at least the chance 
for a new Soviet attempt to make nationalism an effective 
instrument of foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
On the surrace, Lenin's and Stalin's repeated use 
or nationalism to extend their territorial dominion and to 
protect their gains from outside attack appeared quite con-
sistent with the general picture of modern international 
politics. Ever since France's Napoleon I transformed patri-
otism from a feeling of devotion to the nativ~ land into 
a weapon of great military and political significance, 
many political leaders have made use of nationalism for 
both offensive and defensive purposes. But, in two re-
spects, the Soviet leaders differed from all others in 
this practice. For one thing, they were not motivated by 
a positive regard for nationalism; their ultimate goal was 
not the satisfaction of national aspirations. On the con~ 
trary, they acted on the basis of a theoretical bias against 
nationalism, viewing it as incompatible with socialism and 
worthy of destruction at the earliest possible moment. 
For another thing, the exploitation of nationalism in 
foreign policy by Lenin and Stalin led to successes in 
world affairs that few modern leaders could match. Since 
the beginning of 1918, their calculated promotion of 
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nationalism at home and abroad helped significantly to 
turn a weak Soviet revolutionary regime into a vast empire 
and the Communist movement into a powerful force for revo-
lutionary change throughout the world. 
The apparent incongruity between the theory and 
practice of the Soviet leaders on the national issue was 
not indicative of a hidden conflict between the opposing 
tendencies of nationalism and internationalism. Although 
Communism may yet be completely fragmentized by the centri-
fugal force of nationalism, much in the same manner as 
many universalist doctrines have been in the past, the 
actions of Lenin and Stalin were not to be taken as symp-
tomatic in this respect. The dichotomy between theory and 
practice in their case was a deliberate one; its basis was 
contained in a calculated scheme to use nationalism as a 
weapon against capitalism and, since it was regarded as 
peculiar to capitalism, against nationalism itself. 
From Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin inherited 
their anti-capitalist and anti-nationalist revolutionary 
doctrine. And from the originators of Marxism they also 
learned the logic of combining practical nationalism tem-
porarily with theoretical anti-nationalism. They dis-
covered it in Marx 1 s plan to promote successful socialist 
revolutions in Europe by the simple expedient of encour-
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aging the Irish and Poles to rebel against their English 
and Russian rulers. Marx had assumed that Irish indepen-
dence would deprive British capitalism of one of its prin-
cipal bases, intensiry exploitation of the working class 
in Britain, and thus generate a revolutionary upheaval 
that would set off a chain reaction or working class rev-
olutions on the European continent. He had also assumed 
that Polish independence would guarantee the success of 
the revolutions by blocking armed counter-revolutionary 
intervention by Tsarist Russia. 
But it took the insight, ingenuity, and perseverance 
or Lenin to revive the Marxian revolutionary plan, to 
enlarge upon it by replacing Marxrs advocacy of Irish 
and Polish independence with his own advocacy or indepen-
dence for all colonies, and to prove its validity as a 
revolutionary weapon. This he did despite the fact that 
the original plan possessed no tradition of recognition 
to recommend it, but only a record of rejection by Euro-
pean socialists. Dogmatic internationalists had refused to 
accept its ideological incons·istency, while ttrevisionists", 
whose revolutionary ardor waned under the impact or devel-
oping national attachments, had failed to heed its call 
to action. 
Lenin succeeded also despite the active resistance 
of dogmatists in his own following, who decried the notion 
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of promoting nationalistic interests for any reason and 
rejoiced when it failed at first to produce the desired 
results. But Russia, between the March and November revol-
utions in 1917, served as Lenin's laboratory, and his 
effective exploitation of Ukrainian nationalism against the 
Provisional Government provided the positive result he 
sought. Not even the setback suffered early in 1918, when 
Wilsonrs Fourteen Points and Germanyrs appeasement of 
national sentiment undermined the Soviet effort to foster 
national rebellions 1n Eastern Europe, deterred the Commu-
nist leader from seeking new opportunities and new methods 
of utilizing nationalism in the quest for global revolution-
ary objectives. Considering his resoluteness, his refusal 
to bend in the face of the severest criticism leveled by 
doctrinaire Communists and the doubts raised by his protege 
and devotee, Stalin, one can almost conclude that the 
first ruler of Communist Russia regarded the tactical is-
sue involving the use of nationalism as a personal one, 
for which he had to vindicate both Marx and himself, and 
on which he was prepared to stake his own political fate 
and that of the revolution in Russia as well. 
As one can judge by many of the changes 1n the poli-
tical configuration of Eastern Europe and Asia since 
1918, Lenin did more than acquit himself in the eyes. of 
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the critics and skeptics around him. Until his death in 
January, 1924, Lenin's exploitation of national.ism at home 
and abroad contributed significantly to the expansion of 
the Soviet territorial base from a narrow Russian point of 
origination to include almost all the territory·that had 
been a part of. the former Russian Empire. In this case, 
success materialized in spite of counter-revolutionary ef-
forts by the Central Powers, the .Allied-supported nwhi ten 
Russian armies, and the Polish army. Also in this brief 
span of time, Lenin succeeded in developing the Soviet 
regime into a powerful force on behalf of national inde-
pendence in Asia, providing encouragement and material aid 
to Asian nationalists who asserted themselves·against 
Western imperialism. His aid to Kamal in Turkey and Aman-
ullah Khan in Afghanistan helped decisively to limit West-
ern influence in those countries. His skillfully devised 
pressure against the Iranian government, which helped to 
generate a nationalist rebellion, forced the British to 
relax their control over that country. And his policy to-
ward China contributed in large part to the development 
of the powerful anti-imperialist, national unification 
movement under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. 
The key to Lenin's astonishing success as a mani-
pulator of nationalistic symbols and exploiter of national 
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emotions, however, was not only in hia determination to 
prove himself correct. Insight, ingenuity, and an acute 
sense of timing were additional factors that composed an 
unusual tactical ability. Among the leaders of the Com-
munist revolution in Russia, only he could have exploited 
the aspirations of the Ukrainian nationalists for his own 
benefit on three separate occasions -- twice after demon-
strating that his ultimate purpose was to destroy them. 
Furthermore, Lenin displayed amazing judgement in Asia, 
where rising nationalism offered several excellent oppor-
t~ities for his talents. In his anti-imperialist cam-
paign, he skirted the colonial issue to avoid provoking 
the Western colonial powers. Instead, he centered atten-
tion on those countries where Western control and influence 
already existed on a limited basis, as in Afghanistan, 
Iran, and China, or was only threatening to materialize, 
as in Turkey. In this connection, the fictional indepen-
dence of the ttpeople 1 s republicstt of Bokhara and Kb.iva in 
Soviet Central Asia provided Lenin with important pres-
tige among Moslems in the Middle East, especially in 
Afghanistan. The Soviet-supported revolutionary Republic 
of Gilan in northern Iran served as a vital lever against 
the pro-British Iranian government and contributed to ita 
overthrow by the strongly nationalistic, anti-British, 
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Riza Khan. In China, the transfer of interest from the 
Peking regime in the north to Sun Yat-sen's Cantonese 
nationalist movement in the south resulted in the creation 
of a powerful national unification movement there. Finally, 
Soviet aid to the Kemalist national movement in Turkey 
unified that country and prevented the Western powers from 
gaining full control over the Dardanelles. 
The list of Lenin 1 s achievements would be incom-
plete without including consideration of the manner in 
which the promotion of nationalism and the manipulation of 
nationalistic symbols contributed to the expansion of Soviet 
power from its original base in Russia proper. On the one 
hand, most of the borderland regions of the former Russian 
Empire were preserved for ultimate Communist control by a 
number of devices. For example, Lenin's nindependentn Far 
Eastern Republic helped to prevent the Japanese from 
establishing permanent control over eastern Siberia. Avowed 
support of the national aspirations of Ukrainians, Belorus-
sians, Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanians helped to 
turn the tide of opinion in those regions against the 
.Allied-supported ttwhiten Russian counter-revolutionary 
armies. And appeals to Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian 
national sentiment helped to thwart a Polish attempt at 
territorial aggrandizement. 
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On the other hand, the borderland regions were later 
conquered by the Red Army, with nationalistic symbols pro-
viding a convenient screen. From a strictly legalistic 
standpoint, Lenin's conquests were not conquests at all; 
for no declarations of war were ever issued and no action 
was undertaken against the interests of others. Thus, the 
invasion of the Ukraine, described as a defensive action, 
was undertaken only because the Ukrainian Rada had declared 
war. What the-explanation omitted, of course, was that the 
Ukrainians had been provoked by evidence of Communist ag-
gressiveness. Elsewhere, Belorussia was invaded and con-
quered for the ostensible reason of preserving its right 
to national self-determination, while Armenia was seized in 
order to protect it against Turkey. And still another 
method was employed in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In these 
cases, Communists were sent in first to form clandestine 
national revolutionary regimes, to proclaim themselves 
legitimate governments, and then to ask Moscow for assist-
ance. The latter, of course, responded with immediate 
recognition and a mutual defense pact, which served as the 
legal basis for sending the Red Army to help them seize 
full control. 
Lenin purpose in the borderland regions was to extend 
Communist power by force, but without evoking protests in 
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the West or providing the Western pow~rs with a pretext ror 
resorting to arms against the Soviet regime. This he 
achieved by concealing the essentially military operation 
under a cloak or nationalistic symbolism. Then, to roster 
the illusion beyond the point of actual conquest, he per-
mitted the non-Russian regions to retain the rorm or inde-
pendent national states, governed by national coalition 
regimes. However, the local Communists predominated in 
each case, and, by virtue of their membership in the Russian 
Communist Party, provided Moscow with the necessary power 
or direction. After three years or fictitious independence, 
and arter it appeared that the Western powers would do 
nothing to prevent it, all of the independent soviet 
republics nvoluntarily" agreed to political union. 
Though perhaps indirectly, it was Lenin. who made pos-
sible Stalin's successrul exploitation of nationalism during 
the Second World War. After seeing its importance as a 
tactical weapon veriried, Stalin became as confirmed as 
Lenin in his conviction that Communist internationalism 
could proritably accommodate nationalism on a temporary 
basis. And the methods he employed were largely those 
developed by Lenin. The appeals to Russian nationalism and 
the nationalization of the Communist parties throughout 
the world helped to cement the alliance with Britain and 
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the United States and contributed to the successful defense 
against the German invader. Then, once the tide of battle 
was turned in the Soviet favor, the familiar nationalistic 
facade was employed to make the military conquests of Po-
land, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Albania appear to be 
legitimate expressions of those countries' rights to nation-
al self-determination. This process of postwar Russian 
conquest, embellished with the slogan of national libera-
tion and carefully constructed national coalition govern-
ments, was almost an exact duplication of Lenin's early 
triumph in the borderland regions. 
Despite its great usefulness, however, Soviet ex-
ploitation of nationalism in foreign policy was not exactly 
a foolproof scheme. One of the obstacles confronted, for 
example, took the form of Western competition for the 
friendship of nationalists striving for independence 
against foreign domination. The inclusion of the right of 
national self-determination in Wilson's Fourteen Points 
illustrated the problem, for it blunted the effectiveness 
of the Communist appeals to national sentiment in Eastern 
Europe in 1918. But this proved to be a minor problem, 
chiefly for the reason that the Western effort in this 
respect was contained only in the Fourteen Points and in 
the subsequent recognition of the new national states of 
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Eastern Europe at the Versailles Conference. Thereafter, 
the American interest in applying the principle of national 
self-determination was stifled by a return to political 
isolationism. And quite naturally, the European colonial 
powers were not disposed to give it effect in their princi-
pal colonies in Asia and Africa. Consequently, by default, 
the way was opened to renewed Soviet exploitation of na-
tional sentiment, based on an opportunistic campaign 
against imperialism. 
Though it might well have been considerable 7 there 
is no way of telling how much Lenin and Stalin would have 
accomplished in Asia, and possibly in Africa, if not for 
another obstacle that arose. This consisted of Communist 
national deviationism, the most serious internal weakness 
of the international Communist movement, and to which the 
expedient use of nationalism by the Russians undoubtedly 
contributed a great deal to its emergence. The problem 
grew out of the confusing responsibilities that the expe-
dient promotion of nationalism imposed on non-Russian Com-
munists. On the one hand, when MosQow sought to exploit 
nationalism, it was necessary for all non-Russian Commu-
nists to subordinate their own revolutionary aspirations 
to the task of encouraging bourgeois nationalism. On the 
other hand, once the purpose of promoting nationalism had 
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been achieved, or could no longer be achieved, it was nec-
essary for them to swing back to an internationalist 
posture. The confusion of the repeated switching was com-
pounded by the fact that neither Lenin nor Stalin bothered 
to spell out for their non-Russian followers the logic of 
the changes back and forth between nationalism and inter-
nationalism. Perhaps they took it for granted that all 
Communists abroad understood its meaning. Or possibly 
they withheld a precise description of the strategy out of 
fear of prompting the West to develop effective counter-
measures. Since no explanation has been made available, 
one can only speculate on this point. 
Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that 
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some non-Russian Communists would fail to understand the 
responsibilities imposed on them. Those who did fail fell 
into two categories. On the one hand, there were the nleftn 
national deviationists, who refused to accept the need to 
sacrifice their own revolutionary interests for the sake of 
supporting bourgeois nationalists and, consequently, ignored 
ti Gregori Piatakov, the Asian Commu-Moscowrs instruc ons. 
nists during 1925-1926, and the French Communists in 1937 
were in this grouping. On the other hand, there were the 
nright" national deviationists, who accepted the need to 
promote nationalism expediently, but then, after close 
association with the idea, found it difficult to make the 
rapid transformation back to a form of international Com-
munist solidarity that compelled acceptance of Russian 
direction on all matters. Z. Zhilonovich, the Ukrainian, 
Georgian, and Belorussian Communist leaders in 1923, and 
Tito and Gomulka were in this grouping. 
The problem of deviationism was not a serious one 
during Lenin's lifetime. This was due in part to the great 
respect he commanded among Communists at home and abroad, 
and in part to the fact that most non-Russian Communist 
parties were still too weak to resist Moscow's dictates. 
Thus, the resistance posed by Piatatov and Zhilonovich 
were two incidents which, since they caused little trouble, 
could easily be overlooked. And the obstacle created by 
the Ukrainian, Georgian, and Belorussian Communists in 1923 
was overcome without difficulty by the simple device of 
making meaningless concessions to their nationalistic de-
mands. Ultimately, the problem was solved. altogether by 
liquidating the leaders of the resistance. 
It was after Lenints death, however, that deviation-
ism became a truly serious problem in Communist ranks. Its 
first major manifestation occurred during the contest for 
power between Stalin and Trotski in 1925-1926, and as a 
Due to Trotski's insistence on dropping the 
result of it. 
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support of nationalist rebellions in Asia in favor of all-
out socialist revolutions, the Asian Communists began to 
demand recognition of their revolutionary rights. As a 
result, Stalin was forced to concede on this point, and 
political disaster followed. A series of abortive Commu-
nist uprisings in Asia destroyed completely the prestige 
that Lenin had won for Soviet Russia among nationalists. 
Asian nationalist leaders immediately turned away from Com-
munist assistance in their quests for independence. The 
full ramifications of this event were registered as late as 
the period following the Second World War, when, despite 
the time elapsed, Stalin's nationalization of Communism 
during the war, and the efforts of Asian Communists against 
the Japanese, the leaders of Asian nationalism refused to 
pay heed to new gestures of friendship made by Stalin. 
Another example of costly deviationism was provided 
in 1937 by the French Communists, who refused to follow the 
instructions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern to 
pursue a nationalistic policy. Consequently, the overt 
radicalism of the French Communists contributed to the de-
feat of Stalin's effort to develop an anti-Axis alliance 
with France. And still other examples were provided in the 
early years after the Second World War. The "righttt devia-
tionism of Tito and Gomulka prevented Stalin from effecting 
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a smooth integration of the new rrsatellitert states into the 
Soviet bloc. While Gomulka was punished for his contribu-
tion, Tito carried his policy to an extreme conclusion and 
executed the first permanent split in the Communist world. 
It is possible that, in time, the deviationist ten-
dency will shatter international Communism completely and 
irreparably. The evidence available from the experience of 
other universalist doctrines, both secular and religious, 
and from the experience of Communism so far seems ~o indi-
cate that it will. However, it is equally possible that 
the weakening of international Communism by national frag-
mentation will not develop fully before the Communist bloc 
has been strengthened sufficiently to prompt it to initiate 
an all-out military assault against the remaining non-Com-
munist portion of the world. Consequently, it is no~ enough 
for the Western states merely to hold firm in the face of 
threatening armed Communism, in the expectation that the 
threat will wither away in the next moment. It is to be 
expected that Stalin's successor, Khrushchev, though ham-
pered somewhat by his political inheritance, will make a 
full effort to implement the strategy formulated by Lenin. 
Since his rise to power~ Khrus~chev has given evidence of 
his interest in this matter. Hie 11de-Stalinizationn of 
Soviet policy, his revival of anti-imperialism and anti-
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colonialism as principal propaganda themes, and his efforts 
to draw the underdeveloped countries into close economic 
relations with the Communist bloc appear conclusive in this 
respect. 
Under the circumstances, it is incumbent on the West 
to understand the implications of the Soviet Russian strat-
egy and to meet the threat that it poses. New manipula-
tions of nationalistic symbols and expressions of sympathy 
for the national aspirations of the people in the colonies 
and underdeveloped countries will not denote a fundamental 
change in the internationalist outlook and revolutionary 
aims of Communism. These remain unchanged. Furthermore, 
it is to be recognized that, in the absence of an alterna-
tive, the people in the colonies and underdeveloped coun-
tries will more than likely accept the Communist offers of 
assistance. This despite the fact that they may be fully 
aware of Communism's fundamental revolutionary objectives. 
It is to be recalled that many nationalist leaders in the 
past accepted the Cemmunist offers with full knowledge of 
the revolutionary doctrine, and that some of them paid 
dearly for it. It need not be pointed out here that recent 
Communist offers have attracted some attention already in 
Asia; Africa, and Latin America. 
In order to meet the Communist challenge, the West 
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can make use of the Soviet record on the national issue as 
the basis for an intensive propaganda counteroffensive. 
Just as the Communists have exploited anti-imperialism to 
advantage, it is possible to reply in kind by publicizing 
the purely opportunistic concern for the welfare of the 
people in the colonies and underdeveloped countries ex-
pressed by Moscow. A definition of the fundamental revo-
lutionary and anti-national aims of Communism, a descrip-
tion of the tactics employed in exploiting nationalism, and 
some concrete examples of the consequences of. accepting 
offers of pommunist assistance in the pursuit of national 
aims could provide the basis for an effective propaganda 
campaign in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
Also, it is possible to reply to the Communist ef-
forts to subvert the Western military alliances by encour-
aging the deviationist potentialities of non-Russian Com-
munists. The establishment of diplomatic and economic rela-
tions with Communist Chinam for example, may serve to 
loosen the ties between the Chinese and Russians and help 
generate differences between them. And offers of economic 
assistance and trade to the Communist satellite states in 
Eastern Europe may generate new suspicions in that part of 
the Communist world and thus encourage.the appearance of 
new nTitosu. 
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Finally, to blunt the appeal of Communism among the 
people of non-Communist Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 
the Western countries can coordinate their efforts to elim-
inate as quickly as possible the remaining vestiges of colo-
nialism and imperialism for which they are responsible. 
Independence for the remaining colonies and a promise to 
turn over eventually all major foreign-owned economic en-
terprise to the governments of the countries in which they 
are located would help t_o build confidence in the West. 
And a similarly coordinated Western effort can be made to 
provide the people in the underdeveloped countries with the 
type of moral and material assistance that would reduce the 
attractiveness of Communism. It must be understood that, 
in this era of great revolutionary change throughout the 
world, the old aims and methods of foreign policy are no 
longer applicable. New aims and methods have to be devel-
oped if the challenge of Communism is to be met with 
effectiveness. 
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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is the product of an investigation 
into the meaning of Soviet Russian use of nationalism as 
an instrument of foreign policy during the period of Lenin 
and Stalin. It is intended to show:,~(l), that the employ-
ment of nationalism was consistent with ideas advanced by 
Marx and Engels; (2) that the Soviet successes in foreign 
relations depended to a large extent o~ the encouragement 
of nationalism at home and abroad; and (3) that the chief 
weakness of this method was that it contributed to the 
growth of deviationist tendencies among non-Russian Com-
munists. 
For the purpose of this study, principal reliance 
was placed on original documentation. This included the 
works of leading Marxists of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries on the national question, the writings of the 
Soviet leaders on the use of nationalism in foreign pol-
icy, and those of other Communist spokesmen on Soviet 
foreign policy. To complement these sources, use was made 
of reports published by non-Comm~ist statesmen and diplo-
mats who had personal contact with the Soviet leaders, 
and those of political refugees who formerly lived under 
Communist rule. Also employed were books and articles by 
Western scholars and reports by leading newspapers. 
The method of the dissertation is historical and 
analytical. Initially, the idea of using nationalism as an 
1 
instrument of Communist policy is traced from its origin 
in the writings of Marx and Engels to its revival and 
enlargement by Lenin. Thereafter, attention is focused 
on Soviet exploitation of nationalism in foreign policy 
from 1918 to 1953. Five chapters are employed, each 
defining a major period of Soviet policy. In each, con-
sideration is given the particular reason for the use of 
nationalism, the method of its employment, and·its contri-
bution to the Russian purpose. 
One conclusion drawn from this study is that the 
Soviet use of nationalism was consistently Marxist. It 
was derived from a revolutionary plan conceived by Marx 
and Engels to promote socialist uprisings in Europe by 
encouraging Irish and Polish nationalists to fight for 
their freedom. Irish independence was intended to under-
mine capitalism in England and, in turn, on the European 
continent as well. Polish independence was meant to pro-
tect the socialist revolutions against intervention by 
Tsarist Russia. 
A second conclusion is that Lenin's adaptation of 
Marx's expedient nationalism contributed significantly to 
the success of Soviet foreign policy. For example, the 
stimulation of nationalism in Russia proper and in-the 
border regions of the former Russian Empire helped to de-
fend Soviet power against the Central Powers, the "white'' 
2 
Russian counterrevolutionary armies, and the Polish army, 
in 1918-1920. Furthermore, the use of nationalistic sym-
bols facilitated the Communist conquest of most of the 
separated border regions, while the encouragement of Asian 
nationalism contributed to the decline of Western influence 
in .the East. Finally, Lenin's tactics provided the model 
for Stalin's defensive strategy during the Second World 
War and for his postwar conquests in Eastern Europe. 
A final conclusion is that the expedient Soviet pro-
motion of nationalism also contributed to the growth of 
"left 11 and "right" deviationist tendencies among non-
Russian Communists. On the one hand, the "left" devia-
tionist refused to accept the subordination of his own 
revolutionary aspirations for the sake of promoting local 
national interests. On the other hand, the "right" devia-
tionist, who accepted the encouragement of nationalism as 
-a permanent feature of Communist policy, refused to subor-
dinate himself to Moscow's will after achieving power in 
his own country. As illustrated by the "left" deviation-
ism of Asian Communists in 1926 and the "right" deviation-
ism of Tito in 1948, to name only two, the problem was a 
serious one. 
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